CVE-2026-53501: Thumbor Thumbor Has HMAC Validation Bypass Vulnerability

HIGH
Advisory Identifier: GHSA-mw3h-qjxj-6xg9
CVSS 8.2
CWE-347
Published
Advisory Summary

CVE-2026-53501 is a HIGH (CVSS 8.2) thumbor has hmac validation bypass vulnerability (CWE-347: Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature) affecting Thumbor libraries in the PyPI ecosystem. The issue involves thumbor has hmac validation bypass via multiple .replace() calls when removing url signature. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 7.8.0.

CVE-2026-53501 at a Glance

CVE Identifier CVE-2026-53501
GHSA Identifier GHSA-mw3h-qjxj-6xg9
Severity HIGH
CVSS v3.1 Base Score 8.2
CWE Classification CWE-347: Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature
Affected Product Thumbor
Package Ecosystem PyPI
Published Date
Last Updated

Security Impact

CVSS: 8.2

The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L).

Attack Vector Network (AV:N)
Attack Complexity Low (AC:L)
Privileges Required None (PR:N)
User Interaction None (UI:N)
Scope Unchanged (S:U)
Confidentiality None (C:N)
Integrity High (I:H)
Availability Low (A:L)

How to Fix CVE-2026-53501

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Thumbor dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

thumbor fixed: 7.8.0
pip install thumbor>=7.8.0
Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

pip show thumbor

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your Python environment is affected by CVE-2026-53501, inspect your installed packages using pip:

pip show thumbor

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Thumbor in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 7.8.0), your application is affected.

Note: The pip show thumbor command checks currently installed packages in your active Python environment.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-347: Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature, where the product does not verify, or incorrectly verifies, the cryptographic signature for data. In Thumbor, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

# HMAC validation bypass via multiple `.replace()` calls when removing URL signature ## Summary Thumbor’s HMAC validation can be bypassed due to the use of Python’s `.replace()` when removing the signature from the URL before validation. Since `.replace()` removes **all occurrences** of the substring, an attacker can insert the same signature multiple times in the URL and manipulate the final URL used for validation. This allows crafting URLs where the validated string differs from the actual requested resource, enabling loading images from unintended domains or paths. ## Details Thumbor signs URLs using **HMAC-SHA1** to prevent abuse such as loading arbitrary external images or invoking filters without authorization. During request validation, Thumbor removes the signature from the request URL before recalculating the HMAC. The relevant code: ```python url_signature = self.context.request.hash if url_signature: signer = self.context.modules.url_signer( self.context.server.security_key ) try: quoted_hash = quote(self.context.request.hash) except KeyError: self._error(400, f"Invalid hash: {self.context.request.hash}") return url_to_validate = url.replace( f"/{self.context.request.hash}/", "" ).replace(f"/{quoted_hash}/", "") valid = signer.validate( unquote(url_signature).encode(), url_to_validate ) ``` The issue is that `.replace()` removes **every occurrence** of the substring in the URL, not just the first one. Because the signature itself appears in the URL, an attacker can **inject additional copies of the signature** elsewhere in the path. When Thumbor performs `.replace()`, these extra occurrences are also removed, resulting in a different `url_to_validate` than the original request. ## Example Valid request: ``` /ddoyYVYUbDf6Po_dzOrBhCDrXLc=/300x200/s3.glbimg.com/v1/.../image.jpg ``` By injecting the same hash inside the URL: ``` /ddoyYVYUbDf6Po_dzOrBhCDrXLc=/300x200/s3.glbimg.co/ddoyYVYUbDf6Po_dzOrBhCDrXLc=/m/v1/.../image.jpg ``` After `.replace()` removes all occurrences of the hash, the URL used for validation differs from the effective request path. This allows manipulation of the upstream host or path. Further manipulation is possible due to the **second `.replace()` for the URL-encoded hash (`%3D`)**, enabling more precise path manipulation. Example: ``` /ddoyYVYUbDf6Po_dzOrBhCDrXLc=/300x200/s3.glbimg.com/ddoyYVYUbDf6Po/ddoyYVYUbDf6Po_dzOrBhCDrXLc%3D/ddoyYVYUbDf6Po/v1/... ``` ## Impact This behavior may allow attackers to: - Bypass HMAC URL validation - Load images from arbitrary domains - Abuse Thumbor deployments as an open proxy / image fetcher - Circumvent domain restrictions intended by the signed URL mechanism ## Root Cause Use of `.replace()` without limiting the number of replacements when removing the signature from the URL. Since the signature is part of the request path, using a global replacement allows attackers to place additional occurrences of the same substring to influence the validated string. ## Suggested Fix Remove only the first occurrence of the signature or explicitly parse the URL components instead of performing global string replacement. Example: ```python url.replace(f"/{self.context.request.hash}/", "", 1) ``` Alternatively, reconstruct the unsigned URL deterministically from the parsed request components.

CVE-2026-53501 Affected Thumbor Versions

1 component(s)
Fixed Versions:
7.8.0
Product / Package Ecosystem Affected Versions Fixed Version
thumbor
PyPI
< 7.8.0
7.8.0

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-53501?
CVE-2026-53501 is a security vulnerability in Thumbor involving Thumbor has HMAC validation bypass via multiple .replace() calls when removing URL signature under CWE-347: Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature.
Which Thumbor versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to 7.8.0 across affected packages: thumbor.
What version fixes CVE-2026-53501?
Upgrading to 7.8.0 (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
Is thumbor affected?
Yes, thumbor is affected in releases prior to 7.8.0. Upgrade your dependency to 7.8.0 or later.
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-53501?
CVE-2026-53501 has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 8.2 (HIGH) with vector string CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L.
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-53501?
CVE-2026-53501 is classified under CWE-347: Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature (The product does not verify, or incorrectly verifies, the cryptographic signature for data.).
How can I check PyPI dependencies for CVE-2026-53501?
Run the dependency tree command: 'pip show thumbor'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-mw3h-qjxj-6xg9",
  "modified" : "2026-07-31T18:51:54Z",
  "published" : "2026-07-31T18:51:54Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-53501" ],
  "summary" : "Thumbor has HMAC validation bypass via multiple .replace() calls when removing URL signature",
  "details" : "# HMAC validation bypass via multiple `.replace()` calls when removing URL signature\n\n## Summary\n\nThumbor’s HMAC validation can be bypassed due to the use of Python’s `.replace()` when removing the signature from the URL before validation. Since `.replace()` removes **all occurrences** of the substring, an attacker can insert the same signature multiple times in the URL and manipulate the final URL used for validation.\n\nThis allows crafting URLs where the validated string differs from the actual requested resource, enabling loading images from unintended domains or paths.\n\n## Details\n\nThumbor signs URLs using **HMAC-SHA1** to prevent abuse such as loading arbitrary external images or invoking filters without authorization.\n\nDuring request validation, Thumbor removes the signature from the request URL before recalculating the HMAC. The relevant code:\n\n```python\nurl_signature = self.context.request.hash\nif url_signature:\n    signer = self.context.modules.url_signer(\n        self.context.server.security_key\n    )\n\n    try:\n        quoted_hash = quote(self.context.request.hash)\n    except KeyError:\n        self._error(400, f\"Invalid hash: {self.context.request.hash}\")\n        return\n\n    url_to_validate = url.replace(\n        f\"/{self.context.request.hash}/\", \"\"\n    ).replace(f\"/{quoted_hash}/\", \"\")\n\n    valid = signer.validate(\n        unquote(url_signature).encode(), url_to_validate\n    )\n```\n\nThe issue is that `.replace()` removes **every occurrence** of the substring in the URL, not just the first one.\n\nBecause the signature itself appears in the URL, an attacker can **inject additional copies of the signature** elsewhere in the path. When Thumbor performs `.replace()`, these extra occurrences are also removed, resulting in a different `url_to_validate` than the original request.\n\n## Example\n\nValid request:\n\n```\n/ddoyYVYUbDf6Po_dzOrBhCDrXLc=/300x200/s3.glbimg.com/v1/.../image.jpg\n```\n\nBy injecting the same hash inside the URL:\n\n```\n/ddoyYVYUbDf6Po_dzOrBhCDrXLc=/300x200/s3.glbimg.co/ddoyYVYUbDf6Po_dzOrBhCDrXLc=/m/v1/.../image.jpg\n```\n\nAfter `.replace()` removes all occurrences of the hash, the URL used for validation differs from the effective request path. This allows manipulation of the upstream host or path.\n\nFurther manipulation is possible due to the **second `.replace()` for the URL-encoded hash (`%3D`)**, enabling more precise path manipulation.\n\nExample:\n\n```\n/ddoyYVYUbDf6Po_dzOrBhCDrXLc=/300x200/s3.glbimg.com/ddoyYVYUbDf6Po/ddoyYVYUbDf6Po_dzOrBhCDrXLc%3D/ddoyYVYUbDf6Po/v1/...\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nThis behavior may allow attackers to:\n\n- Bypass HMAC URL validation\n- Load images from arbitrary domains\n- Abuse Thumbor deployments as an open proxy / image fetcher\n- Circumvent domain restrictions intended by the signed URL mechanism\n\n## Root Cause\n\nUse of `.replace()` without limiting the number of replacements when removing the signature from the URL.\n\nSince the signature is part of the request path, using a global replacement allows attackers to place additional occurrences of the same substring to influence the validated string.\n\n## Suggested Fix\n\nRemove only the first occurrence of the signature or explicitly parse the URL components instead of performing global string replacement.\n\nExample:\n\n```python\nurl.replace(f\"/{self.context.request.hash}/\", \"\", 1)\n```\n\nAlternatively, reconstruct the unsigned URL deterministically from the parsed request components.",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "PyPI",
      "name" : "thumbor"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "7.8.0"
      } ]
    } ],
    "database_specific" : {
      "last_known_affected_version_range" : "<= 7.7.7"
    }
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/thumbor/thumbor/security/advisories/GHSA-mw3h-qjxj-6xg9"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/thumbor/thumbor/commit/e3ae3e2500537b4d735df4144129a649374bb70b"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/thumbor/thumbor"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/thumbor/thumbor/releases/tag/7.8.0"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-347" ],
    "severity" : "HIGH",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-07-31T18:51:54Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : null
  }
}