CVE-2025-54583: @finos/git proxy GitProxy Approval Bypass When Pushing Vulnerability

HIGH
Advisory Identifier: GHSA-qr93-8wwf-22g4
CWE-863
Published
Advisory Summary

CVE-2025-54583 is a HIGH gitproxy approval bypass when pushing vulnerability (CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization) affecting @finos/git proxy libraries in the npm ecosystem. The issue involves gitproxy approval bypass when pushing multiple branches. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 1.19.2.

CVE-2025-54583 at a Glance

CVE Identifier CVE-2025-54583
GHSA Identifier GHSA-qr93-8wwf-22g4
Severity HIGH
CVSS v3.1 Base Score N/A
CWE Classification CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization
Affected Product @finos/git proxy
Package Ecosystem npm
Published Date
Last Updated

How to Fix CVE-2025-54583

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected @finos/git proxy dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

@finos/git-proxy fixed: 1.19.2
npm install @finos/git-proxy@1.19.2
Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

npm ls @finos/git-proxy

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your Node.js application is affected by CVE-2025-54583, inspect your project dependencies using npm:

npm ls @finos/git-proxy

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of @finos/git proxy in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 1.19.2), your application is affected.

Note: The npm ls @finos/git-proxy command inspects dependencies declared in your package.json and lockfile; it does not perform automated runtime dynamic scanning.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization, where the product performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action, but it does not correctly perform the check. In @finos/git proxy, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

### Summary This vulnerability allows a user to push to the remote repository while bypassing policies and explicit approval. Since checks and plugins are skipped, code containing secrets or unwanted changes could be pushed into a repository. Because it can allow policy violations to go undetected, we classify this as a High impact vulnerability. ### Details The source of the vulnerability is the push parser action `parsePush.ts`. It reads the first branch and parses it, while ignoring subsequent branches (silently letting them go through). Although the fix involves multiple improvements to the commit and push parsing logic, the core solution is to prevent multiple branch pushes from going through in the first place: ```ts if (refUpdates.length !== 1) { step.log('Invalid number of branch updates.'); step.log(`Expected 1, but got ${refUpdates.length}`); step.setError('Your push has been blocked. Please make sure you are pushing to a single branch.'); action.addStep(step); return action; } ``` ### PoC 1. Make a commit on a branch: ```bash git checkout -b safe-branch echo "Approved code" > file.txt git add . git commit -m "Approved code" git push proxy safe-branch ``` 2. Wait for approval of `safe-branch`. 3. Make a commit on a separate branch with a secret, for example: ```bash git checkout -b bad-branch echo "SECRET=abc123" > .env git add . git commit -m "Bad code" ``` 4. Push both at the same time: `git push proxy safe-branch bad-branch` #### Expected Result Ideally, this would force checks to run for the second branch while sending it out for approval. Meanwhile, the first branch would be pushed to the remote. A simpler solution is to simply prevent multiple branch pushes. #### Actual Result Both branches get pushed to the remote, and second branch bypasses the proxy. ### Impact Attackers with push access can bypass review policies, potentially inserting unwanted/malicious code into a GitProxy-protected repository. The vulnerability impacts all users or organizations relying on GitProxy to enforce policies and prevent unapproved changes. It requires no elevated privileges beyond regular push access, and no extra user interaction. It does however, require a GitProxy administrator or designated user (`canUserApproveRejectPush`) to approve the first push. It is much more likely that a well-meaning user would trigger this accidentally.

CVE-2025-54583 Affected @finos/git proxy Versions

1 component(s)
Fixed Versions:
1.19.2
Product / Package Ecosystem Affected Versions Fixed Version
@finos/git-proxy
npm
< 1.19.2
1.19.2

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2025-54583?
CVE-2025-54583 is a security vulnerability in @finos/git proxy involving GitProxy Approval Bypass When Pushing Multiple Branches under CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization.
Which @finos/git proxy versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to 1.19.2 across affected packages: @finos/git-proxy.
What version fixes CVE-2025-54583?
Upgrading to 1.19.2 (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
Is @finos/git-proxy affected?
Yes, @finos/git-proxy is affected in releases prior to 1.19.2. Upgrade your dependency to 1.19.2 or later.
What CWE is associated with CVE-2025-54583?
CVE-2025-54583 is classified under CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization (The product performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action, but it does not correctly perform the check.).
How can I check npm dependencies for CVE-2025-54583?
Run the dependency tree command: 'npm ls @finos/git-proxy'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-qr93-8wwf-22g4",
  "modified" : "2025-07-31T11:18:36Z",
  "published" : "2025-07-30T16:34:50Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2025-54583" ],
  "summary" : "GitProxy Approval Bypass When Pushing Multiple Branches",
  "details" : "### Summary\nThis vulnerability allows a user to push to the remote repository while bypassing policies and explicit approval. Since checks and plugins are skipped, code containing secrets or unwanted changes could be pushed into a repository.\n\nBecause it can allow policy violations to go undetected, we classify this as a High impact vulnerability.\n\n### Details\nThe source of the vulnerability is the push parser action `parsePush.ts`. It reads the first branch and parses it, while ignoring subsequent branches (silently letting them go through).\n\nAlthough the fix involves multiple improvements to the commit and push parsing logic, the core solution is to prevent multiple branch pushes from going through in the first place:\n\n```ts\nif (refUpdates.length !== 1) {\n  step.log('Invalid number of branch updates.');\n  step.log(`Expected 1, but got ${refUpdates.length}`);\n  step.setError('Your push has been blocked. Please make sure you are pushing to a single branch.');\n  action.addStep(step);\n  return action;\n}\n```\n\n### PoC\n\n1. Make a commit on a branch:\n\n```bash\ngit checkout -b safe-branch\necho \"Approved code\" > file.txt\ngit add .\ngit commit -m \"Approved code\"\ngit push proxy safe-branch\n```\n\n2. Wait for approval of `safe-branch`.\n\n3. Make a commit on a separate branch with a secret, for example:\n\n```bash\ngit checkout -b bad-branch\necho \"SECRET=abc123\" > .env\ngit add .\ngit commit -m \"Bad code\"\n```\n\n4. Push both at the same time:\n\n`git push proxy safe-branch bad-branch`\n\n#### Expected Result\nIdeally, this would force checks to run for the second branch while sending it out for approval. Meanwhile, the first branch would be pushed to the remote. A simpler solution is to simply prevent multiple branch pushes.\n\n#### Actual Result\nBoth branches get pushed to the remote, and second branch bypasses the proxy.\n\n### Impact\nAttackers with push access can bypass review policies, potentially inserting unwanted/malicious code into a GitProxy-protected repository.\n\nThe vulnerability impacts all users or organizations relying on GitProxy to enforce policies and prevent unapproved changes. It requires no elevated privileges beyond regular push access, and no extra user interaction. It does however, require a GitProxy administrator or designated user (`canUserApproveRejectPush`) to approve the first push. It is much more likely that a well-meaning user would trigger this accidentally.",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V4",
    "score" : "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:H/SA:N"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "npm",
      "name" : "@finos/git-proxy"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "1.19.2"
      } ]
    } ],
    "database_specific" : {
      "last_known_affected_version_range" : "<= 1.19.1"
    }
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/finos/git-proxy/security/advisories/GHSA-qr93-8wwf-22g4"
  }, {
    "type" : "ADVISORY",
    "url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-54583"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/finos/git-proxy/commit/a620a2f33c39c78e01783a274580bf822af3cc3a"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/finos/git-proxy/commit/bd2ecb2099cba21bca3941ee4d655d2eb887b3a9"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/finos/git-proxy"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/finos/git-proxy/releases/tag/v1.19.2"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-863" ],
    "severity" : "HIGH",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2025-07-30T16:34:50Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : "2025-07-30T20:15:38Z"
  }
}