CVE-2026-55698: pnpm Project Env Lockfile Can Short-circuit Vulnerability

HIGH
Advisory Identifier: GHSA-w466-c33r-3gjp
CVSS 8.8
CWE-829 CWE-494 CWE-345
Published
Advisory Summary

CVE-2026-55698 is a HIGH (CVSS 8.8) project env lockfile can short-circuit vulnerability (CWE-829: Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere) affecting pnpm libraries in the npm ecosystem. The issue involves project env lockfile can short-circuit package-manager resolution and execute lockfile-selected pnpm bytes. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 10.34.2, 11.5.3.

CVE-2026-55698 at a Glance

CVE Identifier CVE-2026-55698
GHSA Identifier GHSA-w466-c33r-3gjp
Severity HIGH
CVSS v3.1 Base Score 8.8
CWE Classification CWE-829: Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere
Affected Product pnpm
Package Ecosystem npm
Published Date
Last Updated

Security Impact

CVSS: 8.8

The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H).

Attack Vector Network (AV:N)
Attack Complexity Low (AC:L)
Privileges Required None (PR:N)
User Interaction Required (UI:R)
Scope Unchanged (S:U)
Confidentiality High (C:H)
Integrity High (I:H)
Availability High (A:H)

How to Fix CVE-2026-55698

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected pnpm dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

pnpm fixed: 10.34.2
npm install pnpm@10.34.2
pnpm fixed: 11.5.3
npm install pnpm@11.5.3
Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

npm ls pnpm

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your Node.js application is affected by CVE-2026-55698, inspect your project dependencies using npm:

npm ls pnpm

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of pnpm in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 10.34.2), your application is affected.

Note: The npm ls pnpm command inspects dependencies declared in your package.json and lockfile; it does not perform automated runtime dynamic scanning.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-829: Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere, where the product imports, requires, or includes executable functionality (such as a library) from a source that is outside of the intended control sphere. In pnpm, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

<!-- maintainer-action:start --> ## Maintainer Action Plan This report is ready to review with the shared patch branch. Start with the PR and the expected fixed behavior, then use the detailed exploit narrative below only if you want to replay the original path. - Advisory: `CAND-PNPM-063` / `GHSA-w466-c33r-3gjp` - Advisory URL: https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/security/advisories/GHSA-w466-c33r-3gjp - Shared patch PR: https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm-ghsa-j2hc-m6cf-6jm8/pull/1 - Shared patch branch: `security/ghsa-batch-2026-06-09` - Patch commit: `a93449314f398cf4bdf2e28d033c02d37395ad22` - Base commit: `origin/main` `55a4035abf1ae3fe7208ba1f5ef43c5eff58ccec` - Maintainer priority: `start-here` - Component: `pnpm packageManager env lockfile` - Patch area: package-manager env lockfile is re-resolved through trusted registries before execution - Affected packages: `npm:pnpm`, `npm:@pnpm/installing.env-installer` - CWE IDs: `CWE-829`, `CWE-494`, `CWE-345` - Conservative CVSS: `8.8` / `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H` - Next action: review the shared patch branch for this component, set the final affected version range, merge and release the fix, then publish or close the advisory. ### Expected Patched Behavior Committed env-lockfile package-manager entries are force-refreshed through trusted registries before execution; attacker tarball requests and markers stay at zero. ### Files And Tests To Review - `installing/env-installer/src/resolvePackageManagerIntegrities.ts` - `pnpm/src/switchCliVersion.ts` - `pnpm/src/switchCliVersion.test.ts` - `.changeset/clean-package-manager-registries.md` ### Focused Validation Run these from a checkout of the shared patch branch. They are the useful maintainer commands with machine-local artifact paths removed. ```bash ./node_modules/.bin/tsgo --build installing/env-installer/tsconfig.json ./node_modules/.bin/tsgo --build pnpm/tsconfig.json PNPM_REGISTRY_MOCK_PORT=7799 NODE_OPTIONS="--experimental-vm-modules --disable-warning=ExperimentalWarning --disable-warning=DEP0169" ../node_modules/.bin/jest src/switchCliVersion.test.ts -t "re-resolved package-manager lockfile" --runInBand PNPM_REGISTRY_MOCK_PORT=7799 NODE_OPTIONS="--experimental-vm-modules --disable-warning=ExperimentalWarning --disable-warning=DEP0169" ../node_modules/.bin/jest src/switchCliVersion.test.ts src/syncEnvLockfile.test.ts --runInBand ./node_modules/.bin/eslint installing/env-installer/src/resolvePackageManagerIntegrities.ts pnpm/src/switchCliVersion.ts pnpm/src/switchCliVersion.test.ts git diff --check ``` The full patched replay for the shared branch passed with all 20 candidates marked fixed. This candidate's replay evidence is `results/CAND-PNPM-063-patched-result.json`. <!-- maintainer-action:end --> ### Summary pnpm can persist package-manager bootstrap metadata in the first YAML document of `pnpm-lock.yaml`. Before the patch, direct pnpm execution trusted an already resolved `packageManagerDependencies` entry when the committed env lockfile contained matching `pnpm` and `@pnpm/exe` versions. A malicious repository could therefore commit package-manager lockfile package records and snapshots that bypassed fresh package-manager resolution, then cause pnpm to install and execute bytes selected by that committed lockfile state during automatic version switching. ### Details The vulnerable source-to-sink path was: - `lockfile/fs/src/envLockfile.ts` reads the repository's first YAML lockfile document and validates shape only. - `pnpm/src/main.ts` reaches `switchCliVersion()` when a direct pnpm invocation sees a wanted `pnpm` package manager with `onFail=download`. - `pnpm/src/switchCliVersion.ts` reads the committed env lockfile when package-manager metadata should be persisted. - `installing/env-installer/src/resolvePackageManagerIntegrities.ts` treated `packageManagerDependencies` as resolved when only the `pnpm` and `@pnpm/exe` versions matched. - `engine/pm/commands/src/self-updater/installPnpm.ts` converts env-lockfile `snapshots` and `packages` into the wanted lockfile used by `headlessInstall()`. - `pnpm/src/switchCliVersion.ts` executes the installed `pnpm` binary with `spawn.sync()`. The helper fast path is intentionally still version-based for non-execution callers, so the security boundary is enforced at the execution path: `switchCliVersion()` now re-resolves already present package-manager env-lockfile entries before they can reach `installPnpmToStore()` and `spawn.sync()`. ### PoC Standalone PoC and verification script: The PoC constructs a committed env-lockfile object with matching package-manager dependency versions and attacker-selected package metadata: ```json { "importers": { ".": { "configDependencies": {}, "packageManagerDependencies": { "@pnpm/exe": { "specifier": "9.3.0", "version": "9.3.0" }, "pnpm": { "specifier": "9.3.0", "version": "9.3.0" } } } }, "lockfileVersion": "9.0", "packages": { "/pnpm@9.3.0": { "resolution": { "integrity": "sha512-poisoned" } } }, "snapshots": { "/pnpm@9.3.0": {} } } ``` Pre-patch exploit model: 1. The victim runs pnpm directly in a malicious repository. 2. The requested package-manager version differs from the currently running pnpm. 3. pnpm enters `switchCliVersion()` and reads the committed env lockfile. 4. Matching `pnpm` / `@pnpm/exe` versions short-circuit package-manager resolution. 5. pnpm installs from the committed env-lockfile package records and executes the resulting `pnpm` binary. Observed primitive proof from the PoC: ```json { "primitive": "unforced resolver reuses already-resolved env lockfile metadata", "isResolvedByVersionOnly": true, "reusedPoisonedIntegrity": true } ``` The same script then runs the patched `switchCliVersion` regression. The regression seeds a poisoned committed env lockfile, has the resolver return a trusted replacement lockfile, and asserts `installPnpmToStore()` receives the trusted lockfile rather than the committed one. This would fail on the vulnerable control flow because the resolver was not called and the committed lockfile reached the installer. Focused validation commands: ```bash ./node_modules/.bin/tsgo --build installing/env-installer/tsconfig.json ./node_modules/.bin/tsgo --build pnpm/tsconfig.json PNPM_REGISTRY_MOCK_PORT=7799 NODE_OPTIONS="--experimental-vm-modules --disable-warning=ExperimentalWarning --disable-warning=DEP0169" ../node_modules/.bin/jest src/switchCliVersion.test.ts -t "re-resolved package-manager lockfile" --runInBand PNPM_REGISTRY_MOCK_PORT=7799 NODE_OPTIONS="--experimental-vm-modules --disable-warning=ExperimentalWarning --disable-warning=DEP0169" ../node_modules/.bin/jest src/switchCliVersion.test.ts src/syncEnvLockfile.test.ts --runInBand ./node_modules/.bin/eslint installing/env-installer/src/resolvePackageManagerIntegrities.ts pnpm/src/switchCliVersion.ts pnpm/src/switchCliVersion.test.ts git diff --check ``` Validation result: - The PoC confirmed the unforced resolver still reuses a version-matching env lockfile, proving the original primitive. - Patched `switchCliVersion()` calls `resolvePackageManagerIntegrities()` with `force: true` when committed env-lockfile package-manager entries already satisfy the requested version. - Patched `switchCliVersion()` assigns the resolver return value back to `envLockfile`. - The installer receives the refreshed lockfile and not the poisoned committed lockfile. - TypeScript builds passed for `@pnpm/installing.env-installer` and `pnpm`. - The focused Jest regression passed: 1 passed, 1 skipped in `switchCliVersion.test.ts`. - ESLint passed for the affected package-manager switch files. - `git diff --check` passed. ### Impact A malicious repository can cause arbitrary package-manager code execution in the victim's developer or CI environment before normal command handling continues. That code executes with the victim user's privileges and can read local secrets, alter project files, mutate dependency state, or run further commands. ## Affected products Ecosystem: npm Package name: `pnpm`, `@pnpm/installing.env-installer` Affected versions: current main before this patch; direct pnpm execution with package-manager auto-switching and a repository-controlled env lockfile. Patched versions: pending release containing this patch. ## Severity Severity: High Vector string: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H` Base score: 8.8 Rationale: the malicious source is repository-controlled package-manager lockfile state delivered through normal supply-chain channels. Exploitation is low complexity once the victim runs pnpm directly, no attacker privileges are required, and user interaction is required. Successful exploitation executes attacker-selected package-manager code in the victim user's security context, with high confidentiality, integrity, and availability impact. ## Weaknesses CWE-829: Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere CWE-494: Download of Code Without Integrity Check CWE-345: Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity ## Patch The patch makes automatic package-manager switching re-resolve repository-provided bootstrap metadata before install and execution: - `resolvePackageManagerIntegrities()` accepts `force`, which bypasses the version-only fast path. - `switchCliVersion()` creates a store controller even when the committed env lockfile already contains satisfying package-manager dependency versions. - `switchCliVersion()` calls `resolvePackageManagerIntegrities()` with `force: true` for already resolved package-manager entries. - `switchCliVersion()` assigns the returned env lockfile back to `envLockfile`, so `installPnpmToStore()` installs from freshly resolved metadata. - The package-manager bootstrap registry hardening from CAND-PNPM-061 is reused, so the refresh happens through trusted package-manager registries rather than repository workspace registries. Changed files: - `installing/env-installer/src/resolvePackageManagerIntegrities.ts` - `pnpm/src/switchCliVersion.ts` - `pnpm/src/switchCliVersion.test.ts` Changeset: - `.changeset/clean-package-manager-registries.md` Pacquet parity: No pacquet-side patch is required for this finding because pacquet does not implement pnpm's package-manager auto-switch path or `installPnpmToStore()`. ## CVSS Reassessment Initial CVSS remains correct for vulnerable versions: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H` / 8.8 High. Final CVSS after patch: not vulnerable after patch / 0.0. The PoC still demonstrates the underlying unforced env-lockfile reuse primitive, but the patched execution path force-refreshes package-manager metadata through trusted bootstrap registries before install or execution. ## Remaining Risk The helper `resolvePackageManagerIntegrities()` still has an unforced fast path that treats matching `pnpm` and `@pnpm/exe` versions as resolved. Current execution-sensitive callers either use trusted roots/registries or pass through the patched `switchCliVersion()` boundary, but future execution paths should use `force: true` before installing or executing package-manager bytes from repository-provided env-lockfile metadata.

CVE-2026-55698 Affected pnpm Versions

2 component(s)
Fixed Versions:
10.34.211.5.3
Product / Package Ecosystem Affected Versions Fixed Version
pnpm
npm
< 10.34.2
10.34.2
pnpm
npm
≥ 11.0.0
< 11.5.3
11.5.3

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-55698?
CVE-2026-55698 is a security vulnerability in pnpm involving Project env lockfile can short-circuit package-manager resolution and execute lockfile-selected pnpm bytes under CWE-829: Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere.
Which pnpm versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to 10.34.2, 11.5.3 across affected packages: pnpm.
What version fixes CVE-2026-55698?
Upgrading to 10.34.2, 11.5.3 (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
Is pnpm affected?
Yes, pnpm is affected in releases prior to 10.34.2, 11.5.3. Upgrade your dependency to 10.34.2, 11.5.3 or later.
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-55698?
CVE-2026-55698 has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 8.8 (HIGH) with vector string CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H.
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-55698?
CVE-2026-55698 is classified under CWE-829: Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere (The product imports, requires, or includes executable functionality (such as a library) from a source that is outside of the intended control sphere.).
How can I check npm dependencies for CVE-2026-55698?
Run the dependency tree command: 'npm ls pnpm'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-w466-c33r-3gjp",
  "modified" : "2026-06-26T23:34:06Z",
  "published" : "2026-06-26T23:34:06Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-55698" ],
  "summary" : "pnpm: Project env lockfile can short-circuit package-manager resolution and execute lockfile-selected pnpm bytes",
  "details" : "<!-- maintainer-action:start -->\n## Maintainer Action Plan\n\nThis report is ready to review with the shared patch branch. Start with the PR and the expected fixed behavior, then use the detailed exploit narrative below only if you want to replay the original path.\n\n- Advisory: `CAND-PNPM-063` / `GHSA-w466-c33r-3gjp`\n- Advisory URL: https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/security/advisories/GHSA-w466-c33r-3gjp\n- Shared patch PR: https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm-ghsa-j2hc-m6cf-6jm8/pull/1\n- Shared patch branch: `security/ghsa-batch-2026-06-09`\n- Patch commit: `a93449314f398cf4bdf2e28d033c02d37395ad22`\n- Base commit: `origin/main` `55a4035abf1ae3fe7208ba1f5ef43c5eff58ccec`\n- Maintainer priority: `start-here`\n- Component: `pnpm packageManager env lockfile`\n- Patch area: package-manager env lockfile is re-resolved through trusted registries before execution\n- Affected packages: `npm:pnpm`, `npm:@pnpm/installing.env-installer`\n- CWE IDs: `CWE-829`, `CWE-494`, `CWE-345`\n- Conservative CVSS: `8.8` / `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H`\n- Next action: review the shared patch branch for this component, set the final affected version range, merge and release the fix, then publish or close the advisory.\n\n### Expected Patched Behavior\n\nCommitted env-lockfile package-manager entries are force-refreshed through trusted registries before execution; attacker tarball requests and markers stay at zero.\n\n### Files And Tests To Review\n\n- `installing/env-installer/src/resolvePackageManagerIntegrities.ts`\n- `pnpm/src/switchCliVersion.ts`\n- `pnpm/src/switchCliVersion.test.ts`\n- `.changeset/clean-package-manager-registries.md`\n\n### Focused Validation\n\nRun these from a checkout of the shared patch branch. They are the useful maintainer commands with machine-local artifact paths removed.\n\n```bash\n./node_modules/.bin/tsgo --build installing/env-installer/tsconfig.json\n./node_modules/.bin/tsgo --build pnpm/tsconfig.json\nPNPM_REGISTRY_MOCK_PORT=7799 NODE_OPTIONS=\"--experimental-vm-modules --disable-warning=ExperimentalWarning --disable-warning=DEP0169\" ../node_modules/.bin/jest src/switchCliVersion.test.ts -t \"re-resolved package-manager lockfile\" --runInBand\nPNPM_REGISTRY_MOCK_PORT=7799 NODE_OPTIONS=\"--experimental-vm-modules --disable-warning=ExperimentalWarning --disable-warning=DEP0169\" ../node_modules/.bin/jest src/switchCliVersion.test.ts src/syncEnvLockfile.test.ts --runInBand\n./node_modules/.bin/eslint installing/env-installer/src/resolvePackageManagerIntegrities.ts pnpm/src/switchCliVersion.ts pnpm/src/switchCliVersion.test.ts\ngit diff --check\n```\n\nThe full patched replay for the shared branch passed with all 20 candidates marked fixed. This candidate's replay evidence is `results/CAND-PNPM-063-patched-result.json`.\n<!-- maintainer-action:end -->\n\n### Summary\n\npnpm can persist package-manager bootstrap metadata in the first YAML document of `pnpm-lock.yaml`. Before the patch, direct pnpm execution trusted an already resolved `packageManagerDependencies` entry when the committed env lockfile contained matching `pnpm` and `@pnpm/exe` versions. A malicious repository could therefore commit package-manager lockfile package records and snapshots that bypassed fresh package-manager resolution, then cause pnpm to install and execute bytes selected by that committed lockfile state during automatic version switching.\n\n### Details\n\nThe vulnerable source-to-sink path was:\n\n- `lockfile/fs/src/envLockfile.ts` reads the repository's first YAML lockfile document and validates shape only.\n- `pnpm/src/main.ts` reaches `switchCliVersion()` when a direct pnpm invocation sees a wanted `pnpm` package manager with `onFail=download`.\n- `pnpm/src/switchCliVersion.ts` reads the committed env lockfile when package-manager metadata should be persisted.\n- `installing/env-installer/src/resolvePackageManagerIntegrities.ts` treated `packageManagerDependencies` as resolved when only the `pnpm` and `@pnpm/exe` versions matched.\n- `engine/pm/commands/src/self-updater/installPnpm.ts` converts env-lockfile `snapshots` and `packages` into the wanted lockfile used by `headlessInstall()`.\n- `pnpm/src/switchCliVersion.ts` executes the installed `pnpm` binary with `spawn.sync()`.\n\nThe helper fast path is intentionally still version-based for non-execution callers, so the security boundary is enforced at the execution path: `switchCliVersion()` now re-resolves already present package-manager env-lockfile entries before they can reach `installPnpmToStore()` and `spawn.sync()`.\n\n### PoC\n\nStandalone PoC and verification script:\n\nThe PoC constructs a committed env-lockfile object with matching package-manager dependency versions and attacker-selected package metadata:\n\n```json\n{\n  \"importers\": {\n    \".\": {\n      \"configDependencies\": {},\n      \"packageManagerDependencies\": {\n        \"@pnpm/exe\": { \"specifier\": \"9.3.0\", \"version\": \"9.3.0\" },\n        \"pnpm\": { \"specifier\": \"9.3.0\", \"version\": \"9.3.0\" }\n      }\n    }\n  },\n  \"lockfileVersion\": \"9.0\",\n  \"packages\": {\n    \"/pnpm@9.3.0\": {\n      \"resolution\": {\n        \"integrity\": \"sha512-poisoned\"\n      }\n    }\n  },\n  \"snapshots\": {\n    \"/pnpm@9.3.0\": {}\n  }\n}\n```\n\nPre-patch exploit model:\n\n1. The victim runs pnpm directly in a malicious repository.\n2. The requested package-manager version differs from the currently running pnpm.\n3. pnpm enters `switchCliVersion()` and reads the committed env lockfile.\n4. Matching `pnpm` / `@pnpm/exe` versions short-circuit package-manager resolution.\n5. pnpm installs from the committed env-lockfile package records and executes the resulting `pnpm` binary.\n\nObserved primitive proof from the PoC:\n\n```json\n{\n  \"primitive\": \"unforced resolver reuses already-resolved env lockfile metadata\",\n  \"isResolvedByVersionOnly\": true,\n  \"reusedPoisonedIntegrity\": true\n}\n```\n\nThe same script then runs the patched `switchCliVersion` regression. The regression seeds a poisoned committed env lockfile, has the resolver return a trusted replacement lockfile, and asserts `installPnpmToStore()` receives the trusted lockfile rather than the committed one. This would fail on the vulnerable control flow because the resolver was not called and the committed lockfile reached the installer.\n\nFocused validation commands:\n\n```bash\n./node_modules/.bin/tsgo --build installing/env-installer/tsconfig.json\n./node_modules/.bin/tsgo --build pnpm/tsconfig.json\nPNPM_REGISTRY_MOCK_PORT=7799 NODE_OPTIONS=\"--experimental-vm-modules --disable-warning=ExperimentalWarning --disable-warning=DEP0169\" ../node_modules/.bin/jest src/switchCliVersion.test.ts -t \"re-resolved package-manager lockfile\" --runInBand\nPNPM_REGISTRY_MOCK_PORT=7799 NODE_OPTIONS=\"--experimental-vm-modules --disable-warning=ExperimentalWarning --disable-warning=DEP0169\" ../node_modules/.bin/jest src/switchCliVersion.test.ts src/syncEnvLockfile.test.ts --runInBand\n./node_modules/.bin/eslint installing/env-installer/src/resolvePackageManagerIntegrities.ts pnpm/src/switchCliVersion.ts pnpm/src/switchCliVersion.test.ts\ngit diff --check\n```\n\nValidation result:\n\n- The PoC confirmed the unforced resolver still reuses a version-matching env lockfile, proving the original primitive.\n- Patched `switchCliVersion()` calls `resolvePackageManagerIntegrities()` with `force: true` when committed env-lockfile package-manager entries already satisfy the requested version.\n- Patched `switchCliVersion()` assigns the resolver return value back to `envLockfile`.\n- The installer receives the refreshed lockfile and not the poisoned committed lockfile.\n- TypeScript builds passed for `@pnpm/installing.env-installer` and `pnpm`.\n- The focused Jest regression passed: 1 passed, 1 skipped in `switchCliVersion.test.ts`.\n- ESLint passed for the affected package-manager switch files.\n- `git diff --check` passed.\n\n### Impact\n\nA malicious repository can cause arbitrary package-manager code execution in the victim's developer or CI environment before normal command handling continues. That code executes with the victim user's privileges and can read local secrets, alter project files, mutate dependency state, or run further commands.\n\n## Affected products\n\nEcosystem: npm\n\nPackage name: `pnpm`, `@pnpm/installing.env-installer`\n\nAffected versions: current main before this patch; direct pnpm execution with package-manager auto-switching and a repository-controlled env lockfile.\n\nPatched versions: pending release containing this patch.\n\n## Severity\n\nSeverity: High\n\nVector string: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H`\n\nBase score: 8.8\n\nRationale: the malicious source is repository-controlled package-manager lockfile state delivered through normal supply-chain channels. Exploitation is low complexity once the victim runs pnpm directly, no attacker privileges are required, and user interaction is required. Successful exploitation executes attacker-selected package-manager code in the victim user's security context, with high confidentiality, integrity, and availability impact.\n\n## Weaknesses\n\nCWE-829: Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere\n\nCWE-494: Download of Code Without Integrity Check\n\nCWE-345: Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity\n\n## Patch\n\nThe patch makes automatic package-manager switching re-resolve repository-provided bootstrap metadata before install and execution:\n\n- `resolvePackageManagerIntegrities()` accepts `force`, which bypasses the version-only fast path.\n- `switchCliVersion()` creates a store controller even when the committed env lockfile already contains satisfying package-manager dependency versions.\n- `switchCliVersion()` calls `resolvePackageManagerIntegrities()` with `force: true` for already resolved package-manager entries.\n- `switchCliVersion()` assigns the returned env lockfile back to `envLockfile`, so `installPnpmToStore()` installs from freshly resolved metadata.\n- The package-manager bootstrap registry hardening from CAND-PNPM-061 is reused, so the refresh happens through trusted package-manager registries rather than repository workspace registries.\n\nChanged files:\n\n- `installing/env-installer/src/resolvePackageManagerIntegrities.ts`\n- `pnpm/src/switchCliVersion.ts`\n- `pnpm/src/switchCliVersion.test.ts`\n\nChangeset:\n\n- `.changeset/clean-package-manager-registries.md`\n\nPacquet parity:\n\nNo pacquet-side patch is required for this finding because pacquet does not implement pnpm's package-manager auto-switch path or `installPnpmToStore()`.\n\n## CVSS Reassessment\n\nInitial CVSS remains correct for vulnerable versions: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H` / 8.8 High.\n\nFinal CVSS after patch: not vulnerable after patch / 0.0. The PoC still demonstrates the underlying unforced env-lockfile reuse primitive, but the patched execution path force-refreshes package-manager metadata through trusted bootstrap registries before install or execution.\n\n## Remaining Risk\n\nThe helper `resolvePackageManagerIntegrities()` still has an unforced fast path that treats matching `pnpm` and `@pnpm/exe` versions as resolved. Current execution-sensitive callers either use trusted roots/registries or pass through the patched `switchCliVersion()` boundary, but future execution paths should use `force: true` before installing or executing package-manager bytes from repository-provided env-lockfile metadata.",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "npm",
      "name" : "pnpm"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "10.34.2"
      } ]
    } ]
  }, {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "npm",
      "name" : "pnpm"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "11.0.0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "11.5.3"
      } ]
    } ]
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/security/advisories/GHSA-w466-c33r-3gjp"
  }, {
    "type" : "ADVISORY",
    "url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-55698"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-345", "CWE-494", "CWE-829" ],
    "severity" : "HIGH",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-06-26T23:34:06Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : "2026-06-25T18:16:40Z"
  }
}