CVE-2026-90015: Software Security Vulnerability Vulnerability

UNKNOWN

Advisory Identifier: GHSA-vp4r-2v9h-p25v

Published 2026-09-16

Advisory Summary

CVE-2026-90015 is a security vulnerability vulnerability (General Security Weakness) affecting Software libraries in the Maven ecosystem. Remediation is available in the latest vendor maintenance releases.

CVE-2026-90015 at a Glance

CVE Identifier CVE-2026-90015

GHSA Identifier GHSA-vp4r-2v9h-p25v

Severity N/A

CVSS v3.1 Base Score N/A

CWE Classification General Security Weakness

Affected Product Software

Package Ecosystem Maven

Published Date 2026-09-16

Last Updated 2026-09-16

How to Fix CVE-2026-90015

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Software dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

mvn dependency:tree

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your Java application is affected by CVE-2026-90015, inspect your build dependencies using the Maven Dependency Plugin:

mvn dependency:tree

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Software in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than the patched release), your application is affected.

Note: The mvn dependency:tree command inspects the resolved dependency graph declared in your project's POM files; it does not perform automated security scanning or inspect runtime dynamic classpaths. Always verify runtime container classpaths and shaded JARs.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under General Security Weakness. In Software, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xhci: fix lost bounce buffers on TDs spanning several ring segments When a TD reaches a link TRB with data that is not aligned to the endpoint's wMaxPacketSize, xhci_align_td() stages the unalignable tail through the bounce buffer of the ring segment holding that link TRB. xhci_unmap_td_bounce_buffer() later unmaps it and, for IN transfers, copies the data back into the URB's buffer. The enqueue path records the segment that was bounced in td->bounce_seg, under the assumption that a TD never spans more than two ring segments. That assumption does not hold: a TD large enough to span three or more segments crosses several link TRBs and can be bounced at each of them. Only the last one survives in td->bounce_seg, so every earlier bounce buffer is neither copied back nor DMA unmapped. The URB still completes with actual_length equal to the requested length and no error, so the transfer looks successful while a wMaxPacketSize sized hole in the destination buffer silently keeps its previous contents. It also leaks a DMA mapping per dropped bounce. Any sufficiently large and fragmented bulk transfer can hit this. It was found with a USB mass storage device behind xHCI backing a dm-verity target with 512 byte hash blocks, where the stale data is detected rather than silently consumed. The device enumerates as SuperSpeed, so wMaxPacketSize is 1024, while dm-bufio issues one 512 byte bio per hash block. verity_prefetch_io() makes the block layer merge hundreds of them into a single request of up to 512 scatterlist entries of 512 bytes each. At 256 TRBs per ring segment such a TD spans three segments, and every segment boundary falls on an odd multiple of 512, i.e. unaligned to wMaxPacketSize. dm-bufio then caches a hash block holding stale data and dm-verity declares the metadata block corrupted: device-mapper: verity: 8:2: metadata block 10850 is corrupted A reproducer running this under qemu is available at https://github.com/baloo/xhci-verity The bounce state (bounce_buf, bounce_dma, bounce_len, bounce_offs) already lives on the ring segment, so there is nothing extra to track. Keep recording the last bounced segment in td->bounce_seg and, on completion, walk the segments from td->start_seg up to it, unmapping every segment that still has a pending bounce. Stopping at td->bounce_seg rather than td->end_seg matters: a bounce implies the TD continues past that segment's link TRB, so bounce_seg is always strictly before end_seg, and a later TD may already have started in end_seg and been bounced there. Walking that far would copy a foreign bounce buffer into this URB and unmap it twice. It also keeps the walk correct if a TD ever wraps the whole ring so that end_seg == start_seg. [mn: Add ring->num_segs check to prevent unlikely infinite for loop.]

References

NVD — CVE-2026-90015 NVD

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-90015

git.kernel.org/stable/c/3c9a2b5a4f... WEB

https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3c9a2b5a4f1183696f02ac280ced1d34afb409b1

git.kernel.org/stable/c/43239fc6df... WEB

https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/43239fc6dfb62c50ae1b9c0e82bac0f8cd2e285c

git.kernel.org/stable/c/7236bbd2cb... WEB

https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7236bbd2cb7d9fc0eda896bbd34790341e2a4377

git.kernel.org/stable/c/a1629dfb01... WEB

https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a1629dfb011446d02905778f6df19f14c5f4f3b3

git.kernel.org/stable/c/c8124b28f1... WEB

https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c8124b28f12dbdd126118e63d0ebf8093a01fb81

git.kernel.org/stable/c/e04d5304a2... WEB

https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e04d5304a248e5d2a7f4faa87541644bdd320cfb

git.kernel.org/stable/c/efaab8938f... WEB

https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/efaab8938fb92979be6df359f7d1a43fb7e4717d

git.kernel.org/stable/c/ff44dfb03a... WEB

https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ff44dfb03a293bf30e31f98772a1dd316a6071d1

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-90015?

CVE-2026-90015 is a security vulnerability in Software classified as a security vulnerability vulnerability under General Security Weakness.

Which Software versions are affected?

Affected versions include releases prior to current release patches.

What version fixes CVE-2026-90015?

Upgrading to current release patches (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.

What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-90015?

CVE-2026-90015 is classified under General Security Weakness.

How can I check Maven dependencies for CVE-2026-90015?

Run the dependency tree command: 'mvn dependency:tree'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.

Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema

Normalized schema output

View Raw JSON

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  "id" : "GHSA-vp4r-2v9h-p25v",
  "modified" : "2026-09-16T12:30:45Z",
  "published" : "2026-09-16T12:30:45Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-90015" ],
  "details" : "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nxhci: fix lost bounce buffers on TDs spanning several ring segments\n\nWhen a TD reaches a link TRB with data that is not aligned to the\nendpoint's wMaxPacketSize, xhci_align_td() stages the unalignable tail\nthrough the bounce buffer of the ring segment holding that link TRB.\nxhci_unmap_td_bounce_buffer() later unmaps it and, for IN transfers,\ncopies the data back into the URB's buffer.\n\nThe enqueue path records the segment that was bounced in td->bounce_seg,\nunder the assumption that a TD never spans more than two ring segments.\nThat assumption does not hold: a TD large enough to span three or more\nsegments crosses several link TRBs and can be bounced at each of them.\nOnly the last one survives in td->bounce_seg, so every earlier bounce\nbuffer is neither copied back nor DMA unmapped.\n\nThe URB still completes with actual_length equal to the requested length\nand no error, so the transfer looks successful while a wMaxPacketSize\nsized hole in the destination buffer silently keeps its previous\ncontents. It also leaks a DMA mapping per dropped bounce.\n\nAny sufficiently large and fragmented bulk transfer can hit this. It was\nfound with a USB mass storage device behind xHCI backing a dm-verity\ntarget with 512 byte hash blocks, where the stale data is detected rather\nthan silently consumed. The device enumerates as SuperSpeed, so\nwMaxPacketSize is 1024, while dm-bufio issues one 512 byte bio per hash\nblock. verity_prefetch_io() makes the block layer merge hundreds of them\ninto a single request of up to 512 scatterlist entries of 512 bytes each.\nAt 256 TRBs per ring segment such a TD spans three segments, and every\nsegment boundary falls on an odd multiple of 512, i.e. unaligned to\nwMaxPacketSize. dm-bufio then caches a hash block holding stale data and\ndm-verity declares the metadata block corrupted:\n\n  device-mapper: verity: 8:2: metadata block 10850 is corrupted\n\nA reproducer running this under qemu is available at\nhttps://github.com/baloo/xhci-verity\n\nThe bounce state (bounce_buf, bounce_dma, bounce_len, bounce_offs)\nalready lives on the ring segment, so there is nothing extra to track.\nKeep recording the last bounced segment in td->bounce_seg and, on\ncompletion, walk the segments from td->start_seg up to it, unmapping\nevery segment that still has a pending bounce.\n\nStopping at td->bounce_seg rather than td->end_seg matters: a bounce\nimplies the TD continues past that segment's link TRB, so bounce_seg is\nalways strictly before end_seg, and a later TD may already have started\nin end_seg and been bounced there. Walking that far would copy a foreign\nbounce buffer into this URB and unmap it twice. It also keeps the walk\ncorrect if a TD ever wraps the whole ring so that end_seg == start_seg.\n\n[mn: Add ring->num_segs check to prevent unlikely infinite for loop.]",
  "severity" : [ ],
  "affected" : [ ],
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  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ ],
    "severity" : null,
    "github_reviewed" : false,
    "github_reviewed_at" : null,
    "nvd_published_at" : "2026-09-16T11:17:14Z"
  }
}

Advisory Metadata

Source ID: GHSA-vp4r-2v9h-p25v
Schema Version: 1.4.0
Published: 2026-09-16 12:30
Last Modified: 2026-09-16 12:30
Database Record File: advisories/unreviewed/2026/09/GHSA-vp4r-2v9h-p25v/GHSA-vp4r-2v9h-p25v.json