CVE-2026-62996: Smarty/smarty Remote Code Execution Vulnerability

MODERATE
Advisory Identifier: GHSA-rjhh-76wf-8xmw
CWE-22
Published
Advisory Summary

CVE-2026-62996 is a MODERATE remote code execution vulnerability (CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')) affecting Smarty/smarty libraries in the Packagist ecosystem. The issue involves resource. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 5.8.4.

CVE-2026-62996 at a Glance

CVE Identifier CVE-2026-62996
GHSA Identifier GHSA-rjhh-76wf-8xmw
Severity MODERATE
CVSS v3.1 Base Score N/A
CWE Classification CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
Affected Product Smarty/smarty
Package Ecosystem Packagist
Published Date
Last Updated

How to Fix CVE-2026-62996

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Smarty/smarty dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

smarty/smarty fixed: 5.8.4
Upgrade smarty/smarty to 5.8.4
Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

inspect dependencies for smarty/smarty

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your application is affected by CVE-2026-62996, inspect your project dependencies for Smarty/smarty:

inspect dependencies for smarty/smarty

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Smarty/smarty in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 5.8.4), your application is affected.

Note: Verify declared build manifests and deployed runtime container environments.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal'), where the product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory. In Smarty/smarty, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

`smarty/smarty` version `5.8.0` can read local files through PHP stream wrappers even when Smarty Security is enabled and all streams are disabled with `Security::$streams = null`. The bypass uses Smarty's built-in `stream:` resource type. A template such as: ```smarty {include file="stream:php://filter/read=convert.base64-encode/resource=/tmp/secret.tpl"} ``` is handled as Smarty resource type `stream`, so the security check that would normally reject the underlying `php` wrapper is not applied. `StreamPlugin` then opens the nested `php://filter/...` URI directly. For comparison, the direct resource: ```smarty {include file="php://filter/read=convert.base64-encode/resource=/tmp/secret.tpl"} ``` is blocked with `stream 'php' not allowed by security setting`. Affected package: - Ecosystem: Packagist / Composer - Package: `smarty/smarty` - Confirmed affected version: `5.8.0` - Confirmed source reference from Composer lock: `78d259d3b971c59a0cd719c270cc5cbb740c36a7` - Current stable version on Packagist at review time: `v5.8.0` - Packagist usage at review time: 41,113,855 total downloads and 840,604 monthly downloads Relevant code paths: - `Smarty\Resource\BasePlugin::load(...)` - `Smarty\Resource\StreamPlugin::getContent(...)` - `Smarty\Security::isTrustedStream(...)` `BasePlugin::load()` maps the built-in resource name `stream` directly to `StreamPlugin` before the code path that checks PHP stream wrappers with `stream_get_wrappers()` and `Security::isTrustedStream($type)`. `StreamPlugin::getContent()` later calls `fopen($filepath, 'r+')` on the nested URI when the resource name contains `://`. Preconditions: An application must render templates that are not fully trusted while relying on Smarty Security to restrict local files and PHP stream wrappers. The PoC sets: ```php $smarty->enableSecurity(); $smarty->security_policy->streams = null; ``` Local reproduction: The PoC creates a disposable template directory and a separate outside directory. It enables Smarty Security, disables all streams, and then compares three includes: 1. `../outside/secret.tpl` to confirm the ordinary trusted-directory boundary is enforced. 2. `php://filter/...` to confirm direct PHP streams are blocked by `Security::$streams = null`. 3. `stream:php://filter/...` to show the built-in `stream:` resource bypasses the same restriction and reads the outside file. Run: ```shell php -d display_errors=1 poc.php ``` Observed sanitized output: ```text package=smarty/smarty installed_version=v5.8.0 template_dir=<tmp>/templates outside_template=<tmp>/outside/secret.tpl plain_dotdot_include=BLOCKED:Smarty\Exception:Smarty Security: not trusted file path '<tmp>/outside/secret.tpl' direct_php_filter_include=BLOCKED:Smarty\Exception:stream 'php' not allowed by security setting stream_php_filter_include=OK:U01BUlRZX1NUUkVBTV9XUkFQUEVSX1NFQ1VSSVRZX0VTQ0FQRQ== expected_base64=U01BUlRZX1NUUkVBTV9XUkFQUEVSX1NFQ1VSSVRZX0VTQ0FQRQ== ``` The `plain_dotdot_include` line shows the directory boundary is enforced for ordinary traversal. The `direct_php_filter_include` line shows the same policy rejects `php://filter` when used directly. The `stream_php_filter_include` line shows that wrapping the same URI in Smarty's `stream:` resource bypasses that restriction and reads the outside file. Impact: A template author can bypass Smarty Security stream restrictions and read local files that are readable by the PHP process. With `php://filter`, file contents can be base64 encoded and rendered back through the template. This bypasses both the intended `Security::$streams = null` restriction and the normal trusted-template-directory check that blocks `../` traversal. Duplicate checks: - OSV query for `Packagist/smarty/smarty` version `5.8.0` returned no vulnerabilities. - GitHub advisory query for `ecosystem=composer` and `affects=smarty/smarty` returned historical Smarty advisories, including sandbox escapes, PHP code injection, XSS, and older path traversal issues. The listed path traversal advisories affect older versions and do not describe this current `stream:php://filter` resource-wrapper bypass in 5.8.0. - GitHub issue search in `smarty-php/smarty` for `stream:php://filter` returned zero results. - Public searches for `Smarty StreamPlugin php://filter` and `smarty/smarty isTrustedStream stream:` did not identify a clear public duplicate during triage. Suggested remediation: When resolving the built-in `stream:` resource, parse and validate the nested URI scheme before opening it. For example, `stream:php://filter/...` should call `Security::isTrustedStream('php')`, and `Security::$streams = null` should block the resource before `StreamPlugin::getContent()` reaches `fopen()`. It would also be safer for `StreamPlugin` to reject nested stream wrappers by default unless the underlying wrapper is explicitly allowed by the active security policy.

CVE-2026-62996 Affected Smarty/smarty Versions

1 component(s)
Fixed Versions:
5.8.4
Product / Package Ecosystem Affected Versions Fixed Version
smarty/smarty
Packagist
≥ 5.0.0
< 5.8.4
5.8.4

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-62996?
CVE-2026-62996 is a security vulnerability in Smarty/smarty involving resource under CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal').
Which Smarty/smarty versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to 5.8.4 across affected packages: smarty/smarty.
What version fixes CVE-2026-62996?
Upgrading to 5.8.4 (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
Is smarty/smarty affected?
Yes, smarty/smarty is affected in releases prior to 5.8.4. Upgrade your dependency to 5.8.4 or later.
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-62996?
CVE-2026-62996 is classified under CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal') (The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory.).
How can I check Packagist dependencies for CVE-2026-62996?
Run the dependency tree command: 'inspect dependencies for smarty/smarty'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-rjhh-76wf-8xmw",
  "modified" : "2026-08-07T15:10:51Z",
  "published" : "2026-08-07T15:10:51Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-62996" ],
  "summary" : "Smarty Security stream restriction bypass through stream: resource",
  "details" : "`smarty/smarty` version `5.8.0` can read local files through PHP stream wrappers even when Smarty Security is enabled and all streams are disabled with `Security::$streams = null`.\n\nThe bypass uses Smarty's built-in `stream:` resource type. A template such as:\n\n```smarty\n{include file=\"stream:php://filter/read=convert.base64-encode/resource=/tmp/secret.tpl\"}\n```\n\nis handled as Smarty resource type `stream`, so the security check that would normally reject the underlying `php` wrapper is not applied. `StreamPlugin` then opens the nested `php://filter/...` URI directly.\n\nFor comparison, the direct resource:\n\n```smarty\n{include file=\"php://filter/read=convert.base64-encode/resource=/tmp/secret.tpl\"}\n```\n\nis blocked with `stream 'php' not allowed by security setting`.\n\nAffected package:\n\n- Ecosystem: Packagist / Composer\n- Package: `smarty/smarty`\n- Confirmed affected version: `5.8.0`\n- Confirmed source reference from Composer lock: `78d259d3b971c59a0cd719c270cc5cbb740c36a7`\n- Current stable version on Packagist at review time: `v5.8.0`\n- Packagist usage at review time: 41,113,855 total downloads and 840,604 monthly downloads\n\nRelevant code paths:\n\n- `Smarty\\Resource\\BasePlugin::load(...)`\n- `Smarty\\Resource\\StreamPlugin::getContent(...)`\n- `Smarty\\Security::isTrustedStream(...)`\n\n`BasePlugin::load()` maps the built-in resource name `stream` directly to `StreamPlugin` before the code path that checks PHP stream wrappers with `stream_get_wrappers()` and `Security::isTrustedStream($type)`. `StreamPlugin::getContent()` later calls `fopen($filepath, 'r+')` on the nested URI when the resource name contains `://`.\n\nPreconditions:\n\nAn application must render templates that are not fully trusted while relying on Smarty Security to restrict local files and PHP stream wrappers. The PoC sets:\n\n```php\n$smarty->enableSecurity();\n$smarty->security_policy->streams = null;\n```\n\nLocal reproduction:\n\nThe PoC creates a disposable template directory and a separate outside directory. It enables Smarty Security, disables all streams, and then compares three includes:\n\n1. `../outside/secret.tpl` to confirm the ordinary trusted-directory boundary is enforced.\n2. `php://filter/...` to confirm direct PHP streams are blocked by `Security::$streams = null`.\n3. `stream:php://filter/...` to show the built-in `stream:` resource bypasses the same restriction and reads the outside file.\n\nRun:\n\n```shell\nphp -d display_errors=1 poc.php\n```\n\nObserved sanitized output:\n\n```text\npackage=smarty/smarty\ninstalled_version=v5.8.0\ntemplate_dir=<tmp>/templates\noutside_template=<tmp>/outside/secret.tpl\nplain_dotdot_include=BLOCKED:Smarty\\Exception:Smarty Security: not trusted file path '<tmp>/outside/secret.tpl'\ndirect_php_filter_include=BLOCKED:Smarty\\Exception:stream 'php' not allowed by security setting\nstream_php_filter_include=OK:U01BUlRZX1NUUkVBTV9XUkFQUEVSX1NFQ1VSSVRZX0VTQ0FQRQ==\nexpected_base64=U01BUlRZX1NUUkVBTV9XUkFQUEVSX1NFQ1VSSVRZX0VTQ0FQRQ==\n```\n\nThe `plain_dotdot_include` line shows the directory boundary is enforced for ordinary traversal. The `direct_php_filter_include` line shows the same policy rejects `php://filter` when used directly. The `stream_php_filter_include` line shows that wrapping the same URI in Smarty's `stream:` resource bypasses that restriction and reads the outside file.\n\nImpact:\n\nA template author can bypass Smarty Security stream restrictions and read local files that are readable by the PHP process. With `php://filter`, file contents can be base64 encoded and rendered back through the template. This bypasses both the intended `Security::$streams = null` restriction and the normal trusted-template-directory check that blocks `../` traversal.\n\nDuplicate checks:\n\n- OSV query for `Packagist/smarty/smarty` version `5.8.0` returned no vulnerabilities.\n- GitHub advisory query for `ecosystem=composer` and `affects=smarty/smarty` returned historical Smarty advisories, including sandbox escapes, PHP code injection, XSS, and older path traversal issues. The listed path traversal advisories affect older versions and do not describe this current `stream:php://filter` resource-wrapper bypass in 5.8.0.\n- GitHub issue search in `smarty-php/smarty` for `stream:php://filter` returned zero results.\n- Public searches for `Smarty StreamPlugin php://filter` and `smarty/smarty isTrustedStream stream:` did not identify a clear public duplicate during triage.\n\nSuggested remediation:\n\nWhen resolving the built-in `stream:` resource, parse and validate the nested URI scheme before opening it. For example, `stream:php://filter/...` should call `Security::isTrustedStream('php')`, and `Security::$streams = null` should block the resource before `StreamPlugin::getContent()` reaches `fopen()`.\n\nIt would also be safer for `StreamPlugin` to reject nested stream wrappers by default unless the underlying wrapper is explicitly allowed by the active security policy.",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V4",
    "score" : "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "Packagist",
      "name" : "smarty/smarty"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "5.0.0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "5.8.4"
      } ]
    } ]
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/smarty-php/smarty/security/advisories/GHSA-rjhh-76wf-8xmw"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/smarty-php/smarty/pull/1195"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/smarty-php/smarty/commit/3c9f77a2e06ce319ae0092496af32cc8f3adc52e"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/smarty-php/smarty"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/smarty-php/smarty/releases/tag/v5.8.4"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-22" ],
    "severity" : "MODERATE",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-08-07T15:10:51Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : null
  }
}