CVE-2026-40910: Github.com/fatedier/frp Authentication Bypass Vulnerability

MODERATE
Advisory Identifier: GHSA-pq96-pwvg-vrr9
CVSS 6.5
CWE-287
Published
Advisory Summary

CVE-2026-40910 is a MODERATE (CVSS 6.5) authentication bypass vulnerability (CWE-287: Improper Authentication) affecting Github.com/fatedier/frp libraries in the Go ecosystem. The issue involves frp has an authentication bypass in http vhost routing when routebyhttpuser is used for access control. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 0.68.1.

CVE-2026-40910 at a Glance

CVE Identifier CVE-2026-40910
GHSA Identifier GHSA-pq96-pwvg-vrr9
Severity MODERATE
CVSS v3.1 Base Score 6.5
CWE Classification CWE-287: Improper Authentication
Affected Product Github.com/fatedier/frp
Package Ecosystem Go
Published Date
Last Updated

Security Impact

CVSS: 6.5

The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N).

Attack Vector Network (AV:N)
Attack Complexity High (AC:H)
Privileges Required None (PR:N)
User Interaction None (UI:N)
Scope Unchanged (S:U)
Confidentiality High (C:H)
Integrity Low (I:L)
Availability None (A:N)

How to Fix CVE-2026-40910

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Github.com/fatedier/frp dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

github.com/fatedier/frp fixed: 0.68.1
Upgrade github.com/fatedier/frp to 0.68.1
Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

inspect dependencies for github.com/fatedier/frp

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your application is affected by CVE-2026-40910, inspect your project dependencies for Github.com/fatedier/frp:

inspect dependencies for github.com/fatedier/frp

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Github.com/fatedier/frp in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 0.68.1), your application is affected.

Note: Verify declared build manifests and deployed runtime container environments.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-287: Improper Authentication, where when an actor claims to have a given identity, the product does not prove or insufficiently proves that the claim is correct. In Github.com/fatedier/frp, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

### Summary frp contains an authentication bypass in the HTTP vhost routing path when `routeByHTTPUser` is used as part of access control. In proxy-style requests, the routing logic uses the username from `Proxy-Authorization` to select the `routeByHTTPUser` backend, while the access control check uses credentials from the regular `Authorization` header. As a result, an attacker who can reach the HTTP vhost entrypoint and knows or can guess the protected `routeByHTTPUser` value may access a backend protected by `httpUser` / `httpPassword` even with an incorrect `Proxy-Authorization` password. This issue affects deployments that explicitly use `routeByHTTPUser`. It does not affect ordinary HTTP proxies that do not use this feature. ### Details The issue is in `pkg/util/vhost/http.go`. In proxy-style requests using an absolute URI, the routing path extracts the username from `Proxy-Authorization` and stores it as the request `HTTPUser`, which is then used for `routeByHTTPUser` route selection. More specifically, `injectRequestInfoToCtx()` derives the routing user from `Proxy-Authorization`, while the original `ServeHTTP()` implementation used `req.BasicAuth()` for the authentication check. Because routing and authentication use different credential sources, a request can be routed to a protected backend based on the `Proxy-Authorization` username while the authentication check is not performed against the same credentials. This creates an authentication bypass when `routeByHTTPUser`, `httpUser`, and `httpPassword` are used together. This is not a universal anonymous bypass for all frp HTTP proxies; it is specific to deployments that use `routeByHTTPUser` and where the target user value is known or can be inferred. A minimal fix is to make the authentication check in proxy mode use the same credential source as route selection, i.e. to derive proxy-mode credentials from `Proxy-Authorization` consistently. From local Git history analysis, this logic appears to have been introduced by commit `4af85da0c2c6eb981142a8fdb44f885d26cb9d08`, with the earliest containing release tag appearing to be `v0.43.0`. ### PoC I reproduced the issue with the official `frp_0.68.0_linux_amd64.tar.gz` release binaries both locally and on an internet-reachable test server under my control. Minimal setup: - `frps` exposes an HTTP vhost entrypoint. - One HTTP proxy is configured with: - `customDomains = ["example.test"]` - `routeByHTTPUser = "alice"` - `httpUser = "alice"` - `httpPassword = "secret"` - The protected backend returns a constant marker string: `PRIVATE`. Minimal request flow: 1. Direct unauthenticated request: - `curl -i --proxy '' -H 'Host: example.test' http://<FRPS_HOST>:<VHOST_HTTP_PORT>/` - Result: `404 Not Found` 2. Direct request with correct backend credentials: - `curl -i --proxy '' -u alice:secret -H 'Host: example.test' http://<FRPS_HOST>:<VHOST_HTTP_PORT>/` - Result: `200 OK`, body contains `PRIVATE` 3. Proxy-style request with incorrect `Proxy-Authorization`: - `curl -i --noproxy '' -x http://<FRPS_HOST>:<VHOST_HTTP_PORT> --proxy-user alice:wrong http://example.test/` - Result: `200 OK`, body contains `PRIVATE` Observed minimal result summary: - `DIRECT_NOAUTH -> 404` - `DIRECT_BASICAUTH_GOOD -> 200 PRIVATE` - `PROXY_PROXYAUTH_WRONGPASS -> 200 PRIVATE` This was reproduced against the official binary, not only against a local source build. ### Impact This is an authentication bypass leading to unauthorized access to a protected backend. The practical impact depends on what service is behind the protected route. Examples include private application endpoints, internal administration panels, loopback-only local services, or development and operations interfaces. Important boundary: if the protected backend is an `frpc` admin API that is separately protected by its own `webServer.user` / `webServer.password`, this issue only bypasses the outer vhost restriction and does not automatically bypass the inner admin authentication. In that case, the request may still reach the backend but correctly receive `401 Unauthorized` from the inner layer. There is also a deployment-specific downstream impact path. If the bypassed backend is an `frpc` admin API without separate inner authentication, and if that `frpc` instance permits store-based proxy management, an attacker may be able to create additional plugin-based proxies through the admin API. In deployments where a `unix_domain_socket` proxy can be used to expose Docker's Unix socket, this may further expose the Docker API and potentially enable host-level command execution through Docker. This follow-on consequence depends on multiple additional deployment conditions and should be treated as a conditional downstream impact rather than the core vulnerability itself. Because exploitation requires a deployment to explicitly use `routeByHTTPUser`, and because the attacker must know or be able to guess the target `routeByHTTPUser` value, the issue is better classified as a configuration-dependent authentication bypass rather than a default-configuration issue.

CVE-2026-40910 Affected Github.com/fatedier/frp Versions

1 component(s)
Fixed Versions:
0.68.1
Product / Package Ecosystem Affected Versions Fixed Version
github.com/fatedier/frp
Go
≥ 0.43.0
< 0.68.1
0.68.1

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-40910?
CVE-2026-40910 is a security vulnerability in Github.com/fatedier/frp involving frp has an authentication bypass in HTTP vhost routing when routeByHTTPUser is used for access control under CWE-287: Improper Authentication.
Which Github.com/fatedier/frp versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to 0.68.1 across affected packages: github.com/fatedier/frp.
What version fixes CVE-2026-40910?
Upgrading to 0.68.1 (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
Is github.com/fatedier/frp affected?
Yes, github.com/fatedier/frp is affected in releases prior to 0.68.1. Upgrade your dependency to 0.68.1 or later.
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-40910?
CVE-2026-40910 has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 6.5 (MODERATE) with vector string CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N.
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-40910?
CVE-2026-40910 is classified under CWE-287: Improper Authentication (When an actor claims to have a given identity, the product does not prove or insufficiently proves that the claim is correct.).
How can I check Go dependencies for CVE-2026-40910?
Run the dependency tree command: 'inspect dependencies for github.com/fatedier/frp'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-pq96-pwvg-vrr9",
  "modified" : "2026-04-24T20:30:23Z",
  "published" : "2026-04-14T23:33:15Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-40910" ],
  "summary" : "frp has an authentication bypass in HTTP vhost routing when routeByHTTPUser is used for access control",
  "details" : "### Summary\nfrp contains an authentication bypass in the HTTP vhost routing path when `routeByHTTPUser` is used as part of access control. In proxy-style requests, the routing logic uses the username from `Proxy-Authorization` to select the `routeByHTTPUser` backend, while the access control check uses credentials from the regular `Authorization` header. As a result, an attacker who can reach the HTTP vhost entrypoint and knows or can guess the protected `routeByHTTPUser` value may access a backend protected by `httpUser` / `httpPassword` even with an incorrect `Proxy-Authorization` password.\n\nThis issue affects deployments that explicitly use `routeByHTTPUser`. It does not affect ordinary HTTP proxies that do not use this feature.\n\n### Details\nThe issue is in `pkg/util/vhost/http.go`.\n\nIn proxy-style requests using an absolute URI, the routing path extracts the username from `Proxy-Authorization` and stores it as the request `HTTPUser`, which is then used for `routeByHTTPUser` route selection.\n\nMore specifically, `injectRequestInfoToCtx()` derives the routing user from `Proxy-Authorization`, while the original `ServeHTTP()` implementation used `req.BasicAuth()` for the authentication check.\n\nBecause routing and authentication use different credential sources, a request can be routed to a protected backend based on the `Proxy-Authorization` username while the authentication check is not performed against the same credentials. This creates an authentication bypass when `routeByHTTPUser`, `httpUser`, and `httpPassword` are used together.\n\nThis is not a universal anonymous bypass for all frp HTTP proxies; it is specific to deployments that use `routeByHTTPUser` and where the target user value is known or can be inferred.\n\nA minimal fix is to make the authentication check in proxy mode use the same credential source as route selection, i.e. to derive proxy-mode credentials from `Proxy-Authorization` consistently.\n\nFrom local Git history analysis, this logic appears to have been introduced by commit `4af85da0c2c6eb981142a8fdb44f885d26cb9d08`, with the earliest containing release tag appearing to be `v0.43.0`.\n\n### PoC\nI reproduced the issue with the official `frp_0.68.0_linux_amd64.tar.gz` release binaries both locally and on an internet-reachable test server under my control.\n\nMinimal setup:\n- `frps` exposes an HTTP vhost entrypoint.\n- One HTTP proxy is configured with:\n  - `customDomains = [\"example.test\"]`\n  - `routeByHTTPUser = \"alice\"`\n  - `httpUser = \"alice\"`\n  - `httpPassword = \"secret\"`\n- The protected backend returns a constant marker string: `PRIVATE`.\n\nMinimal request flow:\n1. Direct unauthenticated request:\n   - `curl -i --proxy '' -H 'Host: example.test' http://<FRPS_HOST>:<VHOST_HTTP_PORT>/`\n   - Result: `404 Not Found`\n\n2. Direct request with correct backend credentials:\n   - `curl -i --proxy '' -u alice:secret -H 'Host: example.test' http://<FRPS_HOST>:<VHOST_HTTP_PORT>/`\n   - Result: `200 OK`, body contains `PRIVATE`\n\n3. Proxy-style request with incorrect `Proxy-Authorization`:\n   - `curl -i --noproxy '' -x http://<FRPS_HOST>:<VHOST_HTTP_PORT> --proxy-user alice:wrong http://example.test/`\n   - Result: `200 OK`, body contains `PRIVATE`\n\nObserved minimal result summary:\n- `DIRECT_NOAUTH -> 404`\n- `DIRECT_BASICAUTH_GOOD -> 200 PRIVATE`\n- `PROXY_PROXYAUTH_WRONGPASS -> 200 PRIVATE`\n\nThis was reproduced against the official binary, not only against a local source build.\n\n### Impact\nThis is an authentication bypass leading to unauthorized access to a protected backend.\n\nThe practical impact depends on what service is behind the protected route. Examples include private application endpoints, internal administration panels, loopback-only local services, or development and operations interfaces.\n\nImportant boundary: if the protected backend is an `frpc` admin API that is separately protected by its own `webServer.user` / `webServer.password`, this issue only bypasses the outer vhost restriction and does not automatically bypass the inner admin authentication. In that case, the request may still reach the backend but correctly receive `401 Unauthorized` from the inner layer.\n\nThere is also a deployment-specific downstream impact path. If the bypassed backend is an `frpc` admin API without separate inner authentication, and if that `frpc` instance permits store-based proxy management, an attacker may be able to create additional plugin-based proxies through the admin API. In deployments where a `unix_domain_socket` proxy can be used to expose Docker's Unix socket, this may further expose the Docker API and potentially enable host-level command execution through Docker. This follow-on consequence depends on multiple additional deployment conditions and should be treated as a conditional downstream impact rather than the core vulnerability itself.\n\nBecause exploitation requires a deployment to explicitly use `routeByHTTPUser`, and because the attacker must know or be able to guess the target `routeByHTTPUser` value, the issue is better classified as a configuration-dependent authentication bypass rather than a default-configuration issue.",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "Go",
      "name" : "github.com/fatedier/frp"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0.43.0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "0.68.1"
      } ]
    } ],
    "database_specific" : {
      "last_known_affected_version_range" : "<= 0.68.0"
    }
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/fatedier/frp/security/advisories/GHSA-pq96-pwvg-vrr9"
  }, {
    "type" : "ADVISORY",
    "url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-40910"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/fatedier/frp"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-287" ],
    "severity" : "MODERATE",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-04-14T23:33:15Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : "2026-04-21T21:16:45Z"
  }
}