CVE-2025-27093: Github.com/BishopFox/sliver Silver Has Unrestricted Traffic Between Vulnerability

MODERATE
Advisory Identifier: GHSA-q8j9-34qf-7vq7
CVSS 6.3
CWE-284
Published
Advisory Summary

CVE-2025-27093 is a MODERATE (CVSS 6.3) silver has unrestricted traffic between vulnerability (CWE-284: Improper Access Control) affecting Github.com/BishopFox/sliver libraries in the Go ecosystem. The issue involves silver has unrestricted traffic between wireguard clients. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 1.5.44.

CVE-2025-27093 at a Glance

CVE Identifier CVE-2025-27093
GHSA Identifier GHSA-q8j9-34qf-7vq7
Severity MODERATE
CVSS v3.1 Base Score 6.3
CWE Classification CWE-284: Improper Access Control
Affected Product Github.com/BishopFox/sliver
Package Ecosystem Go
Published Date
Last Updated

Security Impact

CVSS: 6.3

The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L).

Attack Vector Network (AV:N)
Attack Complexity Low (AC:L)
Privileges Required None (PR:N)
User Interaction Required (UI:R)
Scope Unchanged (S:U)
Confidentiality Low (C:L)
Integrity Low (I:L)
Availability Low (A:L)

How to Fix CVE-2025-27093

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Github.com/BishopFox/sliver dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

github.com/BishopFox/sliver fixed: 1.5.44
Upgrade github.com/BishopFox/sliver to 1.5.44
github.com/bishopfox/sliver fixed: 1.5.44
Upgrade github.com/bishopfox/sliver to 1.5.44
Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

inspect dependencies for github.com/BishopFox/sliver

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your application is affected by CVE-2025-27093, inspect your project dependencies for Github.com/BishopFox/sliver:

inspect dependencies for github.com/BishopFox/sliver

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Github.com/BishopFox/sliver in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 1.5.44), your application is affected.

Note: Verify declared build manifests and deployed runtime container environments.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-284: Improper Access Control, where the product does not restrict or incorrectly restricts access to a resource from an unauthorized actor. In Github.com/BishopFox/sliver, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

### Summary Sliver's custom Wireguard netstack doesn't limit traffic between Wireguard clients, this could lead to: 1. Leaked/recovered keypair (from a beacon) being used to attack operators. 2. Port forwardings usable from other implants. ### Details 1. Sliver treat operators' Wireguard config and beacon/session's Wireguard config equally, they both connect to the wireguard listener created from the CLI. 2. The current netstack implementation does not filter traffic between clients. I think this piece of code handle traffic between clients, from experimental results clients can ping and connect to each other freely, and I didn't see any filtering here either: ``` File: server\c2\wireguard.go 246: func socketWGWriteEnvelope(connection net.Conn, envelope *sliverpb.Envelope) error { 247: data, err := proto.Marshal(envelope) 248: if err != nil { 249: wgLog.Errorf("Envelope marshaling error: %v", err) 250: return err 251: } 252: dataLengthBuf := new(bytes.Buffer) 253: binary.Write(dataLengthBuf, binary.LittleEndian, uint32(len(data))) 254: connection.Write(dataLengthBuf.Bytes()) 255: connection.Write(data) 256: return nil 257: } 258: ``` 3. The docs says to use a Wireguard clients and operator wg-config to connect to the same WG listener as beacons: https://sliver.sh/docs?name=Port%20Forwarding 4. If the operator uses official wireguard clients that integrates with the OS's netstack (I'm using the [Windows client](https://www.wireguard.com/install/)) then their services are accessible on the wireguard interface's IP address (for example 100.64.0.3) when the services listen on 0.0.0.0 (SSH, RDP, SMB, etc) ![image](https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/8c791655-6f77-423c-8274-389e0850436b) 5. The beacon's wireguard private key can be recovered through a process dump or other forensic techniques. 6. When a private key is recovered, an attacker can connect to 100.64.0.1:1337 (key exchange listener) to generate new wireguard clients without the operators' knowledge, in that way achieve persistence inside the wireguard network. ### PoC Easy way: 1. Create 2 operators wireguard config. 2. Connect them both to the wireguard listener. 3. From one machine, ping/scan/connect to the other's services like RDP (3389), SSH (22), etc. Slightly complicated way: 1. From the operator's machine, connect to the wireguard listener. 2. On the attacker's machine, run a beacon. 3. Dump the process 4. Find the private key, public key, endpoint, etc in the dump file: ![image](https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/84d3841f-398d-4bca-939f-bf8ed2881be7) ![image](https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/000c7d02-b6f0-4b12-82e5-29eddfff93f8) ![image](https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/3d0a3e80-3a16-4434-8622-1832c5865a85) ![image](https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/a17f73ab-622b-4852-9c15-0ad5c5afa0eb) 5. Construct a valid Wireguard config based on the strings found. On the attacker's machine, connect to the Wireguard listener. 6. Ping/scan/connect to the other's services like RDP (3389), SSH (22), etc. ### Impact The operator's machine is impacted, if their services contain a vulnerability, an attacker can exploit it and gain RCE. If not then it could be used to gather information (Hostname, SSH signature, etc). ### Suggestion 1. Filter traffic between clients with a default-deny policy. 2. Differentiate between operators and beacons' wireguard config/client 3. Only allow specific one-way traffic when the operator request to open a Wireguard port forward. ### Vulnerable versions All versions containing wireguard functionality.

CVE-2025-27093 Affected Github.com/BishopFox/sliver Versions

2 component(s)
Fixed Versions:
1.5.44
Product / Package Ecosystem Affected Versions Fixed Version
github.com/BishopFox/sliver
Go
< 1.5.44
1.5.44
github.com/bishopfox/sliver
Go
< 1.5.44
1.5.44

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2025-27093?
CVE-2025-27093 is a security vulnerability in Github.com/BishopFox/sliver involving Silver has unrestricted traffic between Wireguard clients under CWE-284: Improper Access Control.
Which Github.com/BishopFox/sliver versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to 1.5.44 across affected packages: github.com/BishopFox/sliver, github.com/bishopfox/sliver.
What version fixes CVE-2025-27093?
Upgrading to 1.5.44 (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
Is github.com/BishopFox/sliver affected?
Yes, github.com/BishopFox/sliver is affected in releases prior to 1.5.44. Upgrade your dependency to 1.5.44 or later.
Is github.com/bishopfox/sliver affected?
Yes, github.com/bishopfox/sliver is affected in releases prior to 1.5.44. Upgrade your dependency to 1.5.44 or later.
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2025-27093?
CVE-2025-27093 has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 6.3 (MODERATE) with vector string CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L.
What CWE is associated with CVE-2025-27093?
CVE-2025-27093 is classified under CWE-284: Improper Access Control (The product does not restrict or incorrectly restricts access to a resource from an unauthorized actor.).
How can I check Go dependencies for CVE-2025-27093?
Run the dependency tree command: 'inspect dependencies for github.com/BishopFox/sliver'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-q8j9-34qf-7vq7",
  "modified" : "2025-11-05T22:05:52Z",
  "published" : "2025-10-28T17:31:32Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2025-27093" ],
  "summary" : "Silver has unrestricted traffic between Wireguard clients",
  "details" : "### Summary\nSliver's custom Wireguard netstack doesn't limit traffic between Wireguard clients, this could lead to:\n1. Leaked/recovered keypair (from a beacon) being used to attack operators.\n2. Port forwardings usable from other implants.\n\n\n### Details\n1. Sliver treat operators' Wireguard config and beacon/session's Wireguard config equally, they both connect to the wireguard listener created from the CLI.\n\n2. The current netstack implementation does not filter traffic between clients. \nI think this piece of code handle traffic between clients, from experimental results clients can ping and connect to each other freely, and I didn't see any filtering here either:\n```\nFile: server\\c2\\wireguard.go\n246: func socketWGWriteEnvelope(connection net.Conn, envelope *sliverpb.Envelope) error {\n247: \tdata, err := proto.Marshal(envelope)\n248: \tif err != nil {\n249: \t\twgLog.Errorf(\"Envelope marshaling error: %v\", err)\n250: \t\treturn err\n251: \t}\n252: \tdataLengthBuf := new(bytes.Buffer)\n253: \tbinary.Write(dataLengthBuf, binary.LittleEndian, uint32(len(data)))\n254: \tconnection.Write(dataLengthBuf.Bytes())\n255: \tconnection.Write(data)\n256: \treturn nil\n257: }\n258: \n\n```\n3. The docs says to use a Wireguard clients and operator wg-config to connect to the same WG listener as beacons:\nhttps://sliver.sh/docs?name=Port%20Forwarding\n\n4. If the operator uses official wireguard clients that integrates with the OS's netstack (I'm using the [Windows client](https://www.wireguard.com/install/)) then their services are accessible on the wireguard interface's IP address (for example 100.64.0.3) when the services listen on 0.0.0.0 (SSH, RDP, SMB, etc) \n![image](https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/8c791655-6f77-423c-8274-389e0850436b)\n\n5. The beacon's wireguard private key can be recovered through a process dump or other forensic techniques.\n6. When a private key is recovered, an attacker can connect to 100.64.0.1:1337 (key exchange listener) to generate new wireguard clients without the operators' knowledge, in that way achieve persistence inside the wireguard network.\n\n\n### PoC\nEasy way:\n1. Create 2 operators wireguard config.\n2. Connect them both to the wireguard listener.\n3. From one machine, ping/scan/connect to the other's services like RDP (3389), SSH (22), etc.\n\nSlightly complicated way:\n1. From the operator's machine, connect to the wireguard listener.\n2. On the attacker's machine, run a beacon.\n3. Dump the process\n4. Find the private key, public key, endpoint, etc in the dump file:\n![image](https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/84d3841f-398d-4bca-939f-bf8ed2881be7)\n![image](https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/000c7d02-b6f0-4b12-82e5-29eddfff93f8)\n![image](https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/3d0a3e80-3a16-4434-8622-1832c5865a85)\n![image](https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/a17f73ab-622b-4852-9c15-0ad5c5afa0eb)\n\n5. Construct a valid Wireguard config based on the strings found. On the attacker's machine, connect to the Wireguard listener.\n6. Ping/scan/connect to the other's services like RDP (3389), SSH (22), etc.\n\n### Impact\nThe operator's machine is impacted, if their services contain a vulnerability, an attacker can exploit it and gain RCE. If not then it could be used to gather information (Hostname, SSH signature, etc).\n\n### Suggestion\n1. Filter traffic between clients with a default-deny policy.\n2. Differentiate between operators and beacons' wireguard config/client\n3. Only allow specific one-way traffic when the operator request to open a Wireguard port forward.\n\n### Vulnerable versions\nAll versions containing wireguard functionality.",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "Go",
      "name" : "github.com/BishopFox/sliver"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "1.5.44"
      } ]
    } ],
    "database_specific" : {
      "last_known_affected_version_range" : "<= 1.5.43"
    }
  }, {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "Go",
      "name" : "github.com/bishopfox/sliver"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "1.5.44"
      } ]
    } ]
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/BishopFox/sliver/security/advisories/GHSA-q8j9-34qf-7vq7"
  }, {
    "type" : "ADVISORY",
    "url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-27093"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/BishopFox/sliver/commit/8e5c5f14506d6d60ebb3362e6b9857ab1e0d76ff"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/BishopFox/sliver/commit/9122878cbbcae543eb8210f616550382af2065fd"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/BishopFox/sliver"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2025-4079"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-284" ],
    "severity" : "MODERATE",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2025-10-28T17:31:32Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : "2025-10-28T20:15:47Z"
  }
}