GHSA-q567-cr4x-96w4: Trigger.dev Blind SSRF Vulnerability

MODERATE
CVSS 5.4
CWE-918
Published
Advisory Summary

GHSA-q567-cr4x-96w4 is a MODERATE (CVSS 5.4) blind ssrf vulnerability (CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)) affecting Trigger.dev libraries in the npm ecosystem. The issue involves blind ssrf via alert-channel webhook. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 4.5.2.

GHSA-q567-cr4x-96w4 at a Glance

CVE Identifier N/A
GHSA Identifier GHSA-q567-cr4x-96w4
Severity MODERATE
CVSS v3.1 Base Score 5.4
CWE Classification CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
Affected Product Trigger.dev
Package Ecosystem npm
Published Date
Last Updated

Security Impact

CVSS: 5.4

The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N).

Attack Vector Network (AV:N)
Attack Complexity Low (AC:L)
Privileges Required Low (PR:L)
User Interaction None (UI:N)
Scope Unchanged (S:U)
Confidentiality Low (C:L)
Integrity Low (I:L)
Availability None (A:N)

How to Fix GHSA-q567-cr4x-96w4

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Trigger.dev dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

trigger.dev fixed: 4.5.2
npm install trigger.dev@4.5.2
Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

npm ls trigger.dev

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your Node.js application is affected by GHSA-q567-cr4x-96w4, inspect your project dependencies using npm:

npm ls trigger.dev

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Trigger.dev in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 4.5.2), your application is affected.

Note: The npm ls trigger.dev command inspects dependencies declared in your package.json and lockfile; it does not perform automated runtime dynamic scanning.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF), where the web server receives a url or similar request from an upstream component and retrieves the contents of this url, but it does not sufficiently ensure that the request is being sent to the expected destination. In Trigger.dev, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

### Summary A WEBHOOK alert channel stores a user-supplied `url`. When an alert fires (deployment/run failure, error groups), the webapp server (`alertsWorker` -> `DeliverAlertService`) POSTs the HMAC-signed alert payload to that URL via `fetch(webhook.url, ...)`. The URL is never validated against a host allowlist or private-IP/metadata blocklist (a repo-wide search for `169.254`, `isPrivate`, `isLoopback`, `net.isIP`, `ssrf` returns ZERO hits), and the API route's URL field is just `z.string().optional()` (no syntax check at all). So an authenticated tenant can point the webhook at internal infrastructure or `169.254.169.254` and the multi-tenant server fetches it. ### Affected `apps/webapp`, HEAD `5d99457` (current main). ### Root cause - Source (API route): `app/presenters/v3/ApiAlertChannelPresenter.server.ts` `ApiAlertChannelData.url = z.string().optional()` (no host validation); route `app/routes/api.v1.projects.$projectRef.alertChannels.ts` (PAT-auth). - Store: `app/v3/services/alerts/createAlertChannel.server.ts` persists `{url, secret, version}` verbatim. - Sink: `app/v3/services/alerts/deliverAlert.server.ts:973` `fetch(webhook.url, {method:"POST", headers:{"x-trigger-signature-hmacsha256":...}, body:rawPayload})`; identical at `deliverErrorGroupAlert.server.ts:258`. Runs inside the webapp process; `fetch` follows redirects (IMDSv1-via-redirect). No egress guard anywhere. ### Runtime PoC (proven on self-host) Seeded a project + STAGING env + a WEBHOOK channel with `url=http://host.docker.internal:7766/...` (an internal address from the server's POV) + a DEPLOYING deployment. Triggered via the public API `POST /api/v1/deployments/deployment_ssrfpoc/fail` -> 200 -> FAILED -> alertsWorker -> the server fetched the listener. Captured: ``` POST /ssrf-via-webhook HTTP/1.1 host: host.docker.internal:7766 x-trigger-signature-hmacsha256: <redacted> user-agent: node {"type":"alert.deployment.failed", ...} ``` The webapp server (user-agent: node) made an outbound POST to the attacker-chosen internal URL; 169.254.169.254 / any internal host works identically. ### Severity `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N` ~ Medium. Blind (response not reflected) + POST-only (fixed body = signed alert payload), so it enables internal port/host scanning (delivery success/timing oracle), state-changing POSTs to internal services, and IMDSv1-via-redirect — not arbitrary GET exfiltration. PR:L (authenticated tenant). Egress private-IP/metadata blocking on server-issued webhooks is industry standard; its absence is the defect. ### Suggested fix Validate the webhook URL on create (require http(s), resolve host, reject private/link-local/loopback/metadata ranges) AND re-check at fetch time (re-resolve after redirects or disable redirects / pin to resolved public IP). A shared `assertPublicUrl(url)` used by `createAlertChannel` + the two delivery sinks. ### Dup Distinct CWE-918 class from the IDOR advisories. FRESH. (The Grav maintainer independently hardened the same webhook-URL-SSRF class in grav-plugin-api commit dfcc947 on 2026-06-26 — corroborating the class is real and fixable.)

GHSA-q567-cr4x-96w4 Affected Trigger.dev Versions

1 component(s)
Fixed Versions:
4.5.2
Product / Package Ecosystem Affected Versions Fixed Version
trigger.dev
npm
< 4.5.2
4.5.2

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is GHSA-q567-cr4x-96w4?
GHSA-q567-cr4x-96w4 is a security vulnerability in Trigger.dev involving Blind SSRF via alert-channel webhook under CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF).
Which Trigger.dev versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to 4.5.2 across affected packages: trigger.dev.
What version fixes GHSA-q567-cr4x-96w4?
Upgrading to 4.5.2 (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
Is trigger.dev affected?
Yes, trigger.dev is affected in releases prior to 4.5.2. Upgrade your dependency to 4.5.2 or later.
What is the CVSS score of GHSA-q567-cr4x-96w4?
GHSA-q567-cr4x-96w4 has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 5.4 (MODERATE) with vector string CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N.
What CWE is associated with GHSA-q567-cr4x-96w4?
GHSA-q567-cr4x-96w4 is classified under CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) (The web server receives a URL or similar request from an upstream component and retrieves the contents of this URL, but it does not sufficiently ensure that the request is being sent to the expected destination.).
How can I check npm dependencies for GHSA-q567-cr4x-96w4?
Run the dependency tree command: 'npm ls trigger.dev'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-q567-cr4x-96w4",
  "modified" : "2026-10-02T22:35:31Z",
  "published" : "2026-10-02T22:35:31Z",
  "aliases" : [ ],
  "summary" : "Trigger.dev: Blind SSRF via alert-channel webhook",
  "details" : "### Summary\n\nA WEBHOOK alert channel stores a user-supplied `url`. When an alert fires (deployment/run failure, error groups), the webapp server (`alertsWorker` -> `DeliverAlertService`) POSTs the HMAC-signed alert payload to that URL via `fetch(webhook.url, ...)`. The URL is never validated against a host allowlist or private-IP/metadata blocklist (a repo-wide search for `169.254`, `isPrivate`, `isLoopback`, `net.isIP`, `ssrf` returns ZERO hits), and the API route's URL field is just `z.string().optional()` (no syntax check at all). So an authenticated tenant can point the webhook at internal infrastructure or `169.254.169.254` and the multi-tenant server fetches it.\n\n### Affected\n`apps/webapp`, HEAD `5d99457` (current main).\n\n### Root cause\n- Source (API route): `app/presenters/v3/ApiAlertChannelPresenter.server.ts` `ApiAlertChannelData.url = z.string().optional()` (no host validation); route `app/routes/api.v1.projects.$projectRef.alertChannels.ts` (PAT-auth).\n- Store: `app/v3/services/alerts/createAlertChannel.server.ts` persists `{url, secret, version}` verbatim.\n- Sink: `app/v3/services/alerts/deliverAlert.server.ts:973` `fetch(webhook.url, {method:\"POST\", headers:{\"x-trigger-signature-hmacsha256\":...}, body:rawPayload})`; identical at `deliverErrorGroupAlert.server.ts:258`. Runs inside the webapp process; `fetch` follows redirects (IMDSv1-via-redirect). No egress guard anywhere.\n\n### Runtime PoC (proven on self-host)\nSeeded a project + STAGING env + a WEBHOOK channel with `url=http://host.docker.internal:7766/...` (an internal address from the server's POV) + a DEPLOYING deployment. Triggered via the public API `POST /api/v1/deployments/deployment_ssrfpoc/fail` -> 200 -> FAILED -> alertsWorker -> the server fetched the listener. Captured:\n```\nPOST /ssrf-via-webhook HTTP/1.1\nhost: host.docker.internal:7766\nx-trigger-signature-hmacsha256: <redacted>\nuser-agent: node\n{\"type\":\"alert.deployment.failed\", ...}\n```\nThe webapp server (user-agent: node) made an outbound POST to the attacker-chosen internal URL; 169.254.169.254 / any internal host works identically.\n\n### Severity\n`CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N` ~ Medium. Blind (response not reflected) + POST-only (fixed body = signed alert payload), so it enables internal port/host scanning (delivery success/timing oracle), state-changing POSTs to internal services, and IMDSv1-via-redirect — not arbitrary GET exfiltration. PR:L (authenticated tenant). Egress private-IP/metadata blocking on server-issued webhooks is industry standard; its absence is the defect.\n\n### Suggested fix\nValidate the webhook URL on create (require http(s), resolve host, reject private/link-local/loopback/metadata ranges) AND re-check at fetch time (re-resolve after redirects or disable redirects / pin to resolved public IP). A shared `assertPublicUrl(url)` used by `createAlertChannel` + the two delivery sinks.\n\n### Dup\nDistinct CWE-918 class from the IDOR advisories. FRESH. (The Grav maintainer independently hardened the same webhook-URL-SSRF class in grav-plugin-api commit dfcc947 on 2026-06-26 — corroborating the class is real and fixable.)",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "npm",
      "name" : "trigger.dev"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "4.5.2"
      } ]
    } ],
    "database_specific" : {
      "last_known_affected_version_range" : "<= 4.5.1"
    }
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev/security/advisories/GHSA-q567-cr4x-96w4"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev/pull/4199"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev/commit/34b1a181c2a1d33a53ebab88f84b05f81fea4254"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev/releases/tag/v4.5.2"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-918" ],
    "severity" : "MODERATE",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-10-02T22:35:31Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : null
  }
}