CVE-2026-55255: Langflow IDOR Vulnerability Vulnerability

HIGH
Advisory Identifier: GHSA-qrpv-q767-xqq2
CVSS 8.4
CWE-639
Published
Advisory Summary

CVE-2026-55255 is a HIGH (CVSS 8.4) idor vulnerability vulnerability (CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key) affecting Langflow libraries in the PyPI ecosystem. The issue involves idor vulnerability in `/api/v1/responses` endpoint allows authenticated attackers to access another user's flow. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 1.9.1.

CVE-2026-55255 at a Glance

CVE Identifier CVE-2026-55255
GHSA Identifier GHSA-qrpv-q767-xqq2
Severity HIGH
CVSS v3.1 Base Score 8.4
CWE Classification CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key
Affected Product Langflow
Package Ecosystem PyPI
Published Date
Last Updated

Security Impact

CVSS: 8.4

The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:L).

Attack Vector Network (AV:N)
Attack Complexity High (AC:H)
Privileges Required Low (PR:L)
User Interaction None (UI:N)
Scope Changed (S:C)
Confidentiality High (C:H)
Integrity High (I:H)
Availability Low (A:L)

How to Fix CVE-2026-55255

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Langflow dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

langflow fixed: 1.9.1
pip install langflow>=1.9.1
Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

pip show langflow

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your Python environment is affected by CVE-2026-55255, inspect your installed packages using pip:

pip show langflow

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Langflow in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 1.9.1), your application is affected.

Note: The pip show langflow command checks currently installed packages in your active Python environment.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key, where the system's authorization functionality does not prevent one user from gaining access to another user's data or record by modifying the key value identifying the data. In Langflow, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

## Summary Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) vulnerability in `/api/v1/responses` endpoint allows an authenticated attacker to execute any flow belonging to another user by specifying the victim's flow ID in the request. ## Details The vulnerability exists in the `get_flow_by_id_or_endpoint_name` helper function in [`src/backend/base/langflow/helpers/flow.py` (lines 399-414)](https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/blob/v1.9.0/src/backend/base/langflow/helpers/flow.py#L399C1-L414C67). When a flow is accessed via UUID (flow_id), the function queries the database directly without verifying if the authenticated user owns that flow: ```python # src/backend/base/langflow/helpers/flow.py:399-414 async def get_flow_by_id_or_endpoint_name(flow_id_or_name: str, user_id: str | UUID | None = None) -> FlowRead: async with session_scope() as session: try: flow_id = UUID(flow_id_or_name) # When using UUID, query directly WITHOUT checking user_id flow = await session.get(Flow, flow_id) # ❌ No user_id check! except ValueError: endpoint_name = flow_id_or_name stmt = select(Flow).where(Flow.endpoint_name == endpoint_name) # Only when using endpoint_name is user_id checked if user_id: stmt = stmt.where(Flow.user_id == uuid_user_id) ``` This function is used by the `/api/v1/responses` endpoint (defined in [`src/backend/base/langflow/api/v1/openai_responses.py:589`](https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/blob/v1.9.0/src/backend/base/langflow/api/v1/openai_responses.py#L589)). ## PoC (Proof of Concept) ```bash # Attacker (user A) with API_KEY_A tries to execute victim (user B)'s flow curl -X POST "http://localhost:7860/api/v1/responses" \ -H "x-api-key: sk-ATTACKER_API_KEY" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{ "model": "VICTIM_FLOW_ID", "input_value": "test", "stream": false }' # Returns 200 and executes the victim's flow ``` ## Impact Any authenticated user can: 1. Execute any flow in the system by knowing its flow ID 2. Access potentially sensitive data processed by victim's flows 3. Consume victim's resources ## Fixes Fixed in **PR #12832** (`fix(security): close IDOR in get_flow_by_id_or_endpoint_name`), merged 2026-04-22, released in **Langflow 1.9.1**. The helper normalizes `user_id` once and enforces ownership on **both** lookup branches (UUID *and* `endpoint_name`): ```python flow_id = UUID(flow_id_or_name) flow = await session.get(Flow, flow_id) if flow is not None and uuid_user_id is not None and flow.user_id != uuid_user_id: flow = None # cross-user lookup falls through to the shared 404 ``` Key points: - Cross-user lookups return **404** (not 403), so flow existence is not disclosed via a 403-vs-404 oracle. - `/api/v1/responses` and `/api/v2/workflow` pass `user_id` explicitly, so fixing the helper closes them directly; the `/api/v1/run*` routes were additionally moved from a bare `Depends(get_flow_by_id_or_endpoint_name)` to auth-aware wrapper dependencies (defense in depth). - A malformed `user_id` now fails closed (404 instead of a raw 500). - Webhook routes intentionally keep the unscoped lookup (public by design / explicit ownership check elsewhere). - Regression tests cover the cross-user UUID case and reproduce the original PoC against `/api/v1/responses`. ## Acknowledgements Thanks to the security researchers who responsibly disclosed this vulnerability: * @yzeirnials * @johnatzeropath * @LeftenantZero * @Zwique

CVE-2026-55255 Affected Langflow Versions

1 component(s)
Fixed Versions:
1.9.1
Product / Package Ecosystem Affected Versions Fixed Version
langflow
PyPI
< 1.9.1
1.9.1

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-55255?
CVE-2026-55255 is a security vulnerability in Langflow involving IDOR Vulnerability in `/api/v1/responses` Endpoint Allows Authenticated Attackers to Access Another User's Flow under CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key.
Which Langflow versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to 1.9.1 across affected packages: langflow.
What version fixes CVE-2026-55255?
Upgrading to 1.9.1 (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
Is langflow affected?
Yes, langflow is affected in releases prior to 1.9.1. Upgrade your dependency to 1.9.1 or later.
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-55255?
CVE-2026-55255 has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 8.4 (HIGH) with vector string CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:L.
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-55255?
CVE-2026-55255 is classified under CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key (The system's authorization functionality does not prevent one user from gaining access to another user's data or record by modifying the key value identifying the data.).
How can I check PyPI dependencies for CVE-2026-55255?
Run the dependency tree command: 'pip show langflow'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-qrpv-q767-xqq2",
  "modified" : "2026-07-07T22:14:36Z",
  "published" : "2026-06-19T21:16:46Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-55255" ],
  "summary" : "Langflow: IDOR Vulnerability in `/api/v1/responses` Endpoint Allows Authenticated Attackers to Access Another User's Flow",
  "details" : "## Summary\n\nInsecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) vulnerability in `/api/v1/responses` endpoint allows an authenticated attacker to execute any flow belonging to another user by specifying the victim's flow ID in the request.\n\n## Details\n\nThe vulnerability exists in the `get_flow_by_id_or_endpoint_name` helper function in [`src/backend/base/langflow/helpers/flow.py` (lines 399-414)](https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/blob/v1.9.0/src/backend/base/langflow/helpers/flow.py#L399C1-L414C67).\n\nWhen a flow is accessed via UUID (flow_id), the function queries the database directly without verifying if the authenticated user owns that flow:\n\n```python\n# src/backend/base/langflow/helpers/flow.py:399-414\nasync def get_flow_by_id_or_endpoint_name(flow_id_or_name: str, user_id: str | UUID | None = None) -> FlowRead:\n    async with session_scope() as session:\n        try:\n            flow_id = UUID(flow_id_or_name)\n            # When using UUID, query directly WITHOUT checking user_id\n            flow = await session.get(Flow, flow_id)  # ❌ No user_id check!\n        except ValueError:\n            endpoint_name = flow_id_or_name\n            stmt = select(Flow).where(Flow.endpoint_name == endpoint_name)\n            # Only when using endpoint_name is user_id checked\n            if user_id:\n                stmt = stmt.where(Flow.user_id == uuid_user_id)\n```\n\nThis function is used by the `/api/v1/responses` endpoint (defined in [`src/backend/base/langflow/api/v1/openai_responses.py:589`](https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/blob/v1.9.0/src/backend/base/langflow/api/v1/openai_responses.py#L589)).\n\n## PoC (Proof of Concept)\n\n```bash\n# Attacker (user A) with API_KEY_A tries to execute victim (user B)'s flow\ncurl -X POST \"http://localhost:7860/api/v1/responses\" \\\n  -H \"x-api-key: sk-ATTACKER_API_KEY\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -d '{\n    \"model\": \"VICTIM_FLOW_ID\",\n    \"input_value\": \"test\",\n    \"stream\": false\n  }'\n# Returns 200 and executes the victim's flow\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nAny authenticated user can:\n1. Execute any flow in the system by knowing its flow ID\n2. Access potentially sensitive data processed by victim's flows\n3. Consume victim's resources\n\n## Fixes\n\nFixed in **PR #12832** (`fix(security): close IDOR in get_flow_by_id_or_endpoint_name`), merged 2026-04-22, released in **Langflow 1.9.1**.\n\nThe helper normalizes `user_id` once and enforces ownership on **both** lookup branches (UUID *and* `endpoint_name`):\n\n```python\nflow_id = UUID(flow_id_or_name)\nflow = await session.get(Flow, flow_id)\nif flow is not None and uuid_user_id is not None and flow.user_id != uuid_user_id:\n    flow = None  # cross-user lookup falls through to the shared 404\n```\n\nKey points:\n- Cross-user lookups return **404** (not 403), so flow existence is not disclosed via a 403-vs-404 oracle.\n- `/api/v1/responses` and `/api/v2/workflow` pass `user_id` explicitly, so fixing the helper closes them directly; the `/api/v1/run*` routes were additionally moved from a bare `Depends(get_flow_by_id_or_endpoint_name)` to auth-aware wrapper dependencies (defense in depth).\n- A malformed `user_id` now fails closed (404 instead of a raw 500).\n- Webhook routes intentionally keep the unscoped lookup (public by design / explicit ownership check elsewhere).\n- Regression tests cover the cross-user UUID case and reproduce the original PoC against `/api/v1/responses`.\n\n\n\n\n\n## Acknowledgements\n\nThanks to the security researchers who responsibly disclosed this vulnerability:\n* @yzeirnials\n* @johnatzeropath\n* @LeftenantZero\n* @Zwique",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:L"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "PyPI",
      "name" : "langflow"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "1.9.1"
      } ]
    } ]
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/security/advisories/GHSA-qrpv-q767-xqq2"
  }, {
    "type" : "ADVISORY",
    "url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-55255"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/pull/12832"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/commit/2c9f498d664a3c32698b57d7c5e752625291060e"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/langflow/PYSEC-2026-221.yaml"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://webflow.sysdig.com/blog/understanding-langflow-cve-2026-55255-and-why-higher-cvss-vulnerabilities-arent-always-the-most-exploited"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2026-55255"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-639" ],
    "severity" : "HIGH",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-06-19T21:16:46Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : "2026-06-23T17:17:08Z"
  }
}