CVE-2026-43073: Software Security Vulnerability Vulnerability

MODERATE
Advisory Identifier: GHSA-w93x-73ch-q28m
CVSS 5.5
Published
Advisory Summary

CVE-2026-43073 is a MODERATE (CVSS 5.5) security vulnerability vulnerability (General Security Weakness) affecting Software libraries in the Maven ecosystem. Remediation is available in the latest vendor maintenance releases.

CVE-2026-43073 at a Glance

CVE Identifier CVE-2026-43073
GHSA Identifier GHSA-w93x-73ch-q28m
Severity MODERATE
CVSS v3.1 Base Score 5.5
CWE Classification General Security Weakness
Affected Product Software
Package Ecosystem Maven
Published Date
Last Updated

Security Impact

CVSS: 5.5

The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H).

Attack Vector Local (AV:L)
Attack Complexity Low (AC:L)
Privileges Required Low (PR:L)
User Interaction None (UI:N)
Scope Unchanged (S:U)
Confidentiality None (C:N)
Integrity None (I:N)
Availability High (A:H)

How to Fix CVE-2026-43073

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Software dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

mvn dependency:tree

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your Java application is affected by CVE-2026-43073, inspect your build dependencies using the Maven Dependency Plugin:

mvn dependency:tree

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Software in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than the patched release), your application is affected.

Note: The mvn dependency:tree command inspects the resolved dependency graph declared in your project's POM files; it does not perform automated security scanning or inspect runtime dynamic classpaths. Always verify runtime container classpaths and shaded JARs.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under General Security Weakness. In Software, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: x86-64: rename misleadingly named '__copy_user_nocache()' function This function was a masterclass in bad naming, for various historical reasons. It claimed to be a non-cached user copy. It is literally _neither_ of those things. It's a specialty memory copy routine that uses non-temporal stores for the destination (but not the source), and that does exception handling for both source and destination accesses. Also note that while it works for unaligned targets, any unaligned parts (whether at beginning or end) will not use non-temporal stores, since only words and quadwords can be non-temporal on x86. The exception handling means that it _can_ be used for user space accesses, but not on its own - it needs all the normal "start user space access" logic around it. But typically the user space access would be the source, not the non-temporal destination. That was the original intention of this, where the destination was some fragile persistent memory target that needed non-temporal stores in order to catch machine check exceptions synchronously and deal with them gracefully. Thus that non-descriptive name: one use case was to copy from user space into a non-cached kernel buffer. However, the existing users are a mix of that intended use-case, and a couple of random drivers that just did this as a performance tweak. Some of those random drivers then actively misused the user copying version (with STAC/CLAC and all) to do kernel copies without ever even caring about the exception handling, _just_ for the non-temporal destination. Rename it as a first small step to actually make it halfway sane, and change the prototype to be more normal: it doesn't take a user pointer unless the caller has done the proper conversion, and the argument size is the full size_t (it still won't actually copy more than 4GB in one go, but there's also no reason to silently truncate the size argument in the caller). Finally, use this now sanely named function in the NTB code, which mis-used a user copy version (with STAC/CLAC and all) of this interface despite it not actually being a user copy at all.

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-43073?
CVE-2026-43073 is a security vulnerability in Software classified as a security vulnerability vulnerability under General Security Weakness.
Which Software versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to current release patches.
What version fixes CVE-2026-43073?
Upgrading to current release patches (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-43073?
CVE-2026-43073 has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 5.5 (MODERATE) with vector string CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H.
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-43073?
CVE-2026-43073 is classified under General Security Weakness.
How can I check Maven dependencies for CVE-2026-43073?
Run the dependency tree command: 'mvn dependency:tree'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-w93x-73ch-q28m",
  "modified" : "2026-06-07T09:31:30Z",
  "published" : "2026-05-05T18:33:26Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-43073" ],
  "details" : "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nx86-64: rename misleadingly named '__copy_user_nocache()' function\n\nThis function was a masterclass in bad naming, for various historical\nreasons.\n\nIt claimed to be a non-cached user copy.  It is literally _neither_ of\nthose things.  It's a specialty memory copy routine that uses\nnon-temporal stores for the destination (but not the source), and that\ndoes exception handling for both source and destination accesses.\n\nAlso note that while it works for unaligned targets, any unaligned parts\n(whether at beginning or end) will not use non-temporal stores, since\nonly words and quadwords can be non-temporal on x86.\n\nThe exception handling means that it _can_ be used for user space\naccesses, but not on its own - it needs all the normal \"start user space\naccess\" logic around it.\n\nBut typically the user space access would be the source, not the\nnon-temporal destination.  That was the original intention of this,\nwhere the destination was some fragile persistent memory target that\nneeded non-temporal stores in order to catch machine check exceptions\nsynchronously and deal with them gracefully.\n\nThus that non-descriptive name: one use case was to copy from user space\ninto a non-cached kernel buffer.  However, the existing users are a mix\nof that intended use-case, and a couple of random drivers that just did\nthis as a performance tweak.\n\nSome of those random drivers then actively misused the user copying\nversion (with STAC/CLAC and all) to do kernel copies without ever even\ncaring about the exception handling, _just_ for the non-temporal\ndestination.\n\nRename it as a first small step to actually make it halfway sane, and\nchange the prototype to be more normal: it doesn't take a user pointer\nunless the caller has done the proper conversion, and the argument size\nis the full size_t (it still won't actually copy more than 4GB in one\ngo, but there's also no reason to silently truncate the size argument in\nthe caller).\n\nFinally, use this now sanely named function in the NTB code, which\nmis-used a user copy version (with STAC/CLAC and all) of this interface\ndespite it not actually being a user copy at all.",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "ADVISORY",
    "url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-43073"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/14b9194db4a28421a4dbe5d6e519efbaa7c5f3cd"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c6d4e0599e7e73abc04e2488dfeb7940c4039660"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d187a86de793f84766ea40b9ade7ac60aabbb4fe"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d993e1723aa2a085aa0d72e70ea889031fc225b4"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/efea91ad1729ff1853d7418e4d3bc27d085e72d0"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://project-zero.issues.chromium.org/issues/496923375"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ ],
    "severity" : "MODERATE",
    "github_reviewed" : false,
    "github_reviewed_at" : null,
    "nvd_published_at" : "2026-05-05T16:16:16Z"
  }
}