CVE-2026-48508: Lemur Lemur Has An Authorization Bypass Vulnerability

HIGH
Advisory Identifier: GHSA-qcqw-jwxc-2hqg
CVSS 8.8
CWE-863
Published
Advisory Summary

CVE-2026-48508 is a HIGH (CVSS 8.8) lemur has an authorization bypass vulnerability (CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization) affecting Lemur libraries in the PyPI ecosystem. The issue involves lemur has an authorization bypass in strictrolepermission / authoritycreatorpermission. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 1.9.1.

CVE-2026-48508 at a Glance

CVE Identifier CVE-2026-48508
GHSA Identifier GHSA-qcqw-jwxc-2hqg
Severity HIGH
CVSS v3.1 Base Score 8.8
CWE Classification CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization
Affected Product Lemur
Package Ecosystem PyPI
Published Date
Last Updated

Security Impact

CVSS: 8.8

The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H).

Attack Vector Network (AV:N)
Attack Complexity Low (AC:L)
Privileges Required Low (PR:L)
User Interaction None (UI:N)
Scope Unchanged (S:U)
Confidentiality High (C:H)
Integrity High (I:H)
Availability High (A:H)

How to Fix CVE-2026-48508

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Lemur dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

lemur fixed: 1.9.1
pip install lemur>=1.9.1
Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

pip show lemur

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your Python environment is affected by CVE-2026-48508, inspect your installed packages using pip:

pip show lemur

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Lemur in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 1.9.1), your application is affected.

Note: The pip show lemur command checks currently installed packages in your active Python environment.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization, where the product performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action, but it does not correctly perform the check. In Lemur, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

## Summary `StrictRolePermission` and `AuthorityCreatorPermission` in `lemur/auth/permissions.py` call `flask_principal.Permission.__init__()` with zero `Need`s when their config flags are unset. Both flags defaulted to `False` in code prior to the fix, so this was the state of any Lemur install that hadn't explicitly opted in. Flask-Principal's `Permission.allows()` returns `True` whenever `self.needs` is empty. The `.can()` gate therefore passes for every authenticated identity, including the lowest-privilege role Lemur ships (`read-only`). A user holding only `read-only` can create root Certificate Authorities, create and edit notifications (an SSRF sink), create domain entries, and upload arbitrary certificates. These classes are the sole authorization check on those endpoints. ## Root Cause ```python # lemur/auth/permissions.py class AuthorityCreatorPermission(Permission): def __init__(self): requires_admin = current_app.config.get("ADMIN_ONLY_AUTHORITY_CREATION", False) if requires_admin: super().__init__(RoleNeed("admin")) else: super().__init__() # empty Need set class StrictRolePermission(Permission): def __init__(self): strict_role_enforcement = current_app.config.get("LEMUR_STRICT_ROLE_ENFORCEMENT", False) if strict_role_enforcement: needs = [RoleNeed("admin"), RoleNeed("operator")] super().__init__(*needs) else: super().__init__() # empty Need set ``` `flask_principal.Permission.allows()` (upstream, v0.4.0): ```python def allows(self, identity): if self.needs and not self.needs.intersection(identity.provides): return False ... return True ``` When `self.needs == set()`, the first guard is falsy and is skipped. `excludes` is also empty, so `allows()` returns `True` for any identity. `AuthenticatedResource` (the parent class for these views) sets `method_decorators = [login_required]`, which checks authentication only, no role. So the permission `.can()` is the only authorization layer in front of these endpoints. ## Affected Endpoints Views whose only authorization check is `StrictRolePermission().can()` or `AuthorityCreatorPermission().can()`: | Method | Path | Source | |----------|-------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------| | POST | /api/1/authorities | lemur/authorities/views.py:231 | | POST | /api/1/certificates/upload | lemur/certificates/views.py:651 | | POST | /api/1/pending_certificates/\<id>/upload | lemur/pending_certificates/views.py:545 | | POST | /api/1/notifications | lemur/notifications/views.py:227 | | PUT/DEL | /api/1/notifications/\<id> | lemur/notifications/views.py:370,384 | | POST | /api/1/domains | lemur/domains/views.py:131 | `POST /api/1/authorities` is gated by `AuthorityCreatorPermission().can() and StrictRolePermission().can()`; both have empty Needs by default. The other rows are gated by `StrictRolePermission().can()` alone. Note on scope: `PUT /api/1/authorities/<id>` also references `StrictRolePermission`, but its gate is `AuthorityPermission(...).can() and StrictRolePermission().can()`. `AuthorityPermission` is constructed with non-empty Needs (`RoleNeed("admin")` plus authority-scoped needs), so that endpoint is not bypassable by a `read-only` user and is excluded from this report. ## Impact A user holding only the `read-only` role can: 1. Create root Certificate Authorities. CA cert and private key are persisted in Lemur's DB with the attacker as owner. Any internal trust store that pins Lemur-managed roots can now be signed against by the attacker. 2. Upload arbitrary certificates via `/certificates/upload`, including attacker-supplied keys with destinations such as AWS push. 3. Create or modify notifications, which reach an SSRF sink (see related finding F3, Slack notification webhook). 4. Mark arbitrary domains as `sensitive`, manipulating Lemur's domain registry and the cert-issuance approval path. Combined with any low-privilege credential leak (phished employee, leaked SSO token) or insider access, this is a pivot from "any authenticated identity" to control of the PKI issuance plane. ## Remediation The config flag defaults for `ADMIN_ONLY_AUTHORITY_CREATION` and `LEMUR_STRICT_ROLE_ENFORCEMENT` were changed from `False` to `True`. Restrictive role enforcement is now active on all default installs without requiring explicit configuration. ```python class AuthorityCreatorPermission(Permission): def __init__(self): requires_admin = current_app.config.get("ADMIN_ONLY_AUTHORITY_CREATION", True) ... class StrictRolePermission(Permission): def __init__(self): strict_role_enforcement = current_app.config.get("LEMUR_STRICT_ROLE_ENFORCEMENT", True) ... ``` **Note:** The opt-out branches (empty Needs) remain in the code. Operators who explicitly set `ADMIN_ONLY_AUTHORITY_CREATION = False` or `LEMUR_STRICT_ROLE_ENFORCEMENT = False` in their config will reintroduce the bypass. These flags should be left unset or set to `True`.

CVE-2026-48508 Affected Lemur Versions

1 component(s)
Fixed Versions:
1.9.1
Product / Package Ecosystem Affected Versions Fixed Version
lemur
PyPI
< 1.9.1
1.9.1

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-48508?
CVE-2026-48508 is a security vulnerability in Lemur involving Lemur has an authorization bypass in StrictRolePermission / AuthorityCreatorPermission under CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization.
Which Lemur versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to 1.9.1 across affected packages: lemur.
What version fixes CVE-2026-48508?
Upgrading to 1.9.1 (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
Is lemur affected?
Yes, lemur is affected in releases prior to 1.9.1. Upgrade your dependency to 1.9.1 or later.
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-48508?
CVE-2026-48508 has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 8.8 (HIGH) with vector string CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H.
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-48508?
CVE-2026-48508 is classified under CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization (The product performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action, but it does not correctly perform the check.).
How can I check PyPI dependencies for CVE-2026-48508?
Run the dependency tree command: 'pip show lemur'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-qcqw-jwxc-2hqg",
  "modified" : "2026-06-25T18:48:39Z",
  "published" : "2026-06-25T18:48:39Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-48508" ],
  "summary" : "Lemur has an authorization bypass in StrictRolePermission / AuthorityCreatorPermission",
  "details" : "## Summary\n\n`StrictRolePermission` and `AuthorityCreatorPermission` in `lemur/auth/permissions.py` call `flask_principal.Permission.__init__()` with zero `Need`s when their config flags are unset. Both flags defaulted to `False` in code prior to the fix, so this was the state of any Lemur install that hadn't explicitly opted in.\n\nFlask-Principal's `Permission.allows()` returns `True` whenever `self.needs` is empty. The `.can()` gate therefore passes for every authenticated identity, including the lowest-privilege role Lemur ships (`read-only`).\n\nA user holding only `read-only` can create root Certificate Authorities, create and edit notifications (an SSRF sink), create domain entries, and upload arbitrary certificates. These classes are the sole authorization check on those endpoints.\n\n## Root Cause\n\n```python\n# lemur/auth/permissions.py\nclass AuthorityCreatorPermission(Permission):\n    def __init__(self):\n        requires_admin = current_app.config.get(\"ADMIN_ONLY_AUTHORITY_CREATION\", False)\n        if requires_admin:\n            super().__init__(RoleNeed(\"admin\"))\n        else:\n            super().__init__()              # empty Need set\n\nclass StrictRolePermission(Permission):\n    def __init__(self):\n        strict_role_enforcement = current_app.config.get(\"LEMUR_STRICT_ROLE_ENFORCEMENT\", False)\n        if strict_role_enforcement:\n            needs = [RoleNeed(\"admin\"), RoleNeed(\"operator\")]\n            super().__init__(*needs)\n        else:\n            super().__init__()              # empty Need set\n```\n\n`flask_principal.Permission.allows()` (upstream, v0.4.0):\n\n```python\ndef allows(self, identity):\n    if self.needs and not self.needs.intersection(identity.provides):\n        return False\n    ...\n    return True\n```\n\nWhen `self.needs == set()`, the first guard is falsy and is skipped. `excludes` is also empty, so `allows()` returns `True` for any identity. `AuthenticatedResource` (the parent class for these views) sets `method_decorators = [login_required]`, which checks authentication only, no role. So the permission `.can()` is the only authorization layer in front of these endpoints.\n\n## Affected Endpoints\n\nViews whose only authorization check is `StrictRolePermission().can()` or `AuthorityCreatorPermission().can()`:\n\n| Method   | Path                                      | Source                                  |\n|----------|-------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------|\n| POST     | /api/1/authorities                        | lemur/authorities/views.py:231          |\n| POST     | /api/1/certificates/upload                | lemur/certificates/views.py:651         |\n| POST     | /api/1/pending_certificates/\\<id>/upload  | lemur/pending_certificates/views.py:545 |\n| POST     | /api/1/notifications                      | lemur/notifications/views.py:227        |\n| PUT/DEL  | /api/1/notifications/\\<id>                | lemur/notifications/views.py:370,384    |\n| POST     | /api/1/domains                            | lemur/domains/views.py:131              |\n\n`POST /api/1/authorities` is gated by `AuthorityCreatorPermission().can() and StrictRolePermission().can()`; both have empty Needs by default. The other rows are gated by `StrictRolePermission().can()` alone.\n\nNote on scope: `PUT /api/1/authorities/<id>` also references `StrictRolePermission`, but its gate is `AuthorityPermission(...).can() and StrictRolePermission().can()`. `AuthorityPermission` is constructed with non-empty Needs (`RoleNeed(\"admin\")` plus authority-scoped needs), so that endpoint is not bypassable by a `read-only` user and is excluded from this report.\n\n## Impact\n\nA user holding only the `read-only` role can:\n\n1. Create root Certificate Authorities. CA cert and private key are persisted in Lemur's DB with the attacker as owner. Any internal trust store that pins Lemur-managed roots can now be signed against by the attacker.\n2. Upload arbitrary certificates via `/certificates/upload`, including attacker-supplied keys with destinations such as AWS push.\n3. Create or modify notifications, which reach an SSRF sink (see related finding F3, Slack notification webhook).\n4. Mark arbitrary domains as `sensitive`, manipulating Lemur's domain registry and the cert-issuance approval path.\n\nCombined with any low-privilege credential leak (phished employee, leaked SSO token) or insider access, this is a pivot from \"any authenticated identity\" to control of the PKI issuance plane.\n\n## Remediation\n\nThe config flag defaults for `ADMIN_ONLY_AUTHORITY_CREATION` and `LEMUR_STRICT_ROLE_ENFORCEMENT` were changed from `False` to `True`. Restrictive role enforcement is now active on all default installs without requiring explicit configuration.\n\n```python\nclass AuthorityCreatorPermission(Permission):\n    def __init__(self):\n        requires_admin = current_app.config.get(\"ADMIN_ONLY_AUTHORITY_CREATION\", True)\n        ...\n\nclass StrictRolePermission(Permission):\n    def __init__(self):\n        strict_role_enforcement = current_app.config.get(\"LEMUR_STRICT_ROLE_ENFORCEMENT\", True)\n        ...\n```\n\n**Note:** The opt-out branches (empty Needs) remain in the code. Operators who explicitly set `ADMIN_ONLY_AUTHORITY_CREATION = False` or `LEMUR_STRICT_ROLE_ENFORCEMENT = False` in their config will reintroduce the bypass. These flags should be left unset or set to `True`.",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "PyPI",
      "name" : "lemur"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "1.9.1"
      } ]
    } ],
    "database_specific" : {
      "last_known_affected_version_range" : "<= 1.9.0"
    }
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/Netflix/lemur/security/advisories/GHSA-qcqw-jwxc-2hqg"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/Netflix/lemur"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-863" ],
    "severity" : "HIGH",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-06-25T18:48:39Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : null
  }
}