CVE-2026-23450: Software Security Vulnerability Vulnerability

{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-m7g4-hqc4-25c8",
  "modified" : "2026-10-15T03:35:30Z",
  "published" : "2026-04-03T18:31:21Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-23450" ],
  "details" : "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet/smc: fix NULL dereference and UAF in smc_tcp_syn_recv_sock()\n\nSyzkaller reported a panic in smc_tcp_syn_recv_sock() [1].\n\nsmc_tcp_syn_recv_sock() is called in the TCP receive path\n(softirq) via icsk_af_ops->syn_recv_sock on the clcsock (TCP\nlistening socket). It reads sk_user_data to get the smc_sock\npointer. However, when the SMC listen socket is being closed\nconcurrently, smc_close_active() sets clcsock->sk_user_data\nto NULL under sk_callback_lock, and then the smc_sock itself\ncan be freed via sock_put() in smc_release().\n\nThis leads to two issues:\n\n1) NULL pointer dereference: sk_user_data is NULL when\n   accessed.\n2) Use-after-free: sk_user_data is read as non-NULL, but the\n   smc_sock is freed before its fields (e.g., queued_smc_hs,\n   ori_af_ops) are accessed.\n\nThe race window looks like this (the syzkaller crash [1]\ntriggers via the SYN cookie path: tcp_get_cookie_sock() ->\nsmc_tcp_syn_recv_sock(), but the normal tcp_check_req() path\nhas the same race):\n\n  CPU A (softirq)              CPU B (process ctx)\n\n  tcp_v4_rcv()\n    TCP_NEW_SYN_RECV:\n    sk = req->rsk_listener\n    sock_hold(sk)\n    /* No lock on listener */\n                               smc_close_active():\n                                 write_lock_bh(cb_lock)\n                                 sk_user_data = NULL\n                                 write_unlock_bh(cb_lock)\n                                 ...\n                                 smc_clcsock_release()\n                                 sock_put(smc->sk) x2\n                                   -> smc_sock freed!\n    tcp_check_req()\n      smc_tcp_syn_recv_sock():\n        smc = user_data(sk)\n          -> NULL or dangling\n        smc->queued_smc_hs\n          -> crash!\n\nNote that the clcsock and smc_sock are two independent objects\nwith separate refcounts. TCP stack holds a reference on the\nclcsock, which keeps it alive, but this does NOT prevent the\nsmc_sock from being freed.\n\nFix this by using RCU and refcount_inc_not_zero() to safely\naccess smc_sock. Since smc_tcp_syn_recv_sock() is called in\nthe TCP three-way handshake path, taking read_lock_bh on\nsk_callback_lock is too heavy and would not survive a SYN\nflood attack. Using rcu_read_lock() is much more lightweight.\n\n- Set SOCK_RCU_FREE on the SMC listen socket so that\n  smc_sock freeing is deferred until after the RCU grace\n  period. This guarantees the memory is still valid when\n  accessed inside rcu_read_lock().\n- Use rcu_read_lock() to protect reading sk_user_data.\n- Use refcount_inc_not_zero(&smc->sk.sk_refcnt) to pin the\n  smc_sock. If the refcount has already reached zero (close\n  path completed), it returns false and we bail out safely.\n\nNote: smc_hs_congested() has a similar lockless read of\nsk_user_data without rcu_read_lock(), but it only checks for\nNULL and accesses the global smc_hs_wq, never dereferencing\nany smc_sock field, so it is not affected.\n\nReproducer was verified with mdelay injection and smc_run,\nthe issue no longer occurs with this patch applied.\n\n[1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=827ae2bfb3a3529333e9",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "ADVISORY",
    "url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23450"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/html/ssa-019113.html"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/html/ssa-082556.html"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/html/ssa-457936.html"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1e4f873879e075bbd4eb1c644d6933303ac5eba4"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1fab5ece76fb42a761178dcd0ebcbf578377b0dd"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6d5e4538364b9ceb1ac2941a4deb86650afb3538"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cadf3da46c15523fba90d80c9955f536ee3b4023"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f00fc26c8a06442b225a350fe000c0a11483e6a3"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f315277856caeafcd996c2611afc085ca2d53275"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fd7579f0a2c84ba8a7d4f206201b50dc8ddf90c2"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-362", "CWE-416" ],
    "severity" : "CRITICAL",
    "github_reviewed" : false,
    "github_reviewed_at" : null,
    "nvd_published_at" : "2026-04-03T16:16:31Z"
  }
}