CVE-2026-98256: Software Security Vulnerability Vulnerability

HIGH
Advisory Identifier: GHSA-jj25-6g4q-4cf8
CVSS 7.8
Published
Advisory Summary

CVE-2026-98256 is a HIGH (CVSS 7.8) security vulnerability vulnerability (General Security Weakness) affecting Software libraries in the Maven ecosystem. Remediation is available in the latest vendor maintenance releases.

CVE-2026-98256 at a Glance

CVE Identifier CVE-2026-98256
GHSA Identifier GHSA-jj25-6g4q-4cf8
Severity HIGH
CVSS v3.1 Base Score 7.8
CWE Classification General Security Weakness
Affected Product Software
Package Ecosystem Maven
Published Date
Last Updated

Security Impact

CVSS: 7.8

The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H).

Attack Vector Local (AV:L)
Attack Complexity Low (AC:L)
Privileges Required Low (PR:L)
User Interaction None (UI:N)
Scope Unchanged (S:U)
Confidentiality High (C:H)
Integrity High (I:H)
Availability High (A:H)

How to Fix CVE-2026-98256

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Software dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

mvn dependency:tree

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your Java application is affected by CVE-2026-98256, inspect your build dependencies using the Maven Dependency Plugin:

mvn dependency:tree

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Software in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than the patched release), your application is affected.

Note: The mvn dependency:tree command inspects the resolved dependency graph declared in your project's POM files; it does not perform automated security scanning or inspect runtime dynamic classpaths. Always verify runtime container classpaths and shaded JARs.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under General Security Weakness. In Software, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: signal: Prevent exec() race Hyunwoo debugged the following KASAN UAF splat: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __send_signal_locked+0xb27/0xba0 Write of size 8 at addr ffff888007ed80c8 by task poc/79 ... Call Trace: __send_signal_locked+0xb27/0xba0 do_send_sig_info+0xa7/0x160 do_send_specific+0x76/0xa0 __x64_sys_tgkill+0x193/0x270 ... Allocated by task 80: do_timer_create+0x1a4/0x1030 __x64_sys_timer_create+0x145/0x190 ... Freed by task 12: kmem_cache_free_bulk+0x1f8/0x4a0 kvfree_rcu_bulk+0x14f/0x1c0 kfree_rcu_work+0x128/0x1a0 ... Last potentially related work creation: kvfree_call_rcu+0x39/0x390 __flush_itimer_signals+0x211/0x320 flush_itimer_signals+0x47/0x90 begin_new_exec+0xa6b/0x28c0 It turned out that this happens with a non-leader exec() as Hyunwoo explained: de_thread() calls exchange_tids() before release_task(leader), so the struct pid held by a SIGEV_THREAD_ID timer created against the leader's tid now points to the thread which called execve(). pid_task() returns that thread and lock_task_sighand() on it succeeds. If the timer signal is blocked, its sigqueue stays queued on the leader's task::pending. The next expiry of that timer can then run while release_task() flushes the queue. posixtimer_send_sigqueue() checks whether the sigqueue is already queued with a plain list_empty(), which only reads list_head::next. list_del_init() is not atomic and INIT_LIST_HEAD() stores list_head::next before list_head::prev, so the check can pass in between. list_add_tail() queues the entry on the task::pending of the live thread, and the list_head::prev store from the flush then overwrites the list_head::prev link that list_add_tail() has just set. __flush_itimer_signals() does not undo that either. With list_head::prev pointing at the entry itself, its list_del_init() only stores the same values again, so the entry is not removed from the list. It is still there after the last reference is dropped and the timer is freed by RCU, and the list_add_tail() of a later tgkill() follows that list_head::prev into the freed timer. This problem surfaced with the recent commit which moved the sigqueue flush out of the sighand lock held region. Hyonwoo proposed to fix this by using list_del_init_careful(), but that just papers over the problem. After some disucssions and various attempts to solve it, Eric pointed out that there is no reason to flush task::pending late in release_task() and it should be done in exit_signals() already. As nothing can collect and deliver signals which are queued in a dying task's pending queue, there is no reason to delay it further. But it has to be ensured that no signals can be queued into it after that point. exit_signals() sets PF_EXITING in task::flags, which can be used as an indicator for this. Cure it by: - Preventing signal queueing for task private signals (PIDTYPE_PID) when the task has PF_EXITING set in __send_signal_locked() and in posixtimer_send_sigqueue(). - Protecting the unlocked setting of PF_EXITING in exit_signals() for the task group empty and the group exit case with sighand lock - Flushing task::pending signals right there. Optimize that by moving the whole pending list to an on-stack list head under sighand lock and free the signals without the lock held. There has been quite some discussion about the lockless flush and the non-leader exec case on weakly ordered systems. The problem is that a third party which tries to send a posix timer signal relies on the PID lookup to find the target task and that lookup might result in the new leader when the signal was originaly directed to the old leader. In case that the signal was queued on the old leader then the lockless flush raised a concern over the following situation: old_leader new_leader third party A: flush_list() // list_del_in ---truncated---

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-98256?
CVE-2026-98256 is a security vulnerability in Software classified as a security vulnerability vulnerability under General Security Weakness.
Which Software versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to current release patches.
What version fixes CVE-2026-98256?
Upgrading to current release patches (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-98256?
CVE-2026-98256 has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 7.8 (HIGH) with vector string CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H.
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-98256?
CVE-2026-98256 is classified under General Security Weakness.
How can I check Maven dependencies for CVE-2026-98256?
Run the dependency tree command: 'mvn dependency:tree'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-jj25-6g4q-4cf8",
  "modified" : "2026-10-07T09:32:14Z",
  "published" : "2026-10-06T09:31:32Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-98256" ],
  "details" : "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nsignal: Prevent exec() race\n\nHyunwoo debugged the following KASAN UAF splat:\n\n  BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __send_signal_locked+0xb27/0xba0\n  Write of size 8 at addr ffff888007ed80c8 by task poc/79\n  ...\n  Call Trace:\n   __send_signal_locked+0xb27/0xba0\n   do_send_sig_info+0xa7/0x160\n   do_send_specific+0x76/0xa0\n   __x64_sys_tgkill+0x193/0x270\n  ...\n  Allocated by task 80:\n   do_timer_create+0x1a4/0x1030\n   __x64_sys_timer_create+0x145/0x190\n  ...\n  Freed by task 12:\n   kmem_cache_free_bulk+0x1f8/0x4a0\n   kvfree_rcu_bulk+0x14f/0x1c0\n   kfree_rcu_work+0x128/0x1a0\n  ...\n  Last potentially related work creation:\n   kvfree_call_rcu+0x39/0x390\n   __flush_itimer_signals+0x211/0x320\n   flush_itimer_signals+0x47/0x90\n   begin_new_exec+0xa6b/0x28c0\n\nIt turned out that this happens with a non-leader exec() as Hyunwoo\nexplained:\n\nde_thread() calls exchange_tids() before release_task(leader), so the\nstruct pid held by a SIGEV_THREAD_ID timer created against the leader's tid\nnow points to the thread which called execve(). pid_task() returns that\nthread and lock_task_sighand() on it succeeds.\n\nIf the timer signal is blocked, its sigqueue stays queued on the leader's\ntask::pending. The next expiry of that timer can then run while\nrelease_task() flushes the queue.\n\nposixtimer_send_sigqueue() checks whether the sigqueue is already queued\nwith a plain list_empty(), which only reads list_head::next.\nlist_del_init() is not atomic and INIT_LIST_HEAD() stores list_head::next\nbefore list_head::prev, so the check can pass in between. list_add_tail()\nqueues the entry on the task::pending of the live thread, and the\nlist_head::prev store from the flush then overwrites the list_head::prev\nlink that list_add_tail() has just set.\n\n__flush_itimer_signals() does not undo that either. With list_head::prev\npointing at the entry itself, its list_del_init() only stores the same\nvalues again, so the entry is not removed from the list. It is still there\nafter the last reference is dropped and the timer is freed by RCU, and the\nlist_add_tail() of a later tgkill() follows that list_head::prev into the\nfreed timer.\n\nThis problem surfaced with the recent commit which moved the sigqueue flush\nout of the sighand lock held region.\n\nHyonwoo proposed to fix this by using list_del_init_careful(), but that\njust papers over the problem. After some disucssions and various attempts\nto solve it, Eric pointed out that there is no reason to flush\ntask::pending late in release_task() and it should be done in\nexit_signals() already.\n\nAs nothing can collect and deliver signals which are queued in a dying\ntask's pending queue, there is no reason to delay it further.\n\nBut it has to be ensured that no signals can be queued into it after that\npoint. exit_signals() sets PF_EXITING in task::flags, which can be used as\nan indicator for this.\n\nCure it by:\n\n  - Preventing signal queueing for task private signals (PIDTYPE_PID) when\n    the task has PF_EXITING set in __send_signal_locked() and in\n    posixtimer_send_sigqueue().\n\n  - Protecting the unlocked setting of PF_EXITING in exit_signals() for the\n    task group empty and the group exit case with sighand lock\n\n  - Flushing task::pending signals right there.\n\n    Optimize that by moving the whole pending list to an on-stack list head\n    under sighand lock and free the signals without the lock held.\n\nThere has been quite some discussion about the lockless flush and the\nnon-leader exec case on weakly ordered systems. The problem is that a third\nparty which tries to send a posix timer signal relies on the PID lookup to\nfind the target task and that lookup might result in the new leader when\nthe signal was originaly directed to the old leader. In case that the\nsignal was queued on the old leader then the lockless flush raised a\nconcern over the following situation:\n\n   old_leader\t\tnew_leader              third party\n\nA: flush_list()\t// list_del_in\n---truncated---",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "ADVISORY",
    "url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-98256"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/621c365739828900f32a0c1cdfe5387528a62176"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/934bd95f1a6404dbb845951b823547abab05a649"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d2710c8d938ae6a825a6463158e6e6f31eac792a"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ ],
    "severity" : "HIGH",
    "github_reviewed" : false,
    "github_reviewed_at" : null,
    "nvd_published_at" : "2026-10-06T09:18:14Z"
  }
}