GHSA-qv97-5qr8-2266: Mithril client Mithril Snapshots For Cardano Database Vulnerability

MODERATE
CVSS 4.9
CWE-345
Published
Advisory Summary

GHSA-qv97-5qr8-2266 is a MODERATE (CVSS 4.9) mithril snapshots for cardano database vulnerability (CWE-345: Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity) affecting Mithril client libraries in the crates.io ecosystem. The issue involves mithril snapshots for cardano database could be compromised by an adversary. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 0.12.2.

GHSA-qv97-5qr8-2266 at a Glance

CVE Identifier N/A
GHSA Identifier GHSA-qv97-5qr8-2266
Severity MODERATE
CVSS v3.1 Base Score 4.9
CWE Classification CWE-345: Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity
Affected Product Mithril client
Package Ecosystem crates.io
Published Date
Last Updated

Security Impact

CVSS: 4.9

The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:L/A:L).

Attack Vector Network (AV:N)
Attack Complexity High (AC:H)
Privileges Required Low (PR:L)
User Interaction None (UI:N)
Scope Changed (S:C)
Confidentiality None (C:N)
Integrity Low (I:L)
Availability Low (A:L)

How to Fix GHSA-qv97-5qr8-2266

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Mithril client dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

mithril-client fixed: 0.12.2
Upgrade mithril-client to 0.12.2
Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

inspect dependencies for mithril-client

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your application is affected by GHSA-qv97-5qr8-2266, inspect your project dependencies for Mithril client:

inspect dependencies for mithril-client

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Mithril client in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 0.12.2), your application is affected.

Note: Verify declared build manifests and deployed runtime container environments.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-345: Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity, where the product does not sufficiently verify the origin or authenticity of data, in a way that causes it to accept invalid data. In Mithril client, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

### Impact #### Mithril certification of Cardano database The Mithril network provides certification for snapshots of the Cardano database, enabling users to quickly bootstrap a Cardano node without relying on the slower peer-to-peer synchronization process. To generate a multi-signature, a minimum threshold of Cardano stake registered in the protocol must agree on signing the same message. In this context, a digest is computed from the internal files of the Cardano node's database. However, this mechanism has certain limitations. Specifically, some files are not identically generated across all Cardano nodes, and there is no API to provide consistent snapshots at a specific beacon on the Cardano chain: - All immutable files, except the last one (which is still being created), are used to compute the message - The last immutable file is excluded from the signature - The ledger state files are also excluded from the signature. #### Cardano node startup sequence A Cardano node can only perform a fast bootstrap if a pre-computed ledger state is loaded into its database; otherwise, a full re-computation is required, which is time-consuming. During the startup phase with a pre-computed ledger state, the node performs structural verification of the ledger state and lightweight conformity checks which may not be enough to systematically detect invalid ledger state. #### Attack scenarios Inconsistencies could be introduced into a tampered ledger state distributed through Mithril snapshots, either by an unknown source or by a compromised IOG-operated aggregator. These inconsistencies would not be immediately detected by Cardano nodes started with such snapshots, potentially enabling long-range attacks that might not be corrected by honest nodes, even if they sync from genesis. Currently, a Mithril network has only one aggregator, which serves snapshots from a secure cloud location operated by IOG and is therefore assumed to be trustworthy. In the future, as Mithril networks become more decentralized, multiple aggregators will operate independently. This increased decentralization could raise the risk of a malicious aggregator distributing a tampered ledger state. ### Patches As a mitigation, the Mithril aggregator now signs the ledger state snapshot and the latest immutable file using an IOG-owned key, and the client library and CLI validate the signature of these files upon download. - The **Mithril client library** has been fixed with version `0.12.2`, **previous versions must not be used anymore**. - The **Mithril client CLI** has been fixed with version `0.12.1`, **previous versions must not be used anymore**. - The **Mithril aggregator** has been fixed with version `0.7.44`, **previous versions must not be used anymore**. ### References - _Mithril protocol in depth_: https://mithril.network/doc/next/mithril/mithril-protocol/protocol - _Bootstrap a Cardano node_: https://mithril.network/doc/manual/getting-started/bootstrap-cardano-node - _Mithril certification of the Cardano node database_: https://mithril.network/doc/mithril/advanced/mithril-certification/cardano-node-database

GHSA-qv97-5qr8-2266 Affected Mithril client Versions

1 component(s)
Fixed Versions:
0.12.2
Product / Package Ecosystem Affected Versions Fixed Version
mithril-client
crates.io
< 0.12.2
0.12.2

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is GHSA-qv97-5qr8-2266?
GHSA-qv97-5qr8-2266 is a security vulnerability in Mithril client involving Mithril snapshots for Cardano database could be compromised by an adversary under CWE-345: Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity.
Which Mithril client versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to 0.12.2 across affected packages: mithril-client.
What version fixes GHSA-qv97-5qr8-2266?
Upgrading to 0.12.2 (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
Is mithril-client affected?
Yes, mithril-client is affected in releases prior to 0.12.2. Upgrade your dependency to 0.12.2 or later.
What is the CVSS score of GHSA-qv97-5qr8-2266?
GHSA-qv97-5qr8-2266 has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 4.9 (MODERATE) with vector string CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:L/A:L.
What CWE is associated with GHSA-qv97-5qr8-2266?
GHSA-qv97-5qr8-2266 is classified under CWE-345: Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity (The product does not sufficiently verify the origin or authenticity of data, in a way that causes it to accept invalid data.).
How can I check crates.io dependencies for GHSA-qv97-5qr8-2266?
Run the dependency tree command: 'inspect dependencies for mithril-client'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-qv97-5qr8-2266",
  "modified" : "2025-05-07T15:25:18Z",
  "published" : "2025-05-07T15:25:18Z",
  "aliases" : [ ],
  "summary" : "Mithril snapshots for Cardano database could be compromised by an adversary",
  "details" : "### Impact\n\n#### Mithril certification of Cardano database\n\nThe Mithril network provides certification for snapshots of the Cardano database, enabling users to quickly bootstrap a Cardano node without relying on the slower peer-to-peer synchronization process.\n\nTo generate a multi-signature, a minimum threshold of Cardano stake registered in the protocol must agree on signing the same message. In this context, a digest is computed from the internal files of the Cardano node's database. However, this mechanism has certain limitations. Specifically, some files are not identically generated across all Cardano nodes, and there is no API to provide consistent snapshots at a specific beacon on the Cardano chain:\n\n- All immutable files, except the last one (which is still being created), are used to compute the message\n- The last immutable file is excluded from the signature\n- The ledger state files are also excluded from the signature.\n\n#### Cardano node startup sequence\n\nA Cardano node can only perform a fast bootstrap if a pre-computed ledger state is loaded into its database; otherwise, a full re-computation is required, which is time-consuming. During the startup phase with a pre-computed ledger state, the node performs structural verification of the ledger state and lightweight conformity checks which may not be enough to systematically detect invalid ledger state.\n\n#### Attack scenarios\n\nInconsistencies could be introduced into a tampered ledger state distributed through Mithril snapshots, either by an unknown source or by a compromised IOG-operated aggregator. These inconsistencies would not be immediately detected by Cardano nodes started with such snapshots, potentially enabling long-range attacks that might not be corrected by honest nodes, even if they sync from genesis.\n\nCurrently, a Mithril network has only one aggregator, which serves snapshots from a secure cloud location operated by IOG and is therefore assumed to be trustworthy. In the future, as Mithril networks become more decentralized, multiple aggregators will operate independently. This increased decentralization could raise the risk of a malicious aggregator distributing a tampered ledger state.\n\n### Patches\n\nAs a mitigation, the Mithril aggregator now signs the ledger state snapshot and the latest immutable file using an IOG-owned key, and the client library and CLI validate the signature of these files upon download.\n\n- The **Mithril client library** has been fixed with version `0.12.2`, **previous versions must not be used anymore**.\n- The **Mithril client CLI** has been fixed with version `0.12.1`, **previous versions must not be used anymore**.\n- The **Mithril aggregator** has been fixed with version `0.7.44`, **previous versions must not be used anymore**.\n\n### References\n\n- _Mithril protocol in depth_: https://mithril.network/doc/next/mithril/mithril-protocol/protocol\n- _Bootstrap a Cardano node_: https://mithril.network/doc/manual/getting-started/bootstrap-cardano-node\n- _Mithril certification of the Cardano node database_: https://mithril.network/doc/mithril/advanced/mithril-certification/cardano-node-database",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:L/A:L"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "crates.io",
      "name" : "mithril-client"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "0.12.2"
      } ]
    } ]
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/input-output-hk/mithril/security/advisories/GHSA-qv97-5qr8-2266"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/input-output-hk/mithril"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-345" ],
    "severity" : "MODERATE",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2025-05-07T15:25:18Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : null
  }
}