CVE-2026-53034: Software Security Vulnerability Vulnerability

MODERATE
Advisory Identifier: GHSA-pwx6-fvf4-6686
CVSS 5.5
CWE-476
Published
Advisory Summary

CVE-2026-53034 is a MODERATE (CVSS 5.5) security vulnerability vulnerability (CWE-476: NULL Pointer Dereference) affecting Software libraries in the Maven ecosystem. The weakness occurs when the product dereferences a pointer that it expects to be valid but is null.. Remediation is available in the latest vendor maintenance releases.

CVE-2026-53034 at a Glance

CVE Identifier CVE-2026-53034
GHSA Identifier GHSA-pwx6-fvf4-6686
Severity MODERATE
CVSS v3.1 Base Score 5.5
CWE Classification CWE-476: NULL Pointer Dereference
Affected Product Software
Package Ecosystem Maven
Published Date
Last Updated

Security Impact

CVSS: 5.5

The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H).

Attack Vector Local (AV:L)
Attack Complexity Low (AC:L)
Privileges Required Low (PR:L)
User Interaction None (UI:N)
Scope Unchanged (S:U)
Confidentiality None (C:N)
Integrity None (I:N)
Availability High (A:H)

How to Fix CVE-2026-53034

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Software dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

mvn dependency:tree

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your Java application is affected by CVE-2026-53034, inspect your build dependencies using the Maven Dependency Plugin:

mvn dependency:tree

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Software in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than the patched release), your application is affected.

Note: The mvn dependency:tree command inspects the resolved dependency graph declared in your project's POM files; it does not perform automated security scanning or inspect runtime dynamic classpaths. Always verify runtime container classpaths and shaded JARs.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-476: NULL Pointer Dereference, where the product dereferences a pointer that it expects to be valid but is null. In Software, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf, sockmap: Fix af_unix null-ptr-deref in proto update unix_stream_connect() sets sk_state (`WRITE_ONCE(sk->sk_state, TCP_ESTABLISHED)`) _before_ it assigns a peer (`unix_peer(sk) = newsk`). sk_state == TCP_ESTABLISHED makes sock_map_sk_state_allowed() believe that socket is properly set up, which would include having a defined peer. IOW, there's a window when unix_stream_bpf_update_proto() can be called on socket which still has unix_peer(sk) == NULL. CPU0 bpf CPU1 connect -------- ------------ WRITE_ONCE(sk->sk_state, TCP_ESTABLISHED) sock_map_sk_state_allowed(sk) ... sk_pair = unix_peer(sk) sock_hold(sk_pair) sock_hold(newsk) smp_mb__after_atomic() unix_peer(sk) = newsk BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000080 RIP: 0010:unix_stream_bpf_update_proto+0xa0/0x1b0 Call Trace: sock_map_link+0x564/0x8b0 sock_map_update_common+0x6e/0x340 sock_map_update_elem_sys+0x17d/0x240 __sys_bpf+0x26db/0x3250 __x64_sys_bpf+0x21/0x30 do_syscall_64+0x6b/0x3a0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e Initial idea was to move peer assignment _before_ the sk_state update[1], but that involved an additional memory barrier, and changing the hot path was rejected. Then a NULL check during proto update in unix_stream_bpf_update_proto() was considered[2], but the follow-up discussion[3] focused on the root cause, i.e. sockmap update taking a wrong lock. Or, more specifically, missing unix_state_lock()[4]. In the end it was concluded that teaching sockmap about the af_unix locking would be unnecessarily complex[5]. Complexity aside, since BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS and BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_ACT are allowed to update sockmaps, sock_map_update_elem() taking the unix lock, as it is currently implemented in unix_state_lock(): spin_lock(&unix_sk(s)->lock), would be problematic. unix_state_lock() taken in a process context, followed by a softirq-context TC BPF program attempting to take the same spinlock -- deadlock[6]. This way we circled back to the peer check idea[2]. [1]: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/ba5c50aa-1df4-40c2-ab33-a72022c5a32e@rbox.co/ [2]: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20240610174906.32921-1-kuniyu@amazon.com/ [3]: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/7603c0e6-cd5b-452b-b710-73b64bd9de26@linux.dev/ [4]: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/CAAVpQUA+8GL_j63CaKb8hbxoL21izD58yr1NvhOhU=j+35+3og@mail.gmail.com/ [5]: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/CAAVpQUAHijOMext28Gi10dSLuMzGYh+jK61Ujn+fZ-wvcODR2A@mail.gmail.com/ [6]: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/dd043c69-4d03-46fe-8325-8f97101435cf@linux.dev/ Summary of scenarios where af_unix/stream connect() may race a sockmap update: 1. connect() vs. bpf(BPF_MAP_UPDATE_ELEM), i.e. sock_map_update_elem_sys() Implemented NULL check is sufficient. Once assigned, socket peer won't be released until socket fd is released. And that's not an issue because sock_map_update_elem_sys() bumps fd refcnf. 2. connect() vs BPF program doing update Update restricted per verifier.c:may_update_sockmap() to BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING/BPF_TRACE_ITER BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCK_OPS (bpf_sock_map_update() only) BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_ACT BPF_PROG_TYPE_XDP BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_REUSEPORT BPF_PROG_TYPE_FLOW_DISSECTOR BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_LOOKUP Plus one more race to consider: CPU0 bpf CPU1 connect -------- ------------ WRITE_ONCE(sk->sk_state, TCP_ESTABLISHED) sock_map_sk_state_allowed(sk) sock_hold(newsk) smp_mb__after_atomic() ---truncated---

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-53034?
CVE-2026-53034 is a security vulnerability in Software classified as a security vulnerability vulnerability under CWE-476: NULL Pointer Dereference.
Which Software versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to current release patches.
What version fixes CVE-2026-53034?
Upgrading to current release patches (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-53034?
CVE-2026-53034 has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 5.5 (MODERATE) with vector string CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H.
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-53034?
CVE-2026-53034 is classified under CWE-476: NULL Pointer Dereference (The product dereferences a pointer that it expects to be valid but is NULL.).
How can I check Maven dependencies for CVE-2026-53034?
Run the dependency tree command: 'mvn dependency:tree'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-pwx6-fvf4-6686",
  "modified" : "2026-07-15T15:32:45Z",
  "published" : "2026-06-24T18:32:44Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-53034" ],
  "details" : "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbpf, sockmap: Fix af_unix null-ptr-deref in proto update\n\nunix_stream_connect() sets sk_state (`WRITE_ONCE(sk->sk_state,\nTCP_ESTABLISHED)`) _before_ it assigns a peer (`unix_peer(sk) = newsk`).\nsk_state == TCP_ESTABLISHED makes sock_map_sk_state_allowed() believe that\nsocket is properly set up, which would include having a defined peer. IOW,\nthere's a window when unix_stream_bpf_update_proto() can be called on\nsocket which still has unix_peer(sk) == NULL.\n\n         CPU0 bpf                            CPU1 connect\n         --------                            ------------\n\n                                WRITE_ONCE(sk->sk_state, TCP_ESTABLISHED)\nsock_map_sk_state_allowed(sk)\n...\nsk_pair = unix_peer(sk)\nsock_hold(sk_pair)\n                                sock_hold(newsk)\n                                smp_mb__after_atomic()\n                                unix_peer(sk) = newsk\n\nBUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000080\nRIP: 0010:unix_stream_bpf_update_proto+0xa0/0x1b0\nCall Trace:\n  sock_map_link+0x564/0x8b0\n  sock_map_update_common+0x6e/0x340\n  sock_map_update_elem_sys+0x17d/0x240\n  __sys_bpf+0x26db/0x3250\n  __x64_sys_bpf+0x21/0x30\n  do_syscall_64+0x6b/0x3a0\n  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e\n\nInitial idea was to move peer assignment _before_ the sk_state update[1],\nbut that involved an additional memory barrier, and changing the hot path\nwas rejected.\nThen a NULL check during proto update in unix_stream_bpf_update_proto() was\nconsidered[2], but the follow-up discussion[3] focused on the root cause,\ni.e. sockmap update taking a wrong lock. Or, more specifically, missing\nunix_state_lock()[4].\nIn the end it was concluded that teaching sockmap about the af_unix locking\nwould be unnecessarily complex[5].\nComplexity aside, since BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS and BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_ACT\nare allowed to update sockmaps, sock_map_update_elem() taking the unix\nlock, as it is currently implemented in unix_state_lock():\nspin_lock(&unix_sk(s)->lock), would be problematic. unix_state_lock() taken\nin a process context, followed by a softirq-context TC BPF program\nattempting to take the same spinlock -- deadlock[6].\nThis way we circled back to the peer check idea[2].\n\n[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/ba5c50aa-1df4-40c2-ab33-a72022c5a32e@rbox.co/\n[2]: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20240610174906.32921-1-kuniyu@amazon.com/\n[3]: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/7603c0e6-cd5b-452b-b710-73b64bd9de26@linux.dev/\n[4]: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/CAAVpQUA+8GL_j63CaKb8hbxoL21izD58yr1NvhOhU=j+35+3og@mail.gmail.com/\n[5]: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/CAAVpQUAHijOMext28Gi10dSLuMzGYh+jK61Ujn+fZ-wvcODR2A@mail.gmail.com/\n[6]: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/dd043c69-4d03-46fe-8325-8f97101435cf@linux.dev/\n\nSummary of scenarios where af_unix/stream connect() may race a sockmap\nupdate:\n\n1. connect() vs. bpf(BPF_MAP_UPDATE_ELEM), i.e. sock_map_update_elem_sys()\n\n   Implemented NULL check is sufficient. Once assigned, socket peer won't\n   be released until socket fd is released. And that's not an issue because\n   sock_map_update_elem_sys() bumps fd refcnf.\n\n2. connect() vs BPF program doing update\n\n   Update restricted per verifier.c:may_update_sockmap() to\n\n      BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING/BPF_TRACE_ITER\n      BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCK_OPS (bpf_sock_map_update() only)\n      BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER\n      BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS\n      BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_ACT\n      BPF_PROG_TYPE_XDP\n      BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_REUSEPORT\n      BPF_PROG_TYPE_FLOW_DISSECTOR\n      BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_LOOKUP\n\n   Plus one more race to consider:\n\n            CPU0 bpf                            CPU1 connect\n            --------                            ------------\n\n                                   WRITE_ONCE(sk->sk_state, TCP_ESTABLISHED)\n   sock_map_sk_state_allowed(sk)\n                                   sock_hold(newsk)\n                                   smp_mb__after_atomic()\n                \n---truncated---",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "ADVISORY",
    "url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-53034"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/041eb6348d73ee5e15fc8161f1eac5a6e8289ca0"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/37bfcd164161b47d00b1c3bd20adc816a6977ce0"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4913c94a3adcdbb64c552110c0c243cb1fdbb317"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/75b7d3b3f8bd4e59eb3af1b11a43c64c0c2db6f4"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a94d3dd78ee8b63e6b8ad629081c952c93ee5a10"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/dca38b7734d2ea00af4818ff3ae836fab33d5d5a"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-476" ],
    "severity" : "MODERATE",
    "github_reviewed" : false,
    "github_reviewed_at" : null,
    "nvd_published_at" : "2026-06-24T17:17:14Z"
  }
}