CVE-2026-39308: PraisonAI Path Traversal Vulnerability
HIGHCVE-2026-39308 is a HIGH (CVSS 7.1) path traversal vulnerability (CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')) affecting PraisonAI libraries in the PyPI ecosystem. The issue involves praisonai recipe registry publish path traversal allows out-of-root file write. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 4.5.113.
CVE-2026-39308 at a Glance
Security Impact
CVSS: 7.1
The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L).
How to Fix CVE-2026-39308
To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected PraisonAI dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.
pip install PraisonAI>=4.5.113
Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:
pip show PraisonAI
How to Check if You Are Affected
To determine whether your Python environment is affected by CVE-2026-39308, inspect your installed packages using pip:
pip show PraisonAI
Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of PraisonAI in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 4.5.113), your application is affected.
Note: The pip show PraisonAI command checks currently installed packages in your active Python environment.
Technical Details
Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis
This vulnerability is classified under CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal'), where the product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory. In PraisonAI, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.
Source Advisory Statement
CVE-2026-39308 Affected PraisonAI Versions
1 component(s)| Product / Package | Ecosystem | Affected Versions | Fixed Version |
|---|---|---|---|
|
PraisonAI
|
PyPI |
< 4.5.113
|
4.5.113
|
References
Frequently Asked Questions
What is CVE-2026-39308?
Which PraisonAI versions are affected?
What version fixes CVE-2026-39308?
Is PraisonAI affected?
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-39308?
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-39308?
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Machine-readable OSV JSON
OSV v1.5 Schema
{
"schema_version" : "1.4.0",
"id" : "GHSA-r9x3-wx45-2v7f",
"modified" : "2026-04-07T22:10:12Z",
"published" : "2026-04-06T23:09:19Z",
"aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-39308" ],
"summary" : "PraisonAI recipe registry publish path traversal allows out-of-root file write",
"details" : "### Summary\n\nPraisonAI's recipe registry publish endpoint writes uploaded recipe bundles to a filesystem path derived from the bundle's internal `manifest.json` before it verifies that the manifest `name` and `version` match the HTTP route. A malicious publisher can place `../` traversal sequences in the bundle manifest and cause the registry server to create files outside the configured registry root even though the request is ultimately rejected with HTTP `400`.\n\nThis is an arbitrary file write / path traversal issue on the registry host. It affects deployments that expose the recipe registry publish flow. If the registry is intentionally run without a token, any network client that can reach the service can trigger it. If a token is configured, any user with publish access can still exploit it.\n\n### Details\n\nThe bug is caused by the order of operations between the HTTP handler and the registry storage layer.\n\n1. `RegistryServer._handle_publish()` in `src/praisonai/praisonai/recipe/server.py:370-426` parses `POST /v1/recipes/{name}/{version}`, writes the uploaded `.praison` file to a temporary path, and immediately calls:\n\n```python\nresult = self.registry.publish(tmp_path, force=force)\n```\n\n2. `LocalRegistry.publish()` in `src/praisonai/praisonai/recipe/registry.py:214-287` opens the uploaded tarball, reads `manifest.json`, and trusts the attacker-controlled `name` and `version` fields:\n\n```python\nname = manifest.get(\"name\")\nversion = manifest.get(\"version\")\nrecipe_dir = self.recipes_path / name / version\nrecipe_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)\nbundle_name = f\"{name}-{version}.praison\"\ndest_path = recipe_dir / bundle_name\nshutil.copy2(bundle_path, dest_path)\n```\n\n3. Validation helpers already exist in the same file:\n\n```python\ndef _validate_name(name: str) -> bool:\ndef _validate_version(version: str) -> bool:\n```\n\nbut they are not called before the filesystem write.\n\n4. Only after `publish()` returns does the route compare the manifest values with the URL values:\n\n```python\nif result[\"name\"] != name or result[\"version\"] != version:\n self.registry.delete(result[\"name\"], result[\"version\"])\n return self._error_response(...)\n```\n\nAt that point the out-of-root artifact has already been created. The request returns an error, but the write outside the registry root remains on disk.\n\nVerified vulnerable behavior:\n\n- Request path: `/v1/recipes/safe/1.0.0`\n- Internal manifest name: `../../outside-dir`\n- Server response: HTTP `400`\n- Leftover artifact: `/tmp/praisonai-publish-traversal-poc/outside-dir-1.0.0.praison`\n\nThis demonstrates that the write occurs before the consistency check and rollback.\n\n### PoC\n\nRun the single verification script from the checked-out repository:\n\n```bash\ncd \"/Users/r1zzg0d/Documents/CVE hunting/targets/PraisonAI\"\npython3 tmp/pocs/poc.py\n```\n\nExpected vulnerable output:\n\n```text\n[+] Publish response status: 400\n{\n \"ok\": false,\n \"error\": \"Bundle name/version (../../outside-dir@1.0.0) doesn't match URL (safe@1.0.0)\",\n \"code\": \"error\"\n}\n[+] Leftover artifact exists: True\n[+] Artifact under registry root: False\n[+] RESULT: VULNERABLE - upload was rejected, but an out-of-root artifact was still created.\n```\n\nThen verify the artifact manually:\n\n```bash\nls -l /tmp/praisonai-publish-traversal-poc/outside-dir-1.0.0.praison\nfind /tmp/praisonai-publish-traversal-poc -maxdepth 2 | sort\n```\n\nWhat the script does internally:\n\n1. Starts a local PraisonAI recipe registry server.\n2. Builds a malicious `.praison` bundle whose internal `manifest.json` contains `name = ../../outside-dir`.\n3. Uploads that bundle to the apparently safe route `/v1/recipes/safe/1.0.0`.\n4. Receives the expected `400` mismatch error.\n5. Confirms that `outside-dir-1.0.0.praison` was still written outside the configured registry directory.\n\n### Impact\n\nThis is a path traversal / arbitrary file write vulnerability in the recipe registry publish flow.\n\nImpacted parties:\n\n- Registry operators running the PraisonAI recipe registry service.\n- Any deployment that allows remote recipe publication.\n- Any environment where adjacent writable filesystem locations contain sensitive application data, service files, or staged content that could be overwritten or planted.\n\nSecurity impact:\n\n- Integrity impact is high because an attacker can create or overwrite files outside the registry root.\n- Availability impact is possible if the attacker targets adjacent runtime or application files.\n- The issue can be chained with other local loading or deployment behaviors if nearby files are later consumed by another component.\n\n### Remediation\n\n1. Validate `manifest.json` `name` and `version` before any path join or filesystem write. Reject path separators, `..`, absolute paths, and any value that fails the existing `_validate_name()` / `_validate_version()` checks.\n\n2. Resolve the final destination path and enforce that it remains under the configured registry root before calling `mkdir()` or `copy2()`. For example, compare the resolved destination against `self.recipes_path.resolve()`.\n\n3. Move the URL-to-manifest consistency check ahead of `self.registry.publish(...)`, or refactor `publish()` so it receives already-validated route parameters instead of trusting attacker-controlled manifest values for storage paths.",
"severity" : [ {
"type" : "CVSS_V3",
"score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L"
} ],
"affected" : [ {
"package" : {
"ecosystem" : "PyPI",
"name" : "PraisonAI"
},
"ranges" : [ {
"type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
"events" : [ {
"introduced" : "0"
}, {
"fixed" : "4.5.113"
} ]
} ],
"database_specific" : {
"last_known_affected_version_range" : "<= 4.5.112"
}
} ],
"references" : [ {
"type" : "WEB",
"url" : "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-r9x3-wx45-2v7f"
}, {
"type" : "ADVISORY",
"url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-39308"
}, {
"type" : "PACKAGE",
"url" : "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI"
}, {
"type" : "WEB",
"url" : "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/releases/tag/v4.5.113"
} ],
"database_specific" : {
"cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-22" ],
"severity" : "HIGH",
"github_reviewed" : true,
"github_reviewed_at" : "2026-04-06T23:09:19Z",
"nvd_published_at" : "2026-04-07T17:16:36Z"
}
}