CVE-2026-41060: Wwbn/avideo WWBN AVideo Has A SSRF Vulnerability

HIGH
Advisory Identifier: GHSA-j432-4w3j-3w8j
CVSS 7.7
CWE-918
Published
Advisory Summary

CVE-2026-41060 is a HIGH (CVSS 7.7) wwbn avideo has a ssrf vulnerability (CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)) affecting Wwbn/avideo libraries in the Packagist ecosystem. The issue involves wwbn avideo has a ssrf via same-domain hostname with alternate port bypasses isssrfsafeurl. Remediation is available in the latest vendor maintenance releases.

CVE-2026-41060 at a Glance

CVE Identifier CVE-2026-41060
GHSA Identifier GHSA-j432-4w3j-3w8j
Severity HIGH
CVSS v3.1 Base Score 7.7
CWE Classification CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
Affected Product Wwbn/avideo
Package Ecosystem Packagist
Published Date
Last Updated

Security Impact

CVSS: 7.7

The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N).

Attack Vector Network (AV:N)
Attack Complexity Low (AC:L)
Privileges Required Low (PR:L)
User Interaction None (UI:N)
Scope Changed (S:C)
Confidentiality High (C:H)
Integrity None (I:N)
Availability None (A:N)

How to Fix CVE-2026-41060

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Wwbn/avideo dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

wwbn/avideo fixed: Latest secure release
Upgrade wwbn/avideo to Latest secure release
Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

inspect dependencies for wwbn/avideo

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your application is affected by CVE-2026-41060, inspect your project dependencies for Wwbn/avideo:

inspect dependencies for wwbn/avideo

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Wwbn/avideo in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than the patched release), your application is affected.

Note: Verify declared build manifests and deployed runtime container environments.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF), where the web server receives a url or similar request from an upstream component and retrieves the contents of this url, but it does not sufficiently ensure that the request is being sent to the expected destination. In Wwbn/avideo, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

## Summary The `isSSRFSafeURL()` function in `objects/functions.php` contains a same-domain shortcircuit (lines 4290-4296) that allows any URL whose hostname matches `webSiteRootURL` to bypass all SSRF protections. Because the check compares only the hostname and ignores the port, an attacker can reach arbitrary ports on the AVideo server by using the site's public hostname with a non-standard port. The response body is saved to a web-accessible path, enabling full exfiltration. ## Details Commit `40872e529` fixed an extension-based SSRF bypass by making `isSSRFSafeURL()` unconditional. However, `isSSRFSafeURL()` itself contains a same-domain shortcircuit that returns `true` when the URL's hostname matches `webSiteRootURL`'s hostname, without validating the port: ```php // objects/functions.php:4290-4296 if (!empty($global['webSiteRootURL'])) { $siteHost = strtolower(parse_url($global['webSiteRootURL'], PHP_URL_HOST)); if ($host === $siteHost) { _error_log("isSSRFSafeURL: allowing same-domain request to {$host} (matches webSiteRootURL)"); return true; // Returns immediately — port, path, scheme all unchecked } } ``` The attack flow through `objects/aVideoEncoder.json.php`: 1. User-supplied `$_REQUEST['downloadURL']` is passed to `downloadVideoFromDownloadURL()` at line 166 2. `isSSRFSafeURL()` is called at line 368 — passes due to hostname match 3. `url_get_contents($downloadURL)` fetches the attacker-controlled URL at line 378 4. Response is written to `Video::getStoragePath() . "cache/tmpFile/" . basename($downloadURL)` at line 393-395 The `cache/tmpFile/` directory is under the web-accessible videos storage path. The attacker can retrieve the file to exfiltrate the internal service response. The auth requirement is `User::canUpload()` (line 59), which is satisfied by any authenticated user with upload permission. Alternatively, a valid `video_id_hash` (a per-video token) can be used via `useVideoHashOrLogin()` at line 57. ## PoC Assuming the AVideo instance is at `https://avideo.example.com/` and an internal service runs on port 9998: ```bash # Step 1: Authenticate and get cookies (any user with upload permission) curl -c cookies.txt -X POST 'https://avideo.example.com/objects/login.json.php' \ -d 'user=testuser&pass=testpass' # Step 2: Send SSRF request targeting port 9998 on the same host # The hostname matches webSiteRootURL so isSSRFSafeURL() returns true curl -b cookies.txt -X POST 'https://avideo.example.com/objects/aVideoEncoder.json.php' \ -d 'format=mp4&downloadURL=http://avideo.example.com:9998/large-internal-endpoint.mp4&videos_id=1&first_request=1' # Step 3: Retrieve the exfiltrated response # The file is saved to cache/tmpFile/ with the basename of the URL curl 'https://avideo.example.com/videos/cache/tmpFile/large-internal-endpoint.mp4' -o response.bin ``` Note: The internal service response must be >= 20KB (or >= 5KB if the URL ends in `.mp3`) to pass the size check at line 384. For smaller responses, the attacker can target endpoints that return verbose output or append padding parameters. The fix at `40872e529` specifically mentions blocking `http://127.0.0.1:9998/probe.mp4`. This bypass reaches the exact same internal service by replacing `127.0.0.1` with the site's public hostname — the DNS resolution points to the same server. ## Impact - **Internal service access**: An authenticated attacker can reach any TCP port on the AVideo server that speaks HTTP, including databases with HTTP interfaces, monitoring endpoints, admin panels, cloud metadata services (if the hostname resolves to a cloud instance), and other co-hosted services. - **Data exfiltration**: Response bodies are written to a web-accessible directory, allowing the attacker to retrieve internal service responses. - **Scope change**: The vulnerability crosses from the AVideo application into other services on the same host, justifying S:C in CVSS scoring. - **Bypass of existing fix**: This directly circumvents the SSRF protection added in commit `40872e529`. ## Recommended Fix The same-domain shortcircuit should validate that both the hostname and port match `webSiteRootURL`. Replace `objects/functions.php` lines 4290-4296: ```php // Allow same-domain requests ONLY if hostname AND port match webSiteRootURL if (!empty($global['webSiteRootURL'])) { $siteHost = strtolower(parse_url($global['webSiteRootURL'], PHP_URL_HOST)); $sitePort = parse_url($global['webSiteRootURL'], PHP_URL_PORT); $siteScheme = strtolower(parse_url($global['webSiteRootURL'], PHP_URL_SCHEME)); // Default port based on scheme if not explicitly set if (empty($sitePort)) { $sitePort = ($siteScheme === 'https') ? 443 : 80; } $urlPort = parse_url($url, PHP_URL_PORT); $urlScheme = strtolower(parse_url($url, PHP_URL_SCHEME)); if (empty($urlPort)) { $urlPort = ($urlScheme === 'https') ? 443 : 80; } if ($host === $siteHost && $urlPort === $sitePort) { _error_log("isSSRFSafeURL: allowing same-domain request to {$host}:{$urlPort} (matches webSiteRootURL)"); return true; } } ``` This ensures the shortcircuit only fires for requests to the exact same origin (scheme-implied port or explicit port) as the configured site URL.

CVE-2026-41060 Affected Wwbn/avideo Versions

1 component(s)
Product / Package Ecosystem Affected Versions Fixed Version
wwbn/avideo
Packagist
≤ 29.0

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-41060?
CVE-2026-41060 is a security vulnerability in Wwbn/avideo involving WWBN AVideo has a SSRF via same-domain hostname with alternate port bypasses isSSRFSafeURL under CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF).
Which Wwbn/avideo versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to current release patches across affected packages: wwbn/avideo.
What version fixes CVE-2026-41060?
Upgrading to current release patches (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
Is wwbn/avideo affected?
Yes, wwbn/avideo is affected in releases prior to Latest secure release. Upgrade your dependency to Latest secure release or later.
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-41060?
CVE-2026-41060 has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 7.7 (HIGH) with vector string CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N.
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-41060?
CVE-2026-41060 is classified under CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) (The web server receives a URL or similar request from an upstream component and retrieves the contents of this URL, but it does not sufficiently ensure that the request is being sent to the expected destination.).
How can I check Packagist dependencies for CVE-2026-41060?
Run the dependency tree command: 'inspect dependencies for wwbn/avideo'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-j432-4w3j-3w8j",
  "modified" : "2026-04-24T20:41:01Z",
  "published" : "2026-04-14T23:22:01Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-41060" ],
  "summary" : "WWBN AVideo has a SSRF via same-domain hostname with alternate port bypasses isSSRFSafeURL",
  "details" : "## Summary\n\nThe `isSSRFSafeURL()` function in `objects/functions.php` contains a same-domain shortcircuit (lines 4290-4296) that allows any URL whose hostname matches `webSiteRootURL` to bypass all SSRF protections. Because the check compares only the hostname and ignores the port, an attacker can reach arbitrary ports on the AVideo server by using the site's public hostname with a non-standard port. The response body is saved to a web-accessible path, enabling full exfiltration.\n\n## Details\n\nCommit `40872e529` fixed an extension-based SSRF bypass by making `isSSRFSafeURL()` unconditional. However, `isSSRFSafeURL()` itself contains a same-domain shortcircuit that returns `true` when the URL's hostname matches `webSiteRootURL`'s hostname, without validating the port:\n\n```php\n// objects/functions.php:4290-4296\nif (!empty($global['webSiteRootURL'])) {\n    $siteHost = strtolower(parse_url($global['webSiteRootURL'], PHP_URL_HOST));\n    if ($host === $siteHost) {\n        _error_log(\"isSSRFSafeURL: allowing same-domain request to {$host} (matches webSiteRootURL)\");\n        return true;  // Returns immediately — port, path, scheme all unchecked\n    }\n}\n```\n\nThe attack flow through `objects/aVideoEncoder.json.php`:\n\n1. User-supplied `$_REQUEST['downloadURL']` is passed to `downloadVideoFromDownloadURL()` at line 166\n2. `isSSRFSafeURL()` is called at line 368 — passes due to hostname match\n3. `url_get_contents($downloadURL)` fetches the attacker-controlled URL at line 378\n4. Response is written to `Video::getStoragePath() . \"cache/tmpFile/\" . basename($downloadURL)` at line 393-395\n\nThe `cache/tmpFile/` directory is under the web-accessible videos storage path. The attacker can retrieve the file to exfiltrate the internal service response.\n\nThe auth requirement is `User::canUpload()` (line 59), which is satisfied by any authenticated user with upload permission. Alternatively, a valid `video_id_hash` (a per-video token) can be used via `useVideoHashOrLogin()` at line 57.\n\n## PoC\n\nAssuming the AVideo instance is at `https://avideo.example.com/` and an internal service runs on port 9998:\n\n```bash\n# Step 1: Authenticate and get cookies (any user with upload permission)\ncurl -c cookies.txt -X POST 'https://avideo.example.com/objects/login.json.php' \\\n  -d 'user=testuser&pass=testpass'\n\n# Step 2: Send SSRF request targeting port 9998 on the same host\n# The hostname matches webSiteRootURL so isSSRFSafeURL() returns true\ncurl -b cookies.txt -X POST 'https://avideo.example.com/objects/aVideoEncoder.json.php' \\\n  -d 'format=mp4&downloadURL=http://avideo.example.com:9998/large-internal-endpoint.mp4&videos_id=1&first_request=1'\n\n# Step 3: Retrieve the exfiltrated response\n# The file is saved to cache/tmpFile/ with the basename of the URL\ncurl 'https://avideo.example.com/videos/cache/tmpFile/large-internal-endpoint.mp4' -o response.bin\n```\n\nNote: The internal service response must be >= 20KB (or >= 5KB if the URL ends in `.mp3`) to pass the size check at line 384. For smaller responses, the attacker can target endpoints that return verbose output or append padding parameters.\n\nThe fix at `40872e529` specifically mentions blocking `http://127.0.0.1:9998/probe.mp4`. This bypass reaches the exact same internal service by replacing `127.0.0.1` with the site's public hostname — the DNS resolution points to the same server.\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Internal service access**: An authenticated attacker can reach any TCP port on the AVideo server that speaks HTTP, including databases with HTTP interfaces, monitoring endpoints, admin panels, cloud metadata services (if the hostname resolves to a cloud instance), and other co-hosted services.\n- **Data exfiltration**: Response bodies are written to a web-accessible directory, allowing the attacker to retrieve internal service responses.\n- **Scope change**: The vulnerability crosses from the AVideo application into other services on the same host, justifying S:C in CVSS scoring.\n- **Bypass of existing fix**: This directly circumvents the SSRF protection added in commit `40872e529`.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nThe same-domain shortcircuit should validate that both the hostname and port match `webSiteRootURL`. Replace `objects/functions.php` lines 4290-4296:\n\n```php\n// Allow same-domain requests ONLY if hostname AND port match webSiteRootURL\nif (!empty($global['webSiteRootURL'])) {\n    $siteHost = strtolower(parse_url($global['webSiteRootURL'], PHP_URL_HOST));\n    $sitePort = parse_url($global['webSiteRootURL'], PHP_URL_PORT);\n    $siteScheme = strtolower(parse_url($global['webSiteRootURL'], PHP_URL_SCHEME));\n    // Default port based on scheme if not explicitly set\n    if (empty($sitePort)) {\n        $sitePort = ($siteScheme === 'https') ? 443 : 80;\n    }\n\n    $urlPort = parse_url($url, PHP_URL_PORT);\n    $urlScheme = strtolower(parse_url($url, PHP_URL_SCHEME));\n    if (empty($urlPort)) {\n        $urlPort = ($urlScheme === 'https') ? 443 : 80;\n    }\n\n    if ($host === $siteHost && $urlPort === $sitePort) {\n        _error_log(\"isSSRFSafeURL: allowing same-domain request to {$host}:{$urlPort} (matches webSiteRootURL)\");\n        return true;\n    }\n}\n```\n\nThis ensures the shortcircuit only fires for requests to the exact same origin (scheme-implied port or explicit port) as the configured site URL.",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "Packagist",
      "name" : "wwbn/avideo"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "last_affected" : "29.0"
      } ]
    } ]
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisories/GHSA-j432-4w3j-3w8j"
  }, {
    "type" : "ADVISORY",
    "url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-41060"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/commit/a0156a6398362086390d949190f9d52a823000ba"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-918" ],
    "severity" : "HIGH",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-04-14T23:22:01Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : "2026-04-21T23:16:21Z"
  }
}