CVE-2026-73605: SiYuan GetUniqueFilename Passes An Unvalidated Client-supplied Vulnerability

{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-hf8h-97gm-4x2p",
  "modified" : "2026-10-01T15:46:01Z",
  "published" : "2026-10-01T15:46:01Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-73605" ],
  "summary" : "SiYuan: getUniqueFilename passes an unvalidated client-supplied path to the filesystem, giving anonymous readers an existence oracle over the entire host filesystem",
  "details" : "### Summary\n\n`/api/file/getUniqueFilename` takes a path from the request body and passes it to a filesystem existence check with no validation, confinement or authorization. The response distinguishes paths that exist from paths that do not, so an anonymous reader in publish mode can probe arbitrary locations on the host, one request per probe. Files and directories both work.\n\nEvery neighbouring file route either requires an administrator or confines the path first.\n\n### Details\n\n**Route.** `kernel/api/router.go:289` on master, `:292` on the development branch, `CheckAuth` only.\n\n**Handler,** `kernel/api/file.go:84`, in full:\n\n```go\nutil.ParseJsonArgs(arg, ret, util.BindJsonArg(\"path\", &filePath, true, true))\nret.Data = map[string]any{\"path\": util.GetUniqueFilename(filePath)}\n```\n\n**The argument binder does no path handling.** `util.BindJsonArg` (`kernel/util/net.go:365`) takes two booleans, `required` (the key must be present) and `rejectEmpty` (the value must be non-empty). That is its entire contract. There is no `filepath.Clean`, no workspace join, no traversal check. An absolute path outside the workspace reaches `gulu.File.IsExist` unmodified.\n\n**The oracle.** `util/file.go:67`:\n\n```go\nif !gulu.File.IsExist(filePath) {\n    return filePath\n}\n// otherwise loop, returning the first non-existent dir/base (i).ext\n```\n\nInput echoed back means the path does not exist. A `(1)` suffix means it does.\n\n**The asymmetry.**\n\n| Route | Middleware |\n|---|---|\n| `putFile`, `copyFile`, `globalCopyFiles`, `workspaceCopyFiles`, `removeFile`, `renameFile` | `CheckAuth`, `CheckAdminRole`, `CheckReadonly` |\n| `readDir` (directory enumeration) | `CheckAuth`, `CheckAdminRole` |\n| `getFile` | `CheckAuth`, but `GetAbsPathInWorkspace` returns 403 on escape, plus `rejectEncryptedBoxPath` and a publish-access check |\n| `getUniqueFilename` | `CheckAuth`, nothing else |\n\n`getFile` binds the identical `BindJsonArg(\"path\", &filePath, true, true)` and confines it as its first action.\n\n### Proof of Concept\n\nKernel 3.7.2, publish mode on port 6808, `Publish.Auth.Enable` false, anonymous client. Reader context confirmed by `getChildBlocks` returning HTTP 403 on the same session.\n\n```\n{\"path\":\"/etc/passwd\"}\n→ {\"code\":0,\"msg\":\"\",\"data\":{\"path\":\"/etc/passwd (1)\"}}\n\n{\"path\":\"/etc/shadow\"}\n→ {\"code\":0,\"msg\":\"\",\"data\":{\"path\":\"/etc/shadow (1)\"}}\n\n{\"path\":\"/etc/definitely-not-here\"}\n→ {\"code\":0,\"msg\":\"\",\"data\":{\"path\":\"/etc/definitely-not-here\"}}\n```\n\nDirectories behave the same way:\n\n```\n{\"path\":\"/root\"}      → {\"path\":\"/root (1)\"}\n{\"path\":\"/rootnope\"}  → {\"path\":\"/rootnope\"}\n```\n\nAnd within the workspace, confirming whether a specific document file exists:\n\n```\n{\"path\":\"<workspace>/data/<boxID>/<docID>.sy\"}  → \"<...> (1).sy\"\n{\"path\":\"<workspace>/data/nope-no-such.sy\"}     → echoed unchanged\n```\n\n### Impact\n\nAn anonymous reader in publish mode, or any publish `RoleReader`, determines whether arbitrary paths exist on the host. Because directories respond the same way as files, the filesystem can be walked rather than only guessed at. This supports identifying the operating-system user's home directory, detecting installed software, backup and synchronisation directories, mapping the workspace layout, and confirming the existence of specific documents by probing their storage paths.\n\nIt also composes with the absolute workspace path returned elsewhere, which supplies a concrete prefix rather than requiring guesswork, and it recovers the operating-system username that the browser-request path strip added under issue #17410 was introduced to conceal.\n\nScoped precisely: nothing is read and nothing is written. This is an existence and layout disclosure, valuable primarily as a reconnaissance step.\n\n### Suggested fix\n\nConfine the path as the adjacent `getFile` route does, by routing `filePath` through `util.GetAbsPathInWorkspace` and returning 403 on escape, or add `CheckAdminRole` and `CheckReadonly` to match `readDir`. The frontend uses this endpoint only for naming uploads and assets inside the workspace, so neither change affects legitimate use.",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "Go",
      "name" : "github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "0.0.0-20260812083335-251596fc0de2"
      } ]
    } ]
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/security/advisories/GHSA-hf8h-97gm-4x2p"
  }, {
    "type" : "ADVISORY",
    "url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-73605"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/siyuan-before-path-traversal-via-getuniquefilename"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-862" ],
    "severity" : "MODERATE",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-10-01T15:46:01Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : null
  }
}