CVE-2026-47719: FUXA Unauthenticated SSRF Vulnerability

HIGH
Advisory Identifier: GHSA-w86f-rf9w-h3x6
CVSS 8.2
CWE-918
Published
Advisory Summary

CVE-2026-47719 is a HIGH (CVSS 8.2) unauthenticated ssrf vulnerability (CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)) affecting FUXA libraries in the npm ecosystem. The issue involves unauthenticated ssrf via socket.io device_webapi_request and device_property with response reading. Remediation is available in the latest vendor maintenance releases.

CVE-2026-47719 at a Glance

CVE Identifier CVE-2026-47719
GHSA Identifier GHSA-w86f-rf9w-h3x6
Severity HIGH
CVSS v3.1 Base Score 8.2
CWE Classification CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
Affected Product FUXA
Package Ecosystem npm
Published Date
Last Updated

Security Impact

CVSS: 8.2

The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N).

Attack Vector Network (AV:N)
Attack Complexity Low (AC:L)
Privileges Required None (PR:N)
User Interaction None (UI:N)
Scope Unchanged (S:U)
Confidentiality High (C:H)
Integrity Low (I:L)
Availability None (A:N)

How to Fix CVE-2026-47719

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected FUXA dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

fuxa-server fixed: Latest secure release
npm install fuxa-server@Latest secure release
Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

npm ls fuxa-server

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your Node.js application is affected by CVE-2026-47719, inspect your project dependencies using npm:

npm ls fuxa-server

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of FUXA in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than the patched release), your application is affected.

Note: The npm ls fuxa-server command inspects dependencies declared in your package.json and lockfile; it does not perform automated runtime dynamic scanning.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF), where the web server receives a url or similar request from an upstream component and retrieves the contents of this url, but it does not sufficiently ensure that the request is being sent to the expected destination. In FUXA, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

## Summary An unauthenticated attacker (Alice) connects to FUXA's Socket.IO endpoint and emits a `device-webapi-request` event whose `property.address` field names an arbitrary URL. FUXA's `DEVICE_WEBAPI_REQUEST` handler at `server/runtime/index.js:296` calls `axios.get(address)` server-side and broadcasts the full response body back on the same event via `io.emit`. The companion handler `DEVICE_PROPERTY` at `server/runtime/index.js:153` has the same miss against OPC UA and ODBC endpoints. Both handlers skip the `isSocketWriteAuthorized()` check that the other write-capable events (`DEVICE_VALUES` at line 182, `DEVICE_ENABLE` at line 358) call. Alice reads cloud instance metadata, scans internal services, and connects to any OPC UA server or ODBC database the FUXA host can reach, then receives the results. ## Details **Vulnerable handlers**: `server/runtime/index.js:153-171, 296-316`: ```javascript socket.on(Events.IoEventTypes.DEVICE_PROPERTY, (message) => { try { if (message && message.endpoint && message.type) { devices.getSupportedProperty(message.endpoint, message.type).then(result => { message.result = result; io.emit(Events.IoEventTypes.DEVICE_PROPERTY, message); }) // ... } } // ... }); socket.on(Events.IoEventTypes.DEVICE_WEBAPI_REQUEST, (message) => { try { if (message && message.property) { devices.getRequestResult(message.property).then(result => { message.result = result; io.emit(Events.IoEventTypes.DEVICE_WEBAPI_REQUEST, message); }) // ... } } // ... }); ``` **Sink**: `server/runtime/devices/httprequest/index.js:471` for the webapi path: ```javascript if (property.method === 'GET') { axios.get(property.address).then(res => { resolve(res.data); // ... ``` Alice fully controls `property.address`, and `io.emit` echoes the response body back on the same event. For the ODBC variant, `server/runtime/devices/odbc/index.js` builds the connection string from `endpoint.address` plus `endpoint.uid` and `endpoint.pwd`, so Alice supplies credentials and targets any reachable ODBC server. **Contrast**: `server/runtime/index.js:182` (the DEVICE_VALUES write handler) gates the exact same kind of action behind `isSocketWriteAuthorized(socket)`. The two handlers above skip that check. Reachability: neither handler performs any authorization check, so both modes reach the sinks. `secureEnabled=true` does not close the gap because the Socket.IO connect block at `server/runtime/index.js:114-120` auto-issues a guest token to any client that connects without one, and the handlers run regardless of `socket.isAuthenticated`. This is the same pattern GHSA-vwcg-c828-9822's note warned about: enabling authentication does not mitigate the missing check here. ## Impact Alice uses FUXA as a read-SSRF oracle against any HTTP(S) service the FUXA host can reach, with the response body delivered back to her Socket.IO session. On cloud-hosted SCADA deployments this exfiltrates IAM credentials from the instance metadata service. On OT networks it reaches internal OPC UA servers, ODBC databases, and administrative consoles that have no other external exposure. The ODBC variant accepts attacker-supplied credentials, so Alice authenticates to any ODBC server that trusts connections from the FUXA host. The attack works against `secureEnabled=true` deployments as well as the default; no operator interaction required. **CVSS 3.1**: `AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N` (High, 8.2). CWE-918. ## Recommended Fix Add the existing `isSocketWriteAuthorized(socket)` check at the top of both handlers, matching the pattern used by `DEVICE_VALUES` and `DEVICE_ENABLE`. Also switch `io.emit` to `socket.emit` so the response scopes to the requesting socket instead of broadcasting to every connected client. For defense in depth, validate `property.address` against an allowlist of schemes and reject private, loopback, and link-local address ranges before calling `axios.get` or the device connect paths. ```javascript socket.on(Events.IoEventTypes.DEVICE_WEBAPI_REQUEST, (message) => { try { if (!isSocketWriteAuthorized(socket)) { logger.warn(`${Events.IoEventTypes.DEVICE_WEBAPI_REQUEST}: unauthorized request from ${socket.userId || 'guest'}`); return; } if (message && message.property) { // ... validate property.address against allowlist ... devices.getRequestResult(message.property).then(result => { message.result = result; socket.emit(Events.IoEventTypes.DEVICE_WEBAPI_REQUEST, message); }) // ... } } // ... }); ``` Apply the same three changes (auth check, `socket.emit`, address validation) to `DEVICE_PROPERTY`. --- A fix is available at https://github.com/frangoteam/FUXA/releases/tag/v1.3.2. --- *Found by [aisafe.io](https://aisafe.io)*

CVE-2026-47719 Affected FUXA Versions

1 component(s)
Product / Package Ecosystem Affected Versions Fixed Version
fuxa-server
npm
≤ 1.1.14-1243

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-47719?
CVE-2026-47719 is a security vulnerability in FUXA involving Unauthenticated SSRF via Socket.IO DEVICE_WEBAPI_REQUEST and DEVICE_PROPERTY with response reading under CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF).
Which FUXA versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to current release patches across affected packages: fuxa-server.
What version fixes CVE-2026-47719?
Upgrading to current release patches (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
Is fuxa-server affected?
Yes, fuxa-server is affected in releases prior to Latest secure release. Upgrade your dependency to Latest secure release or later.
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-47719?
CVE-2026-47719 has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 8.2 (HIGH) with vector string CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N.
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-47719?
CVE-2026-47719 is classified under CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) (The web server receives a URL or similar request from an upstream component and retrieves the contents of this URL, but it does not sufficiently ensure that the request is being sent to the expected destination.).
How can I check npm dependencies for CVE-2026-47719?
Run the dependency tree command: 'npm ls fuxa-server'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-w86f-rf9w-h3x6",
  "modified" : "2026-06-08T23:06:40Z",
  "published" : "2026-06-08T23:06:40Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-47719" ],
  "summary" : "FUXA: Unauthenticated SSRF via Socket.IO DEVICE_WEBAPI_REQUEST and DEVICE_PROPERTY with response reading",
  "details" : "## Summary\n\nAn unauthenticated attacker (Alice) connects to FUXA's Socket.IO endpoint and emits a `device-webapi-request` event whose `property.address` field names an arbitrary URL. FUXA's `DEVICE_WEBAPI_REQUEST` handler at `server/runtime/index.js:296` calls `axios.get(address)` server-side and broadcasts the full response body back on the same event via `io.emit`. The companion handler `DEVICE_PROPERTY` at `server/runtime/index.js:153` has the same miss against OPC UA and ODBC endpoints. Both handlers skip the `isSocketWriteAuthorized()` check that the other write-capable events (`DEVICE_VALUES` at line 182, `DEVICE_ENABLE` at line 358) call. Alice reads cloud instance metadata, scans internal services, and connects to any OPC UA server or ODBC database the FUXA host can reach, then receives the results.\n\n## Details\n\n**Vulnerable handlers**: `server/runtime/index.js:153-171, 296-316`:\n\n```javascript\nsocket.on(Events.IoEventTypes.DEVICE_PROPERTY, (message) => {\n    try {\n        if (message && message.endpoint && message.type) {\n            devices.getSupportedProperty(message.endpoint, message.type).then(result => {\n                message.result = result;\n                io.emit(Events.IoEventTypes.DEVICE_PROPERTY, message);\n            })\n            // ...\n        }\n    }\n    // ...\n});\n\nsocket.on(Events.IoEventTypes.DEVICE_WEBAPI_REQUEST, (message) => {\n    try {\n        if (message && message.property) {\n            devices.getRequestResult(message.property).then(result => {\n                message.result = result;\n                io.emit(Events.IoEventTypes.DEVICE_WEBAPI_REQUEST, message);\n            })\n            // ...\n        }\n    }\n    // ...\n});\n```\n\n**Sink**: `server/runtime/devices/httprequest/index.js:471` for the webapi path:\n\n```javascript\nif (property.method === 'GET') {\n    axios.get(property.address).then(res => {\n        resolve(res.data);\n    // ...\n```\n\nAlice fully controls `property.address`, and `io.emit` echoes the response body back on the same event. For the ODBC variant, `server/runtime/devices/odbc/index.js` builds the connection string from `endpoint.address` plus `endpoint.uid` and `endpoint.pwd`, so Alice supplies credentials and targets any reachable ODBC server.\n\n**Contrast**: `server/runtime/index.js:182` (the DEVICE_VALUES write handler) gates the exact same kind of action behind `isSocketWriteAuthorized(socket)`. The two handlers above skip that check.\n\nReachability: neither handler performs any authorization check, so both modes reach the sinks. `secureEnabled=true` does not close the gap because the Socket.IO connect block at `server/runtime/index.js:114-120` auto-issues a guest token to any client that connects without one, and the handlers run regardless of `socket.isAuthenticated`. This is the same pattern GHSA-vwcg-c828-9822's note warned about: enabling authentication does not mitigate the missing check here.\n\n\n## Impact\n\nAlice uses FUXA as a read-SSRF oracle against any HTTP(S) service the FUXA host can reach, with the response body delivered back to her Socket.IO session. On cloud-hosted SCADA deployments this exfiltrates IAM credentials from the instance metadata service. On OT networks it reaches internal OPC UA servers, ODBC databases, and administrative consoles that have no other external exposure. The ODBC variant accepts attacker-supplied credentials, so Alice authenticates to any ODBC server that trusts connections from the FUXA host. The attack works against `secureEnabled=true` deployments as well as the default; no operator interaction required.\n\n**CVSS 3.1**: `AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N` (High, 8.2). CWE-918.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nAdd the existing `isSocketWriteAuthorized(socket)` check at the top of both handlers, matching the pattern used by `DEVICE_VALUES` and `DEVICE_ENABLE`. Also switch `io.emit` to `socket.emit` so the response scopes to the requesting socket instead of broadcasting to every connected client. For defense in depth, validate `property.address` against an allowlist of schemes and reject private, loopback, and link-local address ranges before calling `axios.get` or the device connect paths.\n\n```javascript\nsocket.on(Events.IoEventTypes.DEVICE_WEBAPI_REQUEST, (message) => {\n    try {\n        if (!isSocketWriteAuthorized(socket)) {\n            logger.warn(`${Events.IoEventTypes.DEVICE_WEBAPI_REQUEST}: unauthorized request from ${socket.userId || 'guest'}`);\n            return;\n        }\n        if (message && message.property) {\n            // ... validate property.address against allowlist ...\n            devices.getRequestResult(message.property).then(result => {\n                message.result = result;\n                socket.emit(Events.IoEventTypes.DEVICE_WEBAPI_REQUEST, message);\n            })\n            // ...\n        }\n    }\n    // ...\n});\n```\n\nApply the same three changes (auth check, `socket.emit`, address validation) to `DEVICE_PROPERTY`.\n\n---\nA fix is available at https://github.com/frangoteam/FUXA/releases/tag/v1.3.2.\n\n---\n*Found by [aisafe.io](https://aisafe.io)*",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "npm",
      "name" : "fuxa-server"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "last_affected" : "1.1.14-1243"
      } ]
    } ]
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/frangoteam/FUXA/security/advisories/GHSA-w86f-rf9w-h3x6"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/frangoteam/FUXA"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/frangoteam/FUXA/releases/tag/v1.3.2"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-918" ],
    "severity" : "HIGH",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-06-08T23:06:40Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : null
  }
}