CVE-2026-27013: Fabric Cross-Site Scripting Vulnerability

HIGH
Advisory Identifier: GHSA-hfvx-25r5-qc3w
CVSS 7.6
CWE-116 CWE-79
Published
Advisory Summary

CVE-2026-27013 is a HIGH (CVSS 7.6) cross-site scripting vulnerability (CWE-116: Improper Encoding or Escaping of Output) affecting Fabric libraries in the npm ecosystem. The issue involves fabric.js affected by stored xss via svg export. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 7.2.0.

CVE-2026-27013 at a Glance

CVE Identifier CVE-2026-27013
GHSA Identifier GHSA-hfvx-25r5-qc3w
Severity HIGH
CVSS v3.1 Base Score 7.6
CWE Classification CWE-116: Improper Encoding or Escaping of Output
Affected Product Fabric
Package Ecosystem npm
Published Date
Last Updated

Security Impact

CVSS: 7.6

The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:L).

Attack Vector Network (AV:N)
Attack Complexity Low (AC:L)
Privileges Required None (PR:N)
User Interaction Required (UI:R)
Scope Unchanged (S:U)
Confidentiality High (C:H)
Integrity Low (I:L)
Availability Low (A:L)

How to Fix CVE-2026-27013

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Fabric dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

fabric fixed: 7.2.0
npm install fabric@7.2.0
Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

npm ls fabric

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your Node.js application is affected by CVE-2026-27013, inspect your project dependencies using npm:

npm ls fabric

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Fabric in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 7.2.0), your application is affected.

Note: The npm ls fabric command inspects dependencies declared in your package.json and lockfile; it does not perform automated runtime dynamic scanning.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-116: Improper Encoding or Escaping of Output, where the product prepares a structured message for communication with another component, but encoding or escaping of the data is either missing or done incorrectly. as a result, the intended structure of the message is not preserved. In Fabric, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

fabric.js applies `escapeXml()` to text content during SVG export (`src/shapes/Text/TextSVGExportMixin.ts:186`) but fails to apply it to other user-controlled string values that are interpolated into SVG attribute markup. When attacker-controlled JSON is loaded via `loadFromJSON()` and later exported via `toSVG()`, the unescaped values break out of XML attributes and inject arbitrary SVG elements including event handlers. ### Deserialization Path (no sanitization) `loadFromJSON()` (`src/canvas/StaticCanvas.ts:1229`) calls `enlivenObjects()` which calls `_fromObject()` (`src/shapes/Object/Object.ts:1902`). `_fromObject` passes all deserialized properties to the shape constructor via `new this(enlivedObjectOptions)`. The constructor ultimately calls `_setOptions()` (`src/CommonMethods.ts:9`) which iterates over every property and assigns it to the object via `this.set(prop, options[prop])`. There is no allowlist or sanitization - any property in the JSON, including `id`, is set verbatim on the fabric object. --- ### Finding 1: XSS via `id` Property Injection The `id` property from deserialized JSON is interpolated directly into SVG attribute strings without escaping. **Vulnerable code (`src/shapes/Object/FabricObjectSVGExportMixin.ts`, line 89, `getSvgCommons()`):** ```typescript getSvgCommons( this: FabricObjectSVGExportMixin & FabricObject & { id?: string }, ) { return [ this.id ? `id="${this.id}" ` : '', // <-- unescaped, user-controlled this.clipPath ? `clip-path="url(#${...})" ` : '', ].join(''); } ``` This method is called in `_createBaseSVGMarkup()` (same file, line 178) which wraps every object's SVG output in a `<g>` element. Every fabric object type (Rect, Circle, Path, Text, Image, Group, etc.) inherits this mixin, so the `id` injection vector applies to all object types. **Contrast with text content, which IS escaped:** ```typescript // src/shapes/Text/TextSVGExportMixin.ts:186 return `<tspan ...>${escapeXml(char)}</tspan>`; ``` The inconsistency shows that the intention was to prevent injection but was missed w attribute contexts. --- ### Finding 2: XSS via Image `src` / `xlink:href` Injection Image source URLs are interpolated raw into `xlink:href` in `_toSVG()`. **Vulnerable code (`src/shapes/Image.ts`, line 404, `_toSVG()`):** ```typescript imageMarkup.push( '\t<image ', 'COMMON_PARTS', `xlink:href="${this.getSvgSrc(true)}" x="${x - this.cropX}" y="${ y - this.cropY }" ...` // <-- unescaped ); ``` `getSvgSrc()` returns the image `src` property which is set from JSON during deserialization. An attacker can inject a `src` value that breaks out of the `xlink:href` attribute. --- ### Finding 3: XSS via Pattern `sourceToString()` **Vulnerable code (`src/Pattern/Pattern.ts`, line 181, `toSVG()`):** ```typescript `<image x="0" y="0" ... xlink:href="${this.sourceToString()}"></image>` // <-- unescaped, returns this.source.src for image sources ``` Additionally, Pattern's constructor (`line 92–94`) runs `this.id = uid()` *before* `Object.assign(this, options)`, meaning a user-supplied `id` in the pattern JSON overwrites the auto-generated uid. The pattern `id` is then interpolated unescaped on line 180: ```typescript `<pattern id="SVGID_${id}" x="${patternOffsetX}" ...>` ``` --- ### Finding 4: Gradient `id` Partial Injection (lower Severity) **Vulnerable code (`src/gradient/Gradient.ts`, line 212, `toSVG()`):** ```typescript `id="SVGID_${this.id}"` // <-- unescaped ``` Gradient's constructor (`line 125`) computes `id: id ? `${id}_${uid()}` : uid()`. If a user-supplied `id` is present in the gradient JSON, it is prepended to the auto-generated uid. The user-controlled portion is interpolated unescaped into the SVG. This is exploitable but the payload is constrained by the `_<uid>` suffix appended after it. --- ## Impact Any application that: 1. Accepts user-supplied JSON (via `loadFromJSON()`, collaborative sharing, import features, CMS plugins), AND 2. Renders the `toSVG()` output in a browser context (SVG preview, export download rendered in-page, email template, embed) ...is vulnerable to stored XSS. An attacker can execute arbitrary JavaScript in the victim's browser session. Real-world attack scenarios: - Collaborative design tools (Canva-like apps) where users share canvas state as JSON - CMS or e-commerce platforms with fabric.js-based editors that store/render designs - Any export-to-SVG workflow where the SVG is later displayed in a browser --- ## Remediation Update to [fabric.js 7.2.0](https://github.com/fabricjs/fabric.js/releases/tag/v720) or newer version. --- ## Confirmed Affected Files | File | Issue | Method | Exploitable | |---|---|---|---| | `src/shapes/Object/FabricObjectSVGExportMixin.ts` | Unescaped `this.id` in attribute | `getSvgCommons()` | Yes - primary vector, all object types | | `src/shapes/Image.ts` | Unescaped `getSvgSrc()` in `xlink:href` | `_toSVG()` | Yes | | `src/Pattern/Pattern.ts` | Unescaped `sourceToString()` in `xlink:href`; unescaped `id` in attribute | `toSVG()` | Yes | | `src/gradient/Gradient.ts` | User-supplied `id` prefix interpolated unescaped | `toSVG()` | Yes (partial - uid suffix appended) |

CVE-2026-27013 Affected Fabric Versions

1 component(s)
Fixed Versions:
7.2.0
Product / Package Ecosystem Affected Versions Fixed Version
fabric
npm
< 7.2.0
7.2.0

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-27013?
CVE-2026-27013 is a security vulnerability in Fabric involving Fabric.js Affected by Stored XSS via SVG Export under CWE-116: Improper Encoding or Escaping of Output.
Which Fabric versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to 7.2.0 across affected packages: fabric.
What version fixes CVE-2026-27013?
Upgrading to 7.2.0 (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
Is fabric affected?
Yes, fabric is affected in releases prior to 7.2.0. Upgrade your dependency to 7.2.0 or later.
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-27013?
CVE-2026-27013 has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 7.6 (HIGH) with vector string CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:L.
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-27013?
CVE-2026-27013 is classified under CWE-116: Improper Encoding or Escaping of Output (The product prepares a structured message for communication with another component, but encoding or escaping of the data is either missing or done incorrectly. As a result, the intended structure of the message is not preserved.).
How can I check npm dependencies for CVE-2026-27013?
Run the dependency tree command: 'npm ls fabric'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-hfvx-25r5-qc3w",
  "modified" : "2026-02-19T21:57:26Z",
  "published" : "2026-02-18T22:44:58Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-27013" ],
  "summary" : "Fabric.js Affected by Stored XSS via SVG Export",
  "details" : "fabric.js applies `escapeXml()` to text content during SVG export (`src/shapes/Text/TextSVGExportMixin.ts:186`) but fails to apply it to other user-controlled string values that are interpolated into SVG attribute markup. When attacker-controlled JSON is loaded via `loadFromJSON()` and later exported via `toSVG()`, the unescaped values break out of XML attributes and inject arbitrary SVG elements including event handlers.\n\n### Deserialization Path (no sanitization)\n\n`loadFromJSON()` (`src/canvas/StaticCanvas.ts:1229`) calls `enlivenObjects()` which calls `_fromObject()` (`src/shapes/Object/Object.ts:1902`). `_fromObject` passes all deserialized properties to the shape constructor via `new this(enlivedObjectOptions)`. The constructor ultimately calls `_setOptions()` (`src/CommonMethods.ts:9`) which iterates over every property and assigns it to the object via `this.set(prop, options[prop])`. There is no allowlist or sanitization - any property in the JSON, including `id`, is set verbatim on the fabric object.\n\n---\n\n### Finding 1: XSS via `id` Property Injection \n\nThe `id` property from deserialized JSON is interpolated directly into SVG attribute strings without escaping.\n\n**Vulnerable code (`src/shapes/Object/FabricObjectSVGExportMixin.ts`, line 89, `getSvgCommons()`):**\n```typescript\ngetSvgCommons(\n  this: FabricObjectSVGExportMixin & FabricObject & { id?: string },\n) {\n  return [\n    this.id ? `id=\"${this.id}\" ` : '',  // <-- unescaped, user-controlled\n    this.clipPath\n      ? `clip-path=\"url(#${...})\" `\n      : '',\n  ].join('');\n}\n```\n\nThis method is called in `_createBaseSVGMarkup()` (same file, line 178) which wraps every object's SVG output in a `<g>` element. Every fabric object type (Rect, Circle, Path, Text, Image, Group, etc.) inherits this mixin, so the `id` injection vector applies to all object types.\n\n**Contrast with text content, which IS escaped:**\n```typescript\n// src/shapes/Text/TextSVGExportMixin.ts:186\nreturn `<tspan ...>${escapeXml(char)}</tspan>`;\n```\n\nThe inconsistency shows that the intention was to prevent injection but was missed w attribute contexts.\n\n---\n\n### Finding 2: XSS via Image `src` / `xlink:href` Injection \n\nImage source URLs are interpolated raw into `xlink:href` in `_toSVG()`.\n\n**Vulnerable code (`src/shapes/Image.ts`, line 404, `_toSVG()`):**\n```typescript\nimageMarkup.push(\n  '\\t<image ',\n  'COMMON_PARTS',\n  `xlink:href=\"${this.getSvgSrc(true)}\" x=\"${x - this.cropX}\" y=\"${\n    y - this.cropY\n  }\" ...`  // <-- unescaped\n);\n```\n\n`getSvgSrc()` returns the image `src` property which is set from JSON during deserialization. An attacker can inject a `src` value that breaks out of the `xlink:href` attribute.\n\n---\n\n### Finding 3: XSS via Pattern `sourceToString()` \n\n**Vulnerable code (`src/Pattern/Pattern.ts`, line 181, `toSVG()`):**\n```typescript\n`<image x=\"0\" y=\"0\" ... xlink:href=\"${this.sourceToString()}\"></image>`\n// <-- unescaped, returns this.source.src for image sources\n```\n\nAdditionally, Pattern's constructor (`line 92–94`) runs `this.id = uid()` *before* `Object.assign(this, options)`, meaning a user-supplied `id` in the pattern JSON overwrites the auto-generated uid. The pattern `id` is then interpolated unescaped on line 180:\n```typescript\n`<pattern id=\"SVGID_${id}\" x=\"${patternOffsetX}\" ...>`\n```\n\n---\n\n### Finding 4: Gradient `id` Partial Injection (lower Severity)\n\n**Vulnerable code (`src/gradient/Gradient.ts`, line 212, `toSVG()`):**\n```typescript\n`id=\"SVGID_${this.id}\"`  // <-- unescaped\n```\n\nGradient's constructor (`line 125`) computes `id: id ? `${id}_${uid()}` : uid()`. If a user-supplied `id` is present in the gradient JSON, it is prepended to the auto-generated uid. The user-controlled portion is interpolated unescaped into the SVG. This is exploitable but the payload is constrained by the `_<uid>` suffix appended after it.\n\n---\n\n## Impact\n\nAny application that:\n1. Accepts user-supplied JSON (via `loadFromJSON()`, collaborative sharing, import features, CMS plugins), AND\n2. Renders the `toSVG()` output in a browser context (SVG preview, export download rendered in-page, email template, embed)\n\n...is vulnerable to stored XSS. An attacker can execute arbitrary JavaScript in the victim's browser session.\n\nReal-world attack scenarios:\n- Collaborative design tools (Canva-like apps) where users share canvas state as JSON\n- CMS or e-commerce platforms with fabric.js-based editors that store/render designs\n- Any export-to-SVG workflow where the SVG is later displayed in a browser\n\n---\n\n## Remediation\n\nUpdate to [fabric.js 7.2.0](https://github.com/fabricjs/fabric.js/releases/tag/v720) or newer version. \n\n---\n\n## Confirmed Affected Files\n\n| File | Issue | Method | Exploitable |\n|---|---|---|---|\n| `src/shapes/Object/FabricObjectSVGExportMixin.ts` | Unescaped `this.id` in attribute | `getSvgCommons()` | Yes - primary vector, all object types |\n| `src/shapes/Image.ts` | Unescaped `getSvgSrc()` in `xlink:href` | `_toSVG()` | Yes |\n| `src/Pattern/Pattern.ts` | Unescaped `sourceToString()` in `xlink:href`; unescaped `id` in attribute | `toSVG()` | Yes |\n| `src/gradient/Gradient.ts` | User-supplied `id` prefix interpolated unescaped | `toSVG()` | Yes (partial - uid suffix appended) |",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:L"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "npm",
      "name" : "fabric"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "7.2.0"
      } ]
    } ]
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/fabricjs/fabric.js/security/advisories/GHSA-hfvx-25r5-qc3w"
  }, {
    "type" : "ADVISORY",
    "url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-27013"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/fabricjs/fabric.js/commit/7e1a122defd8feefe4eb7eaf0c180d7b0aeb6fee"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/fabricjs/fabric.js"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/fabricjs/fabric.js/releases/tag/v720"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-116", "CWE-79" ],
    "severity" : "HIGH",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-02-18T22:44:58Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : "2026-02-19T20:25:44Z"
  }
}