GHSA-pvmv-cwg8-v6c8: Zebrad Zebra V4.4.0 Still Accepts V5 Vulnerability

CRITICAL
CWE-573 CWE-354
Published
Advisory Summary

GHSA-pvmv-cwg8-v6c8 is a CRITICAL zebra v4.4.0 still accepts v5 vulnerability (CWE-573: Improper Following of Specification by Caller) affecting Zebrad libraries in the crates.io ecosystem. The issue involves zebra v4.4.0 still accepts v5 sighash_single without a corresponding output. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 4.4.1, 6.0.1.

GHSA-pvmv-cwg8-v6c8 at a Glance

CVE Identifier N/A
GHSA Identifier GHSA-pvmv-cwg8-v6c8
Severity CRITICAL
CVSS v3.1 Base Score N/A
CWE Classification CWE-573: Improper Following of Specification by Caller
Affected Product Zebrad
Package Ecosystem crates.io
Published Date
Last Updated

How to Fix GHSA-pvmv-cwg8-v6c8

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Zebrad dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

zebrad fixed: 4.4.1
Upgrade zebrad to 4.4.1
zebra-script fixed: 6.0.1
Upgrade zebra-script to 6.0.1
Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

inspect dependencies for zebrad

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your application is affected by GHSA-pvmv-cwg8-v6c8, inspect your project dependencies for Zebrad:

inspect dependencies for zebrad

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Zebrad in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 4.4.1), your application is affected.

Note: Verify declared build manifests and deployed runtime container environments.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-573: Improper Following of Specification by Caller, where the product does not follow or incorrectly follows the specifications as required by the implementation language, environment, framework, protocol, or platform. In Zebrad, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

# Consensus Divergence in V5 Transparent SIGHASH_SINGLE With No Corresponding Output ## Summary Zebra failed to enforce a ZIP-244 consensus rule for V5 transparent transactions: when an input is signed with `SIGHASH_SINGLE` and there is no transparent output at the same index as that input, validation must fail. Zebra instead asked the underlying sighash library to compute a digest, and that library produced a digest over an empty output set rather than failing. An attacker could craft a V5 transaction with more transparent inputs than outputs that Zebra accepts but `zcashd` rejects, creating a consensus split between Zebra and `zcashd` nodes. A previous fix ([`GHSA-cwfq-rfcr-8hmp`](https://github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra/security/advisories/GHSA-cwfq-rfcr-8hmp)) addressed a closely related case in the same area of the code, but did not cover this specific one. ## Severity **Critical** - This is a Consensus Vulnerability that could allow a malicious party to induce network partitioning, service disruption, and potential double-spend attacks against affected nodes. Note that the impact is currently alleviated by the fact that currently most miners run `zcashd`. ## Affected Versions Zebra 4.4.0. ## Description Verification of transparent transactions inherits the Bitcoin Script verification code in C++. Since it is consensus-critical, this code is called from Zebra through a foreign function interface (FFI), with a Rust callback that computes the sighash for each input being verified. ZIP-244 §S.2a marks two situations as consensus failure for V5 transparent signatures: 1. The signed hash type is not one of the six canonical values; and 2. The hash type is `SIGHASH_SINGLE` (alone or combined with `ANYONECANPAY`) and the input has no transparent output at the same index. `zcashd` enforces both rules: its `SignatureHash` raises an exception, and `CheckSig` catches it and fails the script. A previous fix (`GHSA-cwfq-rfcr-8hmp`) added the first rule to Zebra's V5 sighash callback. The second rule, however, was not added — Zebra's callback forwarded the request to `librustzcash`'s ZIP-244 implementation, which handles an out-of-range `SIGHASH_SINGLE` output index by hashing an empty output set rather than refusing to produce a digest. As a result, Zebra would compute a well-defined sighash for the missing-output case and accept any signature that verified against it. An attacker could exploit this by: - Constructing a V5 transaction with two or more transparent inputs and fewer transparent outputs; - Signing an input whose index has no matching `vout` entry with `SIGHASH_SINGLE` (`0x03`) or `SIGHASH_SINGLE|ANYONECANPAY` (`0x83`), using the digest Zebra computes; - Broadcasting the transaction, or a block containing it, to the network. Zebra would verify the transaction's transparent script and accept the transaction (and any block containing it), while `zcashd` would reject both, splitting Zebra nodes from the rest of the network. ## Impact **Consensus Failure** - **Attack Vector:** Network. - **Effect:** Network partition/consensus split. - **Scope:** Any affected Zebra node. ## Fixed Versions This issue is fixed in Zebra 4.4.1. ## Mitigation Users should upgrade to Zebra 4.4.1 or later immediately. There are no known workarounds for this issue. Immediate upgrade is the only way to ensure the node remains on the correct consensus path and is protected against malicious chain forks. ## Credits Zebra thanks @sangsoo-osec, @zmanian, and @fivelittleducks for finding and reporting the issue.

GHSA-pvmv-cwg8-v6c8 Affected Zebrad Versions

2 component(s)
Fixed Versions:
4.4.16.0.1
Product / Package Ecosystem Affected Versions Fixed Version
zebrad
crates.io
< 4.4.1
4.4.1
zebra-script
crates.io
< 6.0.1
6.0.1

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is GHSA-pvmv-cwg8-v6c8?
GHSA-pvmv-cwg8-v6c8 is a security vulnerability in Zebrad involving Zebra v4.4.0 still accepts V5 SIGHASH_SINGLE without a corresponding output under CWE-573: Improper Following of Specification by Caller.
Which Zebrad versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to 4.4.1, 6.0.1 across affected packages: zebrad, zebra-script.
What version fixes GHSA-pvmv-cwg8-v6c8?
Upgrading to 4.4.1, 6.0.1 (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
Is zebrad affected?
Yes, zebrad is affected in releases prior to 4.4.1. Upgrade your dependency to 4.4.1 or later.
Is zebra-script affected?
Yes, zebra-script is affected in releases prior to 6.0.1. Upgrade your dependency to 6.0.1 or later.
What CWE is associated with GHSA-pvmv-cwg8-v6c8?
GHSA-pvmv-cwg8-v6c8 is classified under CWE-573: Improper Following of Specification by Caller (The product does not follow or incorrectly follows the specifications as required by the implementation language, environment, framework, protocol, or platform.).
How can I check crates.io dependencies for GHSA-pvmv-cwg8-v6c8?
Run the dependency tree command: 'inspect dependencies for zebrad'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-pvmv-cwg8-v6c8",
  "modified" : "2026-05-08T18:27:26Z",
  "published" : "2026-05-08T18:27:26Z",
  "aliases" : [ ],
  "summary" : "Zebra v4.4.0 still accepts V5 SIGHASH_SINGLE without a corresponding output",
  "details" : "# Consensus Divergence in V5 Transparent SIGHASH_SINGLE With No Corresponding Output\n\n## Summary\n\nZebra failed to enforce a ZIP-244 consensus rule for V5 transparent transactions: when an input is signed with `SIGHASH_SINGLE` and there is no transparent output at the same index as that input, validation must fail. Zebra instead asked the underlying sighash library to compute a digest, and that library produced a digest over an empty output set rather than failing. An attacker could craft a V5 transaction with more transparent inputs than outputs that Zebra accepts but `zcashd` rejects, creating a consensus split between Zebra and `zcashd` nodes.\n\nA previous fix ([`GHSA-cwfq-rfcr-8hmp`](https://github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra/security/advisories/GHSA-cwfq-rfcr-8hmp)) addressed a closely related case in the same area of the code, but did not cover this specific one. \n\n## Severity\n\n**Critical** - This is a Consensus Vulnerability that could allow a malicious party to induce network partitioning, service disruption, and potential double-spend attacks against affected nodes.\n\nNote that the impact is currently alleviated by the fact that currently most miners run `zcashd`.\n\n## Affected Versions\n\nZebra 4.4.0.\n\n## Description\n\nVerification of transparent transactions inherits the Bitcoin Script verification code in C++. Since it is consensus-critical, this code is called from Zebra through a foreign function interface (FFI), with a Rust callback that computes the sighash for each input being verified.\n\nZIP-244 §S.2a marks two situations as consensus failure for V5 transparent signatures:\n\n1. The signed hash type is not one of the six canonical values; and\n2. The hash type is `SIGHASH_SINGLE` (alone or combined with `ANYONECANPAY`) and the input has no transparent output at the same index.\n\n`zcashd` enforces both rules: its `SignatureHash` raises an exception, and `CheckSig` catches it and fails the script. A previous fix (`GHSA-cwfq-rfcr-8hmp`) added the first rule to Zebra's V5 sighash callback. The second rule, however, was not added — Zebra's callback forwarded the request to `librustzcash`'s ZIP-244 implementation, which handles an out-of-range `SIGHASH_SINGLE` output index by hashing an empty output set rather than refusing to produce a digest. As a result, Zebra would compute a well-defined sighash for the missing-output case and accept any signature that verified against it.\n\nAn attacker could exploit this by:\n\n- Constructing a V5 transaction with two or more transparent inputs and fewer transparent outputs;\n- Signing an input whose index has no matching `vout` entry with `SIGHASH_SINGLE` (`0x03`) or `SIGHASH_SINGLE|ANYONECANPAY` (`0x83`), using the digest Zebra computes;\n- Broadcasting the transaction, or a block containing it, to the network.\n\nZebra would verify the transaction's transparent script and accept the transaction (and any block containing it), while `zcashd` would reject both, splitting Zebra nodes from the rest of the network.\n\n## Impact\n\n**Consensus Failure**\n\n- **Attack Vector:** Network.\n- **Effect:** Network partition/consensus split.\n- **Scope:** Any affected Zebra node.\n\n## Fixed Versions\n\nThis issue is fixed in Zebra 4.4.1.\n\n## Mitigation\n\nUsers should upgrade to Zebra 4.4.1 or later immediately.\n\nThere are no known workarounds for this issue. Immediate upgrade is the only way to ensure the node remains on the correct consensus path and is protected against malicious chain forks.\n\n## Credits\n\nZebra thanks @sangsoo-osec, @zmanian, and @fivelittleducks for finding and reporting the issue.",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V4",
    "score" : "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:H/SA:H"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "crates.io",
      "name" : "zebrad"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "4.4.1"
      } ]
    } ]
  }, {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "crates.io",
      "name" : "zebra-script"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "6.0.1"
      } ]
    } ]
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra/security/advisories/GHSA-pvmv-cwg8-v6c8"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-354", "CWE-573" ],
    "severity" : "CRITICAL",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-05-08T18:27:26Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : null
  }
}