CVE-2026-62674: Omnigent Remote Code Execution Vulnerability

CRITICAL
Advisory Identifier: GHSA-jrrm-9hc7-2v3h
CVSS 9.0
CWE-94
Published
Advisory Summary

CVE-2026-62674 is a CRITICAL (CVSS 9.0) remote code execution vulnerability (CWE-94: Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')) affecting Omnigent libraries in the PyPI ecosystem. The issue involves shared agent bundle overwrite leads to authenticated runner rce. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 0.3.0.

CVE-2026-62674 at a Glance

CVE Identifier CVE-2026-62674
GHSA Identifier GHSA-jrrm-9hc7-2v3h
Severity CRITICAL
CVSS v3.1 Base Score 9.0
CWE Classification CWE-94: Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')
Affected Product Omnigent
Package Ecosystem PyPI
Published Date
Last Updated

Security Impact

CVSS: 9.0

The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H).

Attack Vector Network (AV:N)
Attack Complexity Low (AC:L)
Privileges Required Low (PR:L)
User Interaction Required (UI:R)
Scope Changed (S:C)
Confidentiality High (C:H)
Integrity High (I:H)
Availability High (A:H)

How to Fix CVE-2026-62674

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Omnigent dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

omnigent fixed: 0.3.0
pip install omnigent>=0.3.0
Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

pip show omnigent

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your Python environment is affected by CVE-2026-62674, inspect your installed packages using pip:

pip show omnigent

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Omnigent in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 0.3.0), your application is affected.

Note: The pip show omnigent command checks currently installed packages in your active Python environment.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-94: Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection'), where the product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment. In Omnigent, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

### Summary An authenticated user with edit access to their own session can overwrite a shared/template agent by uploading a full agent bundle through `PUT /sessions/{session_id}/agent`. Shared/template agents are shown as not MCP-editable, but this upload path still accepts a replacement bundle. By adding a `stdio` MCP server to the shared agent, the attacker can cause future runner sessions using that shared agent to start an attacker-controlled command. ### Details The vulnerable endpoint is the full agent bundle upload route: [`PUT /sessions/{session_id}/agent`](https://github.com/omnigent-ai/omnigent/blob/10f5ae3110e162f96fb99bb6662c581abdc56cd6/omnigent/server/routes/sessions.py#L18979-L19077) This route checks whether the caller can edit the session: [`LEVEL_EDIT` session permission check](https://github.com/omnigent-ai/omnigent/blob/10f5ae3110e162f96fb99bb6662c581abdc56cd6/omnigent/server/routes/sessions.py#L19003-L19025) But it does not check whether the bound agent is a shared/template agent. Shared/template agents have: ```python agent.session_id is None ``` The API already exposes that these agents are not meant to be MCP-editable: [`mcp_servers_editable` is false for shared/template agents](https://github.com/omnigent-ai/omnigent/blob/10f5ae3110e162f96fb99bb6662c581abdc56cd6/omnigent/server/routes/sessions.py#L18842-L18857) The direct MCP edit endpoint correctly blocks shared/template agents: [`session_mcp_servers.py` shared-agent guard](https://github.com/omnigent-ai/omnigent/blob/10f5ae3110e162f96fb99bb6662c581abdc56cd6/omnigent/server/routes/session_mcp_servers.py#L170-L183) ```python if agent.session_id is None: raise OmnigentError("Built-in agents are read-only through this endpoint.") ``` The full bundle upload endpoint is missing that same guard. It stores the uploaded bundle and updates the agent row: [`agent_store.update(agent.id, new_loc)`](https://github.com/omnigent-ai/omnigent/blob/10f5ae3110e162f96fb99bb6662c581abdc56cd6/omnigent/server/routes/sessions.py#L19050-L19077) For shared/template agents, this changes the shared agent itself, not only the attacker's session. This becomes command execution because `stdio` MCP servers start the configured command as a runner subprocess: [`tools/mcp.py` stdio subprocess launch](https://github.com/omnigent-ai/omnigent/blob/10f5ae3110e162f96fb99bb6662c581abdc56cd6/omnigent/tools/mcp.py#L971-L1021) Suggested fix: add the same `agent.session_id is None` guard to `PUT /sessions/{session_id}/agent`. ### Impact This is authenticated RCE against Omnigent runner hosts. A normal authenticated user with edit access to their own session can poison a shared/template agent bundle, even though that agent is shown as not MCP-editable. The poisoned bundle can then be used by future sessions created from the same shared agent. Because `stdio` MCP servers run as local subprocesses, the attacker-controlled command executes with the permissions of the Omnigent runner process. In a shared or company-hosted deployment, this can let an attacker read runner-accessible files and credentials, modify workspace data, disrupt runner availability, pivot to internal services reachable from the runner, or establish an interactive remote shell if outbound networking is allowed. This is high impact because it turns normal shared-agent session access into command execution on runner infrastructure used by other sessions.

CVE-2026-62674 Affected Omnigent Versions

1 component(s)
Fixed Versions:
0.3.0
Product / Package Ecosystem Affected Versions Fixed Version
omnigent
PyPI
< 0.3.0
0.3.0

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-62674?
CVE-2026-62674 is a security vulnerability in Omnigent involving Shared Agent Bundle Overwrite Leads to Authenticated Runner RCE under CWE-94: Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection').
Which Omnigent versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to 0.3.0 across affected packages: omnigent.
What version fixes CVE-2026-62674?
Upgrading to 0.3.0 (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
Is omnigent affected?
Yes, omnigent is affected in releases prior to 0.3.0. Upgrade your dependency to 0.3.0 or later.
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-62674?
CVE-2026-62674 has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 9.0 (CRITICAL) with vector string CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H.
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-62674?
CVE-2026-62674 is classified under CWE-94: Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection') (The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment.).
How can I check PyPI dependencies for CVE-2026-62674?
Run the dependency tree command: 'pip show omnigent'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-jrrm-9hc7-2v3h",
  "modified" : "2026-09-02T21:55:11Z",
  "published" : "2026-09-02T21:55:11Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-62674" ],
  "summary" : "Omnigent: Shared Agent Bundle Overwrite Leads to Authenticated Runner RCE",
  "details" : "### Summary\n\nAn authenticated user with edit access to their own session can overwrite a shared/template agent by uploading a full agent bundle through `PUT /sessions/{session_id}/agent`.\n\nShared/template agents are shown as not MCP-editable, but this upload path still accepts a replacement bundle. By adding a `stdio` MCP server to the shared agent, the attacker can cause future runner sessions using that shared agent to start an attacker-controlled command.\n\n### Details\n\nThe vulnerable endpoint is the full agent bundle upload route: [`PUT /sessions/{session_id}/agent`](https://github.com/omnigent-ai/omnigent/blob/10f5ae3110e162f96fb99bb6662c581abdc56cd6/omnigent/server/routes/sessions.py#L18979-L19077) \nThis route checks whether the caller can edit the session: [`LEVEL_EDIT` session permission check](https://github.com/omnigent-ai/omnigent/blob/10f5ae3110e162f96fb99bb6662c581abdc56cd6/omnigent/server/routes/sessions.py#L19003-L19025)\nBut it does not check whether the bound agent is a shared/template agent.\nShared/template agents have:\n```python\nagent.session_id is None\n```\nThe API already exposes that these agents are not meant to be MCP-editable: [`mcp_servers_editable` is false for shared/template agents](https://github.com/omnigent-ai/omnigent/blob/10f5ae3110e162f96fb99bb6662c581abdc56cd6/omnigent/server/routes/sessions.py#L18842-L18857)\nThe direct MCP edit endpoint correctly blocks shared/template agents: [`session_mcp_servers.py` shared-agent guard](https://github.com/omnigent-ai/omnigent/blob/10f5ae3110e162f96fb99bb6662c581abdc56cd6/omnigent/server/routes/session_mcp_servers.py#L170-L183)\n```python\nif agent.session_id is None:\n    raise OmnigentError(\"Built-in agents are read-only through this endpoint.\")\n```\nThe full bundle upload endpoint is missing that same guard. It stores the uploaded bundle and updates the agent row: [`agent_store.update(agent.id, new_loc)`](https://github.com/omnigent-ai/omnigent/blob/10f5ae3110e162f96fb99bb6662c581abdc56cd6/omnigent/server/routes/sessions.py#L19050-L19077)\nFor shared/template agents, this changes the shared agent itself, not only the attacker's session.\nThis becomes command execution because `stdio` MCP servers start the configured command as a runner subprocess: [`tools/mcp.py` stdio subprocess launch](https://github.com/omnigent-ai/omnigent/blob/10f5ae3110e162f96fb99bb6662c581abdc56cd6/omnigent/tools/mcp.py#L971-L1021)\n\nSuggested fix: add the same `agent.session_id is None` guard to `PUT /sessions/{session_id}/agent`.\n\n### Impact\n\nThis is authenticated RCE against Omnigent runner hosts. A normal authenticated user with edit access to their own session can poison a shared/template agent bundle, even though that agent is shown as not MCP-editable. The poisoned bundle can then be used by future sessions created from the same shared agent.\n\nBecause `stdio` MCP servers run as local subprocesses, the attacker-controlled command executes with the permissions of the Omnigent runner process. In a shared or company-hosted deployment, this can let an attacker read runner-accessible files and credentials, modify workspace data, disrupt runner availability, pivot to internal services reachable from the runner, or establish an interactive remote shell if outbound networking is allowed.\n\nThis is high impact because it turns normal shared-agent session access into command execution on runner infrastructure used by other sessions.",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "PyPI",
      "name" : "omnigent"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "0.3.0"
      } ]
    } ]
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/omnigent-ai/omnigent/security/advisories/GHSA-jrrm-9hc7-2v3h"
  }, {
    "type" : "ADVISORY",
    "url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-62674"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/omnigent-ai/omnigent/pull/1418"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/omnigent-ai/omnigent/commit/25a22dc9e6da4648d23749f0a589e47e6aed991b"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/omnigent-ai/omnigent"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/omnigent-ai/omnigent/releases/tag/v0.3.0"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-94" ],
    "severity" : "CRITICAL",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-09-02T21:55:11Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : "2026-08-21T18:16:49Z"
  }
}