GHSA-pvmv-cwg8-v6c8: Zebrad Zebra V4.4.0 Still Accepts V5 Vulnerability
CRITICALGHSA-pvmv-cwg8-v6c8 is a CRITICAL zebra v4.4.0 still accepts v5 vulnerability (CWE-573: Improper Following of Specification by Caller) affecting Zebrad libraries in the crates.io ecosystem. The issue involves zebra v4.4.0 still accepts v5 sighash_single without a corresponding output. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 4.4.1, 6.0.1.
GHSA-pvmv-cwg8-v6c8 at a Glance
How to Fix GHSA-pvmv-cwg8-v6c8
To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Zebrad dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.
Upgrade zebrad to 4.4.1
Upgrade zebra-script to 6.0.1
Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:
inspect dependencies for zebrad
How to Check if You Are Affected
To determine whether your application is affected by GHSA-pvmv-cwg8-v6c8, inspect your project dependencies for Zebrad:
inspect dependencies for zebrad
Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Zebrad in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 4.4.1), your application is affected.
Note: Verify declared build manifests and deployed runtime container environments.
Technical Details
Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis
This vulnerability is classified under CWE-573: Improper Following of Specification by Caller, where the product does not follow or incorrectly follows the specifications as required by the implementation language, environment, framework, protocol, or platform. In Zebrad, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.
Source Advisory Statement
GHSA-pvmv-cwg8-v6c8 Affected Zebrad Versions
2 component(s)| Product / Package | Ecosystem | Affected Versions | Fixed Version |
|---|---|---|---|
|
zebrad
|
crates.io |
< 4.4.1
|
4.4.1
|
|
zebra-script
|
crates.io |
< 6.0.1
|
6.0.1
|
References
Frequently Asked Questions
What is GHSA-pvmv-cwg8-v6c8?
Which Zebrad versions are affected?
What version fixes GHSA-pvmv-cwg8-v6c8?
Is zebrad affected?
Is zebra-script affected?
What CWE is associated with GHSA-pvmv-cwg8-v6c8?
How can I check crates.io dependencies for GHSA-pvmv-cwg8-v6c8?
Machine-readable OSV JSON
OSV v1.5 Schema
{
"schema_version" : "1.4.0",
"id" : "GHSA-pvmv-cwg8-v6c8",
"modified" : "2026-05-08T18:27:26Z",
"published" : "2026-05-08T18:27:26Z",
"aliases" : [ ],
"summary" : "Zebra v4.4.0 still accepts V5 SIGHASH_SINGLE without a corresponding output",
"details" : "# Consensus Divergence in V5 Transparent SIGHASH_SINGLE With No Corresponding Output\n\n## Summary\n\nZebra failed to enforce a ZIP-244 consensus rule for V5 transparent transactions: when an input is signed with `SIGHASH_SINGLE` and there is no transparent output at the same index as that input, validation must fail. Zebra instead asked the underlying sighash library to compute a digest, and that library produced a digest over an empty output set rather than failing. An attacker could craft a V5 transaction with more transparent inputs than outputs that Zebra accepts but `zcashd` rejects, creating a consensus split between Zebra and `zcashd` nodes.\n\nA previous fix ([`GHSA-cwfq-rfcr-8hmp`](https://github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra/security/advisories/GHSA-cwfq-rfcr-8hmp)) addressed a closely related case in the same area of the code, but did not cover this specific one. \n\n## Severity\n\n**Critical** - This is a Consensus Vulnerability that could allow a malicious party to induce network partitioning, service disruption, and potential double-spend attacks against affected nodes.\n\nNote that the impact is currently alleviated by the fact that currently most miners run `zcashd`.\n\n## Affected Versions\n\nZebra 4.4.0.\n\n## Description\n\nVerification of transparent transactions inherits the Bitcoin Script verification code in C++. Since it is consensus-critical, this code is called from Zebra through a foreign function interface (FFI), with a Rust callback that computes the sighash for each input being verified.\n\nZIP-244 §S.2a marks two situations as consensus failure for V5 transparent signatures:\n\n1. The signed hash type is not one of the six canonical values; and\n2. The hash type is `SIGHASH_SINGLE` (alone or combined with `ANYONECANPAY`) and the input has no transparent output at the same index.\n\n`zcashd` enforces both rules: its `SignatureHash` raises an exception, and `CheckSig` catches it and fails the script. A previous fix (`GHSA-cwfq-rfcr-8hmp`) added the first rule to Zebra's V5 sighash callback. The second rule, however, was not added — Zebra's callback forwarded the request to `librustzcash`'s ZIP-244 implementation, which handles an out-of-range `SIGHASH_SINGLE` output index by hashing an empty output set rather than refusing to produce a digest. As a result, Zebra would compute a well-defined sighash for the missing-output case and accept any signature that verified against it.\n\nAn attacker could exploit this by:\n\n- Constructing a V5 transaction with two or more transparent inputs and fewer transparent outputs;\n- Signing an input whose index has no matching `vout` entry with `SIGHASH_SINGLE` (`0x03`) or `SIGHASH_SINGLE|ANYONECANPAY` (`0x83`), using the digest Zebra computes;\n- Broadcasting the transaction, or a block containing it, to the network.\n\nZebra would verify the transaction's transparent script and accept the transaction (and any block containing it), while `zcashd` would reject both, splitting Zebra nodes from the rest of the network.\n\n## Impact\n\n**Consensus Failure**\n\n- **Attack Vector:** Network.\n- **Effect:** Network partition/consensus split.\n- **Scope:** Any affected Zebra node.\n\n## Fixed Versions\n\nThis issue is fixed in Zebra 4.4.1.\n\n## Mitigation\n\nUsers should upgrade to Zebra 4.4.1 or later immediately.\n\nThere are no known workarounds for this issue. Immediate upgrade is the only way to ensure the node remains on the correct consensus path and is protected against malicious chain forks.\n\n## Credits\n\nZebra thanks @sangsoo-osec, @zmanian, and @fivelittleducks for finding and reporting the issue.",
"severity" : [ {
"type" : "CVSS_V4",
"score" : "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:H/SA:H"
} ],
"affected" : [ {
"package" : {
"ecosystem" : "crates.io",
"name" : "zebrad"
},
"ranges" : [ {
"type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
"events" : [ {
"introduced" : "0"
}, {
"fixed" : "4.4.1"
} ]
} ]
}, {
"package" : {
"ecosystem" : "crates.io",
"name" : "zebra-script"
},
"ranges" : [ {
"type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
"events" : [ {
"introduced" : "0"
}, {
"fixed" : "6.0.1"
} ]
} ]
} ],
"references" : [ {
"type" : "WEB",
"url" : "https://github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra/security/advisories/GHSA-pvmv-cwg8-v6c8"
}, {
"type" : "PACKAGE",
"url" : "https://github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra"
} ],
"database_specific" : {
"cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-354", "CWE-573" ],
"severity" : "CRITICAL",
"github_reviewed" : true,
"github_reviewed_at" : "2026-05-08T18:27:26Z",
"nvd_published_at" : null
}
}