CVE-2026-43472: Software Security Vulnerability Vulnerability

MODERATE
Advisory Identifier: GHSA-vgv8-2mh4-qh7r
CVSS 5.5
CWE-908
Published
Advisory Summary

CVE-2026-43472 is a MODERATE (CVSS 5.5) security vulnerability vulnerability (CWE-908: Use of Uninitialized Resource) affecting Software libraries in the Maven ecosystem. The weakness occurs when the product uses or accesses a resource that has not been initialized.. Remediation is available in the latest vendor maintenance releases.

CVE-2026-43472 at a Glance

CVE Identifier CVE-2026-43472
GHSA Identifier GHSA-vgv8-2mh4-qh7r
Severity MODERATE
CVSS v3.1 Base Score 5.5
CWE Classification CWE-908: Use of Uninitialized Resource
Affected Product Software
Package Ecosystem Maven
Published Date
Last Updated

Security Impact

CVSS: 5.5

The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H).

Attack Vector Local (AV:L)
Attack Complexity Low (AC:L)
Privileges Required Low (PR:L)
User Interaction None (UI:N)
Scope Unchanged (S:U)
Confidentiality None (C:N)
Integrity None (I:N)
Availability High (A:H)

How to Fix CVE-2026-43472

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Software dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

mvn dependency:tree

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your Java application is affected by CVE-2026-43472, inspect your build dependencies using the Maven Dependency Plugin:

mvn dependency:tree

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Software in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than the patched release), your application is affected.

Note: The mvn dependency:tree command inspects the resolved dependency graph declared in your project's POM files; it does not perform automated security scanning or inspect runtime dynamic classpaths. Always verify runtime container classpaths and shaded JARs.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-908: Use of Uninitialized Resource, where the product uses or accesses a resource that has not been initialized. In Software, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: unshare: fix unshare_fs() handling There's an unpleasant corner case in unshare(2), when we have a CLONE_NEWNS in flags and current->fs hadn't been shared at all; in that case copy_mnt_ns() gets passed current->fs instead of a private copy, which causes interesting warts in proof of correctness] > I guess if private means fs->users == 1, the condition could still be true. Unfortunately, it's worse than just a convoluted proof of correctness. Consider the case when we have CLONE_NEWCGROUP in addition to CLONE_NEWNS (and current->fs->users == 1). We pass current->fs to copy_mnt_ns(), all right. Suppose it succeeds and flips current->fs->{pwd,root} to corresponding locations in the new namespace. Now we proceed to copy_cgroup_ns(), which fails (e.g. with -ENOMEM). We call put_mnt_ns() on the namespace created by copy_mnt_ns(), it's destroyed and its mount tree is dissolved, but... current->fs->root and current->fs->pwd are both left pointing to now detached mounts. They are pinning those, so it's not a UAF, but it leaves the calling process with unshare(2) failing with -ENOMEM _and_ leaving it with pwd and root on detached isolated mounts. The last part is clearly a bug. There is other fun related to that mess (races with pivot_root(), including the one between pivot_root() and fork(), of all things), but this one is easy to isolate and fix - treat CLONE_NEWNS as "allocate a new fs_struct even if it hadn't been shared in the first place". Sure, we could go for something like "if both CLONE_NEWNS *and* one of the things that might end up failing after copy_mnt_ns() call in create_new_namespaces() are set, force allocation of new fs_struct", but let's keep it simple - the cost of copy_fs_struct() is trivial. Another benefit is that copy_mnt_ns() with CLONE_NEWNS *always* gets a freshly allocated fs_struct, yet to be attached to anything. That seriously simplifies the analysis... FWIW, that bug had been there since the introduction of unshare(2) ;-/

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-43472?
CVE-2026-43472 is a security vulnerability in Software classified as a security vulnerability vulnerability under CWE-908: Use of Uninitialized Resource.
Which Software versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to current release patches.
What version fixes CVE-2026-43472?
Upgrading to current release patches (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-43472?
CVE-2026-43472 has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 5.5 (MODERATE) with vector string CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H.
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-43472?
CVE-2026-43472 is classified under CWE-908: Use of Uninitialized Resource (The product uses or accesses a resource that has not been initialized.).
How can I check Maven dependencies for CVE-2026-43472?
Run the dependency tree command: 'mvn dependency:tree'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
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  "id" : "GHSA-vgv8-2mh4-qh7r",
  "modified" : "2026-05-21T15:34:02Z",
  "published" : "2026-05-08T15:31:30Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-43472" ],
  "details" : "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nunshare: fix unshare_fs() handling\n\nThere's an unpleasant corner case in unshare(2), when we have a\nCLONE_NEWNS in flags and current->fs hadn't been shared at all; in that\ncase copy_mnt_ns() gets passed current->fs instead of a private copy,\nwhich causes interesting warts in proof of correctness]\n\n> I guess if private means fs->users == 1, the condition could still be true.\n\nUnfortunately, it's worse than just a convoluted proof of correctness.\nConsider the case when we have CLONE_NEWCGROUP in addition to CLONE_NEWNS\n(and current->fs->users == 1).\n\nWe pass current->fs to copy_mnt_ns(), all right.  Suppose it succeeds and\nflips current->fs->{pwd,root} to corresponding locations in the new namespace.\nNow we proceed to copy_cgroup_ns(), which fails (e.g. with -ENOMEM).\nWe call put_mnt_ns() on the namespace created by copy_mnt_ns(), it's\ndestroyed and its mount tree is dissolved, but...  current->fs->root and\ncurrent->fs->pwd are both left pointing to now detached mounts.\n\nThey are pinning those, so it's not a UAF, but it leaves the calling\nprocess with unshare(2) failing with -ENOMEM _and_ leaving it with\npwd and root on detached isolated mounts.  The last part is clearly a bug.\n\nThere is other fun related to that mess (races with pivot_root(), including\nthe one between pivot_root() and fork(), of all things), but this one\nis easy to isolate and fix - treat CLONE_NEWNS as \"allocate a new\nfs_struct even if it hadn't been shared in the first place\".  Sure, we could\ngo for something like \"if both CLONE_NEWNS *and* one of the things that might\nend up failing after copy_mnt_ns() call in create_new_namespaces() are set,\nforce allocation of new fs_struct\", but let's keep it simple - the cost\nof copy_fs_struct() is trivial.\n\nAnother benefit is that copy_mnt_ns() with CLONE_NEWNS *always* gets\na freshly allocated fs_struct, yet to be attached to anything.  That\nseriously simplifies the analysis...\n\nFWIW, that bug had been there since the introduction of unshare(2) ;-/",
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    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H"
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  "affected" : [ ],
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